Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

Economic Development,Violent Leader Removal,and Democratization

This article argues that autocratic regime strength plays a critical mediating role in the link between economic development and democracy. Looking at 167 countries from 1875 to 2004, I find that development strengthens autocratic regimes, as indicated by a reduced likelihood of violent leader removal. Simultaneously, greater development predicts democratization, but only if a violent turnover has occurred in the recent past. Hence, development can cause democratization, but only in distinctive periods of regime vulnerability. Although development’s stabilizing and democratizing forces roughly balance out within autocracies, they reinforce each other within democracies, resolving the puzzle of why economic development has a stronger effect on democratic stability than on democratization. Further, the theory extends to any variable that predicts violent leader removal and democracy following such violence, pointing to broad unexplored patterns of democratic development.     

The hazard rate of political regimes

We present a preliminary study on the stability of political regimes. In a longitudinal data set we study the effect of some observable economic and political conditions on the hazard rate of different types of political regimes. We find that economic development has a stabilizing effect in countries with democratic political institutions, but rich autocracies do not show a lower hazard rate than less developed autocracies. While the stability of autocracies is not affected by their degree of economic development, it is greatly associated with the degree of popular discontent. Widespread discontent with leaders in autocratic regimes highly increases their hazard rate. This relationship is much weaker for regimes with democratic institutions. We also find a non-monotonic time dependence pattern for the hazard rate of political regimes. Political regimes are found to be at an increasing risk of collapse during the first years, with their hazard rates reaching a peak around the fourth year.     

Democracy as insurance

Explaining the existence and stability of democracies pose difficulties for the Public Choice-paradigm. The article argues that these difficulties may be resolved by focusing on the insurance-aspect of democratic decision-making procedures. Democratic regimes may be better able than autocratic regimes to provide the inhabitants with insurance against the risk of being subjected to arbitrary suppression from the ruling elite. This propensity of democratic regimes may explain the origin, as well as stability, of such regimes.     

The political geography of electoral autocracies: The influence of party strongholds on political beliefs in Africa

In electoral autocracies, why do some citizens view the state as autocratic, while others see it as democratic and legitimate? Traditionally, indicators such as income and education have been the most important factors to explaining how different types of citizens understand politics. This article argues that in electoral autocracies, we must also take into account the role of political geography. In these types of regimes, opposition parties are often one of the only actors that provide information about the authoritarian nature the government, but their message tends to get quarantined within their strongholds. I argue that regardless of income, education, ethnicity, access to government spending, or even partisanship, citizens living in opposition strongholds should be far more likely to view the state as autocratic and illegitimate than citizens living in ruling party strongholds. I find evidence for this theory using Afrobarometer survey data paired with constituency-level electoral returns from five electoral autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa.     

Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000

This article examines how political institutional structures affect political instability. It classifies polities as autocracies or democracies based on three institutional dimensions: election of the executive, constraints on executive decision-making authority, and extent of political participation. It hypothesizes that strongly autocratic and democratic regimes will exhibit the greatest stability resulting from self-enforcing equilibria, whereby the maintenance of a polity's institutional structure is in the interest of political elites, whether through autocratic or democratic control. Institutionally inconsistent regimes (those exhibiting a mix of institutional characteristics of both democracy and autocracy) lack these self-enforcing characteristics and are expected to be shorter-lived. Using a log-logistic duration model, polity survival time ratios are estimated. Institutionally consistent polities are significantly more stable than institutionally inconsistent polities. The least stable political systems are dictatorships with high levels of political participation. The most unstable configuration for polities with an elected executive is one where the executive is highly constrained, but the electorate is very small.     

Regional autocratic linkage and regime survival

In this article, the effects of regional autocratic linkage on the survival of autocratic regimes are analysed. Scholars have suggested that regional factors shape regime survival through processes of diffusion. However, in most accounts, diffusion is simply derived from characteristics of the region, such as the number or proportion of regional autocracies. In contrast, it is argued here that it is the actual linkages between countries that must be examined. Regional political, economic and social ties between autocratic regimes create domestic and external stakes in the regime, counterweigh democratisation pressure and facilitate autocratic learning. The study employs the average volume of trade, migration and diplomatic exchanges between autocratic regimes within a region as proxies for regional autocratic linkage, and asserts that regional autocratic linkage is on the rise. Applying Cox survival models on a dataset of regional autocratic linkage and regime survival between 1946 and 2009, it is found that regional autocratic linkage significantly reduces the likelihood of autocratic regime breakdown. These effects hold when the proportion of autocratic regimes within a region is controlled for, suggesting that one must look beyond the characteristics of the countries within a region and focus on the ties and linkages between them.     

Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System

Post-World War II Western foreign policies are often based on the claim that the spread of democracy will result in global peace. Our understanding of how this propagation can bring about peace is limited, and we have little reason to believe that the causal arrow points only in one direction. We tackle these issues by modeling the linkages between states' regime types, interstate conflict, and the strength of the democratic community relative to the autocratic community. Analysis of our model suggests initial increases in the strength of the democratic community increase the level of conflict in a system. Beyond a threshold of democratic strength, however, conflict wanes as the democratic community waxes. Our model also suggests that the survival rate of democracies increases as the material strength of the democratic community increases and decreases as systemic conflict rises. Empirical analyses offer support for the survival propositions.     

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Although empirical research has generally demonstrated that democracies experience more terrorism than autocracies, research suggests that this depends upon complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy‐autocracy divide. This study examines these differences, linking institutions to strategies of coercion and co‐optation. Using zero‐inflated negative binomial regression estimations on Geddes’ (2003) autocratic regime‐type data for 161 countries between 1970 and 2006, we find that single‐party authoritarian regimes consistently experience less domestic and international terrorism relative to military autocracies and democracies. This finding is robust to a large number of specifications, underscoring the explanatory power of regime type for predicting terrorism. Our explanation for these findings is that party‐based autocracies have a wider range of coercion and co‐option strategies that they can employ to address grievance and dissent than do other, more strategically restricted, regimes.     

On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes

Numerous empirical studies have investigated the direction of causality between democracy and economic growth (as well as the level of income per capita), but this empirical work has been paralleled by relatively few theoretical models that endogenize the institutional structure of the regime. Moreover, the different types of autocratic regimes have received relatively little attention. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes facing a revolt or an insurgency. In this model, there are three players: the regime, the rebels, and the masses. There are three stages in the game. In the first stage, the regime determines the level of infrastructure and the tax rate. In the second stage, the masses allocate their time between production and helping the rebels. In the third stage, the regime and the rebels simultaneously choose their fighting effort levels in a contest, in which the probability of survival of the regime is determined. It is found that autocratic regimes facing a revolt endogenously sort themselves into “tinpot” regimes that maximize their consumption at the cost of their survival, and (weak and strong) “totalitarian” regimes that maximize their probability of survival at the expense of their consumption. Empirical implications of the model are derived, and the relevance of the model to public policy is discussed.     

Institutions,governmental performance and the rise of political newcomers

This article analyses the institutional and contextual factors that facilitate the election of political newcomers as heads of government in democratic regimes. Using data from 870 democratic elections between 1945 and 2015, it is found that political newcomers are more likely to be successful in presidential systems, in new democracies and when party systems are weakly institutionalised. The election of politically inexperienced candidates is also related to governmental performance. Political newcomers are more successful when the economic performance of the government is bad and when the government engages in high‐level corruption.     

“He’s not my prime minister!”: negative party identification and satisfaction with democracy

ABSTRACT

Across Europe and the United States, negative party identification – an abiding aversion to a particular opposing political party is on the rise. At the same time, satisfaction with democracy is down worldwide. In this article, we explore the potential connection between these two phenomena. We develop a theory that posits a relationship between negative party identification and satisfaction with democracy where institutional structures and outcomes can mitigate the deleterious effects of negative party identification. We test our theory by drawing on data from 25 parliamentary and semi-presidential countries in the third wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) from 2006–2011 to assess the cross-national effect of negative party identification on levels of satisfaction with the democratic process in one’s own country. We find that satisfaction with democracy declines among voters in multiparty systems when an “out-group” party holds the prime ministership. At the same time, larger vote margins and the nature of the governing coalition can mitigate the effects of negative party identification. Our findings have important implications for how institutions can reduce the potential effect of negative party identification on satisfaction with democracy.     

Testing the Influence of Autocratic Leadership,Democratic Leadership,and Public Service Motivation on Citizen Ratings of An Agency Head’s Performance

Abstract

Research is lacking concerning the impact of leadership styles on citizen attitudes toward the performance of government leaders. To address this gap, an online experimental survey was conducted to determine the effect of leadership styles on respondents’ perceptions regarding a fictitious superintendent’s performance in a school district. The results demonstrate that democratic leadership practices enhanced the performance reviews of the superintendent, while autocratic leadership practices decreased them. Respondents’ level of public service motivation (PSM) was also found to have a positive effect on the superintendent’s performance ratings. Furthermore, democratic leadership style moderated the relationship between PSM and the performance ratings assigned by respondents. In particular, individuals with high PSM rated the performance of democratic leaders higher as compared to individuals with low PSM. However, autocratic leadership was not found to moderate the relationship between PSM and the superintendent’s performance. These results are thoroughly discussed in the paper.     

Trajectory of Asian American Nonpartisanship: Transitory,Transitional, or End State?

Scholarship holds that high rates of party identification constitute a key marker of successful immigrant incorporation, yet rates of Democratic or Republican affiliation remain surprisingly low among Asian Americans. This longitudinal study investigates the extent to which nonpartisanship for Asian Americans is stable or likely to change. Using a unique dataset that matches cases with corresponding observations over time, the analysis finds that No Preference is relatively permanent for individuals from large segments of Asian America. Low party support from Asian Americans is likely affected by weak party outreach. More than that, however, parties are a central organizing institution for aggregating the interests of and advocating for the base. Therefore, one potential consequence is that Asian Americans may be less effective in institutionalizing their interests and priorities in party politicking and in the political mainstream. This type of marginalization merits substantial reconsideration in a democratic and inclusive society.     

US counterterrorism intelligence cooperation with the developing world and its limits

The US struggle against global terrorist groups depends heavily on intelligence cooperation, particularly with developing world countries that are autocratic. This dependence creates many problems. Autocratic allies often have politicized security institutions to prevent a coup and maintain the regime in power. Services will be reluctant to cooperate on areas of high regime sensitivity. Internal communication and information sharing is poor, and security services are often pitted against one another. In addition, the regimes often lack democratic legitimacy, corruption flourishes by design, and many senior leaders are chosen for loyalty, not competence. American influence will be limited, and at times providing fewer resources may gain more influence than providing more assistance.     

Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies

In electoral autocracies, opposition coalition formation offers the best hope of getting to democracy. Yet forming electoral coalitions also entails convincing opposition voters to ignore compromises and engage in the cross‐party voting necessary for opposition victory. To what extent are voters committed to defeating the autocratic incumbent even if it would result in dislikable outcomes? A survey experiment in Malaysia finds that opposition voters overwhelmingly express pretreatment support for the opposition coalition. But when exposed to a treatment vignette about which member party might lead the next government, many voters retract their support. Specifically, voters’ support for the coalition declines when their least preferred member is expected to control the government and when they can vote for a closer ideological alternative outside of the coalition. Although voters are committed to opposition unity and democratic transition, that commitment is sensitive to the anticipated consequences of an opposition victory.     

Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies

This article investigates the role of political competition in explaining de facto judicial independence in non‐democratic regimes. It argues that the electoral, political insurance explanation popular in the study of courts in democracies also offers explanatory power in the autocratic context, despite popular wisdom otherwise: due to the relatively greater risks of losing power in non‐democracies, electoral competition is highly salient when present. This is examined via hierarchical and fixed effects models that show competition strongly associated with increased levels of independence. This relationship is robust to alternative model and data specification, and has strong out‐of‐sample predictive accuracy.     

Timing matters: The impact of regularity of election cycles on autocratic stability

A large literature has examined the role of elections in autocratic politics. This literature has been particularly interested in the extent to which elections stabilize or destabilize autocratic regimes. One important aspect left unexplored in the research thus far is how the timing of such elections and the broader electoral cycle influence patterns of regime stability. This paper fills part of that gap and studies the regularity of elections in dictatorships. It argues that dictators that stage less regular elections may offset the destabilizing short-term effect of elections identified by the extant research. Dictators can take advantage of election timing to stymie challengers and hinder civil society collective action. Statistical analyses of all electoral autocratic regimes in the post–WWII period provides support for this proposition and suggests that regimes that hold less regular elections are more durable. This pattern holds in models which, partially, attempt to account for endogenity.     

Die Dividende der Demokratie: Politische Herrschaft und gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktivität

In social sciences exists a broad consensus about the impact of political institutions on economic development. There is dissent, however, about the influence of democratic order on economic performance. Based on arguments from economic institutionalism, this paper argues that democracy has a significant and positive impact on productivity growth. In contrast to autocratic order, democratic systems can be interpreted as a competition-friendly regulation of a natural monopoly, which results in comparatively high productivity gains. This hypothesis is tested for a sample of 81 countries for the 1975–2000 period. Different regression models provide empirical support for the assumption that increasing levels of democracy produce a productivity dividend.     

Breaking the Boundary: Pro-poor Policies and Electoral Outcomes in Brazilian Sub-national Governments

The article explores the role of state-led and of centre-led pro-poor policies in the electoral shift of state elections in the state of Bahia, in Brazil's Northeast. It analyses a pro-poor policy sponsored by a traditional party which has ruled the state for several decades during both the military and the democratic regimes. The article investigates the causes of the party's defeat in 2006 and its replacement by a non-traditional party. The argument is that the defeat of the traditional party and the victory of a non-traditional one can be explained as the result of the state's main pro-poor policy that has always created dependency between voters and sub-national politicians. Centre-led pro-poor policies introduced in the late 1990s, in contrast, have universal or clear targets, eliminating the intermediation of sub-national political brokers.