Reviving the Rhetoric of Realism: Politics and Responsibility in Grand Strategy

In both disciplinary history and contemporary methodology, realism is conventionally cast as the antithesis of rhetoric. Born in reaction against the empty liberal rhetoric of interwar liberalism and espousing a robust materialism and rigorous rationalism, realism often seems the obstacle that rhetoric's focus on language, narrative, and social construction must inevitably confront and the challenge around which debates must again inevitably revolve. This article challenges this vision of the relationship between rhetoric and realism. Returning to the birth of international relations in the immediate post-war era, we demonstrate that early realists perceived rhetoric as central to action in domestic as well as international politics and that it was particularly important in the United States. This realist rhetoric is marked by an engagement with grand politics, with the relationship between rhetoric, political identity, social mobilization, political leadership, and foreign policy. Rather than taking either the American state or its national interest for granted, post-war realists sought to counter the dangers of the dominant historical rhetorics of American foreign policy and to develop an alternative rhetoric that could insulate American democracy from destructive tensions and provide the basis for robust and responsible action in world affairs. Recovering the relationship between realism and rhetoric is important not only in challenging disciplinary and methodological orthodoxies that obstruct creative theorizing, but also for its incisive contributions to thinking about American foreign policy amidst the profound changes and challenges it confronts today.     

On Strategy,Grand and Mundane

Is “grand strategy” a useful concept? What is it, and how is it different from “strategy”? Some definitions of grand strategy—as an all-encompassing idea for coordinating the resources of an entire nation to achieve its ultimate goals—are unachievable, overly focused on strategy as a master concept, could unintentionally militarize domestic policy, and blur the lines between strategy and policy. The concept is salvageable. Grand strategy is best thought of as both the intellectual framework or master concept that ties together whole-of-government (but not whole-of-nation) planning, and the long-term pattern of behavior that reveals states’ behaviors and priorities in action.     

结构理论、地理政治与大战略

本文认为,当今大战略研究长期以来一直都深受结构理论的重大影响,这种影响主要体现在当今大战略研究一般都是以国际体系中的权力分布作为主要的自变量,尽管在具体研究中技术因素和地理因素都可以作为干扰性变量,但这些变量并不影响到结构理论的内在逻辑.本文指出,以结构理论为基础的当代大战略研究的主要弊病在于,忽视了技术因素与地理因素的相互作用对大战略运行环境的潜在含义,而对此种相互作用的探讨可在很大程度上向人们提示以其作为主要考察对象的地理政治视角对大战略研究具有的重要意义.     

Intelligence and Grand Strategy

Elegant strategies can be constructed without reference to intelligence but persuading policymakers to implement them without knowing what intelligence might have to say about their likely efficacy and unintended consequences would be exceedingly difficult. Intelligence-derived information and insights should not dictate the goals of grand strategy, but they should inform decisions about what to do, how to do it, and what to look for in order to assess how well or badly the strategy is working.     

国家大战略理论论纲

作为一个单独和自觉的领域,关于国家大战略的真正理论研究迟至20世纪50和60年代才明确出现.直至当今,特别由若干杰出著作构建和标志,国家大战略理论研究经历了主要产生四方面重要学理成就的发展过程.然而,中国的有关理论研究尚处于很不充分的状态,同时国际上已有的大战略理论仍存在一些重大的乃至根本性的忽略和肤浅.为了针对现存的不足和缺陷从事补充、深化和升华,需要形成一个基本框架或纲要,在其中尽可能较全面并有创新地界定和提示大战略的15项基本问题或机理,它们分别存在于大战略目的、大战略目的与手段之间的关系、大战略手段及其资源基础、大战略决策机制和体制、大战略思维方式、大战略艺术及领导素质这六个方面.在特别根本的认识论意义上,大战略思维方式和大战略艺术本性问题是大战略的"活的灵魂",值得予以深入讨论.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

American Grand Strategy after Iraq

To the extent that a grand strategy can be discerned in the first year of the Obama Administration, its defining features are not a break from the past but continuity. As the President himself has analogized since taking office, crafting grand strategy is like parallel parking. He has only been able to make changes to grand strategy around the margins since a number of existing commitments limit his freedom of action. This article first identifies the structural determinants of grand strategy, pointing to the international distribution of power, American bureaucracy, and public as the key sources of strategic constraint and opportunity. It then shows how shifts in these factors—comparatively less U.S. power, an overstretched military organized around counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an American public weary from an aggressive grand strategy—produced a shift in grand strategy that predated the 2008 election and that remains consistent with the current strategic setting. It is for these reasons that the 2008 “change” election has produced considerable continuity in American grand strategy.     

国家大战略:概念与原则

本文主要对大战略的概念进行了廓清。认为大战略不同于国家战略和国家安全战略。战略是讲求原则的,认为大战略的原则主要有四条。指出大战略重视间接战略,实施大战略首选的是间接战略。     

国家大战略:目标与途径

国家大战略的构成要素主要有战略目标、战略实力和战略途径。关于战略实力,中国学术界论述较多,而对于战略目标和战略途径涉及较少。本文首先对战略目的、战略目标和战略任务三个概念进行了区分。在此基础上,作者对大战略的目标进行了确定,认为应该是防止外部威胁、控制外部威胁和化解外部威胁,并提出了实现战略目标的几种途径。     

How Grand was Reagan's Strategy, 1976-1984?

This article disputes the assertions of the new Reagan literature. Drawing upon radio broadcasts, speeches, correspondences, and documents from his presidential library, as well as recently published diaries from his White House years, it argues that Ronald Reagan had no grand strategy in the years 1976-1984. Indeed, throughout this period, he possessed two less-than-grand strategies I label “peace through strength” and “a crusade for freedom.” Each of these contained its own respective set of goals and employed its own corresponding set of tactics. Yet there was no grand strategy for ending the Cold War.     

Grand Strategy after the Vietnam War

The perceived history of the Vietnam War profoundly influenced American discussions on grand strategy during the postwar period. The two largest schools of thought, one favoring confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other favoring engagement, drew lessons from the war based upon differing historical interpretations and used those lessons as support beams in constructing grand strategy. Compelling world events during the Carter presidency caused only a few individuals to shift positions in the debate, but one of those individuals was Jimmy Carter himself. Subsequent discoveries by historians indicate that the confrontation school understood the war's history and the postwar world better than did the engagement school and consequently crafted a superior grand strategy. The post-Vietnam debate contains numerous parallels to present-day discussions of grand strategy and offers a variety of lessons salient to contemporary strategic formulation.     

Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations

Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Garfinkle recently opined that American grand strategy has died a silent death. Too much attention has been devoted to definitions, or debates over the utility of strategy. Not enough consideration has been given to the complexities of actually building a robust strategy amidst that effectively integrates all elements of national power within a complex bureaucracy. Oddly, the exclusion of politics contradicts our understanding of war and conflict. Likewise, not enough attention has been applied to the fundamental components of building a competitive strategy that can be sustained over time. This essay offers an introductory discussion of the basic considerations or components of national strategy.     

Grand Strategy for the Next Administration

With the current administration's attention, resources and reputation so tied to Iraq, the prospect for significant changes in American foreign policy are limited in George W. Bush's remaining months in office. A new administration coming into power in January 2009, however, gives the United States a chance to revisit the changes to American foreign policy implemented after 9/11, as well as to consider any needed course corrections. The opportunity such changes in administration offers is a major strength of the American political system. Clearly, now is the time to start thinking about such issues.     

国家大战略理论与中国的大战略实践

经过两战之间时期里的理论生成铺垫 ,国家大战略作为一个单独和自觉的理论领域到 2 0世纪五六十年代明确出现 ,90年代开始扩散和发展。然而 ,予以重要补充、拓展和深化仍然必要 ,而尚存问题分布于大战略目的、目的与手段之间关系、手段及其资源基础、决策机制和体制这四大方面。国家大战略理论可以成为一种基本框架和有力工具 ,用于考察、构思、论证和表述中国远期和近期的对外大战略主要内容 ,及其较具体的中国对外战略和政策的各主要分支性课题。     

Russia's Indirect Grand Strategy

Modern Russia is a revisionist, if not a revanchist, nation-state. It seeks to end the efficacy of the post-World War II institutionalized rules-based international order, which was created and maintained by the U.S.-led Western alliance. Russia pursues this objective to reclaim great power status and dominate the region and its borders. However, it lacks the strength to achieve this goal directly. To be successful, Russia must devise a strategy for bringing about cumulative changes in the relative power of the United States and Russia. And, it must do so while avoiding direct confrontation. A model for such an indirect approach exists.     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

The Potential and Pitfalls of a Zero-Sum Grand Strategy

Grand strategy provides the strategic vision for a state in pursuit of its national interests. The current U.S. grand strategy straddles the line between isolationism and off-shore balancing. Based on the international relations theory of realism, these strategies view international actions as a zero-sum game. In other words, a country can only benefit at the expense of another. The zero-sum logic is clearly articulated in the “America First” strategic documents. It is also apparent in many of the president's speeches and policy actions. While the Trump administration's zero-sum approach has potential to rebalance burdens and level the playing field in such areas of trade, it is fraught with risks and jeopardizes the standing of the United States in the world.     

Partisan Conflict Over Grand Strategy in Eastern Europe, 2014-2017

How should foreign policy analysts understand the American response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014? Despite widespread bipartisan recognition that Eastern European states, from the Baltic States to the Black Sea, were experiencing their most severe crisis since at least the end of the Cold War, the United States responded with little military support to the region. Even though all sides agreed on the need for a larger response, the tepid reaction to the Russian invasion was due to the partisan divide over the means of addressing the issue. This divide foreclosed the two main options for the President: a redeployment of forces from the United States or a larger military and budget. This disagreement over the means, rather than the ends, counter intuitively prevented a response for which both parties expressed support.

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American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk

If there is no single long-standing American grand strategy, one nonetheless sees through the course of U.S. history the tracks of a grand strategy. It started with the idea of a U.S. monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world; with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic system to support these; and the objective of transforming international politics. Since 9/11, even if the strategic hierarchy, intensity, and political basis have changed, the Bush administration has largely been continuing in this same project, with a sensible strategy but poorly considered tactics.