一个综合视角下的国际制度化动力分析

制度化动力是国际制度分析的重要问题之一。制度化动力往往包含理性选择和社会建构两重因素,二者之间存在密切的互动关系。在高级制度化形式下,制度化动力以理性计算为起点吸收社会性因素,转化为战略性社会建构动力并有机结合于国家间社会化进程之中,将制度化从工具性制度化推向建构性制度化,对国家产生根本性影响。     

Selection Effects and Deterrence

The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical "case" is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research.     

The Impact of the Threat of Terrorism on U.S. District Court Decisions During Wartime

Federal courts are key actors in the U.S. government’s fight against terrorism because they adjudicate cases based on the USA PATRIOT Act, and accordingly make national security policy. We examine the extent that the terror threat influences judicial decisions in a dataset of 111 USA PATRIOT Act cases decided in the U.S. District Courts from 2001 through 2013, while controlling for other judicial decision-making variables. The results demonstrate that when a case involves a heightened terror threat, federal judges are more likely to defer to the government. Some key control variables are also significant.     

Making Palestinian “Martyrdom Operations”/“Suicide Attacks”: Interviews With Would-Be Perpetrators and Organizers

Knowledge about the ways in which suicide attacks are recruited and prepared and on the motivation of suicide bombers and the factors that influence the decisions of organizers of suicide attacks has so far been sketchy and sporadic, derived mostly from media sources. In this study, 15 Palestinian would-be suicides and 14 organizers of suicide attacks participated in semi-structured interviews designed to fill this lacuna. The paper focuses on the self-reported feelings and behavior of the suicide bombers from recruitment to dispatching, as well as on the organizers' self-reported views and decisions concerning suicide attacks.     

The recovery of radical Islam in the wake of the defeat of the Taliban11Many of the websites cited in this article have either been suppressed or have moved from address to address. When this is the case I have placed an asterix in brackets (∗) at the end of the URL.

This article analyses the intellectual and religious processes through which radical Islam has had to confront its defeat in Afghanistan and rebuild during the period since that time, including paradigms of battle, dreams and martyrologies and apocalyptic readings of history and current events.     

A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States

ABSTRACT

Drawing on Rapoport’s four waves thesis, this study asks whether the emergence of terrorist semi-states (TSS) in the 21st-century MENA region and Pakistan mean that we are seeing the beginning of a new (fifth) wave. We define a TSS as a rebel group that a) has control over portions of a weak state’s territory, maintaining governance there; b) but still launches terrorist attacks against third-party states. To be considered a fifth wave, the new terrorism phenomenon at hand must both fit Rapoport’s criteria of a wave (be global, have the same driving force) and also be significantly different from the prior wave. Clearly, the TSSs are different from the religious terror groups of the fourth wave in key respects: they prioritize territorial control, they engage in a much wider array of governance activities (not just social services), most of their victims have been members of the same religion—namely, Muslims (which suggests that they are driven more by the pursuit of power than by Jihad); and finally, their behavior (though not their statements) shows they have a local rather than a universal agenda. The main counter-argument is that TSSs are all Islamic and have so far not been exported globally.     

伊斯兰祈祷团再起波澜的原因探析

曾一度淡出人们视线的东南亚恐怖组织伊斯兰祈祷团(AJAI)再度掀起波澜,从2005年至今策划了一系列恐怖案件。为何一个重要首领被逮捕、受到重大打击的恐怖主义组织,在短期内又能死灰复燃?笔者认为根本原因在于其动态的网络系统、一体化的组织结构、丰富的资金来源与广阔的联系渠道。在上述分析的基础上,笔者尝试性地提出应对这一恐怖组织的政策性建议。     

From Warfare to Imagefare: How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts With Extensive Media Coverage

Conflicts in the 21st century differ from past conflicts based on two central factors: the level of asymmetry and disparity between the actors taking part in the conflict and the amount of foreign media coverage that a conflict receives. This article aims to develop a new theoretical perspective on the implications of these two factors on how the involved states manage a conflict. Most actors in current conflicts have vast levels of disparity and receive extensive media coverage; events in those conflicts are referred to as occurrences in the “information space” because a conflict's borders are anywhere people can receive information about it. “Imagefare”—the use of images as a guiding principle or a substitute for traditional military means to achieve political objectives—is argued to be the main tool for better facing adversaries in the information space.