Is Mexican democracy consolidated?

In the wake of Mexico's electoral watershed of 2 July 2000, many scholars are willing to classify the country as an electoral democracy, yet debate persists over whether Mexican democracy is consolidated. This article seeks to advance this debate by clarifying the meaning of the term democratic ‘consolidation’ and how it should be operationalised. It argues that the concept should refer exclusively to a regime with a low probability of democratic breakdown. This avoids the conceptual confusion created by viewing consolidation as any change that improves the quality of democracy. In terms of measuring consolidation, it maintains the importance of placing greater weight on the proximate cause of regime instability, anti‐democratic behaviour, and discounting more remote causes of democratic breakdown, including economic performance, institution building, and attitudinal support. Based on this understanding, the article explains why Mexican democracy is fully consolidated.     

In the service of democracy

The notion of service can encompass much more than the basic duties of obedience, loyalty, trust, and courage directed solely to some higher secular authority. It can also encompass a duty to a “common good,” a “good society,” a “public,” or a people. If public service is to be viewed as an integral component of our democratic political system, the ethical-moral values of faith, hope, and love must be recognized as the critical impulses which energize a life dedicated to the service of democracy. But such an approach is very different from the current focus of democratic ethics. In particular the love ethic inevitably moves on a collision course with many of our basic canons of public sector management such as the concept of formal, institutionalized, bureaucratic authority, the notion of detached, dispassionate, objective neutrality, and the almost absolute emphasis placed on rational, routinized, programmed behavior.

To labor in the service of democracy is to recognize that all of us are called, in one way or another, to be watchmen, sentinels, or prophets of others. It is a recognition of the fact that a life in service of democracy is a life of constant instruction, giving and receiving knowledge about right conduct in the formation of one person's character by another, and in the acceptance of another's guidance in one's own growth. In a word, society is dependent on the career professionals in governments at all levels to lead it to a new value vision of the common good. As a first step in this direction, public administrators must be willing to confront the suppressive and debilitating constraints which currently are being imposed on bureaucracy from all directions, and to reaffirm the values and virtues inherent in the notion of service which have unified the ethical forces of democracy so well in the past.     

International democracy promotion: a role for public goods theory?

The state of international democracy promotion is in flux. After more than fifteen years of increasing activity and with more organisations and resources devoted to promoting democracy than ever before, a mood of uncertainty surrounds democracy support's current performance and future prospects. The last decade has also seen the emergence of a new literature on global public goods theory, offering fresh analytical perspectives on pressing issues in international affairs like peace, security, development, and environmental sustainability. The future of democracy promotion will be determined chiefly by the realities of the political market place, in societies on both sides of the relationship. But could recent theorising about the market for global public goods offer some analytical support for making sense of its current condition and, by identifying the democratic peace as a global public good strengthen the case for greater international cooperation in promoting democracy as means to achieve that end?     

Flexibility versus Inflexibility: discursive discrepancy in US democracy promotion and anti-corruption policies

This article analyses US discourses on democracy promotion and anti-corruption strategies. The analysis shows that there is a cosmetic agreement in these discourses on notions of the good society that identify democracy as a good thing and corruption as a bad thing. However, despite this agreement, there are differences in the discourses on the measures recommended to promote democracy and fight corruption that may lead to policies and processes pulling in opposite directions. This discrepancy arises, on the one hand, from a mode of operation of democracy promotion that is flexible and adaptable to various contexts and, on the other hand, from the uncompromising and inflexible language of anti-corruption policies that threatens to ‘undo’ what US democracy promotion's rhetoric aims to achieve: ownership and sustainability of democratic reforms through re-empowering the state.     

Can non-democracies support international democracy? Turkey as a case study

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a rise of interest in the concept of autocracy promotion, with scholars questioning whether the efforts by authoritarian governments to influence political transitions beyond their borders are necessarily pro-authoritarian. An extension of this question is whether some authoritarian governments may at times find it in their interest to support democracy abroad. This article aims to answer this question by focusing on the case of Turkey. It argues that, despite its rapidly deteriorating democracy since the late 2000s, Turkey has undertaken democracy support policies with the explicit goal of democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the Arab Spring and, while not bearing the intention of democratic transition, has employed democracy support instruments in the form of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 to the present day. Based on original fieldwork, the article finds that non-democracies can turn out as democracy supporters, if and when opportunities for strategic gains from democratisation abroad arise. The article further suggests that even in those cases where strategic interests do not necessitate regime change, a non-democracy may still deploy democracy support instruments to pursue its narrow interests, without adhering to an agenda for democratic transition.     

Reconciling public administration and democracy: the role of the responsible administrator

This article considers whether the individual responsibilities of bureaucratic officials provide a useful means for reconciling the tension between democracy and bureaucracy. Three questions central to the proper definition of bureaucratic responsibility are examined: (1) What is the relation of bureaucratic responsibility to the view that proper bureaucratic conduct is essentially a matter of ethics and morality? (2) If the appeal to moral values does not ordinarily offer an acceptable guide to proper bureaucratic conduct, upon what principles does a theory of bureaucratic responsibility rest? (3) What issues arise in putting responsibility into practice within a complex organizational setting? The article concludes that a democratic, process-based conception offers the most useful way of thinking about the responsibilities of bureaucratic officials.

The tension between democracy and bureaucracy has bedeviled public administration. However one defines democracy, its core demand for responsiveness (to higher political authorities, the public, client groups, or whatever the presumed agent of democratic rule) does not neatly square with notions of effective organization of the policy process and efficient delivery of goods and services, which are central to the definition of bureaucracy. Responsiveness need not guarantee efficiency, while bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency often belie democratic control.

This tension between democracy and bureaucracy persists, but that it is the individual administrator who directly experiences the tension is especially important as a guide toward a resolution of this conflict. Since divergence is central to this tension between democracy and bureaucracy, speculation about the responsibilities of bureaucratic officials—their individual places within the bureaucracy, particularly the administrator's thoughts, choices, and actions—provides fruitful terrain for resolving the question of bureaucracy's place within a democratic system of rule.

Three questions need to be addressed if one accepts the premise that individual responsibility is central to locating the place of bureaucracy in a democratic order. First, what is unique about bureaucratic responsibility, especially in contrast to the view that these are largely ethical problems that can be resolved by appeal to moral values? Second, if dilemmas of bureaucratic conduct are by and large not resolvable through appeal to moral values, upon what other principles does a theory of bureaucratic responsibility rest? Third, what issues arise in putting responsibility into practice, especially within a complex organizational setting? This list of questions is not meant to be exhaustive but only a starting point for discussion.     

Grassroots democracy and local government in Northern Syria: the case of democratic confederalism

This paper provides a case study regarding an innovative model of grass-roots democracy, called democratic confederalism, which is currently being implemented in Northern Syria. The difference between democratic confederalism and previous experiments with grass-roots democracy is that its evolutionary pattern aims to include heterogeneous local communities living in the same territories, with the objective of becoming an administrative model for the whole Syrian country, without shattering its national constitution. In fact, the evolution of the political and administrative system and the introduction of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria were specifically aimed at including all ethnicities and not focusing on the Kurdish population only. Following a literature review aimed at defining the theoretical background of democratic confederalism, the case study is presented. Data collection occurred through semi-structured interviews and informal talks with key stakeholders in the Kurdish movement; the findings and main implications of the model are described and analysed.     

Moderate Islam and secularist opposition in Turkey: implications for the world,Muslims and secular democracy

Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey's peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy. Arguing that secularism in advanced democracies may be a product of democracy as much as it is the other way around, the article maintains that democratic consolidation may secure further consolidation of Turkish secularism and sustainable moderation of Turkish political Islam. Besides democratic Islamic – conservative actors and other factors, democratic consolidation requires strong democratic – secularist political parties so that secularist and moderate Islamist civilian actors check and balance each other. Otherwise, middle class value divisions and mistrust in areas like education and social regulation may jeopardise democratisation and economic modernisation and continuing reconciliation of Islamism with secular democracy and modernity.     

Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing recent evidence

The purpose of this article is to reassess two influential theories of democratic development: the theory of democratic culture and the theory of economic development. The leading predecessors in each domain—Ronald Inglehart and Adam Przeworski—are the prime targets of analysis. We take issue with recent evidence presented by these authors on three grounds: the evidence (1) confuses “basic” criteria of democracy with possible “quality” criteria (Inglehart); (2) conceptualizes democracy in dichotomous rather than continuous terms (Przeworski); and (3) fails to account for endogeneity and contingent effects (Inglehart). In correcting for these shortcomings, we present striking results. In the case of democratic culture, the theory lacks support; neither overt support for democracy nor “self-expression values” affect democratic development. In the case of economic development, earlier findings must be refined. Although the largest impact of modernization is found among more democratized countries, we also find an effect among “semi-democracies.” Axel Hadenius is professor of political science at Uppsala University in Sweden. He is the author ofDemocracy and Development (Cambridge University Press, 1992) andInstitutions and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2001). Jan Teorell is associated professor of political science at Uppsala University. His articles on intra-party democracy, social capital, and political participation appear in international journals.     

Social capital and democracy in Russia

The two basic objectives of this study are to determine whether or not Russia has stocks of social capital upon which to draw as it seeks to democratize, and to examine the nature of the relationship between social capital and democracy in Russia. I present both qualitative and quantitative evidence that social capital exists in many parts of Russia. After a quantitative analysis of social capital and democratization, which identifies a strong positive relationship, I suggest that if the center is able to sustain democracy, Russia should be able to consolidate democratic rule.     

Nation and democracy building in contemporary Europe: the reproduction of the Basque demos

The article analyzes the material or objectified reproduction of the Basque demos since democracy was established in Spain in 1980. Spain holds within its territory diverse regions and political communities and the Basque case is a highly illustrative example of how the development of regional state institutions is fundamental for the reproduction of distinct democratic demoi not merely in their political but also socio-economic dimension. This paper argues that, in our current European context, political distinctions cannot become effectively objectified and instituted power structures without state institutions being able to uphold a differentiated system of stratification.     

Post-communist transformation in progress: Poles' attitudes toward democracy

The present study investigates how Poles perceive the post-communist political system of contemporary Poland. A nationwide random sample of 400 adults was selected, using a probability quota sampling strategy, and interviewed face-to-face in respondents' homes. The chief outcome variables were: full acceptance, conditional acceptance, and rejection of the Polish version of democracy. The majority of respondents generally approved, fully or at least conditionally, the new democratic system in Poland. Multiple regression analyses showed that differential attitudes toward Polish democracy depend on respondents' age, their understanding of the concept of democracy, evaluations of democracy in general, and levels of political anomie.     

Development strategy and regime type: Why doesn’t democracy matter?

The development strategy literature argues that autonomous bureaucrats in authoritarian Asian NICs followed successful export-led growth strategies while Latin American policymakers were pressured by mobilized sectors to maintain doomed import substitution industrialization. What is more, this ISI strategy made the consolidation of democracy impossible. However, my research on Venezuela indicates that ISI and democracy can be made compatible—the democratic state was penetrated by business and labor, those avenues for penetration were protected from electoral politics, and the relative participation of business and labor remained fluid. How are recently established democracies being made compatible with a new market-oriented development strategy? Evidence from East Asia and Latin America indicates that the transition to market-oriented economies and the institutionalization of participation by key sectors have not gone together. Policymakers are trying to isolate bureaucrats from public pressure and centralize power away from bodies vulnerable to electoral oversight. The “deinstitutionalization” of democratic politics may make the relationship between regime type and development strategy unstable.     

US democracy assistance programs in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution

The 2004 Orange Revolution failed to skyrocket Ukraine into the ranks of consolidated democracies. Some previous research claimed that, in the similar case of post-Rose Revolution Georgia, its vague democratic perspectives can be explained by, among others, a negative impact of politically biased US democracy assistance programs. This article examines five groups of US programs (electoral aid, political party development, legislative strengthening, NGO development and media strengthening) implemented in Ukraine in 2005–2010, and concludes that US diplomatic support for the pro-Western “Orange” leadership did not translate into political bias of US-funded democracy assistance programs.     

When the center can hold: The primacy of politics in shaping Russian democracy

Violations of rights, a weak Duma, political parties dominated by bureaucrats, and corrupt privatization are ordinarily taken as signs or even causes of the failure of democracy in Russia or at best as normal traits of electoral politics in a middle-income state. Yet all of these are natural consequences of introducing democracy in a country with the Russian electorate’s distinctive recent experience of a loss of a third of the state’s territory and half its population. In such a democracy only a centrist, not a liberal, strategy can block a return to authoritarianism, and such a strategy in Russia will subordinate rights to the task of privatization that a Duma weakened by ideological, demographic and geographic impediments to party development cannot conduct. Consequently what are taken as signs or causes of democratic failure in Russia are instead necessary effects of introducing democracy in Russia’s special circumstances.     

Leaking Superpower: WikiLeaks and the contradictions of democracy

While US government agencies endorse and support the democratic potential of the internet and social media overseas, the criticisms of the WikiLeaks disclosures of US diplomatic cables reveal the bias in relation to transparency and democracy. This poses a wider problem of connectivity combined with hegemony. This paper discusses what the criticisms of the WikiLeaks disclosures reveal. After discussing the enthusiasm about ‘hyper-connectivity’, the paper turns to the WikiLeaks disclosures, and next spells out global ramifications of the leaked cables, the problems of transparency and hegemony, frictions between democracy and democratisation, and the role of banks blocking donations to WikiLeaks.     

Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell

This article demonstrates that Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell’s attempt to disprove a causal effect of emancipative mass orientations on democracy is flawed in each of its three lines of reasoning. First, contrary to Hadenius and Teorell’s claim that measures of “effective democracy” end up in meaningless confusion of democracy and minor aspects of its quality, we illustrate that additional qualifications of democracy illuminate meaningful differences in the effective practice of democracy. Second, Hadenius and Teorell’s finding that emancipative orientations have no significant effect on subsequent measures of democracy from Freedom House is highly unstable: using only a slightly later measure of the dependent variable, the effect turns out to be highly signficant. Third, we illustrate that these authors’ analytical strategy is irrelevant to the study of democratization because the temporal specification they use misses almost all cases of democratization. We present a more conclusive model of democratization, analyzing how much a country moved toward or away from democracy as the dependent variable. The model shows that emancipative orientations had a strong effect on democratization during the most massive wave of democratization ever—stronger than any indicator of economic development. Finally, we illustrate a reason why this is so: emancipative orientations motivate emancipative social movements that aim at the attainment, sustenance, and extension of democratic freedoms.     

Elections and democracy in Russia

The word `democracy' has predominantly negative connotations when referring to its practical implementation in Russia. However, Russians are favourable to the idea of democracy in principle, and support the establishment of genuine democracy in the country. Beliefs that elections ensure accountability of elected officials, allow public input on the policy direction of government, and give personal benefits to individuals would help to increase acceptance of the value of Russian democracy. A combination of factors, however, makes it doubtful that the current negative attitudes can be overcome quickly.     

Manifestations of delegative democracy in Russian local politics: what does it mean for the future of Russia?

In attempts to describe post-communist politics adequately, this paper employs the concept of delegative democracy for analyzing Russia's local politics. It argues that the election rather than appointment by the President of local governors in Russia has facilitated the establishment of a system which can be generally described as delegative democracy. This regime inherits free and contested elections from the democratic system and non-democratic methods of power consolidation from the authoritarian system. As a mixture of those two hardly reconcilable types of political system, delegative democracy in Russia has gained a shape and reached a certain degree of stability during 1993–95. This gain may delay the consolidation of representative democracy in Russia for an indefinite time and eventually lead to a new level of economic stagnation and a return to authoritarianism.     

Discursive democracy and the challenge of state building in divided societies: reckoning with symbolic capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Current approaches to democratic state building place serious conceptual limits on policy options. A democratic future for Bosnia's people will require far more searching engagement with identity formation and its politicization than reform efforts have so far contemplated. Theories of discursive democracy illuminate how this might be possible. We deploy the discursive idea of symbolic capital to show how one might identify the lines along which people in Bosnia could constitute meaningful, internally legitimated political communities – or that would indicate the experiment was not worth attempting. Unless advocates of democratic state building can articulate, rather than assume, a sufficiency of common ground among the populations' multiple, overlapping and conflicting identities, they may have to revert to the default of separate political communities.