A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice

The paper examines the benefits the sovereign member states of the EU expect to derive by granting the European Court of Justice the power to review the collective policy making decisions of the EU legislative bodies. Using the methodology of constitutional political economy it investigates the one-country one-judge rule of judicial appointments in the ECJ, the restrictions imposed on litigants to access the ECJ and the limits on the jurisdiction of the ECJ to review EU legislation. It also analyses how the presence of judicial review affects the size of the policy measures taken by the policy makers.     

论美国联邦宪法的程序规则

美国联邦宪法规定了完备的程序规则制度,为规范权力,保障公民权利奠定了坚实的基础。美国宪法的哲学原理见之于其繁复的权力运行程序细节之中。宪法的程序规则具有权力的正当化功能、规范化功能和形式合理化功能。作为宪政基石和宪政基本内涵的法治,是一种以正当程序为主要内容的人们服从规则治理的过程,而法治的正当程序则以宪法程序为根本。     

司法审查与维护宪法权威

在解决立法冲突和认定法律、法规的有效或无效方面,我国采用的是上级立法机关审查和行政审查,而不是司法审查。这种审查机制的问题在于以下两个方面:第一,由制定法律的机关进行审查,下级立法是否无效上级立法机关说了算,缺乏监督;第二,审查的标准通常是自己制定的法律或立法机关自己确立的标准,不能维护宪法的权威。我国应确立以宪法为最高标准的法律审查制度,并且,不能由制定法律的机关进行审查;否则,无法保证审查的客观性和公正性。     

论《天坛宪草》的国家权力配置

《天坛宪草》中国会与立法权力优越过度的国家权力配置具体表现为:超强的国会和立法权力;受到严格制约的总统和国务院以及行政权力;漂移的法院和司法权力;纵向的国家权力配置阙失;法律工具主义隐身于权力之争。国会与立法权力优越过度的配置模式与法律工具主义的缺陷成为招致宪法草案胎死腹中之命运的一个关键因素和直接诱因。     

从国际条约的执行看加拿大联邦宪法问题

“条约必须信守”原则要求,承担了执行生效条约义务的国家必须在国内有效地履行所缔结的国际条约。但是,加拿大联邦政府在执行所缔结条约时存在一定困难。通过分析比较发现,加拿大履行条约的最大障碍存在于加拿大联邦制度。因为加拿大联邦制度无法有效解决联邦与地方的权力争端。     

Law-making functions of the Chinese courts: Judicial activism in a country of rapid social changes

The judicial production of law and the legislative production of law make a striking distinction between the two legal traditions. Despite of these differences, judges in both legal traditions in adjudicating cases have a common task, which is the application of legal rules to the facts of cases pending for judgments. The tension between the certainty and the “discretion” is universal for any legal system and, to a certain extent, it poses a hard dilemma for the rhetoric of rule of law. In the transitional countries such as China where rapid social changes and transformations take place, the judiciary and judges can not escape from taking more active roles in interpreting or even law making process. It arouses much controversy, particularly in continental legal traditions, for the judiciary is deemed to perform a mechanical role in adjudicating cases. This article intends to analyze the needs for judicial law-making function in China and its reasons. It reveals that judicial interpretation constitutes an important source of law despite its ambiguous legislative position. The article argues that judicial activism is inevitable against the transitional nature of current Chinese society.