Deciding on the Electoral System: Chile's Adoption of Proportional Representation in 1925

In 1925 a new electoral system was introduced in Chile. This reform changed the electoral formula from a cumulative voting system to a proportional one (d'Hondt) and established new rules about district magnitude and form of voting. It has been argued that this reform was motivated by the emergence of new parties or the expansion of the electorate. This article offers an alternative explanation: in the case of Chile, the main reason for the electoral reform was the parties' need to solve problems of strategic coordination stemming from the characteristics of the Chilean cumulative voting system. In this context, the Chilean case shows that there are many routes to proportionality.     

Explaining Electoral Volatility in Latin America: Evidence at the Party Level

Many existing explanations of electoral volatility have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level. This study reexamines theories of electoral volatility through the use of multilevel models on party‐level data in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2012. Testing hypotheses at different levels, it finds that irregular institutional alteration increases electoral volatility for all the parties in a country, but the effect is more significant for the presidential party. At the party level, the results show that while a party that is more ideologically distinctive than other parties tends to experience lower electoral volatility, party age is not a statistically significant factor for explaining party volatility.     

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Latin America

Do conditional cash transfer programs reduce voters' incentives to hold their government accountable for its performance? Studies show that these programs generate considerable electoral returns for the governments responsible for them. One important and unexplored question is whether these popular programs have also changed the landscape of accountability in Latin America. Survey data from 16 Latin American countries that have adopted CCT programs do not offer support for the claim that such programs have a detrimental effect on electoral accountability for corruption and for the economy. Only in countries where CCT programs do not follow strict rules do beneficiaries attribute relatively less weight to the government's economic performance, but this effect is marginal. These findings fill an important gap in the literature and offer reassuring evidence that cash transfers can alleviate poverty while preserving voters' incentives to exercise electoral accountability in crucial areas of government performance.     

The Uneven Performance of Third Wave Democracies: Electoral Politics and the Imperfect Rule of Law in Latin America

This article investigates the performance of the new democracies of the third wave by developing a conceptual model of the core elements of liberal democratic government and by constructing a new Database of Liberal Democratic Performance. The performance is shown to be uneven in two main ways. First, the institutional attributes of democratic government advance while individual and minority rights languish. Second, particular institutional attributes coexist uncomfortably, as do particular rights. A comparison of Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala complements the big picture drawn from the database and focuses on the specific contextual conditions that can create the general political contours of the wave. The uneven democratic performance of these cases is mainly explained by the combination of persistent oligarchic power and a largely unaccountable military. Yet uneven performance, and the imperfect rule of law in particular, does not necessarily prevent democratic survival.     

Representation By Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy in Latin America

Most of the countries of South America experienced two notable institutional phenomena during the 1990s: the reform or rewriting of constitutions and the emergence of direct democracy mechanisms. This paper examines the latter process through a cross-national comparison. The introduction of direct democracy mechanisms is typically driven by traditionally excluded political interests. It takes two forms, both involving the failure of representative democratic institutions. In most cases, these traditionally excluded interests win control over the constitutional reform and rewriting process, although this is not a necessary condition for the emergence of direct democracy. Drawing illustrations from 12 cases of constitutional reform, this paper links arguments about direct democracy in the United States and Western Europe, institutional change, neopopulism, and the decline of the party system in Latin America.     

Correlates of Levels of Democracy in Latin America During the 1990s

Does the conventional wisdom about the relationships between economic, cultural, and political party variables and democracy stand up in the Latin American experience of the 1990s? This study, utilizing new data sets for the region, finds that some traditional hypotheses are upheld better than others. It sustains the conventional wisdom that economic development, economic growth, democratic values, and (with a two‐year lead) education correlate positively with the level of democracy. Surprisingly, however, neither social trust nor the number of political parties is significantly correlated with the level of democracy. The study suggests various possible explanations for the weak or nonexistent relationships for social trust and number of parties, in the hope that these surprising results will stimulate further research.     

Can Civil Society Organizations Solve the Crisis of Partisan Representation in Latin America?

This article takes up the question of whether civil society organizations (CSOs) can and do act as mechanisms of representation in times of party crisis. It looks at recent representation practices in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, three countries where political parties have experienced sharp crises after several decades of mixed reviews for their party systems. At such moments, any replacement of parties by CSOs should be especially apparent. This study concludes that the degree of crisis determines the extent that CSOs' representative functions replace partisan representation, at least in the short term. Where systems show signs of re‐equilibration, CSOs offer alternative mechanisms through which citizens can influence political outcomes without seeking to replace parties. Where crisis is profound, CSOs claim some of the basic party functions but do not necessarily solve the problems of partisan representation.     

Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America

Over time, the Organization of American States has become institutionally and normatively more capable of defending democracy in the region. Yet the OAS is as selective in its interventions on behalf of democratic promotion today as it was in the early 1990s. To explain this puzzle, this study disaggregates democratic dilemmas according to issue areas, threats, and contingencies. It finds that the OAS responds more forcefully when the problem presents a clear and present danger both to the offending state and to other members. As threats become weaker or more ambiguous, the OAS tends to act more timidly, unless domestic constituencies cry out for its assistance or the United States puts its full weight behind the effort. Case study capsules provide empirical evidence to illustrate these arguments.     

"We Have A Consensus": Explaining Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin America

By the 1990s, to the astonishment of many ob0servers, most Latin American countries had reformed their systems of national economic governance along market lines. Many analysts of this shift have assumed that it circumvented normal political processes, presuming that such reforms could not be popular. Explanations emphasizing economic crisis, external assistance, and politically insulated executives illustrate this approach. Through a qualitative investigation of the reform process in the region's four most industrialized countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, this study argues, to the contrary, that reforming governments found or created both elite and mass political support for their policies.     

Latin America and the Dollar Bloc in the Twenty‐first Century: To Dollarize or Not?

The choice of exchange rate regime is a continuing challenge to Latin American policymakers, who currently face pressure to dollarize their economies. The constraints imposed by the "dollar bloc," the informal but powerful currency bloc that ties Latin America to the dominant currency, are central to that choice. Current weak economic performance has called the bloc's norms and principles into question and has made the exchange rate an open issue. Ecuador's full official dollarization is one possible strategy for countries with political stability but poor economic performance to gain access to needed dollar resources. Most of Latin America, however, will continue with variants of managed floating exchange rates, and the periodic foreign exchange crises will provide access to official dollar resources and facilitate renegotiation of the terms of outstanding debt.     

Military Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America

Despite the recent shift to democratic regimes and market‐based economies, in many Latin American countries the military retains important economic roles as owner, manager, and stakeholder in economic enterprises. Such military entrepreneurship poses a challenge to the development of democratic civil‐military relations and, by extension, to the development of liberal democracy in the region. While scholars have noted this situation with concern, they have given little attention to distinguishing the different types of military entrepreneurship, which reflect distinct historical patterns and implications. This article identifies two major types of military entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers, determined to build national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige; and nation builders, seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion. Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador demonstrate important differences between these two types in their origins, paths, and political consequences.     

When Valence Crushes: Explaining the Electoral Failure of the German FDP in the 2013 Election

This paper examines why the German Free Democratic Party (FDP) failed to gain electoral success in 2013 despite being well positioned in terms of left–right ideology. Indeed, its vote share dropped from its highest ever point in 2009 (14.6 per cent of the national vote) to its lowest ever in 2013 (4.8 per cent of the vote). The paper shows that the FDP’s valence dropped dramatically between 2009 and 2013. In addition, voting simulations show that the FDP was positioned close to its vote-maximising positions on policy and ideology. However, given the FDP’s extremely low valence it could not have taken any set of policy positions that would have significantly increased its vote share.     

拉美和东亚的汇率制度比较

1994年的墨西哥金融危机和1997年的东亚金融危机充分说明,汇率的重要性越来越明显.本文总结了90年代以前拉美和东亚主要国家汇率制度演化的特点,简要分析了90年代一些东亚国家在汇率管理方面的失误,并探讨了可供发展中国家选择的浮动汇率制、固定汇率制和盯住汇率制的利弊.此外,本文还论述了一些拉美和东亚国家实施货币局汇率制度和美元化的可行性.