On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide

On the face of it the 1948 Convention on Genocide appears tobe a treaty that on the one hand obliges contracting statesto criminalize and punish genocide in their domestic legal systemsand, on the other, arranges for interstate judicial cooperationfor the repression of genocide. The International Court of Justice(ICJ), in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, has instead held thatthe Convention, in addition to providing for the criminal liabilityof individuals, also imposes on contracting states as internationalsubjects a set of obligations (to refrain from engaging in genocide,to prevent and punish the crime, and also to refrain for allthose categories of conduct enumerated in Article III: conspiracy,incitement, attempt, complicity). This approach raises two questions:(i) is it warranted so to broaden states' responsibility? (ii)when applying such Article III categories to state responsibility,should an international court such as the ICJ that pronounceson interstate disputes rely upon criminal law categories toestablish whether a state incurs responsibility for conspiracy,complicity, and so on? Or should it instead forge autonomouslegal categories better suited to state responsibility? Theauthor sets forth doubts about whether it is appropriate totranspose criminal law categories to the corpus of internationallaw of state responsibility. In particular, his misgivings relateto the category of ‘state complicity in genocide’as set out by the Court: once the Court decided to transplantthis criminal law category to state responsibility, arguablyit should have relied upon the rigorous concept of complicity,as derived by international criminal courts from case law andthe relevant practice of states, rather than apply a notionthat finds no basis in international criminal law, in comparativecriminal law or in state practice.     

Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide: The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the ICJ's Judgment in the Genocide Case

Internationally sanctioned assessments of genocide are relativelyuncommon, and since genocide is usually assessed in the contextof an individual's criminal prosecution, assessments of stateresponsibility for genocide are even rarer. Yet two such analyseshave recently been completed: the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur's Report and the International Court of Justice'sJudgment on genocide in Bosnia. On a key issue, the methodologyfor determining whether a state is responsible for genocide,they diverged. Whereas the Darfur Commission determined whetherthe ‘central government’ of Sudan pursued a statepolicy or plan for genocide in Darfur, the ICJ stressed thata state commits genocide through the acts of its officials,holding that if a state organ or a person or group whose actsare legally attributable to the state, engages in genocide,then the international responsibility of that state is incurred.This article critically examines the different methodologicalapproaches taken by these two bodies in light of internationaljurisprudence. It argues that the Darfur Commission erred infocusing its genocide inquiry on whether high-level officialsin Sudan's government possessed genocidal intent, rather thanon the perpetrators of the underlying criminal acts. In addition,it argues that, whether the Commission's goal was to determinestate responsibility or individual criminal responsibility,its approach was at variance with international law as elucidatedin the UN ad hoc tribunals and as subsequently confirmed bythe ICJ in the Genocide Case. In that regard, the ICJ Judgmentreestablishes two sound methodological principles: the existenceof a state plan or policy, although probative of intent, isnot an implicit element of genocide; and determining state intent(however that may be defined) is not a part of determining stateresponsibility for genocide.     

Restorative Justice and Collective Responsibility: Lessons for and from the Rwandan Genocide

Genocide struck Rwanda in 1994. Since then, national and international trials have endeavored to promote reconciliation, deterrence, peace, justice, and human rights. This article posits a disconnect between these trials and the attainment of their avowed goals. This disconnect emerges in part from the influential agendas of international lawyers who equate selective criminal prosecution with the "rule of law" and espouse criminal prosecution as the preferred and uniform response to mass atrocity. Creating a presumption in favor of criminal prosecution has dampened the need to explore whether such trials actually are suitable for the particular afflicted society. A socio-legal analysis suggests that Rwanda is precisely a place where constructed notions of what "rule of law" ought to be are supplanting the need to implement reconstructive policies that may be best for Rwanda. In particular, the populist nature of the Rwandan genocide, coupled with the vast level of victimization, suggest that a shame-based restorative approach may be more successful in promoting reconciliation, deterrence, and peace than the guilt-based retributive approach currently in vogue. This article argues that, when the law blames occurrences of genocidal evil largely on the existence of some evil people, it obscures the fact that so many people, to varying degrees of complicity, are required for this evil to result in so many deaths.     

人权的国家保障义务

国家是人权保障的主要义务主体.这是因为保障人权是国家存在的价值所在和行使国家权力的合法性基础;对人权的最大威胁也往往来自国家权力;社会主体之问侵犯人权的行为也仰仗国家的整治.人权的国家保障义务包括尊重、保护、满足和促进四个方面.按国家行为的性质可分为消极义务与积极义务;按社会主体的权利性质可分为对私权利和公权利的保护义务;还有经由人权推定而衍生的保护义务;以及国家对人权的国际义务.国家在履行人权保障义务时,应当遵守以人为本、人权保障优位原则;平等保护原则;他律与自律原则(以法控权和"克制保留义务").国家(政府)违反人权义务应当承担国家责任.     

Criteria for Allocation of Responsibility under State Law

Numerous state statutes provide guidance for allocating responsibility and response costs among potentially responsible parties at environmentally contaminated sites. Twenty-eight states explicitly or implicitly address joint and several liability; thirty states address allocation criteria; and two states identify how orphan share costs are shared. Of the thirty states that address allocation criteria in their statutes, twenty-four specify one or more criteria that may be applied to avoid joint and several liability, and twenty-nine permit the allocation of responsibility using unspecified equitable factors. The state allocation criteria tabulated and discussed in this article can be used by counsel and their technical consultants and experts to assess which, if any, state-specific criteria are most applicable to a particular site, given the technical, historical, financial, and regulatory information that may be available for that site.     

怠于履行公共职能的国家赔偿责任

怠于履行公共职能是指行政主体行使职权时，未尽合理的注意义务，产生行为之懈怠，导致法律期待的公共职能实现不能或不充分的公务过失行为。为使裁量性行政导致的公民权益受损得到有效的救济，督促行政主体在行使职权时竭心尽力追求公共职能的充分实现，需要将怠于履行公共职能纳入行政赔偿范围。这种公务过失在赔偿责任上适用过错责任原则，对其损害的认定应包括现实利益、精神利益和正当预期利益，在因果关系判断方面，除了要考虑行政主体拥有比一般社会理性更高的公务理性之外，还应该考虑其裁量性选择的正当性理由。     

State Responsibility for Transboundary Air Pollution in International Law

Netherlands International Law Review -     

Making Genocide Unthinkable: Three Guidelines for a Critical Criminology of Genocide

Through a critical examination of some of the prevailing arguments for establishing a criminology of genocide, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of mainstream criminological frameworks for understanding genocide. Moreover, it argues that, if we are to move beyond a mechanical application of the criminological canon to this thus far understudied area of criminal behaviour, we must develop a critical and reflexive criminological approach to the topic of genocide. In this manner, the analysis presented here follows in the footsteps of Bauman [Bauman (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press] by asking: what can genocide teach us about criminology? In addressing this question, three guidelines for a future criminology of genocide are proposed. Briefly put, a criminology of genocide should be: (1) reflexive and non-redemptive; (2) ‘undisciplined’ and critical; and, (3) responsible.     

Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law

States routinely provide support and assistance to their corporate nationals in their global trade and investment ventures. While states may not intend to allow corporate nationals to violate human rights in their extraterritorial operations, by their actions or omissions, states may facilitate, or otherwise contribute to, a situation in which such violations by a corporation occur. This article investigates the extent to which the extraterritorial activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) that violate international human rights law can give rise to home state responsibility. The analysis shows that home states of TNCs have obligations under international law in certain situations to regulate the extraterritorial activities of corporate nationals or the latter's foreign subsidiaries and can incur international responsibility where they fail to do so.     

国家责任法的性质

国家责任法调整国家之间的责任法律关系,涉及国际法的次级规则,具有独立性.与国内法上的责任制度不同,国家责任法是一种普遍性的单一责任制度,它不区分民事责任与刑事责任、违约责任与侵权责任.但国家责任不包含刑事责任,而在总体上与国内法上的民事责任相类似.     

国家保护责任三题

国家保护责任理论认为国家与国际社会有向处在危险中的人民提供生命支持保护及援助的预防责任、做出反应责任以及重建责任.国家保护责任理论是对传统的主权、安全观的重新阐释.国家保护责任理论通过对安理会作用的扩张解释,赋予了国际社会解决人道主义危机的责任.国家保护责任理论在某种程度上可以应付日益复杂的国际危机,但是我们必须关注其所带来的消极影响.     

现代法律援助制度中的国家责任

国家责任的有无是现代法律援助制度与传统法律援助制度相区别的主要标志。现代法律援助制度作为法治社会的一项人权保障制度 ,已经在许多国家的法律甚至宪法或宪法性文件中加以确立。法律援助的国家责任也被规定在一系列国际文件中。我国目前已建立法律援助制度 ,但并未形成现代法律援助制度。在我国向现代法律援助制度方向发展的过程中 ,确立我国法律援助的国家责任尤显必要。     

日本预防接种行政与国家责任之变迁

作为典型的风险领域,预防接种风险与收益并存。从1948年颁布《预防接种法》至今,日本预防接种制度目的从社会防卫走向个人防卫,预防接种行政也经历了从集中接种、强制接种走向个别接种、劝奖接种的转变,法律责任从无责任、民事责任转为损失补偿和国家赔偿责任。上述变革是日本预防接种理论和实践在反复质疑、论证和妥协后所寻求的一次次平衡,其制度背后的实践困境、理论探讨和变革过程值得我国借鉴。     

Making the State Responsible: Intersex Embodiment,Medical Jurisdiction,and State Responsibility

Through consideration of new developments in the United Kingdom's intersex policy, this article traces the ways in which responsibility is produced, naturalized, and avoided by individuals, institutions, and the state. Jurisdiction is identified as a barrier to the attribution of responsibility that must be overcome to achieve progress in relation to the needs of intersex people. By bringing together jurisdictional analysis and vulnerability theory, this article demonstrates how the state has traditionally abrogated responsibility by compartmentalizing specific practices as governed by medical authority. It highlights that such accounts mask the role of the state in the creation of jurisdiction and the ways in which governance is conducted. Challenging these boundaries allows vulnerability theorists to move the state towards greater levels of responsibility. By combining these theoretical tools, the article enhances the practical utility of vulnerability theory and advances an important agenda for intersex people.