Towards Intersectionality in the European Court of Human Rights: The Case of B.S. v Spain

The term ‘intersectionality’ recognises the need for a ‘holistic approach’ in the determination of the right to be free from discrimination and violence. While the European Court of Human Rights has never expressly used the term, this article argues that the recent case of B.S. v Spain provides an example of a more robust use of Article 14 of the convention taking into account the real life experiences of those facing intersectional discrimination. The decision recognising the special vulnerability of a migrant, female sex worker is therefore both welcome and necessary.     

English Transgender Law Reform and the Spectre of Corbett

This article will provide a critique of tworecent English marriage law decisions, thefirst concerning a (female to male) transgenderman and the second a (male to female)intersexed woman. It will do so throughconsideration of the dialogue between each andthe landmark transgender case of Corbett v. Corbett. It will highlight howboth decisions, in seeking to minimise the factof `departure' from Corbett, serve toreproduce key elements of that decision whichserve to undermine the future prospects fortransgender law reform in the English context.In particular, both decisions, in differentways, or with different emphases, ensure that`legal sex' continues to be determined by(bio)logical and temporal factors. Crucially,however, as in Corbett, it is legalanxiety over the boundaries of the `natural',and the homophobia of law, that underscoresthis anxiety, that account for these particularconstructions of `legal sex'.     

Dancing on the head of a pin? Foetal life and the european convention

The case of Vo v. France represents the latest phase of the European Court of Human Rights’ thinking on the scope of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life) in relation to foetal life where a foetus had been lost owing to a medical accident. The Court by a majority decided that, “even assuming” Article 2 applied to the instant case (albeit to the life of the pregnant woman rather than that of the foetus), it had not been violated. While the facts in Vo were extreme and exceptional, the Court will shortly hear the case of D v. Ireland concerning access to abortion for foetal anomaly, an application made under Articles 3, 8, 10 and 14 of the European Convention. If the case of D were declared admissible, the Court would then have to consider whether a denial of access to abortion for foetal anomaly constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3, or an interference with a pregnant woman’s right to respect for private life under Article 8 (and if so, how the doctrine of the margin of appreciation applies). The Grand Chamber precedent of Vo displays ambivalence about whether Article 2 should apply to foetal life, and its resort to the “even assuming” formula spared Member States the difficulty of having to justify their various abortion regimes, by reference to this Article. It remains to be seen whether in a case like D that is directly concerned with abortion, the Court will take a more definite stance on the correct balance to be struck between the State’s interest in protecting foetal life and the Convention rights of pregnant women. Vo v. France [G.C.], judgment of 8th -July 2004, no. 53924/00; D v. Ireland [4th section], no. 26499/02, oral hearing on admissibility and merits, 6 September 2005     

Feminist Activism,Third Party Interventions and the Courts

This article discusses feminist engagement in the judicial process in the light of the changing constitutional landscape in the U.K. It considers feminist activism in the courts and the potential that third party interventions provide for feminists to influence judicial decision making under the Human Rights Act 1998. The impact of the intervention by women’s groups in the case of R. v. A. (No. 2) is discussed. Despite the disappointing decision, it is argued that the intervention was a worthwhile endeavour. Third party interventions are important if feminists are to hold on to the gains they have made through the legislative process. Interventions also offer an opportunity to build a litigation strategy that will help shape the development of the case law under the Human Rights Act 1998.     

Not `Social Justice': The Housing Association, the Judges, the Tenant and his Lover Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association [1997] 4 All E.R. 991; [1998] 1 F.L.R. 6 (C.A.); [1999] 4 All E.R. 705 (H.L.)

This note analyses the decision of the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick, which held that gay partners could fall within the legal definition of ‘family’ for some purposes. The note argues that despite the real (if overstated) benefits that this case bestows on gay partners in the form of legal rights, under analysis, the decision self-deconstructs to reveal that it is grounded on the principle of discrimination on the basis of sexuality. However, it is also suggested that the encounter between discursive legal reasoning (underpinned by normative heterosexuality), and aversion of the family which is ‘other’ to this discourse, is one which leaves its mark on law, as the potential undermining or deconstruction of law’s normative assumptions. The note further argues that although this decision is properly seen as a moment in the struggle for gay rights, it also serves as a reminder that the fortunes of critical theories and political movements that seek to challenge the legal paradigm of the white, heterosexual male are inextricably linked. Fitzpatrick, whatever else it is, is also an object lesson in the debt that current campaigns for gay legal rights owe to feminist critiques of, and campaigns that have successfully challenged, the role of this norm in legal discourse. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Extending the Reach of Human Rights to Encompass Victims of Rape: M.C. V. Bulgaria

This note analyses a recent case of the European Court of Justice in which the applicant, a 14-year old rape victim, alleged that Bulgarian criminal law violated her rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights in pursuing a practice of only prosecuting rape where there was evidence of the use of physical force and active resistance. In upholding the applicant’s claims, the Court re-affirmed the positive obligation on states to adopt measures to ensure that fundamental rights under the Convention were secured. In particular, in the case of rape, this required the enactment and application of criminal laws effectively prescribing all acts of non-consensual sex and not just those involving physical violence. In this way the Court affirmed not only that rape was, in essence, a violation of personal sexual autonomy but also that legal systems which failed adequately to protect against all forms of rape risked operating in breach of Convention obligations.Application no. 39272/98, 4 December 2003.     

Embodying the Law:Coker and Osamor v. The Lord Chancellorand the Lord Chancellor's Department [2002]I.R.L.R. 80 (Court of Appeal)

In Britiain, it is unlawful,regardless of the motive of the discriminator,to refuse to give a woman a job because of hersex. On the other hand, the U.K. case ofCoker and Osamor v. The Lord Chancellor and theLord Chancellor's Department suggests that itis permissible, by `pre-selecting' anindividual man, to rule out any possible femalecandidates. The singular facts of this caseshould not disguise the troubling conclusionthat while sex (and race) discrimination maysometimes be blatant and deliberate, morefrequently it is subtle and routine. Furthermore, discrimination is much moredifficult to challenge, let alone eradicate,when it is embedded in the system. This notestarts from the premise that, while sexequality requires more than the appointment ofwomen to influential posts, that is, at least,a start and if it is decided in advance thatappointments will be made only from a smallcircle of `acceptable' people there is a realdanger that the idea of the `establishment' asa self-perpetuating (white) male enclave willbe confirmed.     

A Local Authority v JB [2020] EWCA Civ 735; [2019] EWCOP 39

In Re JB, a local authority, concerned with the risk the respondent posed to vulnerable women, successfully appealed against an order made in the Court of Protection that declared JB, an autistic man with impaired cognition, possessed capacity to consent to sexual relations. In this recent decision, the Court of Appeal has arguably reset the last 15 years of jurisprudence concerning P’s capacity to make decisions in regard to sexual relations. Previous case law focused on P’s ability to consent to such relations, and whether P understood the information relevant to that decision. Notwithstanding the abundance of legal authority, including the recent appellate judgments of Hayden J in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v NB and AU (consent to sex) [2019] EWCOP 27. and B v A Local Authority [2019] EWCA Civ 913. there was a lacuna in the existing law in relation to what information was relevant for the purposes of assessing the issue of capacity to consent to sexual relations. Judges have traditionally adopted a protectionist stance in understanding “the information relevant to the decision” under s3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), with an emphasis on whether P understood the risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. However, the Court of Appeal in Re JB has broadened its interpretation of ‘relevant’ information to also include the ability to understand the importance of a partner’s consent to such relations. This is a welcome change to previous courts’ interpretations of the ‘nature’ of the sexual act, moving from an approach focused on the physical sexual mechanics to one which views the nature of sex as a mutually consensual engagement. However, a fundamental shift in how we view such cases is likely to have far-reaching consequences, particularly for local authorities and professionals seeking guidance in relation to their care planning.

     

Fairness and Justice for All? The House of Lords in White v. White [2000] 2 F.L.R. 981

In the recent U.K. decision of White v.White, the House of Lords clarified thelaw to be applied in applications under s. 25of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Itconfirmed that the overriding goal of the courtin such cases was to achieve fairness, but,crucially, it articulated a view of fairnesswhich took equality and non-discrimination asstarting points. On this view, the courtchallenged historically gendered assumptions offairness, contribution to the family welfare,and the value of different kinds of work. Whilethe decision has far-reaching potential toachieve a form of substantive equality forwomen in cases of divorce, there is a dangerthat it may be confined to those cases, andissues of family finances will continue toappear unrelated to broader state policies.     

Sir Mark Potter And The Protection Of The Traditional Family: Why Same Sex Marriage Is (Still) A Feminist Issue

In Wilkinson v. Kitzinger, the petitioner (Susan Wilkinson) sought a declaration of her marital status, following her marriage to Celia Kitzinger in British Columbia, Canada in August 2003. The High Court refused the application, finding that their valid Canadian marriage is, in United Kingdom law, a civil partnership. In this note, I focus on Sir Mark Potter’s adjudication of the human rights issues under Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (E.C.H.R.), highlighting his restatement of the ideology of the ‹traditional’ family as natural, normative and desirable. I argue that this case shows that the exclusion of same sex couples from marriage is a feminist issue, because denying same sex couples access to marriage works to sediment patriarchal ideas and re-inscribe gender roles within the family. Wilkinson v. Kitzinger [2006] E.W.H.C. (Fam.) 2022; [2006] H.R.L.R 36     

Sexual Abuse and Claims in Tort: Limitation Periods After <Emphasis Type="Italic">A v</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Hoare (and Other Appeals)</Emphasis> [2008] and <Emphasis Type="Italic">AB and Others v Nugent Care Society; GR v Wirral MBC</Emphasis> [2009]

The claimants brought civil suits against child care institutions and authorities for the sexual abuse to which they were subject whilst under the defendants’ responsibility. These cases were not initiated until the claimants were well into adulthood and began recognising the harms they had suffered, and as a result, their claims were time-barred at first instance. However, after A v Hoare (and Other Appeals), in which the House of Lords significantly altered the laws on limitation, their cases were reheard and allowed to proceed. In this respect, AB and Others v Nugent Care Society; GR v Wirral MBC demonstrates the benefits of the ruling in Hoare; but at the same time, this note argues that the Court of Appeal utilises a problematic conceptualisation of the harm of sexual abuse and the case highlights the potential for inconsistency and uncertainty in such delayed claims following the decision in Hoare—which is not the panacea it initially appears to be.     

Surety Wives in the House of Lords: Time forSolicitors to `Get Real'?Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 4 All E.R. 449

This note considers the recent House of Lordsdecision in Royal Bank of Scotland plc. v.Etridge (No. 2). It concerns the familiarscenario of a wife jointly mortgaging (orproviding a guarantee for a mortgage of) thefamily home in order to secure financialsupport for a business run by her husband. Ina landmark judgement, Lord Nicholls set out newand specific procedures to be followed bylenders and solicitors who are providingindependent advice, in order to counter anyargument by the wife that the charge should beset aside because her signature on the lender'scharge has been obtained by the undue influenceof her husband. This note considers the impactof the decision upon the parties involved insuch transactions. Special consideration isgiven to the surety wife and her chances ofdefending possession proceedings brought bylenders in the post Etridge era.     

Poetic Justice

This note examines the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence (2009). The court held that byelaws prohibiting camping on Ministry of Defence land adjacent to the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, Berkshire violated the human rights of women peace protestors under Articles 10 and 11 European Convention on Human Rights. The note argues that this decision calls into question arguments recently made, that the association of women with peace should be abandoned. It also reveals the potential of law to facilitate the performative and transformative production of subject positions, as ‘woman’, which do not depend on or connect with debilitating patriarchal constructions of women as weak or vulnerable.     

Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Model

In Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] U.K.H.L. 30, the U.K. House of Lords upheld the right of a man to succeed to the tenancy of his deceased same-sex partner as if he had been the husband or wife of the deceased. This note examines the five judgements delivered by the court and considers the implications of the decision. It argues that, within the context of family law, Mendoza was a welcome decision but an evolutionary dead-end. The case signals a more promising approach to the development of human rights, but the appropriate use and scope of s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 remain somewhat unclear.     

A Break Away from the (Hetero)norm?: Lawrence v Gallagher [2012] 1 FCR 557; [2012] EWCA Civ 394

In Lawrence v Gallagher, the issue as to what constitutes an equitable division of assets in the event of civil partnership dissolution arose for the first time. It had been hoped that the case would mark a break away from the heavy reliance upon heteronormativity that had been characteristic of the previous ancillary relief case law. However, it is argued here that what we see within the judgment is the Court of Appeal presenting the problem (and, so, the parties) in Lawrence so as to ‘fit’ within the pre-existing framework. Even at this early stage, it seems that legal actors are approaching civil partnerships on the basis of gendered assumptions and expectations. There is a need to raise awareness of this inability to get past ideas about heteronormativity, and to highlight their possible incompatibility with the lives of lesbian and gay couples, before their radical potential is lost.     

The Benefit Cap and the Complexity of Discrimination: <Emphasis Type="Italic">R</Emphasis> (<Emphasis Type="Italic">SG and others</Emphasis>) <Emphasis Type="Italic">v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions</Emphasis>

In R [on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)] v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the United Kingdom Supreme Court evaluated the legality of the benefit cap. The Court was sharply divided but decided by a narrow margin that the benefit cap did not amount to a violation of the claimants’ human rights. While the majority accepted that the gender discrimination was justified, the Court noted that the current measures fell short of the United Kingdom’s responsibilities under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This could prove of the outmost importance as the government elected in May 2015 has announced further reductions to the existing benefit cap. The case comment evaluates whether the Court paid enough attention to the multifaceted nature of poverty and discrimination, and argues that the impact the benefit cap has had specifically on women from black and ethnic minorities should have been considered.     

Harm,Consent and the Limits of Privacy

Within the context of U.K. law, the right to respect for private life, articulated in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and acknowledged more opaquely in domestic legislation and case law, is one whose scope is unclear. Nowhere is this brought into sharper relief than in cases where conduct which manifests a person’s sexual identity, or concerns her intimate relations with others, is prima facie criminal. In this essay I attempt, through a discussion of cases in which injury is caused in the context of relationships experienced inter-subjectively as private, to explore the contexts in which the law is prepared to legitimate that inter-subjective experience, and where it is not. Using cases in which injury has been caused purposively (in S/M sex), and incidentally (through the reckless transmission of HIV during sexual intercourse), the essay argues that the law is prepared to respect the right to respect for private life only in so far as the private life concerned is one which reinforces traditional gender roles and relationship types; in short, a life that one would be prepared to live publicly.     

The Bleak House of Surrogacy: Broidy v. St Helen's and Knowsley Health Authority

This note examines the British case of Broidy v. St Helen's andKnowsley Health Authority in which Margaret Broidy was unsuccessful in anegligence action against the defendant Health Authority following an emergency caesareanoperation in which a hysterectomy had been performed as `essential'. Of particularfeminist interest is the fact that Broidy's claim for, inter alia, the costs of asurrogacy arrangement to be carried out in California was refused on the basis that it wasnot reasonable – the chances of success of the surrogacy arrangement being deemed tooremote. Set within the context of an increasingly prolific number ofworld-wide surrogacy stories, the Broidy decision is analysed as providing a recentillustration of some of the difficult implications of the reproductive option which surrogacyhas now become.     

V.A.T., Taxation and Prostitution: Feminist Perspectives on Polok

Debates concerning the taxation of prostitution have occurred in taxation law and in feminist literature. This article will integrate the case of Polok v. C.E.C. [2002] E.W.H.C, 156; [2002] S.T.C. 361, within the feminist legal canon. The case is discussed in the context of the argument of the European doctrine of fiscal neutrality, which dictates that, regardless of legality as amongst member states, if an activity is levied to V.A.T. in one member state, V.A.T. should be levied on it in all member states. The doctrine of sovereignty accepts the possibility that the integrity of the V.A.T. system may be compromised by the levying of tax on illegal activities, in terms of the cooperation between tax and other aspects of the U.K.’s legal system. European law, feminist law, commodification and the marketplace are all considered within the context of these principles. The article also considers the place of Polok within standard feminist texts on prostitution. Different paradigms of prostitution define different aspects of prostitution as ‘problems’, and the article considers the implications within a feminist reconstruction of Polok of this. The article suggests that the challenge for a feminist analysis of Polok is to remain within the realm of European tax and competition law, and to render the perspective of the employees of the Polok taxpayers part of the substance of the deliberations of the case.     

“Gender is No Substitute for Sex”: A Comparative Human Rights Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity

U.K. regulation of sexual identity within a marriage context has traditionally been linked to biological sex. In response to the European Court of Human Rights decisions in Goodwin and I.,² and in order to address the question of whether a transsexual person can be treated as a “real” member of their adoptive sex, the U.K. has recently passed the Gender Recognition Act 2004. While the Act appears to signal a move away from biology and towards a conception of sexual identity based on gender rather than sex, questions of sexual identity remain rooted in medico-legal assessments of the individual transsexual body/mind. In contrast, because transsexual people in some parts of Canada have been able to marry in their post-operative sex since 1990, contemporary debates on the sexual identity of transsexual people in British Columbia and Ontario do not focus on the validity of marriage, and more frequently centre upon the provision of goods and services, in human rights contexts where sex is said to matter. Currently in Canada this is prompting questions of what it means to be a woman in society, how the law should interpret sex and gender, and how, if at all, the parameters of sexual identity should be established in law. This article seeks to compare recent U.K. legal conceptualisations of transsexuality with Canadian law in this area. As human rights discourse begins to grow in the U.K., the question remains as to whether or not gender will become an adequate substitute for sex.See Johnson “Gender is no substitute for Sex” Daily Telegraph, 24 February 2004. I am being disingenuous here as the author of the article is arguing that replacing the term sex with gender in relation to transsexuality is erroneous and an annoying Americanism, whereas I am arguing that neither term is adequate. Goodwin v. U.K. [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 18; I. v.U.K. [2002] 2 F.L.R. 518.