The North Korean abduction issue: emotions,securitisation and the reconstruction of Japanese identity from ‘aggressor’ to ‘victim’ and from ‘pacifist’ to ‘normal’

Abstract

After Kim Jong-il's confession in 2002 that North Korean agents had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea has become the most detested country in Japan, and the normalisation of bilateral relations has been put on the back burner. The abduction issue has taken precedence in Japan even over North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. It has also grossly overshadowed the atrocities for which Imperial Japan was responsible in the 20th century. Why has there been such strong emphasis on an issue that could be disregarded as comparatively ‘less important’? This article understands the ascendency of the abduction issue as the epitome of an identity shift under way in Japan – from the identity of a curiously ‘peaceful’ and inherently ‘abnormal’ state, to that of a more ‘normal’ one. The differentiation of North Korea as ‘abnormal’ emphasises Japan's own (claim to) ‘normality’. Indeed, by incarnating the perils of Japan's own ‘pacifist’ ‘abnormality’, which has been so central to the collective sense of Japanese ‘Self’ in the post-war period, the abduction issue has become a very emotional argument for Japan's ‘normalisation’ in security and defence terms. The transformation from ‘abnormal’ to ‘normal’ is further enabled by Japan trading places with North Korea in the discourse, so that Japan is defined as ‘victim’ (rather than former aggressor) and North Korea as ‘aggressor’ (rather than former victim). What is at stake here is the question whether Japan is ‘normalising’ or ‘remilitarising’, and the role of the abduction issue discourse in enabling such foreign and security policy change.     

International and domestic challenges to Japan's postwar security identity: ‘norm constructivism’ and Japan's new ‘proactive pacifism’

Abstract

Japan today is widely portrayed as on the verge of a significant identity shift that could lead to dramatic new security policies. Yet, Japan's first formal national security strategy, adopted in December 2013, proclaims repeatedly Japan's long-standing ‘peace-loving’ policies and principles. Why does a conservative government with high levels of popular support not pursue policies more in line with views widely reported to be central to its values and outlook? The answer lies in Japan's long-standing security identity of domestic antimilitarism, an identity under siege to a degree not seen since its creation over 50 years ago, but – as evidenced in Japan's new national strategy document – one that continues to shape both the framing of Japan's national security debates and the institutions of Japan's postwar security policy-making process. Relational approaches to identity construction illuminate challenges to Japan's dominant security identity, but a focus on domestic institutions and electoral politics offers the best course for modeling identity construction and predicting its future resilience.     

Japan and the Kyoto Protocol: reconstructing ‘proactive’ identity through environmental multilateralism

The aim of this article is to interpret Tokyo's pivotal role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations as a practice of reconstructing Japan's identity of an ‘international’ and ‘independent’ country. The text bases this argument in poststructural national identity scholarship, which believes that discursive differentiation to international forces (‘others’) plays a decisive role in formulating state's identity. For most parts of the post-war history, United States served as the most significant other for Japan's self construction. Japan narrated itself as a ‘weak’ and ‘subservient’ country dominated by the ‘dominant’ West. This narrative, however, has been significantly altered after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Japan's identity entrepreneurs began describing Japan as an ‘independent’ or ‘normal’ country, one that proactively contributes to world affairs. Tokyo's legitimization of the Kyoto Protocol was in line with this identity reconstruction. The image of a proactive environmental leader created a symbol of Kyoto that overshadowed the opponents of the Protocol, and lead Japan to ratify it albeit the United States chose to withdraw from it. Once the ratification was over, however, the practical implementation failed to comply with Japan's symbolic commitment.     

Japan and identity change: why it matters in International Relations

Abstract

Two approaches to identity have been employed to explore issues in Japan's international relations. One views identity as constituted by domestic norms and culture, and as constitutive of interests, which in turn cause behaviour. Proponents view Japan's ‘pacifist’ and ‘antimilitarist’ identity as inherently stable and likely to change only as a result of material factors. In the other approach, ‘Japan’ emerges and changes through processes of differentiation vis-à-vis ‘Others’. Neither ‘domestic’ nor ‘material’ factors can exist outside of such identity constructions. We argue that the second, relational, approach is more theoretically sound, but begs three questions. First, how can different identity constructions in relation to numerous Others be synthesised and understood comprehensively? Second, how can continuity and change be handled in the same relational framework? Third, what is the point of analysing identity in relational terms? This article addresses the first two questions by introducing an analytical framework consisting of three mutually interacting layers of identity construction. Based on the articles in this special issue, we argue that identity entrepreneurs and emotions are particularly likely to contribute to change within this model. We address the third question by stressing common ground with the first approach: identity enables and constrains behaviour. In the case of Japan, changes in identity construction highlighted by the articles in this special issue forebode a political agenda centred on strengthening Japan militarily.     

The rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan's construction of identity: Is China a focal point of Japanese nationalism?

Abstract

Since 1945, the United States (US) has served as a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism. Both sides argued that the US was an arrogant hegemon that unjustly robbed Japan of its autonomy, and prevented Japan from achieving its own ideal national identity. Both sides frequently demanded that Japan should be more ‘resolute’ and resist unfair demands emanating from the US. In recent years, however, both camps are increasingly using the same rhetoric to criticise the Japanese government's China policy. China is also being depicted as an overbearing state that unfairly browbeats Japan into making diplomatic concessions. Given the similarities between the portrayal of China and the US, has China now become a nationalist focal point for both the Japanese Left and Right? Utilising constructivist insights, this article seeks to shed light on this question, by examining how the Japanese Right and Left portray China, and explores the implications for Japan's China policy.     

Shimane Prefecture,Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima: regional and national identities in Japan

Abstract

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se.     

South Korean views on Japan's constitutional reform under the Abe government

In this Special Section, this article reviews South Korean views on Japan's ‘peace’ Constitution and the Abe government's attempts at constitutional reform. It identifies three different understandings among South Korean academics on why Japan is escalating attempts to revise the Constitution under the Abe government. An in-depth analysis demonstrates that all three perspectives pay specific attention to Japan's constitutional reform in relation to security policy changes. However, they differ in assessing the impact of Japan's constitutional reform on South Korea as well as how South Korea should deal with such a change. A minority opinion considers Japan's ‘remilitarisation’ through constitutional revision as conducive to South Korean security interests by increasing deterrence against North Korea, whereas the dominant opinion is that any attempt to revise the Constitution could be in and of itself a potential threat to South Korea's security due to a lack of trust attributed to unresolved historical conflicts between Korea and Japan. However, all three approaches pay hardly any attention to the positive role of Japan's peace Constitution while Japan's peace Constitution might provide a regional peace model in Northeast Asia.     

Japan's foreign aid: old and new contests

Abstract

Domestic and international contests explain the transformation of Japan's foreign aid programme begun in the early 1950s. Through contests between domestic players, Japan has streamlined its aid processes by introducing institutional innovations, accommodating new actors in aid policy and delivery, and responding more sensitively to public opinion and independent advice. At the international level, contests have come from the Development Assistance Committee/Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the USA, and China. Through these contests, Japan has emerged as a more rounded aid donor. Its new aid model blends Western principles with concepts of ‘self-help’, favouring large infrastructure projects that serve both Japan's and recipient countries’ interests.     

Developmental states in transition: adapting,dismantling, innovating,not ‘normalizing’

Abstract

In recent years, there has been an increasingly vigorous debate by a wide range of participants over the past, present and future of Japanese security and the national defence policy. Ever since the end of the Cold War, international relations theorists have cast their gaze to Japan, and have been given to re-examining ‘comprehensive security’ with a particular eye for the meaning of ‘security’. The 1990s were a particularly interesting time for this scholarly revisionism, while events of September 2001 have cast an entirely different spectre on the nature and expectations of Japanese security, both domestically and internationally. This article is particularly concerned with the developments in the 1990s as scholars sought to reassert the ‘defence’ component of the comprehensive security policy hitherto pursued by Japan. This re-examination has elevated former Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) bureaucrat Kubo Takuya as the key architect in crafting Japan's security policy. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki's contributions to the debate are especially interesting on this point. He rightly challenges the short-comings of the so-called ‘domestic-constructivists’, especially Berger and Katzenstein. However, in attempting to demolish their cases for ‘selective biases’ he then proceeds to selectively argue a similarly biased case in asserting the superiority of yet another derivation of the realist cause – ‘postclassical realism’. His key premises are based on his interpretations of the architect of Japan's National Defence Program Outline, Kubo, and in doing so ‘proves’ the military aspect of Japan's security policy and its ‘inherent superiority’ as an explanatory framework. Equally, one can mount a case for the ‘comprehensive security’ proponents by citing the work and presence of the late Okita Saburo in his contributions to understanding post-war security policy. This article will demonstrate a similar argument to that of Kawasaki's based on an analogous analytical framework which grounds Japanese security consciousness in a deeper historical context. It is part of a larger project which seeks to give empirical substance to constructivist interpretations of Japanese security.     

Reassessing pre-war Japanese espionage: The Rutland naval spy case and the Japanese intelligence threat before Pearl Harbor

Soon after the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921, Squadron Leader Frederick Joseph Rutland covertly offered the Japanese navy technical help to develop aircraft carriers. In doing so Rutland played a significant role in the evolution of Japan's offensive capability that made the attack on Pearl Harbor possible. Of as lasting importance was the impact the case had in shaping the perception of ‘the Japanese threat’. British security and intelligence agencies' knowledge of Japanese naval intelligence actions in accepting this ‘offer of service’ and running Rutland as a clandestine agent was not balanced by any understanding of the fragmented nature of the Japanese leadership and intelligence bureaucracy. The case in the 1920s provided the Security Service and SIS with the apparent evidence to justify reassessing Japan from benign if opportunistic former ally to hostile power, apparently proving that Japan's intelligence actions reflected sustained hostile intent throughout the inter-War period.     

Bridging between Myanmar and international society – Japan's self-identity and kakehashi policy

Abstract

Numerous academic works have critiqued Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme for being mercantilist and failing to promote democratization and human rights (Orr 1990; Rix 1993; Arase 1995, 2005). Such accounts assess Japan's ODA policy from Western theoretical perspectives that advocate Western approaches, such as military and economic interventions to contain repressive states. While receptive to these criticisms, Japanese policy-makers have perceived their country's international role in ‘bridging’ (kakehashi) terms and structured their ODA accordingly, as this paper details in the case of Japan's ODA policy towards Myanmar. ¹ 1. Myanmar is used throughout this paper in place of Burma in line with the preference of the Japanese government. Burma is employed when referring to events prior to 1989. The rationale behind Japan's kakehashi approach lies in the construction of Japan's self-identity as a state able to reenter international society after World War II through focusing on economic development rather than military and coercive action. Proponents of the kakehashi approach construct Japan both as a model of successful democratization through development which other states can learn from, as well as the means through ODA to ‘bridge’ the divide between repressive regimes and liberal democratic capitalism. This critical approach examines Japan's kakehashi or bridging strategy in terms of Japan's response to the anti-government protests in September 2007, Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and in the build up to parliamentary elections in November 2010 in Myanmar to demonstrate the permanence of this approach in spite of a change of government in Japan. In so doing, the kakehashi approach reveals opportunities to engage with, rather than contain, repressive regimes, thereby raising the possibility of enticing such states back into international society though economic incentives.     

To revise or not to revise: the ‘peace constitution’, pro-revision movement,and Japan's national identity

Why do conservative nationalists in Japan continuously seek to revise the constitution despite the past failures, and what is the likelihood of successful revision and its impact on Japan's norm of pacifism and its use of force? The article offers an analytical framework for the issue based on national pride and national security, and argues that the ‘revisionists’ seek to create a new national identity, one that infuses a greater sense of national pride among the public and enables the exercise of collective self-defense, thereby removing Japan's postwar psychological and institutional limitations on nationalism and military activities. The LDP's 2012 draft is most explicit and ambitious in this regard, with the current revision attempt under Abe having the highest chance of success since the 1950s. Successful revision would significantly expand Japan's security activities, particularly within the framework of the US–Japan Security Alliance, and entail the end of Japan's unique postwar institutionalized pacifism, although the norm of pacifism will linger on as a constitutional principle. For a smoother return to the international military scene, the Japanese government must distance itself from historical revisionism and utilize its enhanced military role to promote regional public goods rather than merely protecting its narrow national interests.     

The political economy of China and Japan's relationship with Africa: a comparative perspective

China and Japan's policies towards Africa in the 1990s have converged, ostensibly around enhanced economic interaction with the continent based on the premise of integrating the continent into the global economy. At the same time, both countries view Africa as a useful buttress to their respective political and diplomatic goals in the international system. Connected to this and in order to garner support for their agendas, both countries promote themselves as possessing specific pro-South identities. This identity is premised around the notions of ‘non-Westernness’ and, in the case of China, in resistance to the North's hegemony. Yet paradoxically, by pursuing their respective policies in Africa, both states act to further deepen the penetration of the West into Africa. The inherent contradictions in Chinese and Japanese policies towards Africa raises questions as to the long-term viability of the current agendas being pursued by the two countries in Africa.     

The United States,Japan and the aerospace industry: from capture to competitor? 1

Abstract

For all its success in other high-technology sectors, Japan has largely failed to develop a strong aerospace sector. Its leading firms do not market finished aircraft and, in stark contrast to other sectors, the aerospace industry features a trade deficit with the United States. Japanese firms seem trapped as suppliers of components and sub-assemblies, mainly for the US industry. The general explanation for this state of affairs is that the Japanese industry has been effectively ‘captured’ by the United States; Boeing in particular dominates the sector and has effectively locked the Japanese firms into a relationship where moving up the value chain is difficult. This relationship may be changing. Japan's government has placed renewed emphasis on developing Japan's aerospace sector, while matters are evolving at the corporate level too, with Boeing's relations with Japan revealing a steadily increasing work share for the Japanese industry. The rise of Asia as an important market, and technological change making aerospace more like other manufacturing industries, presents Japanese firms with new incentives and opportunities beyond the US relationship.     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

Acting one way and talking another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond.     

Japanese policy and the North Korean ‘soft landing’

Abstract

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.     

Shinzo Abe's security legislation reform and peacebuilding in Mindanao

Recent literature on Japanese foreign policy has focused on analysing the implications of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's security legislation reform for the bilateral security alliance relationship with the US amidst a rising China and the right to collective self-defence. Its impact on Japan's multilateral security policy, in particular, peacebuilding, has so far received little attention. In what ways and to what extent does Japan play a peacebuilding role under this change? This article examines key implications of the security legislation reform, along with the renewal of Japan's Official Development Assistance charter, for its peacebuilding efforts. By taking Mindanao, the Philippines, as a case study, it argues that Abe focuses on taking a foreign aid-centred approach while showing little interest in sending Japanese Self-Defence Force. This article provides a counter-narrative to the claim that Japan is taking a more assertive approach to international security. Abe is more risk-averse as far as his approach to peacebuilding is concerned.     

Rethinking the Europe‐Taiwan relationship

This article attempts to construct an overview of Japan's defence problematique in the post‐cold war era. Its approach is to survey the historical legacies that have shaped Japan's defence policies and perceptions, and to assess how these fit, or do not fit, with the new security environment within which Japan now finds itself. The purpose is to argue that a policy of non‐offensive defence (NOD) could solve many of the difficult defence questions that Japan now faces. As a consequence, the discussion will concentrate mainly on military and political issues, mostly leaving aside questions of economic, societal and environmental security on the grounds that these issues interact less strongly with NOD. Section 1 considers the geopolitics of Japan's security that arise from its being an island country. Section 2 analyses some crucial historical considerations, particularly Japan's status as a great power, and the particular circumstances of its historical relationship with its neighbours. Section 3 looks at Japan's position during the cold war, examining how the legacies of its defeat in the Second World War blended into the demands placed upon it as a front‐line ally of the United States against Chinese and Soviet power. Section 4 surveys the actual and possible changes in Japan's security environment consequent upon the ending of the cold war. It focuses on Japan's relationships with the United States, the East Asian region, the international system as a whole, and finally on Japan's relationship with itself. Section 5 considers the requirements for a Japanese defence and security policy in the post‐cold war era.