Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947

During the post-war negotiations in the years of 1945 and 1946, the Soviets launched a bitter war of nerves against Turkey in order to establish a military base in Istanbul and share control of the Straits. It was crucial for Britain that the USSR be prevented from gaining any influence in Turkey. However, as Britain was in no position to support Turkey financially, American authorities encouraged by London and Ankara took over the responsibility for Turkey. This articles examines the Great Powers rivalry over Turkey and Turkey's response to it. It argues that regional factors other than US-Soviet confrontation, such as Turkey's security search against the Soviets, also played a crucial part in starting the Cold War in the Near East.     

Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the "Soviet Other" in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919–1945

Standard accounts on Turkey's foreign policy identify Molotov's communication of 1945 (better known as "Stalin's demands") as the catalyst behind Turkey's post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. The aim here is to complement these accounts which have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey's foreign policy change, by offering an analysis that explores the conditions of possibility for such change. The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey's search for "Western" allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a "threat" to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.     

中国全面抗战(1937～1945)与苏联对华政策新论

本文将全面抗战前的苏中关系置于国际关系的大环境中,结合中国国内因日本侵略而引发的一系列与维护国家利益紧密相关的历史事件,研究了中国全面抗日战争期间(1937~1945)的苏联对华政策。我们研究的重点是当时苏联与中华民国官方政府和在苏联和共产国际支持下同国民党结成统一战线的中国共产党同时进行的交往与合作。本文揭示了苏联对中国抗日的两个战场给予支持的历史事实,即中国国民党军队的正面战场和中国共产党领导的以特区(指陕甘宁边区——译注)和敌后解放区为根据地的敌后抗战战场。     

Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the Central Intelligence Agency

Intelligence accountability ("oversight") encompasses the supervision of a vast range of secret activities and 15 major agencies. Oversight since 1975 has been robust compared to earlier years; yet it continues to fall short of goals espoused by the Church Committee that year, as well as by subsequent panels advocating intelligence reform. Lawmakers have responded responsibly to intelligence surprises ("fire alarms"), carrying out probes into domestic spying, assassination plots, and other questionable covert actions, counterintelligence vulnerabilities, and major intelligence failures. They have paid less attention, though, to the day-to-day "police-patrolling" that might uncover weaknesses and eliminate the need for emergency firefighting. Individual members in both branches of Congress have displayed a significant commitment to oversight activities, and now and then the full oversight committees have worked energetically as a unit. Mostly, however, intelligence accountability since 1975 has been a story of discontinuous motivation, ad hoc responses to scandals, and reliance on the initiative of just a few members of Congress—mainly the occasional dedicated committee chair—to carry the burden. Despite the recommendations of several scholarly studies and government reports, absent still is a comprehensive approach to intelligence review that mobilizes most, if not all, of the members of the House and Senate standing committees on intelligence toward a systematic plan of police-patrolling, without waiting for fire alarms.     

With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945-1958

This article looks at the Anglo-American atomic intelligence relationship in the early post-war period. In 1946 the wartime sharing of technical atomic information was terminated; despite this barrier, atomic intelligence relations continued and given the common objective of discerning Soviet capabilities, flourished. The close relationship offered many mutual benefits to both sides. As such, the atomic intelligence relationship was to become a crucial instrument in achieving a resumption of relations in 1958, what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to as the “great prize.” This article details the composition of the Anglo-American special-relationship's special-relationship, describing joint operations and placing these within the normal nuclear partnership at this time.     

东北朝鲜移民社会经济与文化考察(1840-1945年)

近代百余年来,由于诸多原因,大量朝鲜人移居中国东北,逐步形成朝鲜族聚居区域与民族群体,为开拓东北边疆经济、文化做出了重大贡献。同时,朝鲜移民在特定的历史环境中,一方面继承和发展本民族固有的传统文化,另一方面又受到其他民族与国家的影响,从而形成了具有自身民族特色的社会经济与文化。     

中国在中亚:政策的演变

中亚国家独立以来,中国对中亚的政策经历了三个阶段的演变:建立睦邻友好关系(1991年12月～1997年9月)、加强能源、经贸和安全合作(1997年9月～2001年6月)、在双边和上海合作组织框架下发展全方位合作关系(2001年6月至今).中国已经与中亚国家建立起密切的政治、经济、安全合作关系,已经成为中亚地缘政治的主要角色之一.中国对中亚政策仍旧存在工具不足--限于经济合作和一定程度的安全合作--的弱点,且受到美国、俄罗斯、中亚国家政局和政策等因素的影响.中国与中亚国家关系前景美好.     

Keeping Cyprus off the agenda: British and American relations at the United Nations, 1954-58

From 1954 to 1958, the Greek government sought to raise the issue of self-determination for Cyprus at the United Nations as a means of pressing for the union of the island with the Greek state - enosis. The British government's objective was to ensure if possible that Cyprus was not debated using the legal argument that it was a domestic issue in which the UN had no rights. The British accepted, however, that other political and strategic arguments would be needed to defeat the Greeks and looked to the US government to support them in the UN forums. This article examines the positions of the British and Americans governments and shows the difficulties which the issue created for both in the UN in the period.     

Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy

Soft power, like so much else in relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, is asymmetrical and freighted with implications for U.S. policy and U.S.-China relations. For China, soft power largely serves—or strives—to reduce alarm (or at least reaction) among other states concerned about China's new-found hard power or, perhaps more realistically, the hard power that China's economic rise can underwrite. Much of the value for Beijing of soft power is—and is likely to remain for quite some time—its potential contribution to reducing the likelihood that other states will react to China's rising hard power in ways that could threaten China's interests.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo-French Third World Power, 1945-1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

Ambivalent Albion,Ambitious Ally: Britain's Decision for No Separate Peace in 1914

When Britain entered the First World War it did so as an especially hesitant belligerent. One month later, the British enthusiastically signed the Treaty of London, stating that the Entente powers would prosecute the war in common and that none would pursue a separate peace. Why would a state long known for jealously guarding its ability to maintain a free hand initiate a binding alliance that restricted its war termination prospects after one month of combat? And what were the effects of its decision to do so? Answering this question requires not only that we examine British decision making but that we understand No Separate Peace Agreements and why states sign them. I hypothesize that a state will initiate a No Separate Peace Agreement when it has reason to fear that one of its cobelligerents may defect. I also hypothesize that No Separate Peace Agreements will cause states to reconcile war aims with their allies, agreeing to different terms of peace than might have been necessary to satisfy any one of them individually. Using new archival documents, I analyze a case study of British decision making in the early weeks of World War I and find substantial support for the hypotheses.     

国际冷战初期的一个地方热点 ——1945年至1950年间的中越边境跨国革命区

自1920年代起,东亚各国,特别是中国、朝鲜和越南的共产主义运动即互相交织并连成一片。东亚三国共产党之间的合作,促成了南北两个跨国革命区的形成,本文探讨的即是1945年至1950年间南方中越边境跨国革命区形成的条件、中越双方合作的方式,以及1950年前与1950年后中越同盟关系的区别。学术界对于1950年后的中越同盟关系已多有论述,但1950年前中共与印支共之间的合作则未引起同等重视。1950年前的中越跨国革命区值得探讨,一是因为这一时期的中越革命同盟关系实际上是第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争的延伸,也是这两场战争的连接点。这种联系突显了这两场战争的国际性,进一步证明第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争都是与冷战密切关联的热战,中越跨国革命区因此成为冷战初期的一个地方热点,并代表了国际冷战的一种地方形态;二是因为这一阶段两党之间的合作为1950年代至1970年代末期的中越关系奠定了基础。在国共内战期间,中共不仅得到了苏联共产党和朝鲜共产党的支持,也得到了印支共产党的援助,中共对于胡志明和越南革命运动的支持也是从印支战争爆发之日起即已开始,1950年后只是扩大了援助的范围,并提高了援助的规模和合作的级别。1950年前两党关系中发生的一些问题也将在1950年后重复出现并带来严重后果。