Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Leader Language and Political Survival Strategies

Authoritarian leaders’ language provides clues to their survival strategies for remaining in office. This line of inquiry fits within an emerging literature that refocuses attention from state-level features to the dynamic role that individual heads of state and government play in international relations, especially in authoritarian regimes. The burgeoning text-as-data field can be used to deepen our understanding of the nuances of leader survival and political choices; for example, language can serve as a leading indicator of leader approval, which itself is a good predictor of leader survival. In this paper, we apply computational linguistics tools to an authoritarian leader corpus consisting of 102 speeches from nine leaders of countries across the Middle East and North Africa between 2009 and 2012. We find systematic differences in the language of these leaders, which help advance a more broadly applicable theory of authoritarian leader language and tenure.     

Political Risk: The Institutional Dimension

The argument developed in this paper is that the political arrangements and institutions that help leaders stay in office are not necessarily the ones that promote economic growth and prosperity. Indeed political leaders can remain in office more securely by rewarding the groups that keep them in power with privileged access to public resources. The net result is that the leadership remains in office but at the price of poor economic performance. It is not that the consequences of mismanaging the economy are unforeseen; rather the increased chances of an economic crisis are an acceptable price to pay if it means avoiding a political crisis which challenges the leaders' hold on power. Political survival, not peace and prosperity, is what determines the choice of policies. In this way bad economics can be good politics. The principal hypothesis addressed is that the smaller the size of the winning coalition the more the leadership depends on distributing private goods to the coalition members in order to purchase their loyalty, and, therefore the greater is the level of political risk. The ultimate effects of coalition size and the corruption attending the competition for private goods are the reduction of foreign direct investment per capita. These hypotheses were tested in a three stage least squares (3SLS) simultaneous estimation. The results generally supported the theoretical expectations.     

Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have proliferated throughout the international system. While ostensibly commercial in purpose, do BITs have domestic political ramifications? I argue that BITs affect a leader’s tenure through their effect on the property rights environment in developing countries. BITs, by segmenting a country’s property rights environment for foreign and domestic firms, reduce the incentive for foreign firms to lobby for property rights protections in the host country thus leading to a stagnating domestic property rights environment. In autocracies, a stagnating domestic property rights regime benefits domestic business elites who can continue to stymie small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The political benefits of BITs, however, decrease as a country becomes more democratic. Using a dataset of developing country leaders over the period 1965-2011, I find support for my hypothesis that BITs are associated with a decreased hazard of losing office and that the effect diminishes with higher levels of democracy. My results highlight the consequences of the legalization of global investment on the domestic political economy.     

Political Investment Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies

Extant research has shown considerable interest in whether host countries’ political uncertainty impedes foreign direct investment (FDI). Building upon the scholarly consensus on the adverse impact of political uncertainty on FDI, this article demonstrates that the extent to which investment climates are unpredictable varies cyclically, on the basis of election timing in democracies and leadership turnover in autocracies. The empirical results show that in presidential democracies, FDI tends to slowly increase after an executive election and then decline as the next executive election nears. However, I find that an electoral investment cycle is not found in parliamentary democracies where election timing is irregular, less predictable, and endogenous to domestic economic conditions. I also find that a similar political investment cycle exists in autocracies not through electoral cycle but through leadership tenure cycle. The level of FDI inflows tends to be relatively low early in autocrats’ tenure when political uncertainty is high and rise as autocratic leadership tenure increases over time but eventually wane again as autocratic leadership is destabilized in the late period of power transition. The findings indicate the existence of heterogeneous political investment cycles, depending on regime type.     

Threats to Leaders’ Political Survival and Pro-Government Militia Formation

It is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers, or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from foreign actors make leaders particularly more likely to form linkages with ethnic or religious PGMs. The findings strongly suggest that PGM linkage formation is driven by leader-level desire for political survival, rather than a host of state-level explanations.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Role models in politicians will disappoint you: Cautionary notes on Aids leadership in post-apartheid South Africa

Abstract

In the face of HIV/Aids the call for political leadership is often made. Invariably, one form that this call takes involves leaders being called upon to act as role models. But time after time scandalous revelations arise. These scandals appear to have the potential to damage efforts to address HIV/Aids. This article assumes that it is not appropriate to attempt to limit public expression concerning the sex-related behaviours of politicians. The author further notices, with reference to post-apartheid leadership in South Africa, that the actions, behaviours and motivations of political leaders cannot be readily assumed to result in desired behaviours in relation to HIV/ Aids. It is proposed that rather than cynically saying we are waiting for ideal leaders to arise, we can embrace the challenge of our time by first allowing ourselves to question the status quo. The aim is to recover questions of the possible roles of politicians as questions of how human relations can be achieved. In other words, the aim is to argue for an approach that humanises both politicians and those who would (be given to) follow them.     

Public Information and Field Theory

The unsolved question of whether the media affect political agendas is tackled with an innovative research method: a survey among politicians and journalists in Belgium. This article shows that this new approach can complement existing knowledge and yield new insights. Results largely support the contention that media matter for politics; politicians and journalists state that the media are important agenda setters, even compared to more established political actors such as political parties and interest groups. Though not all issues are equally conducive to media agenda-setting, media always seem to matter to some extent. Some politicians more than others evaluate the media's agenda impact to be high. The actual parliamentary action of some MPs is affected more by prior mass media coverage than others. I account for these differences and show that it is mainly their political role (government or opposition), the negativity of their evaluation of media power, and their perception of the impact of public opinion on politics that determine politicians' perceptions and behavior regarding political agenda-setting.     

Aftershocks: Postwar Leadership Survival, Rivalry, and Regime Dynamics

Under what conditions are leaders replaced after a war? Past research has reported that the outcome of the war and regime type affect postwar leadership tenure. Yet, this does not exhaust the conditions that could potentially influence political survival. In this article, I reexamine the links between regime type and leadership replacement after a war. I show that past research has failed to account for the dynamics of political leadership, and in the process has misrepresented the evidence supporting previous theories. I then show, using event history techniques, that both internal and external factors can alter leadership trajectories after a war. Specifically, war outcomes significantly affect the job security of a leader outside of international rivalry, but have less of an effect within rivalry. Additionally, relaxing various assumptions concerning the relationship between leadership survival and regime type leads to a richer understanding of the process of postwar leadership turnover. Finally, several propositions concerning the interaction between regime type and the costs of war are not supported in this analysis.     

Leaders,Tenure, and the Politics of Sovereign Credit

Sovereign creditworthiness is as much a function of politics as economic fundamentals. Previous research has focused on the relationship between creditworthiness and political factors such as regime type, regional effects, and international organization membership. These factors, while important, often change slowly and do not always capture the more dynamic political determinants of creditworthiness. As an alternative, this study focuses on the role of leaders. We argue that leaders’ tenure reduces uncertainty in the sovereign credit market. Time in power allows leaders to better manage expectations related to sovereign credit policy of both domestic supporters and market actors. As a result, we expect that creditworthiness improves as a leader’s tenure increases. We find supporting evidence for our argument using two distinct empirical approaches: panel data analysis and a natural experiment. Our findings provide a better understanding of the relationship between leaders, politics, and sovereign credit.     

Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective

This paper applies the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making to non-democratic states. Poliheuristic theory asserts that state leaders assign primary importance to their political survival; however, the meaning of "the political" varies dramatically from country to country. Furthermore, the types of actors who hold leaders politically accountable also vary between countries. Consequently, leaders often pursue vastly different means of ensuring their political survival. The author uses the common distinction between single-party, military, and personalist autocracies to show that apparently arbitrary differences in autocratic leaders' political concerns actually vary in systematic and potentially predictable ways. Because this argument is generalized to non-democratic states as a whole, it has important implications for the ways in which democratic states craft their policies toward autocracies.     

Digital Fit as a Leg-Up for Nongovernmental Organizations’ Media and Political Success

Two important and understudied dimensions of the interaction between politics and the digital revolution are the impact of digital technology on the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to win more media coverage and to successfully influence the political processes. This original quantitative comparison of 50 Israeli NGOs examined two main issues: the impact of technology on the ability of organizations to achieve mass media and political success and whether some groups are better positioned than others to exploit technology to their advantage. A theoretical concept labeled digital fit was introduced and put to a statistical test using data from a survey of 50 NGO leaders and a survey of 15 key politicians who were asked to rank the political impact of organizations they are familiar with from relevant parliamentary committees they are members of. Digital fit is defined as a cluster of digitally related variables that puts political actors in a better position to harness digital technology to self-produce and self-distribute multimedia messages for the purpose of advocating their cause to mass media outlets and politicians. A prospective dimension of digital fit is its potential to stimulate power shifts between the old guard of successful political-communication actors and a new breed of successful challengers. Results showed that digital fit had a strong positive direct effect on mass media success and a mediated influence on political success. There are positive signs that conventional models are shifting in a way that empowers new political actors.     

Tools of single party hegemony in Tanzania: evidence from surveys and survey experiments

Political systems dominated by a single party are common in the developing world, including in countries that hold regular elections. Yet we lack knowledge about the strategies by which these regimes maintain political dominance. This article presents evidence from Tanzania, a paradigmatic dominant party regime, to demonstrate how party institutions are used instrumentally to ensure the regime's sustained control. First, I show that the ruling party maintains a large infrastructure of neighbourhood representatives, and that in the presence of these agents, citizens self-censor about their political views. Second, I provide estimates of the frequency with which politicians give goods to voters around elections, demonstrating that such gifts are more common in Tanzania than previous surveys suggest. Third, I use a survey experiment to test respondents’ reaction to information about corruption. Few voters change their preferences upon receipt of this information. Taken together, this article provides a detailed picture of ruling party activities at the micro-level in Tanzania. Citizens conceal opposition sympathies from ten cell leaders, either because they fear punishment or seek benefits. These party agents can monitor citizens’ political views, facilitating clientelist exchange. Finally, citizens’ relative insensitivity to clientelism helps explain why politicians are not punished for these strategies.     

Leaders Without Borders: Familiarity as a Moderator of Transnational Source Cue Effects

The role of source cue effects in transnational persuasion (in which a foreign actor attempts to persuade an audience in another jurisdiction) is largely unexplored in both the political communication and international relations literatures. This article investigates transnational source cue effects using two source cue experiments that test the persuasiveness of German chancellor Angela Merkel and UK prime minister David Cameron in a Canadian context. The experiments were embedded in an online survey administered to student participants at a Canadian university in January 2011. As might be expected, the foreign leaders exerted positive source cue effects among participants who held positive impressions of the leaders and backlash effects among those who held strongly negative impressions. These effects, however, were moderated by participants’ level of political awareness, with the largest effects observed among participants who had an intermediate level of awareness. It is argued that this nonlinear moderating effect can be attributed to the countervailing effects of attitude stability and source familiarity (both of which are associated with political awareness) on individuals’ susceptibility to source cue effects. Finally, cueing David Cameron had approximately equivalent source cue effects on participants’ attitudes towards government spending on foreign aid and welfare, suggesting that foreign leaders may be able to move opinion on domestic as well as on foreign policy issues. Overall, these results validate existing models of source cue effects in a transnational context and point to the scope and limitations of national leaders’ ability to engage in direct public diplomacy.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Political Communication for the following free supplemental resources: Appendix: Question Wordings for Survey Experiments; Table A1: Balance Tests for Afghanistan and Cameron Cue Experiments; and Table A2: Underlying Salience of Domestic and Foreign Policy Spending.]     

Democracy,Deception, and Entry into War

Realists propose that elected leaders that seek war but face a hesitant public may use deception to build public support for war. Leaders may secretly make provocative diplomatic or military moves to push the adversary to attack first, rallying the public behind a war effort seen as defensive, or publicly exaggerate the threat posed by the adversary. This paper develops a liberal institutionalist critique of this theory, positing that elected leaders are deterred from engaging in such deception because democratic political institutions such as political competition, a professionalized military, and the marketplace of ideas increase the likelihood that such moves will be exposed, and once exposed, deceptive politicians will suffer domestic political punishment. The paper examines the thesis that Franklin Roosevelt sought to provoke Germany and Japan to war in 1941, finding little support. It also finds that in general autocratic leaders are more likely than elected leaders to deceive.     

Domestic political conflict,issue areas,and some dimensions of foreign policy behavior other than conflict∗

This paper examines the seemingly complex linkage between domestic political conflict and external behavior by broadening our consideration of foreign policy behavior. Underlying this analysis is a view that there are elements of both assertiveness and caution in the political use of foreign policy by domestically threatened leaders. They act assertively to divert attention away from domestic issues and enhance the image of their regime, but at the same time they are likely to show some restraint in order to avoid costly military and economic reactions by foreign actors. It is hypothesized that domestic conflict affects the degree of independence, commitment, and intensity in a nation's foreign policy behavior, but no so much its foreign conflict. Supplementing this, the mediating role of another foreign policy property, substantive issue area, is examined as a means of identifying conditions under which the impact of internal unrest would be greatest. The results of the analysis are mixed, but they do lend credibility to the idea that domestic conflict is related to multiple dimensions of foreign policy. More broadly, they suggest that governments employ different foreign policy strategies in coping with different types of domestic political conflict.     

Political leadership at state level in India: Continuity and change

ABSTRACT

Possible explanations are discussed in this article for the paucity of studies regarding political leadership, especially at the state level, in a well-functioning electoral democracy such as India with many parties and leaders. The article argues that such studies can be useful in making sense of the political and economic changes/shifts and developments of a particular state over a period that may have national impact. The article further argues that there has been a perceptible shift not only in terms of social composition but also in the “language” of politics used by the emergent generation of political leaders cutting across the party lines. The change has coincided with the rise of state-level parties and leaders in the post-Congress era followed by the ascendance of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).     

Does the Political System Determine Media Visibility of Politicians? A Comparative Analysis of Political Functions in the News in Sixteen Countries

News coverage of politicians is very unequally distributed: a few powerful politicians receive the bulk of media attention, while the large majority hardly gets into the news. However, case studies show that news outlets in some countries give more attention to ordinary politicians compared to other democracies. This study examines and explains the variation in media visibility of politicians with different institutional functions across Western democracies. We employ a large-scale content analysis of television news, newspapers and online news in sixteen countries to analyze whether a political system logic determines the distribution of political functions appearing in the news. This logic suggests that journalists follow the political hierarchy of the country when covering politicians. We also check for an additional media logic that would push journalists to focus on a limited number of high-standing politicians. The results confirm that both logics matter, but that mainly the structural characteristics of the political system have an impact on the distribution of news coverage of politicians. In countries where political power is more equally distributed across politicians, a broader range of (elite) politicians makes it into the news. Our results suggest that the media logic is nested in the broader political context and in some cases even strengthens the logic of the political system.