论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

论公司治理与公司控制人侵权责任的追究

完善的资本市场是影响公司治理的一个非常重要的外部因素,同时,健全的公司治理又是健康的资本市场不可或缺的组成部分。良好的公司治理机制需要多方面因素的合理组合。从公司法的角度看,追究大股东、董事、经理等公司控制人的侵权责任是我国当前完善公司治理机制的核心内容之一。     

银行危机处置过程中的股东权利限制研究

银行危机处置过程中股东权利限制是危机时期社会规制的需要,规制的原因包括维护金融稳定、预防系统性风险的发生、维护存款者的市场信心和预防股东道德风险发生。但股东权利保护是现代企业制度的核心内容,这就在"限制"与"保护"之间形成矛盾,这是银行生存的不同时期,股东行使权利正当性基础的差别造成的。因此,分析银行运行不同时期股东权行使的正当性基础,是论证银行危机处置期股东权利限制必要性的基础,同时,股东权利的限制必然影响到公司治理中利益相关主体间的权利结构平衡,故从法律规制和银行公司治理结构调整两个方面对"矛盾"的协调提出完善的建议。     

论债权人参与公司治理的模式——基于公司社会责任视角的考察

公司社会责任理论纠正了股东利益至上的片面理念,要求公司在开展经营活动中不仅要遵守法律法规,而且也要遵守一般的商业伦理和社会的善良风俗,尤其要注重对公司债权人的责任承担。当今各国关于债权人参与公司治理的模式主要有两种,一种是以英、美为代表的债权人间接、消极参与模式,另一种是以德国和日本为代表的债权人直接、积极参与模式。我国债权人特别是银行债权人参与公司治理的模式应从内部监督和外部制约两个方面来完善。     

Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth

In recent years a growing consensus has emerged in favour of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation. Increasingly, this model is justified not on the basis of shareholder ownership rights but on efficiency grounds: whoever the immediate and direct beneficiaries of shareholder-orientation, it is argued, it ultimately indirectly benefits everyone by ensuring the maximization of aggregate social wealth. The prevalence of this view has caused the distributional dimensions of corporate governance to be neglected. This paper examines the distribution of share ownership and financial wealth in the US and the UK. Although share ownership has become more widely spread, it argues, it remains very heavily concentrated with the result that shareholder primacy is in reality the primacy of a small privileged elite. After an exploration of the contradictions of working class shareholding and the impact of greater shareholder-orientation on the distribution of wealth, the paper concludes by re-evaluating Hansmann and Kraakman's 'end of corporate history' thesis, arguing that recent developments represent a triumph not for efficiency but for the growing power of the shareholder class.     

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.     

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPANY

The important role that corporate governance has played in a wide range of public companies is self-evident. Recent major corporate failures are more or less related to bad corporate governance and the increasing corporate scandals call for good corporate governance not only in China but all around the world. Corporate governance is principally about how companies are structured and directed, which is indeed a quite broad field. It is a good direction to discuss how to improve the overall corporate governance level in China through the perspective of perfecting shareholder protection. However, while running companies for shareholder interests is getting increasingly more criticisms, the so-called stakeholder model and entity model are raised as alternative approaches. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this paper to find the most appropriate corporate objective which could be applied as the starting point for future corporate governance discussion by providing a right direction for assessing and evaluating corporate performance and accountability of management. Through the comparative studies of the three models, this paper concludes that shareholder primacy is a more effective and efficient approach with regard to advancing social welfare and controlling director’s accountability among others; the other two models cannot justify substituting the shareholder model as the corporate objective.     

The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel

Many concerned about UK corporate governance have urged those who own equity in listed companies to forsake a traditional bias in favour of passivity and act as responsible, engaged ‘owners’. The recent financial crisis has given added impetus to such calls, with the notion of ‘stewardship’ taking centre stage and resulting in July 2010 with the launch of a Stewardship Code targeting UK‐based institutional investors. This paper summarises the Stewardship Code initiative and argues that, primarily due to sustained fragmentation of share ownership occurring over the past 20 years, the Code is unlikely to foster substantially greater shareholder involvement in UK corporate governance.     

Balancing Social and Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese Corporate Structure and Norms

Japanese corporate law is undergoing a transition with new Commercial Code amendments in 2003 that allow corporations to opt for an Anglo‐American model of governance. Combined with shifts in securities regulation, shareholder activism, and the notion of Japanese lifetime employment, there is an important issue of whether these shifts represent a move towards an optimal corporate governance paradigm. The evolution is tempered by particular cultural norms that drive Japanese corporate law. While there is a perception in North America that Japanese corporations have shifted to an Anglo‐American model of corporate governance, the reality is more layered. It may be that ultimately, the governance model that evolves will adopt the best elements of increased transparency, corporate accountability, enhanced shareholder protection, employee long‐term employment protections, and production synergies, that would allow Japanese corporations to compete internationally, but retain those elements of corporate community that have long been considered a primary objective of the social and economic life of Japan.     

公司治理问题的法学思考——对中国公司治理法律问题研究的回顾与展望

对公司治理相关问题的研究是近20年来学术界最为关注的热点问题之一，其研究范围涉及到经济学、法学、管理学、社会学等诸多领域。这一问题的研究成果直接推动了中国现代企业制度的建立和公司法的修改。以法学研究为切入点，从不同的视角，对国内多年来的公司治理相关研究成果予以条分缕析般的冷静审视和详尽评述，其内容涉及到公司治理的范畴与理念、公司治理的路径，以及公司治理研究中广受关注的公司章程、股东会决议瑕疵、董事会与董事、监事会、职工参与、中小股东利益保护等各个方面。并在此基础上，对未来公司治理研究的方法和重点进行了思考和展望。     

Corporate Governance: Towards a Theory of Regulatory Shift

Providing effective corporate governance regulation and controls is a contemporary challenge to all law makers. There exists a need to restore investor confidence while seeking to facilitate and encourage enterprise. This paper reflects on the traditional choice between shareholder versus stakeholder models of corporate governance and suggests that these are inappropriate in the light of emerging news theories of the firm. Instead this paper suggests that law makers should accommodate a shift away from the traditional paradigms of these models in favour of a processual approach of governance. This would require a recognition of the tensions that exist in the regulation of corporate governance and invite the application of a collibratory process to the control of governance. The development and reform of directors’ duties and liabilities, in the UK, is provided as an illustration of the need for the recognised application of a collibratory process. Within that we also consider the application of the economists concept of ‘rent-seeking’ and the conflict between private property rights and public interference.JEL M14, D72, K22, K33     

Promoting a more efficient corporate governance in Nigeria through the law

Corporate governance reforms have been viewed as one of the formal means of improving the economic and social welfare of emerging economies. There have been efforts by the Nigerian government, through its agencies, to promulgate codes of best practices for companies in the country. These reforms appear to be ineffective and the codes do not compliment and are not complimented by corporate law. The aim of this paper is to identify the problems that hinder effective corporate governance reforms in Nigeria within corporate law. Using the doctrinal approach, the paper analyses features of the Nigerian corporate governance framework and identifies the problems bedeviling this regime. It argues that the problems stem from (amongst others), state ownership and control, board independence, poor minority shareholder protection, ineffective judicial system and Incomplete disclosure. The paper, by linking the apparent weakness of the extant framework to the attempt to reform outside corporate law, suggests a hybrid of legislation including hard laws, soft laws and other policy proposals to promote an effective corporate governance regime in Nigeria.     

The New Insolvency Law and Governance of Corporate Legal Person

Start of the insolvency proceedings influences the two basic problems of corporate governance: restriction about the “soft budget” of corporation and “information asymmetry” between the interior and exterior person. In fact, the insolvency law is a mechanism of the potential exterior supervision. In the insolvency proceedings, most of the information is open to the creditor and to the superintendent, who is liable for protecting the interest of the creditor. The key problems of corporate governance are transparency and information disclosure. The insolvency law provides the power of supervision to the creditor when corporation insolvency. Of importance is that power is conducted by collectivity and supported by judicatory and professional organization. In June 2004, the finance committee submitted the new draft of the insolvency law to the standing committee of the national people’s congress. There are many articles about corporate governance. These articles are generally divided into two kinds, one is restriction on conduct of the supervisors in the period of the insolvency proceedings, and the other is examination of the conduct before the start of the insolvency proceedings. Translated from Jurist Review, Vol. 2, 2005 (in Chinese)     

公司法人人格否认制度及其适用

公司法人人格制度在具体运作中,出现了公司股东滥用公司独立人格和股东有限责任的现象,本文针对公司人格被滥用的现状,对公司人格否认制度确立的必要性、公司法人人格否认法理及其适用作了初步分析,以平衡公司与股东的权利和股东与债权人的风险,达到健全和完善我国市场经济的立法作用。     

论公司法与民法典的良性互动关系

《公司法》与《民法典》无缝对接、有机衔接、同频共振、相辅相成《民法典》中的基本原则普适于公司法律关系,诸项具体制度也可补充适用。《公司法》对特定事项有规定、而《民法典》无规定时,应适用《公司法》。两法对特定事项均有规定、但相抵触时,应优先适用《公司法》。两法对法人制度的规定详略不同、但不相抵触时,应优先适用《公司法》。两法在很多公司法案件中可兼容并用,协同共治,互不排斥。平等、自愿、公平、诚信、公序良俗、绿色、关怀弱势群体和禁止权利滥用共同构成民法八项基本原则。而公司法有其独特原则,如等价有偿、尊重与保障公司的生存权与发展权、慎重解散公司、坚持商业模式的包容性、促进公司的三重营利性、弘扬股权文化、鼓励公司社会责任和构建新型亲清政商关系原则。要尊重《公司法》的特别法地位,必须切实扭转司法实践中的“轻公司法化”现象。修改《公司法》和解释《民法典》应着眼于消除规范冲突,预防制度真空,铸造制度合力。     

公司治理中职工参与制度探析

公司治理中的职工参与是我国建立现代企业制度的一个重要课题。在传统的公司治理理论中，股东是公司唯一的统治，公司的目标定位是股东利益的最大化。而职工参与作为现代公司治理结构的特点之一，在我国有着更为重要的现实意义。管理参与作为职工参与的方式之一，是社会主义市场经济的应有之义，我们不能听任其随着国有经济成分的下降而弱化；股权参与作为职工参与的所有权根据，是保障职工地位的更有效的制度保证，更有推行的迫切需要。     

公司社会责任制度的理论基础与路径选择

在经历了＂股东利益最大化理论＂和＂利益相关者理论＂的激烈争论之后,出现了＂改良的利益相关者理论＂。该理论将股东利益、其他利益相关者的利益以及公司价值统合在一个综合的价值评价体系之下,应该成为现代公司社会责任制度实施的理论基础,并指导公司治理实践。公司社会责任的实现不仅需要法律、舆论监督等外部手段的促进,更需要公司治理结构的配合。在＂改良的利益相关者理论＂出现之后,各国公司治理结构受到一定的影响,但并没有脱离原来的制度依赖。本文认为,在公司治理层面,社会责任理念的灌注及实现只能选择局部的功能性调整作为路径。     

Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union

The reform of German company law by the Control and Transparency Law (KonTraG) of 1998 reveals the politics of corporate governance liberalization. The reforms strengthened the supervisory board, shareholder rights, and shareholder equality, but left intra‐corporate power relations largely intact. Major German financial institutions supported the reform's contribution to the modernization of German finance, but blocked mandatory divestment of equity stakes and cross‐shareholding. Conversely, organized labor prevented any erosion of supervisory board codetermination. Paradoxically, by eliminating traditional takeover defenses, the KonTraG's liberalization of company law mobilized German political opposition to the European Union's (EU) draft Takeover Directive and limited further legal liberalization.     

Corporate Financial Performance and the Use of Takeover Defenses

This paper tests the hypothesis that the threat of a contested takeover improves corporate performance. This is done by a cross-sectional analysis of listed Danish firms with and without effective takeover defenses. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. Using simultaneous equation estimation to deal with the problem of causation, the results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms. This suggests that management in unprotected firms are disciplined by other corporate governance mechanisms than the market for corporate control, including the legal protection of shareholders.