How some rules just don't matter: The regulation of lobbyists

Brinig, Holcombe, and Schwartzstein (1993) have argued recently that lobby regulation restricts entry into the population of lobbying organizations, and that the number of lobbying organizations then influences legislative activity. However, they analyze only the relationship between the restrictiveness of lobby regulation and legislative activity, thereby assuming that regulation actually reduces numbers of registered interest organizations. We test this assumption with data on state interest organization populations and find little support for it. We consider several other explanations and comment more generally on the status of institutions and their rules in the study of political phenomena.     

Balancing inside and outside lobbying: The political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences

This article seeks to explain the use of inside and outside lobbying by organised interests at global diplomatic conferences. At first sight, the lobbying at these venues is puzzling as it does not seem to be a very fruitful way to acquire influence. The use of outside strategies especially is perplexing because most aspects of international negotiations fall outside of the purview of national constituencies. It is argued in this article, however, that the presence of outside lobbying is not so puzzling if lobbying is seen both as a way to attain influence and as a way to pursue organisational maintenance goals. Empirically, the article draws on interview data with 232 interest group representatives that participated at either the 2012 session of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Geneva, or the 2011 (Durban) and 2012 (Doha) United Nations Climate Conferences. The analysis demonstrates that organisational needs, and especially the competition actors face in obtaining resources, significantly affects the relative focus of organised interests on inside and outside lobbying.     

Organized interests and administrative rulemaking: the state of Wisconsin's lobbyists and coalitions

This study examines interest groups undertaking lobbying activity focused on administrative rulemaking. The analysis utilizes a dataset composed of observations made during the 2009–2010 Wisconsin Legislative Session, including the entire population of groups lobbying during this time period. This research examines the participants, efforts, and coalitions utilized when groups engaged in lobbying activity related to rulemaking. Although scholars have examined interest group activity focused on rulemaking at the federal level, little work has focused on this behavior in the states. This study aims to further the understanding of this activity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘They are not my people’: Barack Obama on lobbying and lobbyists

This article traces the development of Barack Obama's sometimes ambiguous and sometimes antithetical attitudes and relationship to lobbyists. During his childhood in Indonesia, his stepfther was a lobbyist for a US oil company. Obama engaged himself in what many would consider to be lobbying in his career as a ‘community activist’ in Chicago. As an Illinois state senator, he befriended lobbyists and enjoyed poker and basketball games with them, in addition to raising about two thirds of his campaign finance from big business, unions, and political action committees. In the US Senate, Obama involved in ethics reforms that curbed the influence of lobbyists. His presidential campaign rhetoric was hard‐hitting, often decrying the irresponsibility of lobbyists while he had a number of lobbyists in key positions in his campaign team. On his first full day in office, President Obama signed an executive order restricting lobbyists from working in his administration. He later banned registered lobbyists from having personal meeting with officials about economic stimulus projects. Both these pledges have, however, had unforeseen or unwelcome consequences. More recently, Obama decided to ban lobbyists from membership of federal advisory panels but continues to meet frequently with favored lobbyists and corporate executives behind closed doors. The article questions whether Obama's history in this area adds up to a coherent or principled track record or whether it simply relates a series of inconsistent and political decisions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The regulation of political financing in Portugal

The regulation of political financing in Portugal has taken place through successive waves of reform since the adoption of the first decree which gave legal recognition to parties in 1974. The incremental nature of adjustments and the overall inefficacy of instruments adopted, often introduced without a clear understanding of the problems and opportunities for impropriety and corruption, can be interpreted as an attempt by the political class to anticipate the worst, that is, scandal and the threat this would represent to the normal performance of democracy. In spite of the legislators' increased knowledge about successes and failures of foreign regulatory experiences and the importation of instruments tested abroad, Portuguese regulatory efforts are shaped by specific lines of legal-historical development and the dominant attitudes of Portuguese society towards that sort of illegality.     

The functioning and regulation of escrow accounts

Abstract

About 40 million Americans have mortgages serviced by escrow accounts. Yet escrow accounts are rarely covered by an explicit agreement between borrower and lender and are often poorly understood. As a result, escrow accounts have become the subject of growing controversy. Federal regulation of escrow accounts has become increasingly detailed and intrusive during the past two decades, and the subject is under almost continuous regulatory review. In the 1990s, the attorneys general of at least 10 states have sued large escrow account servicers over administration of accounts.

The purposes of this article are to explain briefly how escrow accounts work, benefit relevant parties, and are regulated by federal agencies, and to evaluate alternative regulatory programs. Most of the legitimate social goals of federal regulation could be achieved by requiring an explicit escrow agreement at the time of closing on a mortgage. A second‐best requirement would be that interest be paid on escrow balances.     

The tripartite regulation of America's health services

The Republican takeover of Congress suggests that the payer-driven forces of managed care, capitated payment, and the regional networks (alliances) will serve as centerpieces to improve the organization, financing, and delivery of our nation's health services. These "voluntary" alliances, frequently as an amalgamation of health providers and health insurance underwriters, often foreshadow the powerful, geographically linked regional health networks that are evolving into oligopolies. The authors anticipate, as a result, the formation of state health services commissions that will regulate market share, the scope of health services, reimbursement rates and allowable profits. State departments of public health and insurance will have their own regulatory duties. Complex relationships will result as these groups will often have conflicting, politically-charged goals.     

The political economy of smoking regulation and taxation

Although anti-smoking policies are on the political agenda in almost all developed countries, a general understanding of these policies is still lacking. Applying the majority voting model of Buchanan and Vanberg (Public Choice 57(2):101–113, 1988) to tobacco taxation and smoking regulation shows that different smoking policies are feasible, depending on the composition of the majority of voters with smokers and non-smokers: (1) internalization of spill-over costs with a mixed majority of smokers and non-smokers as well as (2) a combination of regulation and taxation with a non-smoker majority. Moreover, the influence of the tobacco industry is also discussed.     

Tunnel vision: The regulation of endocrine disruptors

This study examines the failure of a small but significant element of U.S. chemical regulatory policy: the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program (EDSP). A range of conditions are implicated in the failure of this program, but one condition, the scientific testing and regulation paradigm (STRP), seems particularly important and ties the failure of EDSP to the failure of other U.S. chemical regulatory programs. This paradigm is a group of assumptions that have driven pesticide (and other chemical) regulatory policy since World War II. This study investigates the relationship between STRP and the failure of EDSP, the potential efficacy of alternatives to this program, and one alternative that broke from this paradigm. Ultimately, this study suggests that we must revise the role of science in regulation in order to find effective alternatives to modern chemical regulatory policy.     

The Transformation of organic regulation: The ambiguous effects of publicization

The regulatory regime for organic products is different from other non‐state‐market driven (NSMD) regimes because it is the only one that evolved from a purely private into a regime where the establishment of minimum standards has become the monopoly of public powers. This article is the first to study the effects of the process of publicization, a term coined to characterize the transformation of private into public standards. The central hypothesis studied is that the process of publicization has empowerment and containment effects at the same time. To test the hypothesis the article analyses the effects of publicization on regulatory capabilities of private regulators as well as on the quality of the standards. The effects of publicization are further explored by comparing the legal and institutional architecture that shapes the coexistence of private and public regimes in the EU and the US, showing important differences between the two systems. The article offers a new perspective to look at the dynamic interaction between private and public regulation and its findings are of general relevance for the debate on the desirability of governmental intervention on private regulatory schemes.     

The introduction of professional regulation and labor market conditions

There has been increasing concern by policy makers about the impact of occupational regulation and the process by which it is introduced. This paper examines the introduction of mandatory licensure laws to replace public certification of registered nurses at the state level. Historical analysis supports the hypothesis in economic models that small groups with concentrated interests like occupations will dominate the introduction of laws and suggests examining changes in labor market conditions may be useful in predicting future demands for legislation. Estimates of an empirical model of the diffusion of licensure across states for nurses suggests this type of quality assurance regulation was introduced first where the quality of services was probably already relatively high and that policies reducing the impact of licensure on geographical mobility may reduce pressure for new laws. Patterns in the introduction of laws also have implications for evaluating their impact.     

The European regulation of corporate social responsibility: The role of beneficiaries' intermediaries

Intended beneficiaries have an undeniable relevance to regulation. However, current research has focused mainly on the two‐party relationship between rulemaking and rule‐taking. We attempt to fill this gap by exploring the formal and informal roles that beneficiaries’ intermediaries played in co‐creating European Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rules and associated practices between 2000 and 2017. By linking recent conceptualizations of regulatory intermediaries with the literature on critical political CSR, we offer a more dynamic and contextualized understanding of the roles of beneficiaries’ intermediaries. Specifically, we identify six micro‐dynamics through which they influenced the regulatory process. Notably, our findings highlight how the convergence of interests between three groups of beneficiaries’ intermediaries – the Non‐governmental organization–Investor–Union nexus – had a key role in reshaping CSR rules. We conclude that, in the European context, stronger and better‐coordinated beneficiaries’ intermediaries are crucial in order to achieve more effective corporate conduct regulation.     

Regulation under uncertainty: The coevolution of industry and regulation

As production and design disintegrate and become more collaborative, involving dynamic relations between customers and firms supplying complex subsystems and service, products and production methods become more innovative but also more hazardous. The inadvertent co‐production of latent hazards by independent firms is forcing firms and regulators to address the problem of uncertainty – the inability to anticipate, much less assign a probability to future states of the world – more directly than before. Under uncertainty, neither the regulator nor the regulated firms know what needs to be done. The regulator must induce firms to systematically canvas their practices and identify potential hazards. But recognizing the fallibility of all such efforts, the regulator must further foster the institutionalization of incident or event reporting procedures: systems to register failures in products or production processes that could be precursors to catastrophe; to trace out and correct their root causes; to alert others in similar situations to the potential hazard; and to make certain that countermeasures to ensure the safety of current operations are taken and the design requirements for the next generation of the implicated components or installations are updated accordingly. In this essay we develop these arguments and look closely at changes in the Norwegian offshore oil and gas industry and its regulator, the Petroleum Safety Authority to better understand the coevolution of vertically disintegrated industry and new forms of regulation.     

The culture of risk regulation: Responses to environmental disasters

Disasters challenge the equilibrium of regulatory regimes and make policy shifts more likely. Using an institutional theory of cultural biases and the concept of cultural “surprise”, this article analyses the direction and intensity of media argumentation in respect of policy shifts. Instead of assuming a demand for greater State intervention after dramatic focusing events, as suggested by other theoretical frames, cultural theory opens a variety of options that range from embracing regulatory responses from different cultural biases to the radicalization of current, but failing, instruments. The analysis of media reaction to the environmental disasters caused by the oil spills of Exxon Valdez (United States), Erika (France) and Prestige (Spain) shows that the demand for more hierarchy does not monopolize the overall argumentation. The change demanded often implies a radicalization of a particular prevalent view where the associated institutional setting is failing its supporters.     

The Regulatory Gift: Politics,regulation and governance

This article introduces the “regulatory gift” as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government‐led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, “insider” personal interest, or profit‐seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators’ functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry‐specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest – delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation – this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.     

The idea of the legal regulation of war and its origin

The subject matter of the analysis in this paper is jus in bello and the very possibility of its existence. On the face of it, the concept that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the use of force against one＇s opponent should be somehow regulated and limited, which is stranger, and its origin is more difficult to explain, than the concept that human societies should live together in peace or that wars should only be begun on some ethical or legally acceptable grounds. It is likely that limits on the use of force, or at least pressures to keep it within a ritualized framework, are property of human beings that enabled our ancestors to live together as social animals. Something similar would have been applied for groups of such beings. Even though the tendency to regulate the use of force in war has existed in the earliest times, this is not a simple task and sets against this effort there are a number of factors that encourage the freest use of violent methods and weapons： The war is a serious business and the desire to win at all costs is very strong, the logic of war leads the combatants to employ all the forces that can be freed from elsewhere and make use of all available advantages and means, a combat is an emotional mater not only rational, etc. Against these forces, the factors that work in favor of the legal regulation of the use of force are： The existence of at least a basic common identity, a situation in which war does not have the characteristics of total war, ear of reprisals by the enemy, the principle of proportion of force used to the objectives, the existence of an approximately comparable moral code and warrior code of honor on both sides, and the need to legitimize war. The extent to which a given war will abide by legal regulation of the use of force depends on the result of the balance of the opposing factors listed above.     

New occupations,old demands: The public regulation of paraprofessionals

Like doctors, lawyers, and architects before them, many new paraprofessionals occupations are rapidly being defined and regulated, raising the time-worn questions regarding the virtues of free labor markets versus those of regulated labor markets. The trend to regulation is growing rapidly as the paraprofessionals increase in number. The new regulation may improve the quality of services that paraprofessionals provide. But the costs threaten to exceed the benefits. There are less costly ways to deal with the problems that have given rise to the demands for regulation. The success of these demands is due in part to inadequate consideration of their implications.