The ‘Reasonable Man’, his Nineteenth‐century ‘Siblings’, and their Legacy

The reasonable man is the best known, but not the only, legal construct to be born into the nineteenth‐century common law. This article introduces the man's siblings – including those from the areas of trust law, criminal law, contract law, and intellectual property law (both patents and trademarks). The fact that some of these ‘men’ changed the law is not controversial; this research further highlights that while several of these came to life in that century, only some had a significant role into the twentieth century. Those that did are tied to the foundations of our society through their role in facilitating innovation and consumer protection. The argument is that it was the constructs’ nature and their capacity to accommodate public policy issues that enabled the vitality of the ‘reasonable person ‘ (negligence) and the ‘person skilled in the art’ (patents).     

El Instituto Del <<Trust>> en Los Sistemas Legales Continentales y Su Compatibilidad Con Los Principios De <<Civil Law>>: The Global Law Collection, Legal Studies Series * Sonia Marten Santisteban Thomson

Interest in trusts in civil law countries continues. In theforefront of this development of how the Anglo-Saxon conceptcan be absorbed into civil law systems are Spanish and Italianlawyers. The most recent study on the introduction of trustsin Continental legal systems and its compatibility with theprinciples of civil law comes from Sonia Martén Santisteban,Profesora titular interina de Derecho Civil     

Legal ‘Elasticity’ and ‘Sidestepping’ in European Crisis Management of Financial Markets

This paper explores the roles played by law in crisis management of financial markets and some possible consequences. Three questions are raised ‐‐about the ‘elastic’ use of law, about ‘sidestepping’ existing legal order by invention of new structures and about redistributive consequences. These questions are appraised empirically in relation to three areas of financial market law: public support given to banking from 2008 onwards; English case law concerning derivatives contracts when confronted with Lehman‐style insolvencies; and the European Stability Mechanism, which during summer 2015 was being primed in relation to Greece. On the first two case studies, law, having been mightily stretched, did not break. Likewise, legal sidestepping, as epitomised by the European Stability Mechanism, may result in a less coherent legal structure; however such incoherence may be not be fatal to the ensemble. On all three fronts, redistributive questions remain controversial, but controversy in itself does not undermine legal structures. A particular form of theory, the Legal Theory of Finance, is discussed in light of the case studies. Such theory may have an unfulfilled longing to discern law‐like regularities (ironically chasing economics).     

On Two Distinct and Opposing Versions of Natural Law: “Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”

Abstract. This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural‐law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural‐law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural‐law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies moral rules and specifies their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude. *

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Retrieving the ‘subject’ of European integration

In this article, a critical reinterpretation of citizens as subjects of European integration moves the focus of EU law from EU citizens' subjection to their subjectification. This analysis draws on post‐structural social theory in arguing that the law is instrumental to securing the material conditions for transnational political subjectification because it regulates both EU citizens' access to transnational social relations and the perception of difference between them. However, the law also reinforces constraints on the process of transnational subjectification. Systematic obstacles, which must be taken into account, are not limited to economic status, but include other variables like gender or age. It will be argued on this basis that EU law needs to develop a more coherent politics of subjectivity. Towards this goal, the law must carefully attend to what is (and is not) depoliticising in EU citizenship rights.     

Law‐Linked Justice and Existence‐Linked Justice

Abstract. Justice as a manifestation of “the just” is an evasive concept. On the one hand there is the law, an operation run by professionals. On the other hand there are the citizens the law is meant for. Generally speaking the law strives for justice. But the law has to protect many different interests and must work through legal devices. Therefore the justice that emerges from it is necessarily a legal compromise. For the citizens the legal rules are a given reality. Generally they will agree that the law is there to achieve justice but legal arguments that justify a rule or decision cannot have the same value for them. In cases that affect them personally, justice will be a personal, existential experience, which may be incompatible with legal justice. It is hard to keep these two forms of justice under one roof. In order to make this easier this paper proposes a conceptual split between “law‐linked justice” and “existence‐linked justice.” It is argued that the law cannot in truth to its rational origin ignore the citizens’ experience of justice, out of the ordinary as they may be.     

“Critical Legal Histories Revisited”: A Response

The author responds to comments reappraising “Critical Legal Histories” (CLH) (1984). CLH critiqued “evolutionary functionalism,” the idea that law is a functional response to a typical modernizing process. CLH argued that “society” was partly constituted of legal elements and that law was too indeterminate to have reliably regular functional effects. CLH has been misinterpreted as calling for a return to internal histories of “mandarin” doctrine: all it said was that some doctrinal histories were valuable, without privileging them. This response clarifies that the relations of law to society and social change, and of high‐level official law to everyday local law are distinct issues. CLH is mostly moot today, since social‐legal historians have incorporated its insight that legal concepts are embedded in everyday social practice. But other fields have revived deterministic Whiggish accounts of progressive development and of law functional to it—to which CLH's critique still seems relevant.     

Reconfiguring the Politics–Law Relationship in the Integration Project through Conflicts–Law Constitutionalism

This paper argues that the relationship between law and politics must be reconfigured within the European Union. Dissecting recent crises in economic, social and political organisation within Europe with reference to the three ‘fictitious’ commodities of Karl Polanyi, we find that law in Europe has contributed to de‐legalisation, de‐socialisation and disenfranchisement. Moving on to review the potential for law to respond to crisis through new paradigms of conflict resolution as suggested by Ralf Dahrendorf, we find that the steering capacity of law is nevertheless limited if it fails to establish a sustaining relationship with politics. Our conclusions are modest: conflict–law constitutionalism cannot solve Europe's many crises. However, it does represent a new paradigm of law within which relations between European law and European politics might be re‐established—a vital step to overcoming crisis.     

A dilemma for feudal China: To launch a copyright scheme in the late 19<Superscript>th</Superscript> century

Based on copyright law and its jurisprudential basis in the late 19^th century of China, this article is focused on the external conditions affecting or restricting the formation and development of copyright law during this period, and also reviews the tortuous process of copyright law and theories in China, and explores the underlying influences of Chinese traditional culture and other elements. Furthermore, it analyses the significant influences of western copyright concepts on the practical development of Chinese copyright protection system. Last but not least, it argues the fundamental barriers to the development of copyright law in China resulting from the persistent gap between the notions that forced upon the legal system and those embodied in social axiology, and the conflicts and tensions induced have affected both the law making and enforcement in copyright.     

Reflections on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Prince</Emphasis>, Public Welfare Offenses, <Emphasis Type="Italic">American Cyanamid</Emphasis>, and the Wisdom of the Common Law

The fundamental requirement of Anglo-American criminal law is that crime must consist of the concurrence of a guilty mind—a mens rea—with a guilty act—an actus reus. And yet, the criminal law is shot through with discordant lumps of strict liability—crimes for which no mens rea is required. Ignoring the conventional normative objections to this aberration, I distinguish two different types of strict criminal liability: the type that arose at common law and the type associated with the public welfare offenses that are the product of twentieth and twenty-first century legislation. Using famous cases as exemplars, I analyze the two types of strict liability, and then examine the purposes served and incentives created by subjecting individuals to strict liability. I conclude that common law strict liability is rational in that it advances the purposes of the criminal law, while the public welfare offenses are at best pointless and at worst counterproductive. I suggest that in this respect the common law contains more wisdom than the results of the legislative process.     

‘Consumer’ versus ‘Customer’: The Devil in the Detail

According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ‘consumer welfare’. In EU competition law, however, ‘consumer’ means ‘customer’ and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ‘customers’ is generally presumed to harm ‘consumers’ and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non‐linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ‘customer welfare’ does not coincide with the effect on ‘consumer welfare’ and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ‘consumers’, the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ‘consumer’ in ‘consumer welfare’; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves.     

Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law

Abstract: This article discusses the main interactions between bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and EU law. The European Commission identified a number of incompatibilities in BITs signed by eight recent Member States with the USA, proposing solutions for their adjustment in conformity with EU law, but was this step sufficient? The risk of disputes remains, as long as the proposed adjustments do not achieve legal force and as long as other BITs still need to be harmonised with EU law. Moreover, provisions in BITs that are not in conflict with EU law could still be challenged if the application of certain EU requirements by Member States interferes with foreign investors' rights. To avoid such risks, coherence between different commitments and practices of the Member States is needed and coordination at the EU level is highly desirable.     

“Legality with a Vengeance”: Reclaiming Distribution for Sociolegal Studies

The law and society community has argued for decades for an expansive understanding of what counts as “law.” But a content analysis of articles published in the Law & Society Review from its 1966 founding to the present finds that since the 1970s, the law and society community has focused its attention on laws in which the state regulates behavior, and largely ignored laws in which the state distributes resources, goods, and services. Why did socio‐legal scholars avoid studying how laws determine access to such things as health, wealth, housing, education, and food? We find that socio‐legal scholarship has always used “law on the books” as a starting point for analyses (often to identify departures in “law in action”) without ever offering a programmatic vision for how law might ameliorate economic inequality. As a result, when social welfare laws on the books began disappearing, socio‐legal scholarship drifted away from studying law's role in creating, sustaining, and reinforcing economic inequality. We argue that socio‐legal scholarship offers a wide range of analytical tools that could make important contributions to our understanding of social welfare provision.     

Legal Culture and State Building: Liberal Constitutionalism and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Droit Administratif</Emphasis> in early Twentieth Century Argentina

This paper deals with the ways in which jurists and law professors applied transnational systems of public law, in particular US constitutionalism and French droit administratif, in their approaches to the state building process in late nineteenth century Argentina. In covering these movements of adaptation of a nascent legal culture to changing ideological and political circumstances, this article attempts to illuminate the strong links between the process of institutionalization of certain academic disciplines or forms of social knowledge, and modern state building in Latin America.     

The Common Law Clean Up of the ‘Workshop of the World’: More Realism About Nuisance Law's Historic Environmental Achievements

This article examines the environmental benefits arising from compliance with common law nuisance injunctions during the British industrial revolution. It argues, based on the outcomes of industrial nuisance actions involving allegations of serious air and river pollution, that many millions of pounds were invested by corporate polluters in designing and implementing clean technologies within the framework of the common law. Nuisance law was not an unqualified success in the field of environmental protection at this time, but overall the findings contribute to the on‐going critique of the nuisance law histories of Brenner and McLaren, which argue that various limitations of the common law are at the root of modern environmental problems. The discovery of historic practical measures of environmental protection through common law enforcement raises important conceptual, policy, and legal questions for today, and disciplinary questions regarding the rigour of realist legal scholarship concerning the historic performance of the law.     

Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?

Abstract This article analyses the history of EU company law and locates a stable ‘non‐competitive equilibrium’. This equilibrium follows from Member States that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, Member States were determined to prevent the ‘Delaware effect’. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda‐setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking in Europe.     

‘Citizens’ and ‘Foreigners’ in EU Law. Migration Law and its Cosmopolitan Outlook

Migration has become a controversial subject across Europe and beyond. At the same time, the EU has built up an impressive set of rules for third‐country nationals over the past two decades, which—unlike the mobility of EU citizens—received comparatively little attention apart from immigration and asylum specialists. This contribution presents the constitutional framework for ‘migration law’ towards third‐country nationals and shows in how far they depart from the paradigm of intra‐European mobility. It will be argued that differences can be rationalised by divergent objectives and do, nonetheless, not present a move towards ‘fortress Europe’. EU migration law maintains the distinction between citizens and foreigners at the same time as it protects migrants, including refugees. By accommodating migrants' rights and self‐government, EU migration law can be construed as an endeavour to replace traditional notions of alienage with constitutional rules with a cosmopolitan outlook.     

“The ladder of the law has no top and no bottom”: How therapeutic jurisprudence can give life to international human rights

In the past two decades, therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) has become one of the most important theoretical approaches to the law. But, there has, as of yet, been puzzlingly little written about the relationship between TJ and international human rights law. To be sure, there has been some preliminary and exploratory work on the relationship between TJ and international law in general, but virtually nothing on its relationship to international human rights law in a mental disability law context. This paper seeks to focus on this lack of consideration, to speculate as to why that might be, and to offer some suggestions as to how to infuse some new vitality and vigor into this important area of law and social policy.     

Law and Family Formation Among LGBQ‐Parent Families

This article addresses how the law affects family formation among families with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer (LGBQ) parents in the United States. Our discussion draws on a socio‐legal approach to law that focuses not only on the law on the books (what we refer to as “legal barriers”) but also on issues like how the law is practiced, how people experience the law in everyday life, and how the law serves as an interpretive framework through which people understand themselves and their families (what we refer to as “social barriers”). In our review, we highlight how attorneys can play a role in valuing and advancing rights for LGBQ‐parent families and LGBTQ prospective parents.     

Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law

This article is based on the assumption that there is a continuum running from non‐legal positions to legally binding and judicially controlled commitments with, in between these two opposite types of norms, commitments that can be described as soft law. It aims at defining soft law in international relations in order to provide a mapping of EU law on the basis of the soft law/hard law divide. It helps categorise EU competences and public policies, and sees how they fit with the distinction between two kinds of processes: legalisation (transformation of non‐legal norms into soft or hard law) and delegalisation (transformation of hard law norms into soft law and evolution from hard to soft law).