The Political Origins of English Private Law

The article seeks to explain the emergence of the view that English law contains a fundamental divide between public and private law. I propose to explain the divide, not as a conceptual distinction, grounded in the internal rationality of law, but as a response to the potential problem of political legitimacy arising from the fact that in the domain of private law courts are constantly engaged in making substantive law. That by itself shows that the divide between public and private law is politically motivated, but I further argue that the prevailing view of law among proponents of the divide revives Dicey's conception of the common law within the narrower domain of private law. Since Dicey's views are widely believed to be motivated by his political views, if I am right, this lends support to the conclusion that the views of defenders of the divide are grounded in similar political positions.     

Retributivism and Legal Moralism

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways.     

Private Military and Security Companies and the Liberal Conception of Violence

Abstract

The institution of war is the broad framework of rules, norms, and organizations dedicated to the prevention, prosecution, and resolution of violent conflict between political entities. Important parts of that institution consist of the accountability arrangements that hold between armed forces, the political leaders who oversee and direct the use of those forces, and the people in whose name the leaders act and from whose ranks the members of the armed forces are drawn. Like other parts of the institution, these arrangements are responsive to changes in military technology and needs, to geopolitical facts, and to moral and political norms. In particular, they are sensitive to the forms that military organization takes. Since the emergence of modern states in Europe some 500 years ago, there have been three main such forms: private providers—in the form of mercenaries, in early modern Europe—then professional standing armies, which in turn developed into citizen armies. Although elements of the three organizations have coexisted in many armies, the citizen army model has dominated until recently. That model brought with it a particular conception of the accountability relations between the army, the state, and the people. The state had authority over and directed the army, which was accountable to it. In turn the state was accountable for its use of the army to the people, on whose behalf it acted.

The dominance of state authority over the military is now under strain, with the professional and private elements—in the form of private military and security companies (PMSCs)—having increasing importance. As those elements increase in power and presence, so it becomes more difficult to make the state accountable to the people for its use of the military, and more difficult for the people to act as a restraining force on the way in which the military used.

In this essay, I outline and assess these developments—with particular emphasis on the emergence of PMSCs—in the light of a liberal view of (political) violence. The essay focuses on the situation in the United States, which possesses by far the most important military force in the world today, and in which the use of PMSCs is most developed. The paper has three main sections and a brief conclusion: the first section sketches the liberal view of violence and its implications for organizations dedicated to its use; the second outlines the salient characteristics of the three historically dominant forms of armies; and the third looks at the current situation in which the three forms coexist uneasily.     

Criminal Justice and the Liberal Polity

There are several reasonable conceptions of liberalism. A liberal polity can survive a measure of disagreement over just what constitutes liberalism. In part, this is because of the way a liberal order makes possible a dynamic, heterogeneous civil society and how that, in turn, can supply participants with reasons to support a liberal political order. Despite the different conceptions of justice associated with different conceptions of liberalism, there are reasons to distinguish the normative focus of criminal justice from other aspects of justice in a liberal polity. Given the fundamental commitments of liberalism—of whatever variant—there are reasons for criminal justice not to be assimilated to wider conceptions of justice overall. Such assimilation risks undermining some of liberalism's distinctive commitments concerning the standing of individuals as voluntary, responsible agents. Criminal justice is not independent of other aspects of justice but has a distinct focus in a liberal polity.     

The Analysis of Rights

The author argues that the interest theory of rights is clearly preferable to the choice theory of rights and that this is due in large part to the work of Raz and MacCormick. Critical scrutiny of their views, however, reveals a flawed conception of the way that rights reflect interests. The author contends that a superior relation between rights and interests can be formulated, in which rights are identified with a constellation of norms within a normative system which reflect the interests which justify them, but wherein rights are not coextensive with interests conceived as reasons for the imposition of duties.     

The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity in Competing Accounts of Political Violence

By juxtaposing religious, legal, and victims'accounts of political violence, this essay identifies and critiques assumptions about agency, the individual, and the smte that derive from liberal theory and that underlie U.S. asylum taw. In the United States, asylum is available to aliens whose gooernments fail to protect them from persecution on the basis of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or social group membership. Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants have challenged this definition of persecution with their two-decade-long struggle for asylum in the United States. During the 1980s, U.S. religious advocates and solidarity workers took legal action on behalf of what they characterized as victims of oppression in Central America. The asylum claims narrated by the beneficiaries of these legal efforts suggest that repessiwe pactices rendered entire populations politically suspect. To prevail in immigration court, however, victims had to prove that they were individually targeted because of being somehow "different" from the population at large. In other words, to obtain asylum, persecution victims had to explain how and why their actions had placed them at risk, even though persecution obscured the reasons that particular individuals were targeted and thus rendered all politically suspect.     

The Priority of Politics and Procedure over Perfectionism in Penal Law, or, Blackmail in Perspective

Criminal law theory concerns itself with the justification of punishment. Conflicting moral theories of punishment will be held in liberal democracies. The positive law therefore neither will nor should reflect exclusively a single moral theory of punishment. Like the institutions for making law, the institutions for enforcing it will cause punishments imposed to deviate from what pure moral theory might prescribe. These claims are illustrated by the debate over blackmail prohibition. The best rationale for prohibition is not the moral argument that blackmailers culpably cause harm, but the political argument that blackmailers threaten the state’s claimed monopoly on punishing crime.     

Principles,Passions, and the Paradox of Modern Law: A Comment on Bybee

In All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law ( 2010 ), Keith Bybee considers the hypocrisy of modern law—that is, the widespread view that judges are both principled and partisan—by drawing an analogy with courtesy. Both law and courtesy contain and manage the diverse and potentially divisive interests that would, were they not contained, disrupt social life. In this essay I extend this argument by considering whether the relationship between law and courtesy is more than merely analogical. I suggest that both systems are aspects of larger historical developments out of which emerged the modern subject and the modern state, creating a social world made up of apparently bounded individuals and institutions. As such, law and courtesy do more than conceal and contain interests and subjectivity; they produce the unruly, partisan subjects they are designed to manage.     

Retributivism In Extremis

I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples of self-defense he subsequently tries to apply to ordinary cases of punishment.     

Amicus Curiae and the Public Interest: A Search for a Standard1

Despite the widespread and influential presence of an increasingly partisan amicus curiae brief, the role of the "friend of the court" brief remains controversial. Changing rules of access and diverging recommendations for its behavior are associated with two distinct views of jurisprudence. A traditional understanding of adversarial proceedings emphasizes the individual interests of the litigants, and correspondingly excludes consideration of non-parties and the general public. An alternative to the traditional, individual-based, liberal jurisprudence (and its skepticism toward public interest arguments) is a recognition of the need to integrate individual and public interests and to find a coherence between them.
The skeptical view of the public interest can be avoided by adopting a post-empiricist view, which recognizes a plurality of interpretations of the public interest. The amicus curiae role, if given wide access, can serve as a tool of inclusive pluralism, which recognizes a diversity of views regarding the public interest and the impact of legal decisions on the public.     

What the #@!* are they Fighting About?!?: Reflections on Fairness,Identity, Social Capital,and Peacemaking in Family Conflicts

Peacemaking is particularly challenging in family conflicts. Deeply held feelings about identity, fair treatment, moral issues, and protecting social capital often cause people in conflict to make self‐defeating decisions. There are, however, techniques that enable mediators, Collaborative Practice professionals, and other peacemakers to overcome the settlement barriers created by these strongly held views. These techniques include those pioneered by psychotherapists using the Internal Family Systems model, which enables parties to see that their strongly held views comprise only part of the constellation of feelings that they have about the conflict.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Parents who feel that their role as father or mother is in danger often find it difficult to focus on the children's best interests.
• The “rule of reciprocity” causes people who feel wronged to exact even harsher punishment on those who harmed them.
• The concept of “social capital” explains why people care so passionately about whether they are treated fairly and about their reputation for fairness.
• The Internal Family Systems model helps peacemakers to understand how to work with the parties’ ambivalence about settlement versus courtroom vindication.

     

Peacemaking Criminology

This is an overview of the work of criminologists that informs how people build trust, safe and social security in the face of violent social differences. The article begins with a story of how the term “peacemaking” came to “criminology.” A theory of peacemaking emerging from this beginning is then stated, including a review of criminological literature that informs the theory. The theory is grounded in a paradigmatic departure from criminology’s tradition—the study of crime and criminality—to proposing instead of studying what replaces human separation with cooperation and mutual trust. This paradigm implies that stories of dispute handling are its most authoritative data, especially stories people tell about their own relations. It also implies new ways of evaluating the fruits of adopting a peacemaking paradigm for learning and living.     

Self-Defense,Punishment and Forfeiture

Abstract

According to the self-defense view, the moral justification of punishment is derived from the moral justification of an earlier threat of punishment for an offense. According to the forfeiture view, criminals can justly be punished because they have forfeited certain rights in virtue of their crimes. The paper defends three theses about these two views. (1) The self-defense view is false because the right to threaten retaliation is not independent of the right to carry out that threat. (2) A more plausible account of the right to threaten says instead that the right to retaliate is primary to the right to threaten, and that the former right in turn arises because aggressors forfeit the right not to suffer retaliation. (3) The “fair warning thesis,” according to which just punishment must be preceded by a threat, is less plausible than first appearances suggest and is therefore no serious obstacle to the view of threats described above.     

Enticing Business to Create a Healthier American Diet: Performance‐Based Regulation of Food and Beverage Retailers

The American public could enjoy a much healthier diet if we enticed food and beverage retailers (stores and restaurants) to substantially reduce the calories, added sugar, sodium, and saturated fat that pass through their cash registers—say, a 25 percent reduction in sugar, salt, and fat and a 10 percent reduction in calories. Rather than ordering firms to make specific changes in what they sell, this strategy—called performance‐based regulation—leaves industry to figure out what is the best way to transform the American diet in a positive way. Because it calls for real changes in outcomes, this regulatory strategy could be far more effective than information disclosure policies that rely on consumer choices, and because it does not require adding extra cost to the price of food and beverages, it could be politically far more attractive than taxing unhealthy foods. Appealing to both conservative and liberal values, instead of relying on the professional expertise of public health regulators, performance‐based regulation enlists America's large food retailers to serve the public good—or suffer substantial financial penalties for failing to do so.     

Restoring Responsibility: Promoting Justice, Therapy and Reform Through Direct Brain Interventions

Direct brain intervention based mental capacity restoration techniques—for instance, psycho-active drugs—are sometimes used in criminal cases to promote the aims of justice. For instance, they might be used to restore a person’s competence to stand trial in order to assess the degree of their responsibility for what they did, or to restore their competence for punishment so that we can hold them responsible for it. Some also suggest that such interventions might be used for therapy or reform in criminal legal contexts—i.e. to make non-responsible and irresponsible people more responsible. However, I argue that such interventions may at least sometimes fail to promote these responsibility-related legal aims. This is because responsibility hinges on other factors than just what mental capacities a person has—in particular, it also hinges on such things as authenticity, personal identity, and mental capacity ownership—and some ways of restoring mental capacity may adversely affect these other factors. Put one way, my claim is that what might suffice for the restoration of competence need not necessarily suffice for the restoration of responsibility, or, put another way, that although responsibility indeed tracks mental capacity it may not always track restored mental capacities.     

Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment

This paper attempts to establish that, and explain why, the practice of punishing offenders is in principle morally permissible. My account is a nonstandard version of the fair play view, according to which punishment’s permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender gains relative to law-abiding members of the community. Such views struggle, however, to provide a plausible account of this unfairly gained benefit. By contrast, on my account punishment’s permissibility follows more straightforwardly from the fair play view of political obligation: specifically, the rule instituting punishment is itself among those rules with which members of the political community are obliged to comply. For criminal offenders, compliance requires submitting to the prospect of punishment.     

积极刑法观的反思与批判

面对日益增加的社会风险,我国刑事立法不断扩张处罚的范围,这种立法的积极姿态也得到了学者的认同,从而形成了积极刑法观的主张。积极刑法观的含义包括理念、立法、司法三个方面,其与预防刑法观、风险刑法观与功能主义刑法观都存在不同。无论从现实还是从法理层面而言,积极刑法观都存在许多疑问。在现实层面,我国现行刑法的结构并非是厉而不严,而是又严又厉。刑法的但书规定意味着立法采取定性加定量的模式,这与积极刑法观的立论或多或少存在冲突。我国司法机关一直采取扩张解释乃至于类推解释来适用刑法,因此指望通过司法实践来限缩处罚范围的观点并不现实。在法理层面,积极刑法观导致了刑罚权的过度扩张,冲击了人的基本自由,因而抵触宪法;同时它也违反了谦抑原则和比例原则的具体要求,并且作为其依据的积极一般预防理论的根基并不稳固。在方法论上,必须重提"李斯特鸿沟"的重要法治意义。     

Still in Deficit: Rights,Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1

Abstract: Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights‐based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public‐interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist.     

Sanctioning Traditional Crimes with Fines: A Comparative Analysis

Rising crime rates within traditional sanctioning patterns have resulted in a search for alternatives to incarceration in order to control both the economic and the social (humanitarian) costs of punishment. The paper explores this response in four countries: England, Germany, Sweden, and the United States—all modern, industrial democracies. The paper focuses upon the response in terms of the role accorded monetary penalties as an alternative to incarceration. This role is analyzed in terms of the actual use of fines relative to incarceration, as a sentencing disposition for traditional crimes. The major finding is that among the four countries the United States accords fines a very minor role. The reasons for this difference are explored and it is concluded that the use of fines in the United States—when compared to European experience—appears to be far below the level that would minimize the economic and social cost of punishment.     

Punishment and Permissibility in the Criminal Law

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that what distinguishes a criminal punishment from a civil penalty is the presence of a punitive legislative intent. Legislative intent has this role, in part, because court and commentators alike conceive of the criminal law as the body of law that administers punishment; and punishment, in turn, is conceived of in intention-sensitive terms. I argue that this understanding of the distinction between civil penalties and criminal punishments depends on a highly controversial proposition in moral theory – namely, that an agent’s intentions bear directly on what it is permissible for that agent to do, a view most closely associated with the doctrine of double effect. Therefore, legal theorists who are skeptical of granting intention this kind of significance owe us an alternative account of the distinctiveness of the criminal law. I sketch the broad outlines of just such an alternative account – one that focuses on the objective impact of legislation on a class of protected interests, regardless of the state’s motivations in enacting the legislation. In other words, even if the concept of punishment is unavoidably intention-sensitive, it does not follow that the boundaries of the criminal law are likewise intention-sensitive, because the boundaries of the criminal law may be drawn without reference to the concept of punishment. I conclude by illustrating the application of this view to a pair of well-known cases, and noting some of its ramifications.