场所搜查范围的判断基准——以宪法隐私权为视角

公民住宅不受侵犯是宪法所赋予我国公民的基本权利。该权利要求在对场所进行刑事搜查时应当根据一定的基准将其分为住宅和其他场所,并适用不同的搜查程序以体现出对公民住宅权利的保护。西方所普遍接受的隐私权理论为住宅和其他场所的界分提供了良好的理论基础,这一点在我国刑事立法存在空白的情况下具有尤为重要的借鉴价值。我国的司法实践应当采用宪法隐私权学说作为区分住宅和其他场所的理论基础,并在此基础上采用对公众的开放性原则作为判断基准。     

我国刑事诉讼中的隐私权保护——以刑事被追诉人为视角

我国刑事诉讼中的隐私权以宪法隐私权为根基,属于公法权利的范畴,涉及公民人身隐私、空间隐私、信息隐私几方面的利益.不同刑事诉讼模式下隐私权保护呈现不同特点.刑事被追诉人的隐私权保护为刑事诉讼中隐私权保护的主体内容,具体包括讯问、搜查、扣押、人身检查、技术侦查等强制措施中的隐私权保护以及备存资讯保存、管理中的隐私权保护.刑事被追诉人的隐私权保护遵循法律保留原则、比例原则和合目的性解释原则,实质性审查、非法证据排除、国家赔偿构成隐私权保护的具体途径.处于信息时代和反恐政策下的刑事诉讼隐私权保护正面临新的挑战.     

刑事正当程序宪法化研究

被宪法确认和采纳后的正当程序原则,对刑事程序的正当化影响深远,形成了庞大的宪法刑事程序法体系,会对刑事程序中的公民权利保障发挥重要作用.我国刑事正当程序宪法化可采取以宪法修正案的形式明确"正当程序"原则,使刑事被追诉人程序权利宪法化,建立宪法权利救济机制,真正保障公民刑事正当程序权利.     

对我国刑事诉讼中隐私权保护的几点思考

隐私权入宪,确立隐私权的地位是根本 从当今国际的趋势来看,隐私权正在被逐步确立为一项独立的人格权,将隐私权作为一宪法权利加以保护不仅是有关国际公约的要求,也是很多国家的一致做法.而我国宪法并未确立隐私权的独立权利地位,只是在第38条、第39条、第40条原则性地规定了公民人格尊严不受侵犯;公民住宅不受非法侵犯;公民的通信自由和通信秘密受法律保护的内容.这只是规定了与隐私权有关的相当少的一部分内容,并没有明确规定隐私权,因此在宪法中明确规定隐私权显得相当必要.只有这样刑事诉讼法保护隐私权才能切实做到.     

美国高技术的发展将对公民自由权构成威胁

<正> 《世界经济科技》1990年第34期刊登吉恩·斯蒂芬斯的文章《高技术罪行战》,摘要如下: 21世纪将出现许多新技术和新程序,它们将使刑事司法制度变得更加有效。但从宪法权利的角度来看,这些“高技术”也将威胁到人们的许多权利和自由。现代技术和美国宪法正在发生冲突。 1.隐私权美国宪法第四条修正案规定,政府机构在搜     

我国隐私权的立法审视与完善

隐私权作为一种人格尊严权利,我国宪法与民法、刑法、行政法、诉讼法等法律都作出了保护性规定,并初步形成了以部门法尤其是民事保护为核心的权利保障体系.当下需要明确隐私权与名誉权、人格权之内在本质与差异,确立宪法上的隐私权以及保障机制,明确隐私权就是个人对私人领域内的各种隐私信息享有独享权与私生活不被非法或不正当侵扰的独处权的概念与基本内涵,从而才能有效地对隐私权予以保障与救济.     

论刑事司法权利的宪法保护

公民受刑事追究时享有一系列程序性权利 ,涉及人身自由和安全的保障 ,属于基本人权范畴。此类权利应当具有防范国家司法权力侵害的防御功能 ,因此仅仅通过刑事诉讼法予以确定和保护是不够的 ,还应当由宪法加以确定和保障。保障公民的刑事司法权利应当是尊重和保障人权的核心内容。借鉴各国宪法的规定以及有关国家宪法实践 ,我国应当完善公民刑事程序权利宪法保护。     

美国最高法院"隐私的合理期待"标准之介评

美国宪法第四修正案保护公民不受政府不合理的搜查和扣押的权利.美国最高法院在卡兹诉美国案中,提出了"隐私的合理期待"标准,界定了第四修正案下搜查的含义,并通过公共暴露理论、风险承担理论等学说,阐释了该标准的主、客观要件.美国最高法院确立的理论与判例表明,第四修正案下的隐私权的内涵缺乏自治权和人格权的维度.此种狭义的隐私权也是美国最高法院支持"反毒战争"刑事政策的体现.     

论隐私权的宪法保护

我国宪法对隐私权的保护在目前还比较薄弱，我国宪法理论应该将隐私杈普遍化处理。同时，在原则上应将隐私权优先于与之相冲突的权利进行保护，对于与隐私权相冲突的权利，可以在个案中利用价值平衡进行保护。     

论隐私权的宪法保护——以自媒体时代为分析背景

自媒体在彰显言论自由之对,也打开了一扇偷窥公民隐私之窗.在宪法视野下,隐私权已经超越部门法的疆域上升为一项基本人权.在自媒体时代,侵犯公民隐私权的特征表现为隐蔽性、侵财性、便捷性和严重性,隐私权的传统法律保护模式遭遇了新的挑战.宪法对公民隐私权加以保护有其合理性与必要性.隐私权的宪法保护路径在于明确隐私权是一项列举的人权,强化违宪审查制度的贯彻执行,并通过部门法落实和实施该项权利,建立一个由宪法统领的、由部门法具体实施的、多层级和全方位的立体保护架构.     

Human rights and trade mark rights

Legal context. For some time the UK Trade Marks Registry hasrefused to register trade marks which consists of the name ofa well-known individual. This article examines whether the practiceis permissible, not in the terms of intellectual property lawbut whether it is in contravention of the applicant's humanrights. Key points. Looking at the application of the Human Rights Actin the United Kingdom, the article asks how it could apply toan intellectual property case, concluding that the Trade MarkRegistry is clearly a ‘public authority’ and thatthere are a number of ways in which current practice in respectof well-known individuals could be said to infringe their humanrights. Practical significance. It remains to be seen what the Registry'sresponse will be to such arguments and whether it might in thefuture be possible to obtain protection for the name of a celebrity.     

物权与债权的区分及其相对性问题论纲

物权与债权作为两类最基本的财产权 ,既相伴而存 ,有着密切的联系 ,又相离而立 ,在性质、客体、设定、效力、期限等方面存在明显的区别。近现代法上 ,物权与债权的目的性与手段性在发生着更迭与交错 ,特定领域的债权有物权化的现象 ,某些物权也有债权化的趋向 ,物权与债权还有性质上的渗透与融合的问题 ,体现出两者的区分具有相对性。了解并正确对待这种现象 ,有助于物权与债权的类别整理、立法的完善和复杂问题的解决。     

Rights-based rights

Ronald Dworkin maintains that particular rights, like the right to free speech and the right to own personal property, can be derived from a foundational right, the right to equal concern and respect. This paper questions the tenability of this program for rights-based rights. A right is an individuated moral or political guarantee which confers a specified benefit on each right-holder and which resists conduct that would derogate it. For there to be rights-based rights, both the foundational right and the rights it implies must satisfy this definition. It is doubtful, however, that the right to equal concern and respect should count as a right since the benefits it confers are at best highly controversial and may not be assignable to individuals. But even if we grant that the content of the right to equal concern and respect can be satisfactorily specified, the status of the derived rights remains problematic. The trouble is that the relation between the right to equal concern and respect and the rights it implies parallels the relation between the principle of utility and the rights it may imply. Both of these foundational principles can extinguish derived rights. Consequently, rights dependent on either of these principles are not trumps, and their standing as rights is suspect. I conclude that Dworkin's method of defending rights is inappropriate for the most important of our rights though it may well serve for less critical ones.     

Social rights,child rights,discrimination and devolution: untangling the web

Abstract

This article examines judicial reviews of two areas of social security policy and practice in the UK – the household benefit cap and the restriction of bereavement benefits to bereaved spouses and civil partners. While each case ostensibly concerned discrimination against claimants, in practice much of the legal argument centred on the impact on claimants’ children. The judiciary is revealed to be deeply divided on the lawfulness of the acknowledged discrimination. The article considers what lessons can be drawn about the relative weight that ought to be afforded to claimants’ property rights, the best interests of affected children, anti-discrimination provisions and the state’s stated policy imperatives of cost control and administrative convenience. Insights are also sought into whether devolutionary differences can be identified between the approaches of courts in London and Belfast.     

On deriving rights to goods from rights to freedom

This paper examines a particular type of argument often employed to defend welfare rights. This argument contends that welfare rights are a necessary supplement to liberty rights because rights to freedom become hollow when their bearers are not able to take advantage of their freedom. Rights to be provided with certain goods are thus a natural outgrowth of a genuine concern to protect freedom.I argue that this reasoning suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it rests on an erroneous notion of what it is to have a right, neglecting the fact that the exact source of a person's inability to exercise a right is crucial to determining whether that right is being respected. Second, the argument equivocates as to the freedom that rights are intended to protect, sometimes confusing freedom with ability, sometimes confusing not being free with not having other desired things, and sometimes confusing what a person is able to do with what a person is entitled to do.