Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy

How should we explain the recent unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy? Some accounts treat growing American unilateralism as a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration. This paper, by contrast, traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects, at home and abroad, of the end of the Cold War. Internationally, the removal of the Soviet threat has undermined the "institutional bargain" that once guided relations between the U.S. and its major allies. Absent Cold War imperatives, the U.S. is less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less likely to defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal multilateral constraints. Domestically, the end of the Cold War has weakened the ability of presidents to resist the appeals of powerful veto players whose interests are threatened by multilateral commitments. These factors suggest that American unilateralism may have deeper roots and more staying power than many expect.     

Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the strategic goal to contain Communism. Human rights and democracy were of secondary importance. In the post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights and democracy as foreign policy concerns rose in prominence. In the spirit of Andrew Pierre, who once characterized arms transfers as "foreign policy writ large ," this study questions whether the transfer of U.S. arms mirrors America's foreign policy goals. To what extent do U.S. arms transfers reflect a concern for human rights and democracy? As a foreign policy instrument, do U.S. arms transfer patterns mark a transition between Cold War and post-Cold War worlds? To address these questions, I examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981–2002. I use a two-stage model to evaluate the decision-making process. The first-stage addresses whether a country is eligible to receive U.S. arms. If a country successfully passes through the selection stage, it progresses to the second stage where a decision is made about the amount of arms transferred. I use a Heckman model to estimate empirically the determinants of arms at both the initial selection stage and the subsequent amount stage. The findings indicate that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers—although democracy was positively linked to U.S. arms in the selection stage. In the post-Cold War period, both human rights and democracy had a meaningful impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive arms.     

The U.S. and third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations

Although scholars focused on Soviet–American relations during the Cold War, the greatest number of conflicts for the U.S. occurred in the Third World, and most of these were with revolutionary states. Could U.S. policies toward the new revolutionary states have prevented the almost universal collapse in relations? Two dominant explanations for this breakdown are (1) American hostility toward revolutionary change and (2) Stephen Walt's variant of the spiral model. Using the comparative case approach and selecting "hard cases," this article disputes these explanations and offers a new theory based on the externalization of domestic conflict in the revolutionary states. Given their ideological goals, the radicals externalized their domestic conflicts with the moderates, who had transnational ties with the U.S., by fomenting tensions with Washington. To demonstrate that this theory can be generalized, this article varies the dependent variable and shows through a critical case that its lack of conflict can best be explained by the absence of the conditions that lead to externalization. The foreign policies of both the U.S. and revolutionary states are explained by classical realism as opposed to Walt's structural realism, which fails to account for the foreign policies of Third World states.     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998–2001

This article examines the confluence of forces at work to shape U.S. policy toward Cuba since the late 1990s. Our approach examines four key factors involved in policymaking toward Cuba in this period: (1) the entry of new interest groups into the Cuba policy process and an "entrepreneurial" Congress; (2) the executive's constitutionally based interests; (3) bureaucratic interests; and (4) pressure from outside the United States. We examine U.S.–Cuba policy by describing each determinant in isolation and then by looking at the dynamic interaction among them, showing how they are linked together. In doing so, we argue that an analysis including multiple factors better explains U.S. policy toward Cuba than one that focuses on a single factor such as the power of the Cuban-American community.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

American Asia Policy and the U.S. Election

This article reviews post-Cold War U.S./Asia policy and its potential electoral impact even as the United States selects its future foreign policy leadership and course of direction. This essay is presented in three parts: the first focuses on the U.S. security architecture in the Asian region, a brief second section on the relevance of recent changes in regional political economy, and the third attempts to determine how this emerging economic-security model might dovetail with perceived American political interests at a time of national resolution.     

Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes

Although the United States has been the most prolific intervener in the international system since the end of World War II, there has been little consensus among scholars regarding the motivations of U.S. interventions in domestic political disputes abroad. In addition, scholars do not agree on the relative effects of international factors and domestic factors on intervention decisions by the U.S. Previous research on the motivations of U.S. interventions has occurred within at least two distinctive “streams” of literature: (1) studies of state interventions; and (2) studies of the use of military force by the U.S. Hypotheses regarding U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes are derived from the previous literature, and the hypotheses are tested using recently-compiled data on intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes occurring between 1945 and 2002. The results suggest a combination of international factors, including geographic proximity and ideological linkage, significantly influence the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes. The results also suggest international factors are generally more important than domestic factors, and the effects of both domestic factors and international factors on U.S. intervention decisions may differ depending on the specific type of intervention and the time period.     

Getting a Grip on Tailored Deterrence: The World of Conflict Management

The assumption that the United States operates from a position of strength relative to its potential enemy underpins U.S. deterrence theory. This perceived strength has emboldened American administrations to take serious tactical risks, such as the positioning of aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in order to dissuade Soviet intervention in that conflict. This tacit assumption, facilitated and entrenched by overwhelming U.S.conventional military superiority in the post-Cold War era, forms the foundation both for the relatively recent developmentof tailored deterrence and for the “Flexible Deterrence Options” (FDO) that now constitute a routine aspectof the joint military planning process. This article argues that the tacit assumption of strength is too narrow and can promote the implementation of deterrent policies and actions that have the opposite effects of those intended. Deterrence, rightly understood, is a component of a conflict management strategy which implies a degree of weakness on the part of the statethat employs it. This condition must be recognized and then incorporated into policies and plans for deterrence.     

从美对俄战略看当前美俄的紧张关系

美俄关系是世界上最重要的大国关系之一。美国弱俄、抑俄政策是冷战时期对苏“遏制”战略的继续，意识形态的对抗贯穿美苏和美俄关系的发展过程。近些年来，美俄不断形成相互挑战之势，今年俄格军事冲突又导致美俄对抗势头加剧。但两国不会回到冷战时代，非敌非友的两国关系将会长期保持。     

Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?

Aid potentially can contribute to democratization in several ways: (1) through technical assistance focusing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries as checks on executive power, and the promotion of civil society organizations, including a free press; (2) through conditionality; and (3) by improving education and increasing per capita incomes, which research shows are conducive to democratization. This study provides a multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization in a large sample of recipient nations over the 1975–2000 period. Using two different democracy indexes and two different measures of aid intensity, no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy. This result is robust to alternative model specifications and estimation techniques, including the use of exogenous instruments for aid. Results are similar if the analysis is confined to the post–Cold War period (1990–2000), despite the reduced dependence of the U.S. and other donors on pro-Western authoritarian regimes among aid recipient nations.     

试析中越关系中的美国因素

美国因素在中越关系中起着重要的作用。冷战结束以后，尤其是近些年来，越美关系发展迅速。两国在政治、经济和军事领域的合作，将不可避免地对中越关系造成影响。但是由于越美之间存在诸多矛盾和分歧，使得美国因素对中越关系的影响十分有限。对此，中国应积极应对，通过发展对越关系、对美关系和提升自身实力的方式，将美国因素对中越关系造成的不利影响降至最低点。     

Future U.S.-Russian Relations

Presidential changes in Russia and the U.S. may open new opportunities for improving increasingly important bilateral relations, but expectations are not high. With the elapse of the so-called Putin autocracy and the Bush unilateralism, U.S.-Russian relations are overshadowed by a new ＂Cold Word War,＂ if not a Cold War. The U.S. will continue to accuse Russia of running an autocracy in order to justify its own invasive foreign conduct and gain the moral high-ground. The two powers will be involved in a bitter struggle, alternating between offensives and defensives, containment and cooperation.     

Former Secretary of the Navy Lehman Assesses U.S. Strategy—Past and Present

A recurring question posed in recent issues of Orbis has been whether we find ourselves in a new era of great power competition. If so, are there lessons to be learned from America’s Cold War experience? Editor Nikolas K. Gvosdev asked John F. Lehman— former Secretary of the Navy, member of FPRI’s Board of Directors, and one of America’s leading strategic thinkers and policymakers—for his advice for U.S. strategists in this new era of great power competition, based on his experiences during the Cold War. Readers of Orbis will also benefit from Secretary Lehman’s assessments with the release of his new book, Where are the Carriers? U.S. National Strategy and the Choices Ahead.     

A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror

The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the Islamist terrorist threat is relatively undeterred by the U.S. military presence abroad, and U.S. forces abroad, particularly those deployed in Muslim countries, may do more to exacerbate than to diminish the threat. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading the terrorist network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations.     

古巴—美国关系50年四题

古巴革命是美国与古巴双边关系历史的重要转折点,美国对古巴革命及其后续发展的反应和政策则是冷战环境中美国战略思想的典型表露.全球冷战终结并没有改变古美之间的冷战式关系,凸显了美国政策的单边主义性质、意识形态色彩和国内政治主导倾向.     

新一届美国政府对外政策及影响前瞻笔谈

近年来,世界多极化趋势不断发展,美国主导的全球秩序开始显露坍缩征兆。然而,美国仍然保持着当今世界唯一的超级大国地位,其内政外交政策选择一直具有全球性影响。特朗普政府实施的"美国优先"政策对全球秩序造成了严重冲击,特别是对华发动极限施压性的"贸易战"和战略竞争,使中美关系发生严重倒退。特朗普政府随心所欲、极端强硬的执政风格,不仅招致很多国家的激烈批判和反对,在美国国内也引起了巨大争议。美国大选已经落下帷幕,尽管现任总统特朗普仍然没有承认和接受败选事实,但美国政府更迭已经无可逆转。新一届美国政府将采取什么样的对外政策?我们将如何应对美国因政府更迭而发生的政策调整?为加强对美国对外政策的前瞻研究,2020年11月5日,本刊编辑部联合吉林大学经济学院、现代国际关系研究所、东北亚研究院、东北亚研究中心、美国研究所等单位召开了"美国大选后的世界格局与中美关系"学术研讨会,10位专家做了会议发言。本刊选择其中3篇和另外1篇投稿摘要刊发,希望能够促进对美国新一届政府内政外交政策的前瞻性研究。     

Russian Grand Strategy and the United States in the 21st Century

Despite the initially cordial relationship between the United States and Russia following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Iraq War became a turning point in what evolved into the worst relationship between Moscow and Washington since the Cold War. From that point onwards, Russia persistently has exhibited aggressive behavior toward the United States, resulting in numerous crises. This article argues that this Russian assertiveness is deliberate, arising from a mixture of domestic and international factors. In light of recent developments in U.S.-Russian relations, especially the decision of American President Barack Obama to abandon the Bush Administration's scheme to deploy national missile defense (NMD) system in Eastern Europe, it is important to understand that Russia's grand strategy is aimed at promoting multipolarity and that Moscow is willing to apply limited military force to achieve its goals. The Obama Administration should engage Russia, but be prepared to confront it if necessary.     

U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq: Year 3

With year four of the Iraq War under way, this article focuses on the sources, patterns, and effects of fatalities. It shows how trends in fatalities correlate with nine distinct phases since the war's inception and analyzes in detail the last two, which prevailed during year 3, ending March 19, 2006: the Iraqi election cycle (which encompassed the election of the National Assembly, establishment of the transnational government, drafting of the Constitution, approval of the Constitution, and the election of parliament) and the start of U.S. efforts to disengage from the conflict. U.S. intentions to scale down its involvement while increasing Iraqi self-sufficiency have been hampered by the persistence of fatalities inflicted by the insurgency, which bifurcated its efforts during year 3, matching hostilities toward U.S. troops with organized civil strife involving Iraqis. Ultimately, only the Iraqi people and their new government can defeat the insurgency and bring U.S. involvement in the war to an end.     

U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia

Under the Pentagon's current Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), the United States is reducing its forces in several major Cold War base hosts and establishing a global network of smaller, more flexible facilities in new areas such as Central Asia, the Black Sea and Africa. Drawing upon recent evidence from the Central Asian base hosts of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this article cautions that these new U.S. overseas bases, despite their lighter footprint and regardless of the prevailing security situation, risk becoming enmeshed in the local struggles and political agendas of elites within these hosts. Periods of turbulent democratic transition and regime instability may encourage host country politicians to challenge the legitimacy and terms of the U.S. basing presence for their own political purposes. These are important lessons for U.S. planners who are simultaneously promoting democratization while they negotiate basing and military access agreements in these same politically volatile hosts.