SPAIN: EUROCOMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM

Abstract This article analyses the bases of the political competition between the Communist Party (PCE) and the Socialist Party (PSOE) in Spain. The historical backgrounds of this competition in the period of Popular Front strategies and civil war and under Francoism are discussed. The main decisions taken by the PCE seem to have traditionally followed a pattern of politics of broad alliances, generally moderate strategies and attempts to minimize the socialist influence. In the 1960s the socialist influence seemed to be limited as a result of cumulative difficulties, and the reproduction of an Italian style political situation was predicted. There was however a socialist renaissance in the last years of Francoism which was parallel to a more intense political struggle and an increasing crisis of the dictatorship. Secondly, the article looks at recent Spanish experience, the general elections of 1977 indicated the strong persistence of political memory, which favoured the PSOE. There was a remarkable political continuity with the loyalties and cleavages of the Second Republic, with a strong vote to the PSOE in the historical leftist areas, where socialism was able to survive notwithstanding its organizational crisis. The trade union elections of 1978 qualified however this predominance of the socialists on the left. Here, recent militancy at the shop floor level, represented by the communist-orientated Workers' Commissions, seemed more important than historical memory, although the socialist UGT produced a strong challenge. Finally the article examines the similarities between the programme of the PSOE and the Eurocommunism of the PCE and concludes that theoretical-ideological convergence, paradoxically, may well maximize political competition between communism and socialism in Spain.     

Issue salience in regional party manifestos in Spain

Abstract.  This article analyses the dynamics of electoral competition in a multilevel setting. It is based on a content analysis of the party manifestos of the Spanish PP and PSOE in eight regional elections held between 2001 and 2003. It provides an innovative coding scheme for analysing regional party manifestos and on that basis seeks to account for inter-regional, intra-party and inter-party differences in regional campaigning. The authors have tried to explain the inter-regional variation of the issue profiles of state-wide parties in regional elections on the basis of a model with four independent variables: the asymmetric nature of the system, the electoral cycle, the regional party systems and the organisation of the state-wide parties. Three of their hypotheses are rejected, but the stronger variations in the regional issue profiles of the PSOE corroborate the assumption that parties with a more decentralised party organisation support regionally more diverse campaigning. The article concludes by offering an alternative explanation for this finding and by suggesting avenues for further research.     

Change and continuity in the Spanish labour movement

This article assesses the current state of the Spanish trade union movement. More specifically it examines the results of the 1978, 1980 and 1982 union elections and explores changes occurring within the Spanish working class. It seeks to explain the overall strength and combativity of the Spanish working class as measured by available sociological data and the political events of the past three years. It also analyses the current relationship between the major working‐class parties, the PCE and the PSOE, and the two major trade union federations, Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) and General Workers Union (UGT).     

The effects of party mobilisation strategies on the vote: The PSOE and the PP in the 1996 Spanish election

Abstract.  In this article, the author analyses the impact of parties' mobilisation strategies at the district level on their vote share in the Spanish 1996 general elections. In order to do this, the author has estimated a multilevel model to test the impact of aggregate mobilisation variables at the district level controlling for voters' individual characteristics. The efforts made by the two main Spanish parties increased their share of the vote. Moreover, their strategies seem to be more efficient for some profiles of voters than for others. The mobilisation of the PSOE especially affected those who had clear political preferences, whereas the PP's mobilisation had stronger effects on less politically aware voters.     

Explaining Gender Parity Representation in Spain: The Internal Dynamics of Parties

This paper sheds light on the reasons for the sudden rise of women in party politics and political representation in Spain. Structural explanations and the conditioning influence of the electoral system are reviewed before focusing on institutional and party-political explanations. It argues that the key factor in explaining this rise is not just the adoption of rules on the gender parity representation, but the intra-party politics that allows for effective implementation of such rules. Using insights into the internal dynamics of the PSOE gained from extensive field observations and interviews, it argues that high levels of female representation were secured via internal party procedures, coupled with political backing from the party leadership. The paper therefore takes the discussion on women’ participation in representative politics beyond the question of adopting quota rules into the terrain of how, instead of remaining a dead letter, it is successfully implemented in practice.     

Political Corruption and the End of two-party system after the May 2015 Spanish Regional Elections

The autonomous elections held on 25 May 2015 took place simultaneously in 13 of the 17 Spanish autonomous communities (CCAA), leading to the most profound change in the autonomous party system seen in Spain in the last 20 years. A significant number of Spanish citizens hold the two main parties—the PP and the PSOE—responsible for being unable to solve their economic problems and for having pursued their austerity policies and containment of social expenditure to the extent of giving rise to the greatest inequality experienced in Spanish society in history. Furthermore, and as important as the economic crisis, support for the new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, has been linked to the emergence in Spanish public debate of party regeneration and the corruption scandals that tainted the main parties and most institutions in the years prior to the elections on 25 May 2015.     

The Spanish electoral cycle of 2019: a tale of two countries

Abstract

In 2019 alone, Spanish citizens went to the polls at least four times – two general elections, European elections, local elections and, for some, regional elections. Moreover, in the 2016–19 legislature, the country witnessed a successful vote of no confidence that replaced a Conservative prime minister with a Socialist one; experienced an important constitutional crisis over the 2017 referendum on Catalan independence; observed the emergence for the first time of a viable far-right party; and ended with the first coalition government in the modern democratic history. The November 2019 election, the last in this long electoral cycle, left a fragmented and polarized political landscape and a left-wing cabinet – PSOE and Podemos – that does not have a majority in the chamber. This article presents the background, the results of the different elections and discusses how and why Spanish politics experienced a radical transformation likely to have an impact in the next years.     

The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973

The stability of outcomes under democratic decision-making is a significant issue in public choice. Several factors might make U.N. voting blocs less stable than blocs in national legislatures. Nevertheless, the data suggest that from 1946 to 1973 United Nations voting blocs were relatively stable. Nations that leave their blocs tend to vote with nearby blocs rather than making large ideological shifts, and tend to return to their old blocs. There does not appear to be cycles in United Nations voting blocs. Furthermore, the blocs can be ranked on a stable single-dimensioned continuum, lending further evidence that United Nations voting blocs are stable.     

The strongly stable core in weighted voting games

The problems associated with the concept of the core in spatial voting games such as non-existence and instability are well documented. The structurally stable core, presented by Schofield, attempts to resolve these problems by looking at the subset of the core which is still nonempty after a small change in voter preferences. Although this concept, combined with the adoption of supramajoritarian voting rules and weighted voting games, may very well explain the observed stability in reality, it may not be suitable for certain coalition situations. This article proposes a new solution concept, the strongly stable core. The conditions for the existence and the potential location of the strongly stable core are then explored and compared with those of the structurally stable core.     

The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach

This essay provides an explanation for the existence of stable logrolling arrangements. The model presented assumes that issues are voted on one at a time, that people are risk averse, and that each person forecasts future issue decisions with a random variable whose mean is linear in the alternatives of the present issue. We show that under this model, the expectation that logrolling will take place stabilizes the logrolling process. For this expectation to be stable, it must be symmetric, which means that revoting of issues must be possible. Since revoting is possible in institutions such as Congress, we conclude that an important set of real world voting bodies satisfies the conditions for stable logrolling.     

Committee choice and the core under supramajority rule: Results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space

While simple-majority choice by committees is generally unstable, supramajority rule has been demonstrated to yield nonempty sets of stable outcomes: outcomes in the core. This paper reports results of a computer simulation of majority choice by committees under supramajority rule. The object is to explore the transition from unstable to stable committee choice with increasing supramajority rules. The findings are that supramajority rule limits the instability of committee choice; that stable committee choice is no more predictable than unstable committee choice; and that an optimal supramajority rule can be specified which minimizes instability and maximizes the predictability of committee choice. In all of the results, simple-majority rule plays virtually no role.     

Redistribution tax under non-benevolent governments

I analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system. I employ these assumptions: members gain special benefits in the majority; parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers; the member's utility function is given in a quasi-linear function; the government's objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and I classify governments according to the weight. The four main results are: a stable majority dose not support myopic government; the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers; the stable transfer of non-benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority; and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority, because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy.     

Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy

In unitary states – states in whichconstitutional powers are owned by thecentral government – vertical competitioncan generate stable outcomes, that isoutcomes that do not unravel througharbitrary repossessions by the center.Stability is a product of institutionalcommitment devices. Through these ademocratic government, though it cannotbind successor governments, can effectivelyoblige them to respect some of thedecisions it has made. A number of suchcommitment devices exist in Italy; theymake possible stable vertical competitionbetween central and regional governments.     

Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge

In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This essay considers variations of the electorate when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. We formalized such a situation by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, exhibit a stable liberal social choice function and promotion mechanism, and investigate a notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state.     

How (often) do voters change their consideration sets?

The consideration set model posits that in multi-party elections voters decide in two stages. We expect that in the consideration stage, when voters select viable options, ideological proximity is a key determinant, while in the choice stage election-specific factors become particularly important. This would imply that consideration sets are rather stable and that changes in voting preferences occur mainly within ideologically coherent consideration sets. This study examines both claims by analyzing panel survey data from Sweden and the Netherlands. Consideration sets were indeed rather stable, more so than voting intentions. After one year, voters still considered the same party in 81% of cases and only 13% of respondents shifted between ideological camps. This indicates that voters changed electoral preferences primarily within the boundaries of relatively stable consideration sets and ideological camps. These findings help to understand how elections can be volatile, despite the strong impact of highly stable ideological orientations.     

Political geography

I study a model of geopolitical organization endogenizing the size of nations, their public spending and their degree of openness. The optimal geography may not be a stable equilibrium and a bias toward too many countries tends to emerge. An exogenous increase in openness tends to reduce the size of countries but also to increase the size of their public sectors. When openness is endogenous there can be multiple equilibria, some with globalization backlash associated with large nations and small governments and others with smaller countries, bigger governments and high openness. However, stable equilibria may imply excessive globalization, too many countries and too much government spending.     

The Two-Party System and the Federal Political Process

As part of its transition program to civilian federal democracy,the federal military government has constitutionalized a two-partysystem along federal lines, provided funding and other facilitiesto the two parties, and established institutions, such as theNational Electoral Commission and the Directorate for SocialMobilisation, to supervise and oversee the two-party process.This regimentation is seen as being necessary because Nigeriahas not been able to sustain either democracy or a stable partysystem in the past. The stage has been set, therefore, for themaintenance of a two-party system in the Third Republic, butmany problems remain to be resolved before the stable, competitiveparty system becomes rooted in Nigeria's federal system, societaldiversity, and political culture.     

Gradient constraint in voting: The effect of intra-generational social class and income mobility on turnout

As the connection between an individual’s socioeconomic status and electoral participation originates from the socialization process in childhood and adolescence, inequalities in voting are often argued to be relatively stable throughout the life cycle. However, social mobility during adulthood may mitigate the effects of family background. Using individual-level register-based data, this study examines the extent to which changes in adults’ social class and income between 2000 and 2011 influenced voting propensity in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections. The results show that turnout among socially mobile voters settles between the stable members of their socioeconomic group of origin and destination. Our findings imply that intra-generational social and economic mobility can constrain the socioeconomic gradient in turnout.     

A two-dimensional analysis of seventy years of United Nations voting

International relations scholars frequently use roll-call votes on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to measure similarity in the foreign policy ideologies of states. They then correlate those measures with consequential outcomes, such as development lending, trade, or military disputes. Dynamic ideal point models of UNGA voting thus far have been restricted to a single dimension. We examine the existence of a stable, important, and interpretable second dimension underlying contestation in the UN. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, North–South conflict constitutes a stable second dimension, shaped heavily by the agenda-setting powers of the so-called Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77. In the periods before and after, the second dimension neither is stable nor easily interpretable, though it is sometimes important. We suggest that in most applications, our original one-dimensional estimates have conceptual advantages with minimal losses in explanatory value. We illustrate that conclusion with an analysis that correlates ideal point changes with militarized interstate disputes. Yet, our findings also suggest that scholars interested in specific issues, such as the Middle East, human rights, or arms control, might benefit from more specifically tailored ideal point estimates.     

Changes and Fluctuations in Issue Ownership: The Case of Sweden, 1979–2010

Issue ownership (IO) has been an important concept in the analysis of party behaviour, party strategy and party competition for several decades. More recently, it has also been of growing interest for research on voting behaviour. Traditionally, IO has been regarded as a stable phenomenon where parties have different issue profiles and are advantaged by different political issues or issue‐areas. Recently, however, many studies have reported change and fluctuations of IO, and the same studies also makes it clear that we know surprisingly little about what might cause, or facilitate, change in issue ownership. In fact, we do not even have systematic studies of how stable issue ownership is, or how frequent shifts in issue ownership actually are. The aim of this article is to explore the extent of change and stability in issue ownership in Sweden. For this purpose, the Swedish national election studies from 1979 to 2010 are utilised. Although recent research has indicated that changes in IO have increased over time, this is not supported in the Swedish case. Instead, issue ownership seems never to have been a particularly stable phenomenon. However, in line with our theoretical expectations, we show that ownership of economic issues is more volatile compared to ownership of other issues.