Autocratic adaptation: The strategic use of transparency and the persistence of election fraud

Why would an autocrat want, or at least make it appear to want, to reduce election fraud? In recent years, non-democratic rulers have surprisingly begun to embrace fraud-reducing technologies, like web cameras or transparent ballot boxes. The reason for this is found in the relative ease by which one type of fraud can be replaced with another. With the help of new fraud identification techniques, I argue that the installation of web cameras in polling stations changes how fraud is conducted. Web cameras do not reduce fraud, but rather make certain blatant forms of fraud, like ballot box stuffing, more costly. Autocrats then substitute for other types of fraud, such as fabricating the vote count out of view of the cameras.     

Political learning during the 2000 U.S. presidential election: The impact of the campaign on the gender gap in political knowledge

We examine how political campaigns influence individuals’ levels of correct, incorrect, and don’t know responses and the gender gap in political knowledge during the 2000 American presidential campaign. Using data from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), we demonstrate that as the campaign progresses the electorate provides more correct answers and fewer incorrect answers. Moreover, the political campaign significantly reduces (and possibly eliminates) the direct effect of sex on political knowledge. While the political campaign decreases the number of incorrect answers provided by both men and women, the number of correct answers provided by women increases. Our findings highlight the importance of the political campaign in determining relative levels of political knowledge for men and women.     

From political conflict to partisan evaluations: How citizens assess party ideology and competence in polarized elections

Recent comparative electoral research shows that both ideological and competence voting are influenced by the degree of party system polarization. However, while the former association is uncontroversial, investigations on the latter have led to contradicting results. This study takes one step back, arguing that polarization rather affects how voters perceive party ideological positioning and competence. Building on literature linking elite polarization to mass partisanship, the study argues that party identification is a strong moderator of party evaluations in polarized elections. Hypotheses are tested with multilevel logit models on a pooled data set of European Election Studies from 1994 to 2009. Results show that partisans are more likely to view their preferred party as the most competent and ideologically close when the environment is polarized, while there is no such effect for non-partisans.     

Transaction costs in electoral coordination: How turnout shapes changes in the number of parties*

This article examines the forces shaping changes in the number of parties between consecutive elections. We argue that the transaction costs in electoral coordination depend on the turnout level in the previous election. The greater the number of peripheral voters entering the electorate, the less likely a substantial change in the distribution of partisan support in the subsequent election. The argument is tested using data for 313 parliamentary elections in 63 countries from 1990 to 2011, and two cases studies of countries using compulsory voting (the Netherlands and Australia).     

How to estimate the policy preferences of party supporters: Disaggregating data from voting advice applications versus modeling survey responses

Valid and reliable estimates of the policy preferences of political parties' supporters are essential for the study of political representation. However, such estimates are not directly available from standard surveys of public opinion, which are typically representative by design only at the national level and rarely ask questions about public support for specific policies. In this article, we explore the possibility to use data from voting advice applications (VAA) to estimate the policy preferences of party supporters. To do that, first, we identify 10 questions on preferences towards issues of public policy that were asked around the same time and with similar wording in traditional surveys of public opinion and in VAAs fielded in Germany and in the Netherlands. Then we compare the VAA data disaggregated by political affiliation of the respondents to the survey data adjusted via multilevel regression modeling with poststratification (MRP). We find strong positive correlations between the estimates derived from both methods, especially after weighting the VAA data. Yet, point estimates are not always very close, and the match is sensitive to the treatment of neutral and ‘don't know’ answers. Overall, our results bode well for the validity of using VAA data in empirical research on political representation.     

Better Know a District: Competition,Demographics, Ideology and the Use of Pollsters in the 2010 U.S. House Elections

Why do some congressional candidates hire pollsters, while others do not? Prior work claims candidates hire them when they face close contests. This argument does not explain the selection of pollsters in uncompetitive races, especially by incumbents, who also use pollsters to monitor the ramifications of some demographic changes in their districts and ideological incongruity with the constituencies. These determinants should be evident for the use of the most prestigious pollsters, and I argue that candidates hold in higher demand those survey research specialists who have worked for party campaign committees than those without party ties. But while challengers in close races can attract the services of these firms, incumbents in some vulnerable contexts, such as facing experienced challengers, are less able to do so. This study shows that constituency conditions and voter attitudes beyond electoral competition alone shape candidate use of pollsters, who serve representational needs to the extent they are contractually tied to the party organization, which extends its influence over but does not control the political consulting industry.     

Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering: Using computer simulations to estimate the effect of gerrymandering in the U.S. House

What is the effect of gerrymandering on the partisan outcomes of United States Congressional elections? A major challenge to answering this question is in determining the outcomes that would have resulted in the absence of gerrymandering. Since we only observe Congressional elections where the districts have potentially been gerrymandered, we lack a non-gerrymandered counterfactual that would allow us to isolate its true effect. To overcome this challenge, we conduct computer simulations of the districting process to redraw the boundaries of Congressional districts without partisan intent. By estimating the outcomes of these non-gerrymandered districts, we are able to establish the non-gerrymandered counterfactual against which the actual outcomes can be compared. The analysis reveals that while Republican and Democratic gerrymandering affects the partisan outcomes of Congressional elections in some states, the net effect across the states is modest, creating no more than one new Republican seat in Congress. Therefore, the partisan composition of Congress can mostly be explained by non-partisan districting, suggesting that much of the electoral bias in Congressional elections is caused by factors other than partisan intent in the districting process.     

The changing geography of metropolitan opportunity: The segregation of the poor in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1970 to 1990

Abstract

This analysis uses census tract data to measure the segregation of the poor in U.S. metropolitan areas in 1970, 1980, and 1990. Two measures of segregation are used: the indices of dissimilarity and isolation.

In 1990 the mean dissimilarity of the poor in the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas was 36.1, which is substantial but below the 60.6 dissimilarity of blacks. The 1990 isolation of the poor was 21.0. From 1970 to 1990, the dissimilarity of the poor increased by 11 percent, and the isolation of the poor rose by 9 percent; in contrast, racial segregation declined. Exploratory regression analyses reveal that income segregation in metropolitan areas was significantly greater in 1990 and increased more from 1970 to 1990 in the Northeast than in the South and West. Midwest areas generally were not significantly different from Northeast areas in 1990 segregation levels or in changes from 1970 to 1990.