后苏联地区的制度竞争

在转型和发展经济体中,制度竞争经常被作为建立和保障市场的工具而加以讨论.后苏联地区(post-Soviet space)为这一问题的研究提供了一个有益的案例:国际投资流入不断增加,同时缺少政策协调,造成一种各管辖主体之间制度竞争日趋激烈的局面.不过,在后苏联地区,制度的质量看起来还不高.本论文主要分析后苏联地区内各管辖主体就制度质量所展开的竞争的潜在影响,并从两个层面进行分析:理性选择因素(经济不平等和学习效应)以及正式与非正式制度间的相互作用(对自由市场的理解,对公共权威的信任,深层次制度与浅层次制度间的相互影响).     

Beyond the Deficit Model: Social Welfare in Post-Soviet Georgia

Two researchers examine several crucial features of the transformation of Soviet welfare provision in post-Soviet Georgia. Institutional analysis and household surveys in two industrial cities in Georgia are used to identify determinants of distribution and access to three sectors of social welfare: water, heat, and education. The data are used to develop a multidimensional conceptional framework for change.     

后苏联空间国家的政治-法律设计--从后苏联空间政权合法化到国家规划探索

苏联解体后,在后苏联空间国家突然拥有国家主权的条件下,新政治精英需要建立一个新的政治-法律空间。对这些国家而言,设计与现实相适应的政治-法律制度、建立稳定的国家体制、制定和实施有效的国家政策的过程过于拖延,前景令人质疑,而且即将面临政治代际更替的全新挑战。后苏联空间非常复杂,但也因此是研究和政治设计的重要地区。20多年的实践表明,不应期待后苏联空间的快速转型。大多数后苏联空间国家未完成国家建设和制度建设,这使形势复杂化,可能导致巨大的变数,包括冲突和诉诸武力。但是,外部环境仍逼迫变革。对于后苏联空间国家而言,变革具有政治理性化和政治制度形式化的目的,包括以法律形式固定政治制度和强制政治设计者更多地在正式法律范围内行事,而达到上述目的的选择包括革命性变革或自上而下的革命。     

全球与地区制度竞争中的后苏联国家:以哈萨克斯坦为例

本文从哈萨克斯坦的实例出发,考察单个国家利用制度竞争吸引外国投资产生的一系列决策的差异性问题.它主要聚焦于政治偏见和政治生存效果两者之间的矛盾,这恰恰是正规经济制度发展和实施的推动力.哈萨克斯坦的例子展现了这二者相对重要性的转变对国家在争取外国直接投资(FDI)所产生的显著影响.此外,本文还着眼于经济全球化背景下各个层面在制度竞争中的相对重要性.     

Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia: Leadership,Organizational Diversity,and Innovation

A political scientist investigates the weakness of civil society in post-Soviet Russia, asking how these limitations manifest themselves in practice and how they influence the ability of social activists to reach out to the public, form coalitions, and advocate for new government policies. In an examination of environmental organizations from the mid-1990s to the present based on interviews with activists, materials produced by the organizations, and social scientists' analyses, three distinct patterns of organizational development are identified. The mechanisms linking political, economic, and cultural characteristics to patterns of organizational development within civil society are analyzed in this case study.     

Japan and China: Security interests in the post-Cold War era

This article examines the role of Japan in relation to China’s security interests in the post-Cold War era. The first section assesses Japan as a potential security threat to China at a time when Japan appears to be re-emerging as a great power. It analyzes the possible rise of nationalism in Japan today, including discussion of China’s dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. The second section looks at how Japan can actually enhance China’s security interests, particularly in the economic sphere. Japan’s contribution to China’s modernization drive is assessed. It is argued that Japan seems to enhance China’s security interests more than it poses a threat, partly because of the economic benefits China derives from trading with Japan, and partly because Japanese foreign policy has hitherto been kept in check by the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

Endeavours to export a migration crisis: Policy making and Europeanisation in the German migration dilemma

This article examines the potential for ‘Europeanising’ the policy process within Germany ‐ examining the constraints and facilitators that have played a defining role in ‘Europeanising’ asylum and immigration issues. It demonstrates that despite the magnitude of the asylum crisis within Germany, blockages evident within the domestic policy process initially prevented a domestic policy solution. In response the federal government instituted a concerted attempt to resolve the issue outside the domestic arena, exporting the issue to the European decisional level. The processes that governed policy making on the European level within this policy sector proved incapable, however, of adequately addressing the issue. Thus, although agreement on the need to harmonise asylum and immigration policies was forthcoming, consensus on the means to achieve and implement substantive policy harmonisation proved elusive. The ‘Europeanisation’ of asylum and immigration policies within Germany has therefore been inherently limited. In response the German government felt compelled to supplement measures agreed at the European level both with a renewed effort within the domestic arena to resolve the constitutional deadlock and through bilateral agreements with their eastern neighbours.     

Party competition in the Middle East: spatial competition in the post-Arab Spring era

This paper charts the nature of political cleavage between major parties in post-Arab Spring elections in five Mediterranean region countries, with data from online opt-in surveys. We compare the Moroccan elections, held under a consolidated authoritarian regime, with the transitional cases of Tunisia and Egypt as well as the more mature democracies of Turkey and Israel. Voter opinions are obtained on 30 salient issues, and parties and voters are aligned along two dimensions. We trace country-specific cleavage patterns and reflections of party system maturity in these five countries. The cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco reveal that in less settled cleavage structures there is little congruence between vote propensities for parties and agreement levels with policy positions compared to the more institutionalized democracies of Israel and Turkey where voters exhibit a higher likelihood to vote for a party as the distance between the voter and the party in the policy space gets smaller.     

Russia in the Asia–Pacific: The beginning of a new era?

This article discusses significant changes in Russia and the surrounding world during the last several years. The author argues that these changes created major preconditions for the beginning of a new era in relations between Russia and Northeast Asian countries, which will boost a breakthrough in the field of energy cooperation and might add a “second wing” to the idea of regionalism in Northeast Asia.     

Writing history: flow and blockage in the circulation of knowledge

ABSTRACT

Historical writing in Tanzania has had highly serious goals from the early days of the history department at the University of Dar es Salaam. Historians have aimed at the decolonization of intellectual life, the construction of a national historical identity, and the achievement of a just society. This body of well-contextualized historical writing has circulated widely within the country, but does not reach readers outside east Africa as fully as it deserves. The article explores parallels with African genomic science as a way of getting at inequalities between northern and southern countries in access to resources for academic research and publication.