Regulating public procurement in Brazil,India, and China: Toward the regulatory-developmental state

Since the 1990s, emerging economies such as Brazil, India, and China have adopted transparency-enhancing public procurement regulations in line with international norms. Yet they have hesitated to join the World Trade Organization's legally binding Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Based on the Special Issue framework, this article scrutinizes the underlying domestic and international determinants, and how they influence emerging countries’ positions in two overlapping international procurement regimes. In particular, reform-oriented state actors, societal pressure, and lesson-drawing from international templates have induced a strengthening of domestic procurement institutions and turned emerging countries into “promoters” of the international transparency regime. Conversely, the rising powers have remained, to varying degrees, reluctant “spoilers” of the GPA-based market access regime in order to keep policy space and use procurement for domestic development objectives. The article suggests that this regulatory-developmental layering of rule-based governance and interventionist ambitions characterizes the variegated regulatory state in emerging countries.     

International diffusion of regulatory governance: EU actorness in public procurement

This paper attempts to go beyond actor‐centered explanations of the European Union's (EU) presence in regulatory politics by examining the role of the EU in the diffusion of regulatory norms and practices. We explore the international diffusion of public procurement policy, to which multiple organizations and especially the EU and the World Trade Organization have made an active contribution. Using the “opportunity‐presence‐capability” scheme, we argue that the EU is actively co‐shaping the global agenda on public procurement, mainly as a result of the “opportunity” and “presence” dimensions of its global actorness and its role in the horizontal diffusion of public procurement regulations between international organizations. For “EU as a global actor” literature to offer valuable explanations, an in‐depth analysis of its relationship with other international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, reveals significant interactions and the co‐shaping of policy agendas.     

The “baby steps” in mainstreaming sustainable public procurement in Ghana: A “double‐agency” perspective

The emerging literature on public procurement policy suggests that public procurement may be leveraged to advance several public policy agenda. Hence, many countries have reformed their public procurement process towards social and environmental outcomes termed sustainable public procurement. These reforms have often been launched in response to international initiatives such as the global 10‐year framework for action on sustainable consumption and production by the Johannesburg implementation plan in 2002 and the Sustainable Development Goals. Yet, empirical evidence on the drivers and benefits of SPP in developing countries is still scarce. This gap is addressed with a qualitative case study of six public sector institutions in Ghana. On the basis of elite interviews, this paper highlights barriers to mainstreaming SPP in Ghana's public sector. We further advance the scanty principal–agency literature by establishing a double‐agency relationship in the context of SPP, which depicts limited agency cases where principals lack the capacity to defend their own interests.     

Path Dependence and Public Sector Innovation in Regulatory Regimes

The overarching theme of this article is institutional analysis of modernization and innovation in the regulatory state, and in pursuing this, the concepts of ‘path dependence’ and ‘administrative traditions’ are used throughout. Self‐reinforcing or positive feedback processes in political systems represent a basic framework. The empirical point of departure is the EU public procurement directive linked to OECD data concerning use of outsourcing among Member States. The question is asked: What has caused the Nordic countries, traditionally not belonging to the Anglo‐Saxon market‐centred administrative tradition, to be ranked so high as users of the Market‐Type Mechanism (MTM) of outsourcing in the public sector versus inhouse provision of services? The reason may be complex, but might be found in an innovative Scandinavian regulatory approach rooted in a ‘small is beautiful’, small and medium‐seized businesses, and local and regional development planning tradition.     

The role of the state in voluntary environmental reform: A case study of public land

Conventional environmental reform is characterized by the compliance of firms with direct regulatory pressure from the state. Scholars are now turning their attention to alternative modes of reform where firms proactively improve their operations through the implementation of voluntary environmental strategies (VES). While previous research on VES has typically focused on the manufacturing sector, this study explores challenges to corporate greening in the natural resource extractive sector when strategies are undertaken on public land. Findings from two case study regions in the Canadian province of Alberta suggest that VES undertaken on public land are significantly constrained by certain features of the system of environmental governance and the regulatory regime, particularly the reluctance of the state to be involved as a co-regulator of public land. The importance of solid leadership from the state in environmental reform – including cases of voluntary corporate initiatives – is discussed.     

The Regulatory Gift: Politics,regulation and governance

This article introduces the “regulatory gift” as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government‐led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, “insider” personal interest, or profit‐seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators’ functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry‐specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest – delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation – this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.     

The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge

Multibillion–dollar accounting scandals have brought down Enron and WorldCom, while other corporations continue to revise and restate earnings. The gradual stock market tumble has played havoc with investment portfolios of retirees, parents saving for education, small business owners, and corporate America. All eyes are on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a small, independent regulator of the securities markets with a gargantuan challenge. On the one hand, it faces great public expectations for rigorous reform of Wall Street. Politicians have mandated rules and sanctions for cleaning up the practice of outside audits and for improving the veracity of financial disclosures. Yet the public's expectations for a vigorous market recovery are even greater. If sanctions and rules are too severe, though, reform efforts could slow capital accumulation. This special report examines the SEC's regulatory past in order to understand the task it faces today. Management challenges posed by recent legislation are discussed, and recommendations for strengthening the SEC are presented.     

Regulatory Transparency in OECD Countries: Overview, Trends and Challenges

The concept of transparency has rapidly gained prominence in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. It is particularly associated with the rise of the governance agenda, as transparency is a core governance value. The regulatory activities of government constitute one of the main contexts within which transparency must be assured. There is a strong public demand for greater transparency, which is substantially related to the rapid increase in number and influence of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or 'civil society groups', as well as to increasingly well educated and diverse populations.
Transparency initiatives now form a major part of the regulatory policies of many OECD countries: in 2000, 20 of the 30 OECD member countries had government-wide transparency policies (OECD 2002a). Many OECD countries have now made substantial investments in improved regulatory transparency, and have reaped important gains in terms of regulatory quality, legitimacy and accountability.
However, despite these gains, the results have in many cases fallen short of expectations. As well, the implementation of transparency has itself led to new stresses and problems within the regulatory process. This article considers why regulatory transparency is important and points to some of the main trends in improving regulatory transparency. It also considers a range of problems and issues that arise and suggests means of resolving these.     

State Environmental Regulation and Economic Development: Are They Compatible?

An underlyingussumption of the partial preemption apprmh is the belief that minimum federal standmds contribute to the prospective decentralization of environmental protection programs by removing or reducing industry incentives to shop aroundfor states with a more lenient regulatory stance. This assumption was examined through a survey of chief executive oficers of pollution-generating firms. Tlze data suggest that corporate officials see regulatory climate m an important component of overhead ctxits. The author concludes that the desire to retain industries within state boundaries does inhibit the promulgation of strict environmental regulat ions by public officials.     

Regulation,the Regulatory State and European Politics

For the past 15 years or so, the claim of a rise of the regulatory state in Europe has been a dominant theme in public policy research. This paper critically reflects on this claim and the associated scholarship by considering four key questions. First, what is the significance of the supposed rise of the regulatory state for the state in Europe and how can this trend be explained? Second, what insights have been gained from the study of phenomena associated with the regulatory state, both in terms of EU and national levels of government as well as in terms of process and organisational understandings of policy analysis? Third, does the regulatory state represent a stable arrangement or does it suffer from its own peculiar dilemmas that fundamentally affect the nature of European states? Fourth, and finally, this article develops three scenarios – those of withering away, plodding along, and rejuvenation – for the future of the (study of the) regulatory state in Europe.     

Regulatory dynamism of environmental mobilization in urban China

In China, urban middle class mobilization against potential pollution risk has become increasingly common. This article examines this phenomenon through a detailed case study of a 2009 anti‐waste incinerator campaign in the Panyu District of Guangzhou, which culminated in a sizeable public protest and government U‐turn. This episode revealed tension between the narrow, state‐centered regulatory model fixated on end‐of‐pipe pollution control, and a much broader decentered approach advocated – and practiced – by project opponents, which incorporated public consultation and much greater emphasis on upstream waste reduction and sorting. In the process, the Panyu campaign progressed beyond a case of “regulation by escalation,” whereby beneficial regulations are belatedly enforced following populist pressure. Instead, it transformed into an open dialogue between a plurality of actors, including citizens, journalists, experts, and officials, about what regulation should constitute and who should determine acceptable levels of risk. By focusing on the processes through which regulatory issues emerged and changed during the Panyu campaign, this article highlights the regulatory dynamism of environmental mobilization in a context of regulatory uncertainty, and campaigns against “locally unwanted land uses” more broadly.     

Regulatory Stringency, Green Production Offsets, and Organizations' Financial Performance

Some scholars have argued that environmental regulatory pressures constrain organizations' financial opportunities, while others maintain that environmental regulations can spur product and technology innovations and encourage greater operational efficiencies. Advocates on both sides have evidence in support of their positions. However, considering both perspectives in tandem and recognizing that other factors may be associated with improved financial performance, we may find that neither position is valid, or that both are. Relying on data for manufacturing facilities in seven countries, this study shows that more stringent environmental policy regimes are related to diminished firm profits. Yet organizations that are motivated by a green production focus—defined as enhancing internal efficiencies and new product and technology development—are more likely to improve their environmental performance. They also demonstrate a greater probability of benefiting financially, thereby offsetting the cost of regulation or accruing a net gain.     

Regulatory policy outputs and impacts: Exploring a complex relationship

In this article, we pursue the objective of empirically testing the extent to which changes in environmental policy outputs can explain changes in environmental impacts. Previously, systematic testing of this relationship was hampered by the lack of a compelling measurement of changes in regulatory policy outputs. To remedy this, we present a novel approach to the measurement of events of regulatory output change. We illustrate our concept by employing data on changes in clean air regulations in 24 advanced democracies from 1976 to 2003. In a next step, we explore the extent to which changes in clean air regulations can account for changes in air pollutant emissions. The empirical analysis suggests that changes in clean air regulations cannot be unconditionally associated with changing intensities of air pollutant emission. We deem these results to have far‐reaching implications for the study of regulatory policy change.     

Toxic waste and public procurement: The defense sector as a disproportionate contributor to pollution from public–private partnerships

Public procurement is a large sector of the economy with most procurement going to the defense sector. Procurement by the defense sector includes purchases made through contracts to private businesses that manufacture durable goods. Manufacturing of these goods results in pollution production with toxic wastes being among the most dangerous pollutants for public health. Despite green purchasing policy goals, most transactions in the United States through defense contracts result in disproportionately high-toxic pollution releases by manufacturers. We find that persistent exemptions granted defense agencies from following green purchasing policy result in a landscape where contractor environmental performance is unchanging with defense contractors persistently polluting in high amounts. Further, we find that defense contractors are linked to most toxic releases from procurement meaning that exemptions may be hindering potential advancements from green purchasing policy. Results can inform the design of new guidance about procurement and expand understanding of environmental inequality.     

Multilateral development banks,transparency and corporate clients: ‘public–private partnerships’ and public access to information

The multilateral development banks (MDB) recognise and promote transparency as a principle of good governance. Public release of information about policies and projects is a central aspect of this transparency, and the five MDBs studied here each adopted new policies during the 1990s to increase the accessibility of such information. The flow of information to local communities is important to the effectiveness of MDBs' social and environmental safeguards and to securing public support. But MDBs also embrace a second strategy, which sometimes conflicts with transparency: each MDB (or an affiliate) lends to private corporations as well as to member states and each bank modifies its information disclosure rules, giving corporate clients greater discretion than member governments. Environmental and social safeguards apply to corporate borrowers as well as to governments and there is a relatively high level of controversy over corporate projects' environmental and social impact. When subjected to a qualitative review of their disclosure standards, emphasising fullness of disclosure, accessibility of information, timeliness of information and availability of recourse, the disclosure policies of all five MDBs are clearly found to accommodate corporate confidentiality while compromising public demands for information. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Defining Environmental Justice Communities for Regulatory Enforcement: Implications from a Block‐Group‐Level Analysis of New York State

The absence of a clear definition of environmental justice areas has been cited as one of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's major deficiencies in managing federal environmental justice programs. Several states have explicitly defined potential environmental justice areas and integrated targeted efforts into the policy‐making process. At the block‐group level, this study evaluates the effects of New York State's environmental justice policy, which defines communities of concern in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as mandates supplemental regulatory enforcement activities for these neighborhoods, on the agency's policy implementation practices under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. The empirical findings suggest that there is inconclusive evidence regarding race/ethnicity‐ and class‐based environmental inequity. Also, the state's policy intervention is not universally effective. Moreover, task environments of a given community are a consistent determinant of the agency's regulatory compliance monitoring and assurance activities. This study then derives broader implications regarding the adoption of a policy instrument that defines and screens potential environmental justice communities.     

Regulatory lags,liberalization, and vulnerability to banking crises

This article explores the effect of delays in updating prudential regulation on the likelihood of a country experiencing banking crises, and it disentangles the impact of different aspects of regulation on crisis onset. I argue that delays in revision to banks' prudential regulation allow banks to adopt risky behavior, which increases a country's vulnerability to systemic banking crises. This effect, however, is conditional on the level of liberalization of the financial market. At lower levels of liberalization, banks have stronger incentives to escape the constraints of regulation and to take advantage of regulatory lags. At high levels of liberalization, the effect of regulatory lags is curbed, possibly by market discipline. Statistical analyses on a sample of developed and developing countries from 1974–2005 support this argument and help rule out the competing learning hypothesis. These results suggest that the effects of institutions can vary with the passage of time.     

Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

Although vigorous lobbying by groups within society is essential for the functioning of democracy, it is widely perceived that resource‐rich groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair advantages and influence. This perception damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participation and the legitimacy of policymaking. This problem intermittently leads reformers and scholars to assess and develop policies that might assist in addressing lobbying power imbalances. This paper takes up Moloney's call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative economy to directly address the problem of lobbying inequality. It considers the extent of lobbying inequalities and theoretical frameworks for understanding how resources enable an influence advantage, before assessing the types of regulatory approaches that have been used by democratic institutions. Voluntary measures that could be taken by the corporate sector and professional associations are considered, alongside the current interest in using digital platforms to identify inequalities and incorporate public preferences as a variable in allocating lobbying resources.     

Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign‐style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign‐style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two‐pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five‐Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign‐style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign‐style enforcement.     

Corporate Entrepreneurship in the Public Sector: The Dance of the Chameleon

This article explores the application of corporate entrepreneurship within the public sector. It outlines research that investigates whether those factors, which the literature describes as stimulating corporate entrepreneurship in the private sector, apply to the public sector. It concludes that entrepreneurship is a strategic phenomenon and, as a consequence, the unique environmental influences on public sector bodies generate stimulants and constraints to corporate entrepreneurship,which vary from those applicable to the private sector.