Religious fundamentalism,religiosity, and priming: effects on attitudes,perceptions, and mock jurors’ decisions in an insanity defense case

Jurors are asked to use their personal knowledge and experience to make verdict decisions; thus, it is no surprise that their religious beliefs might influence their decisions. During legal insanity trials, jurors might also be exposed to religious stimuli (e.g. crucifix, prayer, Bible, etc.), which could evoke (prime) religious beliefs and thus influence decisions. Two studies examined whether dimensions of religiosity and religious beliefs relate to attitudes and decisions concerning mental health defenses, testing social identity theory against Allport and Ross’s religiosity hypothesis. In Study 1 (attitudes survey) and Study 2 (mock juror decision-making paradigm), religious fundamentalist beliefs consistently predicted punitive attitudes and decisions related to mental health defenses and verdicts, and this was moderated by intrinsic religiosity, such that religious fundamentalist beliefs only predicted punitiveness for individuals low in intrinsic religiosity. Also, priming fundamentalist beliefs increased punitiveness in both verdict and sentencing decisions. Combined, these results suggest that religious beliefs play a role in jurors’ verdict decisions in an insanity case, and that priming fundamentalist beliefs increases jurors’ punitiveness. Allport and Ross’s religiosity hypothesis was supported, but social identity theory was not.     

Beliefs about secondary confession evidence: a survey of laypeople and defense attorneys

We surveyed students, community members, and defense attorneys regarding beliefs about secondary confession evidence (i.e. when a third party tells authorities that a person has confessed to him or her) from jailhouse informants and other sources. Results indicated that laypeople perceive secondary confessions as less credible than other types of evidence (e.g. forensics, DNA, eyewitness testimony), and they are knowledgeable about factors that may influence the veracity of secondary confessions, such as incentives or previous testimony. However, they underestimated or were uncertain about how persuasive secondary confessions would be to themselves or other jurors. Compared to laypeople, defense attorneys were more sensitive about issues affecting the reliability of secondary confessions.     

Modeling Facts,Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate

Can empirical data generate consensus about how to regulate firearms? If so, under what conditions? Previously, we presented evidence that individuals' cultural worldviews explain their positions on gun control more powerfully than any other fact about them, including their race or gender, the type of community or region of the country they live in, and even their political ideology or party affiliation. On this basis, we inferred that culture is prior to facts in the gun debate: empirical data can be expected to persaude individuals to change their view on gun policies only after those individuals come to see those policies as compatible with their core cultural commitments. We now respond to critics. Canvassing the psychological literature, we identify the mechanisms that systematically induce individuals to conform their factual beliefs about guns to their culturally grounded moral evaluations of them. To illustrate the strength and practical implications of these dynamics, we develop a series of computer simulations, which show why public beliefs about the efficacy of gun control can be expected to remain highly polarized even in the face of compelling empirical evidence. Finally, we show that the contribution culture makes to cognition could potentially be harnessed to generate broad, cross-cultural consensus: if gun policies can be framed in terms that are expressively compatible with diverse cultural worldviews, the motivation to resist compelling empirical evidence will dissipate, and individuals of diverse cultural persuasions can be expected rapidly to converge in their beliefs about what policies are best. Constructing a new, expressively pluralistic idiom of gun control should therefore be the first priority of policy-makers and -analysts interested in promoting the adoption of sound gun policies.     

Examining legal authoritarianism in the impact of punishment severity on juror decisions

Recent Supreme Court decisions point to an increased reliance on juries to determine a defendant's sentence. Evidence is mixed on whether jurors are more likely to convict when the potential punishment is mild. The current study examined this issue, as well as the impact of legal authoritarianism (LA) (Kravitz, D. A., Cutler, B. L., & Brock, P. 1993. Reliability and validity of the original and revised legal attitudes questionnaire. Law and Human Behavior, 17, 661–677. doi: 10.1007/BF01044688), on jurors’ decisions. An ethnically diverse sample of participants completed the individual difference measure prior to viewing a videotaped, reenacted criminal trial. We manipulated the severity of the punishment the defendant would receive if convicted. Results indicated LA moderated the effect of punishment severity on verdict. Specifically, at higher levels of punishment severity, civil libertarians convicted less, while legal authoritarians convicted more. That is, the severity-leniency effect held for civil libertarians, but not for legal authoritarians. As juries become more responsible for determining a defendant's sentence, attorneys should be aware of the defendant's potential sentence and use voir dire to identify jurors who are higher on LA.     

Firing Back at the Backfire Effect: The Influence of Mortality Salience and Nullification Beliefs on Reactions to Inadmissible Evidence

Two studies were conducted to explore psychological factors that contribute to the influence of inadmissible evidence (i.e., the backfire effect) on jurors' verdicts. On the basis of hypotheses derived from terror management theory, we predicted that reminders of mortality, in contrast to an aversive control topic, should lead participants to be less punitive when confronted with inadmissible (as opposed to admissible) evidence, when participants were either situationally induced or dispositionally prone to follow their personal sense of justice. In Study 1, control participants who scored high on a measure of nullification beliefs, and thus were prone to relying on their own sense of justice rather than the law, exhibited the backfire effect. However, reminding participants of their mortality reduced the damaging influence of inadmissible evidence. Study 2 extended these findings by showing parallel effects with a manipulation of nullification proneness via judicial instructions. The implications of these factors on the judicial process are discussed.     

The decision theory of paternity disputes: optimization considerations applied to multilocus DNA fingerprinting.

The solution of paternity disputes using results from scientific analyses is studied from a decision-theoretical viewpoint. Two alternative approaches to decision making, the so-called 'Bayes' and 'Minimax' strategies, are described and discussed. If prior probabilities of paternity are exactly known, then Bayes decisions are (a) independent of the source of evidence and (b) optimal with respect to average losses caused by wrong decisions. However, it is concluded that Minimax decisions, which depend upon the employed test system but not upon prior probabilities, are more appropriate in paternity cases if equal prior good will towards disclaimed children and alleged fathers is demanded. It is further demonstrated that, when major evidence about paternity comes from multilocus DNA fingerprinting, prior probabilities must be known quite accurately for Bayes decisions to be superior with respect to average losses. Finally, we are able to show that 'quasi' Bayes decision making, that is, adopting a neutral prior probability of 0.5 but leaving thresholds for decision making unchanged, coincides with Minimax decision making if multilocus DNA fingerprinting is employed.     

The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

Scholars have long been simultaneously concerned with the factors that influence appellate court decision making and the level of deference that the courts allow for agencies. However, scholars have treated administrative agencies as unitary actors with a single level of decision making, but in reality agency decisions involve input from multiple actors within the agency. I argue that appellate courts rely more heavily on decisions made by actors in the bureaucracy with greater levels of expertise and who are less politically motivated as cues in their decision making. This theory is bolstered by legal precedent in the area of administrative law that suggests courts should more heavily rely on the expert judgment of administrative judges. Thus, as a result of their increased expertise, appearance of political neutrality, and institutional support, courts will be more reliant on decisions issued by administrative law judges (ALJs) than those issued by the political appointees as cues in their decision making. Using over 300 unfair labor practice decisions issued by the federal appeals courts on review of cases from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), I develop a model of appeals court decision making in unfair labor practice cases as a function of the initial decision of the ALJ, the final order of the political appointees of the NLRB, case characteristics, the ideology of the deciding appeals court panel, Supreme Court influence, and economic factors. Though the ideology of the court plays a role in its decision making, cues from ALJ decision making and that of the Board weigh more heavily in appellate court outcomes. However, cues from ALJ decisions play the most consistent role in appellate court decision making, even in more difficult cases. This has important implications for agency strategy in courts and suggests that future research should consider the influence of lower‐level decision making over appellate court decision making in the area of administrative law.     

Understanding juror perceptions of forensic evidence: investigating the impact of case context on perceptions of forensic evidence strength

The most widely accepted model of juror decision making acknowledges the importance of both the case-specific information presented in the courtroom, as well as the prior general knowledge and beliefs held by each juror. The studies presented in this paper investigated whether mock jurors could differentiate between evidence of varying strengths in the absence of case information and then followed on to determine the influence that case context (and therefore the story model) has on judgments made about the strength of forensic DNA evidence. The results illustrated that mock jurors correctly identified various strengths of evidence when it was not presented with case information; however, the perceived strength of evidence was significantly inflated when presented in the context of a criminal case, particularly when the evidence was of a weak or ambiguous standard. These findings are discussed in relation to the story model, and the potential implications for real juries.     

Effects of pretrial juror bias,strength of evidence and deliberation process on juror decisions: new validity evidence of the Juror Bias Scale scores

This study examines the validity of the Juror Bias Scale scores in relation to the mock juror decisions reached in two real life homicide cases before and after the deliberation process. The judicial cases used varied in terms of the ambiguity of the evidence presented at both trials. The WLS methodology for statistical modelling of categorical data was used to analyse data. The findings indicated that the Juror Bias Scale scores successfully predict the verdicts and other related questions before and after deliberations in the case with ambiguous evidence. Furthermore, deliberations caused a generalisation effect on the pretrial juror bias in such a case, and enhanced the differences between defense-biased and prosecution-biased jurors in the verdicts delivered after deliberations. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the use of pretrial juror bias questionnaires in jury selection.     

Learning legal reasoning while rejecting the oxymoronic status of feminist judicial rationalities: a view from the law classroom

One misconception accompanying the idea of a feminist judgment is that feminist judgment is inherently at odds with the putative neutrality of the “judge” as a “neutral” adjudicator. Many lawyers, scholars and law students tend to assume that when deliberating as a judge, feminism(s) simply has/have no rightful or rational place, relevance or bearing upon the process or the outcome and that such a “non-neutral” view will necessarily deviate from the standard canons of judicial reasoning by embodying an unacceptable bias. Introducing students to the “grammar” of reasoning in an undergraduate course dedicated to both general critical reasoning and legal reasoning, however, presented an ideal opportunity for students to encounter in greater intimacy the interpretive openness of law and the indeterminacies that argument alone can never ultimately resolve without recourse to deeper positional commitments. By stepping into the role of judge, having studied the techniques, inherent malleability and limitations of legal argument, students could explore for themselves the range of argumentatively defensible interpretations and outcomes possible in any given legal case. In the process, the students could appreciate not only the open textured nature of judgment and legal reasoning more richly, but also see the “rationality” of feminist judgment as a fully plausible alternative to non-feminist “rationality” and judgment.     

刑事归责的时间之维——论危害结果延迟发生案件的司法处理

在处理危害结果延迟发生的案件时,若已经存在对行为人就同一犯罪行为的有效刑事裁判,则即便之后又发生了危害结果或加重结果,也不应再据此追究或加重行为人的刑事责任。观念论的时间观所揭示的人的认知规律和刑事不法的本质,共同决定了经过较长时间才延迟发生的危害结果不能再被归责于早已实行终了的实行行为。这种刑事归责的时间之维是在考虑过往的实行行为对于在现时社会中确证规范效力、保护法益之意义的基础上,从功能主义与目的理性的角度建构刑事不法的结果,其与刑事追诉时效制度存在紧密的内在关联,故在个案中应当类推适用追诉期限判断实行行为与危害结果之间的时间间隔是否已经足以阻却归责。     

Mock jurors' perceptions of identifications made by intoxicated eyewitnesses

Abstract

Psychology research has generally neglected intoxicated eyewitnesses. The current study addressed this need by exploring mock jurors' perceptions of intoxicated witnesses. Undergraduate participants read summarized sexual or aggravated battery cases in which either the victim or a bystander identified the defendant under varying intoxication levels. They answered questions about the case and provided verdicts. Participants were sensitive to the effect that intoxication may have on witnesses' cognitive ability, but not to varying degrees of intoxication. Neither the role of the eyewitness nor the type of crime committed had an effect on perceptions of witness impairment. Participants' perceptions of witness impairment informed identification credibility ratings, and credibility assessments affected verdicts. Impairment and credibility ratings fully mediated intoxication's effect on verdicts. Unlike much prior research, our results suggest that mock jurors can consider potentially important witness information when rendering verdicts.     

Predicting verdicts,adherence to judge's instructions,and assumptions about the disposition of the defendant in a case involving the insanity defense

Abstract

296 college students and jury eligible adults completed attitudinal measures and read a case summary of a murder trial involving the insanity defense. The case summary included opening and closing arguments, testimony from expert witnesses, and judge's instructions. Although broader legal attitudes (the PJAQ) predicted verdicts, the Insanity Defense Attitudes-Revised scale provided incremental predictive validity. Attitudes related to the insanity defense also predicted adherence to judge's instructions, whereas more general legal biases predicted a juror's willingness to change their verdict after being provided with accurate information about the defendant's disposition following the verdict. Importantly, misconceptions concerning the insanity defense impacted verdicts and many jurors made decisions that failed to adhere to the judge's instructions, though the nullification tendency does appear to vary as a function of pretrial juror attitudes. Implications for instructing jurors in insanity defense cases will be discussed.     

How Cross‐Examination on Subjectivity and Bias Affects Jurors’ Evaluations of Forensic Science Evidence

Contextual bias has been widely discussed as a possible problem in forensic science. The trial simulation experiment reported here examined reactions of jurors at a county courthouse to cross‐examination and arguments about contextual bias in a hypothetical case. We varied whether the key prosecution witness (a forensic odontologist) was cross‐examined about the subjectivity of his interpretations and about his exposure to potentially biasing task‐irrelevant information. Jurors found the expert less credible and were less likely to convict when the expert admitted that his interpretation rested on subjective judgment, and when he admitted having been exposed to potentially biasing task‐irrelevant contextual information (relative to when these issues were not raised by the lawyers). The findings suggest, however, that forensic scientists can immunize themselves against such challenges and maximize the weight jurors give their evidence by adopting context management procedures that blind them to task‐irrelevant information.     

Automatic Judgment and Reasoning About Punishment

Several studies provide evidence that judgments on punishment are influenced by variables that are more or less independent of guilt considerations. It is postulated that these so called extralegal variables, such as the victim’s reputation or outcome severity that occurs accidentally and without intention by the offender, in particular influence judgments that are made under restricted cognitive capacity (low processing depth). Two studies, using a vignette methodology, explore whether participants are able to correct the biasing influences of extralegal variables if they are motivated to elaborate their judgments under the most optimal conditions (high processing depth). Study 1 investigates the influence of victim’s reputation, and Study 2 the combined influence of victim’s reputation and accidentally occurring outcome severity under either low or high depth of information processing. Results show that the influence of extralegal variables can be corrected. However, corrections are either limited or excessive, and are sometimes even inappropriate.     

Perceptions of suspect statements: a comparison of exposed lies and confessions

Confrontational interrogation techniques seek to produce a confession, while investigative interviews focus on information gathering and/or catching suspects in lies. Confessions obtained during interrogations are potent for securing a defendant’s conviction. However, the goal of investigative interviews is not to produce a confession, yet it is unknown if their outcome (e.g. exposed lies) is as effective in court as that of an interrogation (i.e. a confession). In two studies, mock jurors read case summaries wherein a defendant was accused of murder and terrorist activities. In both cases, the statement a defendant made during a police interview was manipulated: The defendant either lied or not and either confessed or not. Participants then rendered a verdict and were asked about the probative value of several pieces of supporting evidence. Results were similar across both studies with more convictions when the defendant lied, confessed, or did both relative to when the defendant produced a statement without lies and without a confession. Furthermore, we found that perceptions of supporting evidence mediated the effect of exposed lies on culpability, but this was not the case for confessions. These findings illustrate the positive qualities of presenting exposed lies in court, diminishing the need for a confession.     

The influence of prior record evidence on juror decision making

Several researchers have investigated the impact of evidence of prior convictions on jurors' decision making. Very little is known about a related issue, the impact of prioracquittal evidence introduced by the prosecution on jurors' decisions. The Supreme Court recently held (Dowling v. U.S., 1990) that the admission of prior acquittal evidence does not unfairly prejudice the defendant. We conducted a simulation study to examine the effects of prior record evidence (prior convictions, prior acquittals, and no prior record) on jurors' decisions. We also manipulated the presence of judicial instructions on the limited use jurors can make of extrinsic acts evidence. Mock jurors were more likely to convict the defendant when they had evidence of a prior conviction than when they had evidence of a prior acquittal or no record evidence. This effect was mediated by attributions about criminal propensity. Judge's limiting instructions were ineffective in guiding jurors' use of prior record evidence.     

From impartial expert to adversary in the wake of Ake

In deciding Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that, when defendants demonstrate that their sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the State must assure them access to a competent psychiatrist who will not only examine them but also render other assistance to the defense. There have been 28 known subsequent decisions in which appellate courts have ruled on the validity of Ake-based claims; in only four did the defendant prevail. The case nonetheless raises issues relative to the proper role of the psychiatric expert. The Supreme Court's decisions, although not introducing a new ethical topic, appear to be favoring a more adversarial posture, at least within certain parameters. I suggest that impartiality, independence, and advocacy need not be mutually exclusive concepts and that some of our traditional beliefs about what part we should play in criminal law may have to be modified and expanded.     

The influence of pretrial exposure to community outrage and victim hardship on guilt judgments

Although the courts have explicitly expressed concerns about the effects of public sentiment on juries in highly publicized cases, no research has isolated the degree to which jurors’ exposure to community outrage and/or prospective social interactions in the community independently influence judgments of guilt. In the current research, jury eligible undergraduates were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (negative defendant facts pretrial publicity (PTP): present vs. absent)?×?2 (community outrage PTP: present vs. absent)?×?2 (anticipated social interaction: present vs. absent) between subjects factorial design. In an online session, participants read articles containing PTP (or not), and two days later they arrived at the lab to serve as mock jurors in a murder case – before the trial they were instructed (or not) that they would interact with people from the community in which the case was taking place. Neither PTP containing extra-evidentiary facts about the defendant nor prospective interaction with the community had main or interactive effects on guilt measures; however, mock jurors rated the defendant as more likely to be guilty when they read information about community outrage and hardships on victims. These findings suggest future avenues of PTP research focusing on community outrage and victim impacts.