The effect of alliance membership on national defense burdens, 1953–88: A test of Mancur Olson's theory of collective action

Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) offered the first theoretical explanation for variation in the defense burdens of allies. Since then, the theory of collective action (Olson, 1971 [1965]) has been extensively tested using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WTO). While most studies indicate that allied defense burdens (the ratio of military expenditures to gross domestic product) are correlated with economic size, this relationship has rarely been assessed for non‐allied states. Here we examine the association between national defense burdens and economic size, 1953–1988, for NATO, the WTO, the Rio Pact, and the Arab Collective Security Pact in a nested test using most of the non‐allied nations of the world as a control group. Our results generally support the theory. NATO and the Warsaw Pact consistently conform to theoretical expectations, and evidence regarding the Rio Pact, on balance, is positive. Defense burdens are not correlated with economic size within the Arab Pact, however. In addition, nations’ defense burdens are affected by the external threat, as indicated by arms races and war; but the effect of involvement in war is surprisingly small.     

Transatlantic burden sharing: suggesting a new research agenda

ABSTRACT

Current studies on NATO burden sharing are only able to show some weak statistical trends between selective variables; they are unable to explain and show why this trend exists and why it occurred at particular times (or not). This is due to the dominant deductive and hypothesis testing research designs that prevent researchers to produce richer causal explanations or intersubjective understandings of how states, for example, construct and assign meaning to burdens or what forms of social representation, values, norms and ideals influence the making of (national) burden sharing decisions. Thus, we charge, the literature needs to adopt an eclecticist approach to studying NATO burden sharing – that is to combine rationalist with sociological approaches and methodologies highlighting the importance of intersubjective meanings and the role of social forces, norms, beliefs, and values. The article lays out what such a research programme might look like and how one could operationalise it.     

Regional public goods and international organizations

This article focuses on the provision prognosis for regional public goods (RPGs) and the role of international organizations in fostering supply in developing countries. All three properties of publicness—i.e., nonrivalry of benefits, nonexcludability of nonpayers, and the aggregation technology—play a role in this prognosis. The paper highlights many provision impediments, not faced by national or global public goods. When intervention is necessary, the analysis distinguishes the role of global, regional, and other institutional arrangements (e.g., networks and public-private partnerships). The pros and cons of subsidiarity are addressed. JEL codes H87 · O18 · R58     

Does Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?

The past decade has witnessed an explosion of interest in the partisan polarization of the American electorate. Scholarly investigation of this topic has coincided with the media’s portrayal of a polity deeply divided along partisan lines. Yet little research so far has considered the consequences of the media’s coverage of political polarization. We show that media coverage of polarization increases citizens’ beliefs that the electorate is polarized. Furthermore, the media’s depiction of a polarized electorate causes voters to moderate their own issue positions but increases their dislike of the opposing party. These empirical patterns are consistent with our theoretical argument that polarized exemplars in journalistic coverage serve as anti-cues to media consumers. Our findings have important implications for understanding current and future trends in political polarization.     

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

乌兹别克斯坦再次退出集体安全条约组织的原因及影响

2012年12月19日,集体安全条约组织批准了乌兹别克斯坦关于退出该组织的申请。这是乌2006年8月重返集安组织以来的再次退出。此举的深层次原因是乌对外政策目标与俄罗斯主导的欧亚空间一体化进程矛盾的积累。退出之后,乌将继续在美国和俄罗斯之间寻求一种更加谨慎的平衡关系。乌的退出,对集安组织的负面影响有限,将促使俄罗斯加强该组织内部一体化。