Police legitimacy and support for vigilante violence in Pakistan

Bottoms and Tankebe recently analysed the multidimensional nature of police legitimacy and made an argument for its relevance to social order. Using survey data from three communities of varying socioeconomic conditions in Pakistan, this paper examines the links between the multiple dimensions of the Bottoms-Tankebe model of police legitimacy and support for vigilante violence. The findings show overall high levels of support for vigilantism. Regression analysis shows that experiences of police illegality consistently predict support for vigilantism across the three communities. Perceived quality of police decision-making predicts support for vigilantism in some conditions but not others. Contrary to expectations, quality of interpersonal treatment by police and police effectiveness do not explain support for vigilantism. We also found no evidence to show that feelings of obligation to obey the police mediate the influence of police legitimacy on vigilante support. The implications of these findings are discussed in this paper.     

INSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS,ILLEGITIMACY, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VIGILANTISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Why do individuals or groups support vigilantism as a means of conflict resolution? Most researchers tend to agree that support for and participation in vigilantism occurs in “stateless locations,” that is, when formal justice institutions are weak or absent. Despite this general consensus, quantitative evidence of this relationship is limited to a handful of country‐specific studies that used only subjective survey‐based measures of institutional weakness. This study seeks to extend research on vigilantism by assessing the relationship between subjective and objective conditions of formal justice institutions and public support for vigilantism across 323 provinces in 18 Latin American countries by using the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey. Specifically, this study uses multilevel logistic regression techniques to examine the variability of public support for lethal vigilantism within and across Latin American countries. When controlling for a wide range of potential confounds, the results show that the most robust predictors of support for violent vigilantism are subjective indicators of institutional illegitimacy, personal victimization, and punitive attitudes. Evidence also exists that objective insecurity, as measured by province‐level homicide rates, fosters public support for violent vigilantism in certain situations.     

Varieties of Reconciliation

In recent years scholars from neighboring disciplines have emphasized the importance of conceptual rigor in designing, administering, and interpreting research in the social sciences. Drawing on this new conceptualism, this article analyzes the much talked about notion of "reconciliation." In an effort at structuring a useful debate on possible departures from historic injustice, the article formulates a systematized concept of reconciliation based on the multitude of meanings contained in theory and practice. It distinguishes varieties of reconciliation, organizing these varieties into types and subtypes. The article argues that while most varieties of reconciliation emanate from the same root concept, the various outer layers of meaning do not overlap. This hampers not only our understanding of reconciliation, but its promotion in the international system as well. In response to this methodological malaise, the article prescribes friendly amendments—conceptual modifications and refinements designed to increase measurement validation of reconciliation as a conceptual variable .     

Public support for vigilantism: an experimental study

Objectives

To empirically examine the absolute and relative impact of situational characteristics and confidence in the criminal justice system on public support for vigilantism.

Methods

In an experimental study with a between-subjects design, members of a Dutch household panel (n = 1,930) responded to vignettes about vigilantism that were varied across two experimental factors: (1) type of precipitating crime and (2) type of formal sentence for the precipitating offender. In the measurement of support, we distinguished between outrage at vigilantism, empathy with the vigilante, and desired punishment for the vigilante. Confidence was assessed 1?month later.

Results

Our findings show that situational characteristics have a substantial and independent influence on support for vigilantism, in addition to the role of confidence. This means that when citizens express support for those who take the law into their own hands, this is not necessarily rooted in a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system. Furthermore, all three measures of support were affected more by the situational characteristics than by confidence.

Conclusions

Citizens are nuanced in their judgment of vigilantism and sensitive to contextual information, which is in line with other recent findings regarding public punitiveness. Future studies should assess whether the findings can be generalized to other settings where citizens cannot rely (as much) on the state to deal with crime.     

What’s Inside and Outside the Law?

In this article I take up a conceptual question: What is the distinction between ‘the law’ and the behavior the law regulates, or, as I formulate it, the distinction between what is ‘inside’ the law and what is ‘outside’ it? That conceptual question is in play in (at least) three different doctrinal domains: the constitutional law doctrines regarding the limits on the delegation of legislative powers; the criminal law doctrines regarding mistakes of law; and the constitutional rights doctrines that turn on the distinction between state action and the acts of non-state actors. I argue that legal doctrines should turn solely on normative considerations and should not turn on answers to conceptual questions. However, the doctrines I discuss appear to turn on the conceptual question regarding what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the law. I show how each of these doctrinal areas appears to raise this conceptual issue, and I explain how the doctrines might or might not escape being held hostage to conceptual controversy.     

Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework1

Abstract: It has been argued that the EU suffers from serious accountability deficits. But how can we establish the existence of accountability deficits? This article tries to get to grips with the appealing but elusive concept of accountability by asking three types of questions. First a conceptual one: what exactly is meant by accountability? In this article the concept of accountability is used in a rather narrow sense: a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. The second question is analytical: what types of accountability are involved? A series of dimensions of accountability are discerned that can be used to describe the various accountability relations and arrangements that can be found in the different domains of European governance. The third question is evaluative: how should we assess these accountability arrangements? The article provides three evaluative perspectives: a democratic, a constitutional and a learning perspective. Each of these perspectives may produce different types of accountability deficits.     

The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance

The European Union offers crucial insights into the gradual shift from a Weberian form of modern 'government' towards the institutionalisation of post-Weberian 'governance'. The article argues that the emerging 'polity of polities' context, not only threatens the constitutional basis of democratic rule but also raises the questions of what exactly the new institutions of governance beyond the nation-state are, and what they imply for the functioning (rules of the game) and legitimacy (democratic processes) of the political order. In an effort to elaborate on these questions, the article develops two themes. First, it raises critical questions about the conceptual boundedness of 'governance' in the discussion of constitutional and policy studies within the field of European integration. Secondly, it advances a methodological access point for the study of the institutionalisation of governance in the Euro-polity. It suggests situating the legal concept of acquis communautaire at the boundary of legal studies and politics. The concept is then applied to a case study of citizenship policy in the EU to demonstrate how the acquis communautaire–more precisely, the 'embedded acquis communautaire'–facilitates methodological access to the study of the institutionalisation of governance beyond the state and despite states.     

Criminal Law, the Victim and Community: The Shades of ‘We’ and the Conceptual Involvement of Community in Contemporary Criminal Law Theory

The article addresses the argument, put forward by Lernestedt, that the proprietor of the ‘criminal-law conflict’ is the community (or the community and the offender) and discusses his proposed theoretical model of criminal law trial. I raise questions regarding the legitimacy of such a model, focusing on four counts. Firstly, I assert that his assumptions about the state the individual and the old/new versions of criminal law theory are society-dependent. Secondly, I address some problems with the concept of community and particularly with the proposed conception of community, which seems to mostly exclude the offender. Thirdly, I question the need for (or added value of) such a proposed conceptual involvement of the community as an actor in the criminal law process and theory. Lastly, some potential problems with the idea of the victim as a mere “representative of us” are mentioned, including the possibly undesirable demands and limitations on the victim’s agency and issues of respect for the victim’s individuality.     

Countermovement vigilantism and human rights

Vigilante groups designed to counter dissident movements are common across the world. Although these groups systematically violate the rights of citizens, little theoretical work has examined the phenomenon. The paper develops a theory and set of corresponding propositions on the origins, behaviors, and consequences of counter-dissident vigilantism. The implications for promoting international human rights are then discussed.Groups of private citizens designed to counter dissident movements have become a major concern of human rights organizations. Not only are counter-dissident vigilantes responsible for violations of rights in a wide variety of settings, but rights workers are often themselves the victims of their attacks. The paper develops a theory and set of propositions about counterdissident vigilantism and concludes with strategic implications for rights organizations.     

The Nature of Juridical Proof

Much of evidence scholarship deals with straight forward doctrinal rules,such as relevancy,hearsay,character evidence,expert testimony and the like.These rules are extremely important,and I have lectured on many of them in China.There is another set of questions,though,questions that deal with the conceptual foundations of the law of evidence specifically,or the rule of law more generally.In my first lecture,I touched on some of these issues in discussing the relationship between evidence,procedure,and substantive law.Today I wish to talk with you about another fundamental question,in fact perhaps the most fundamental question pertaining to evidence law,and that question is: What is the nature of juridical proof?     

Sanction and Obligation in Hart's Theory of Law

Abstract. The paper begins by challenging Hart's argument aimed to show that sanctions are not part of the concept of law. It shows that in the “minimal” legal system as understood by Hart, sanctions may be required for keeping the legal system efficacious. I then draw a methodological conclusion from this argument, which challenges the view of Hart (and his followers) that legal philosophy should aim at discovering some general, politically neutral, conceptual truths about law. Instead, the aim should be to discover the values because of which certain things in the world are classified as law and others as non‐law. Focusing on those would give us a more insight to the roles law plays in society, as well as more illuminating answers to traditional jurisprudential questions like the status of law in evil regimes.     

Meeting common environmental challenges: the co-evolution of policies and practices

This article proposes an analytical framework for exploring policy responses to common challenges of environmental governance. Observing that governance involves multiple processes, I begin by identifying a conceptual platform for studying unilateral learning and adaptation as well as international cooperation as integral and interacting components of a complex governance system. I propose the concept of co-evolution as the cornerstone of this platform and distinguish between two modes of co-evolution: diffusion and cooperation. The article draws findings and propositions from recent literature to identify the mechanisms at work and the conditions under which they foster mutually beneficial solutions. Indicating how important governance challenges differ with respect to these conditions, I build the case for a diagnostic and differential approach that matches capacity-building and policy strategies with the challenge in focus.     

Volatile Sovereignty: Governing Crime through the Community in Khayelitsha

This paper asks what crime prevention looks like for residents in informal settlements in Khayelitsha, a black township on the outskirts of Cape Town. It engages with the idea of vigilantism and hybrid policing formations, analyzing the overlaps and intersections between legal community‐based crime prevention initiatives, and local ‘punitive practices’. The focus is not on the intensely violent spectacle of ‘mob justice’, where suspects are killed, but on the more ubiquitous, hybrid formations that also fall on the vigilantism continuum. These include coercive practices such as banishment, corporal punishment, retrieval of stolen goods by local policing formations and, trials conducted by street committees. The core argument I make is that, at times, particularly in poor areas where the state is absent and encourages citizens to take responsibility for their own crime prevention, the boundary between legality and coercive illegality collapses in on itself. Thus, the notion of voluntarism, that is so important to official discourse on crime, is particularly problematic when applied in poor communities with high rates of unemployment and high crime rates. As such, the state's encouraging of citizens to take responsibility for their own safety, alongside a punitive state discourse on crime and criminality, creates the space for illegal vigilante style actions to emerge in the shadow of legal crime prevention initiatives.     

The Common Law Clean Up of the ‘Workshop of the World’: More Realism About Nuisance Law's Historic Environmental Achievements

This article examines the environmental benefits arising from compliance with common law nuisance injunctions during the British industrial revolution. It argues, based on the outcomes of industrial nuisance actions involving allegations of serious air and river pollution, that many millions of pounds were invested by corporate polluters in designing and implementing clean technologies within the framework of the common law. Nuisance law was not an unqualified success in the field of environmental protection at this time, but overall the findings contribute to the on‐going critique of the nuisance law histories of Brenner and McLaren, which argue that various limitations of the common law are at the root of modern environmental problems. The discovery of historic practical measures of environmental protection through common law enforcement raises important conceptual, policy, and legal questions for today, and disciplinary questions regarding the rigour of realist legal scholarship concerning the historic performance of the law.     

DSM-5 proposed diagnostic criteria for sexual paraphilias: tensions between diagnostic validity and forensic utility

In order to prevent sexual crimes, “sexual predator” laws now allow indefinite preventive civil commitment of criminals who have completed their prison sentences but are judged to have a paraphilic mental disorder that makes them likely to commit another crime. Such proceedings can bypass the usual protections of criminal law as long as the basis for incarceration is the attribution of a mental disorder. Thus, the difficult conceptual distinction between deviant sexual desires that are mental disorders versus those that are normal variations in sexual preference (even if they are eccentric, repugnant, or illegal if acted upon) has attained critical forensic significance. Yet, the concept of paraphilic disorders - called “perversions” in earlier times - is inherently fuzzy and controversial and thus open to conceptual abuse for social control purposes. Consequently, the criteria used in diagnosing paraphilic disorders deserve careful scrutiny.The DSM-5 sexual disorders work group is proposing substantial revisions to the paraphilia diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 nosology. It is claimed that the new criteria provide a reconceptualization that clarifies the distinction between normal variation and paraphilic disorder in a way relevant to forensic settings. In this article, after considering the logic of the concept of a paraphilic disorder, I examine each of the proposed changes to the DSM-5 paraphilia criteria and assess their conceptual validity. I argue that the DSM-5 proposals, while containing a kernel of an advance in distinguishing paraphilias from paraphilic disorders, nonetheless would yield criteria for paraphilic disorders that are conceptually invalid in ways open to serious forensic abuse.     

How to do things on purpose: R. A. Duff'sIntention,Agency, and Criminal Liability

Conclusion There is a lot of material in this book, and Duff handles most of it very well. It is unfortunate that he felt the need to tie his discussion of serious philosophical questions in the criminal law to larger overarching questions of philosophy. It is possible that current conceptions of intentional action implicate dualism (or Dualism), I suppose, but that would be a book-length discussion all of its own. It would begin with a careful discussion of just what dualism is, and would track down the various ways in which particular substantive positions on intentional action rule out alternatives to dualism. Such a work might be interesting indeed. It would be interesting, for example, to see a discussion of a type of conceptual dualism that I suspect Duff would find congenial: a dualism that insisted upon the autonomy of purposive notions and rejected the causal analysis of intentional action. Would that sort of dualism make any difference at all for the criminal law? It might, and it might not. But in any event that is not what we find in this book, which, for all of its healthy enthusiasm for the place of philosophy in the law shows an excessive tolerance for makeweight arguments about the great questions.     

Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study

Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus's analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus's analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.     

Dynamic risk factors: scientific kinds or predictive constructs

ABSTRACT

There are a number of theoretical problems evident in the concept of dynamic risk factors that arise from their (increasing) importation into the explanatory and treatment domains of forensic and correctional practice. More specifically: (a) the concept of dynamic risk factors has not been well defined; (b) relatedly, there is a lack of clarity whether dynamic risk factors refer to causal processes or are predictive constructs; and finally (c) because of the above problems no one is sure how best to integrate them into clinical assessment and treatment. I will examine each of these three conceptual problems in this paper and make some suggestions about how to utilise dynamic risk factors in explanations of offending.     

Law in Culture

Abstract. The relationship of law and culture has long been a concern of legal anthropology and sociology of law. But it is recognised today as a central issue in many different kinds of juristic inquiries. All these recent invocations of the concept of culture indicate or imply problems at the boundaries of established thought about either the nature of law or the values that law is thought to express or reflect. The consequence is that legal theory must, it seems, now systematically take account of the notion of culture. The present paper asks how this might best be done. I argue that a concept of culture, as such, is of limited utility for legal theory because the term “culture” embraces a too indefinite and disparate range of phenomena. But legal theory needs conceptual resources to consider at a general level the relations of law and culture. This paper suggests that these resources should include, above all, a rigorous distinguishing of different abstract types of community. Legal theory requires a sociologically‐informed concept of community. What is encompassed by the vague idea of culture is actually the content of different types of social relations of community and the networks (combinations) in which they exist.