法规信息与法规信息处理

第一章法规信息的重要性与主要构成第一节法规信息的重要性法规信息是信息化社会的重要信息内容之一,是一个完整的信息系统所必不可少的组成部分。广泛意义上的法规信息通常包括法律、法规、司法解释、案例、规章、规范性文件和政策性文件、立法调研文献和法学研究文献等。法规信息随着社会发展而不断地产生、更新和发展,并且积累沉淀下来,其     

Rewards and Regulation

Rewards are less useful in regulation than they are in markets. Firms respond to market incentives because most markets are contestable. In markets that are not oligopolies it makes more sense to adopt a competitor mentality than a fixer mentality. Regulatory power in contrast is mostly not contestable. Firms are therefore more likely to adopt a fixer or game-playing mentality. Reactance to regulatory control through rewards is likely to be greater than reactance to market discipline. If a responsive regulatory pyramid is a good strategy for optimizing compliance, then punishment is more useful in regulation than reward. Reward at the middle of a regulatory pyramid brings about a moral hazard problem. Under certain limited conditions reward can be useful at the base of a regulatory pyramid. These conditions are transparent, easy measurement of the performance to be rewarded, an imbalance of power such that the regulatee is weak in comparison to the regulator, and an absence of weapons of the weak for subverting a regulatory system to which the weak are subject. Absent these conditions, and we cannot expect the undoubted efficiency advantages of a market where regulatory outcomes can be traded so that they are secured where the cost of doing so is least. While, in general, punishments are more useful to regulators than monetary rewards, informal rewards (praise, letters of recognition) are rather consistently useful in securing compliance.     

论我国城市水务法规体系的建立及完善

建立健全城市水务法规体系,是规范城市水务市场秩序,提高水务运营效率,增进服务,实现水务业可持续发展的必要手段.城市水务法规体系是一国水法体系中的分支体系,在城市辖区内几乎与水资源有关的法律法规都可归属于城市水务法规体系的范畴.我国城市水务法规体系,是由关于城市辖区内防洪、水治理、水环境保护、水源保护、取水、供水、排水、污水处理及回用、水务投融资、监管体制等的法律规范组成的系统.我国城市水务法规体系中虽然已经制定了一定数量的法律法规,这个体系还很不完善,许多立、改、废工作亟待进行,     

Reflexive Adaptation of Business to Regulation and Regulation to Business

Regulatory change is driven by competitive struggle. Regulatees struggle with each other for customers and with regulators to lessen the burden of the rules being enforced. Regulators compete for regulatees and for the confidence of customers and the general public.
Competition among regulators is imperfect. Along with better rules, new entrants must offer reputational capital, financial strength, and recognized enforcement powers. These entry requirements have supported a secular expansion of government suppliers relative to private suppliers. Principal-agent conflicts inherent in representative democracy establish incentives for this expanding sector to produce regulatory services of poor quality. Finding ways to make top government regulators economically accountable for acts of misregulation is a critical problem.     

Regulation and brand value

Legal context. IP rights are dependent on the public policyconsiderations which provide the justification for their granting.However, when regulation impacts on the exercise of IP rights,there is often a clash of public policy considerations. Key points. This article considers what happens when that clashoccurs, concluding that, in all cases, IP rights will be trumpedby the public policy considerations which underlie the regulation,often with no basis for claiming compensation notwithstandingthe obvious and very real economic impact on the rights owner.Unfortunately, the markets do not always take this risk intoaccount when valuing premium brand companies. Practical significance. This conclusion may have serious implicationsfor premium brand companies, especially in heavily regulatedfields like alcohol, food, pharmaceuticals, and tobacco.     

价格垄断及立法规制

虽然各国立法分类和理论研究都没有将价格垄断作为一般规制对象而单列,但并不能由此否认价格垄断行为具有相对独立性。对价格垄断行为的立法规制有两种立法体例:一元管制和二元管制。我国采二元管制的立法体例,即国家对价格的监管除了通过反垄断法或竞争法外,还制定专门的综合性价格法。反价格垄断法体系作为一个有机整体,是互相关联、衔接和配合的。反价格垄断法律规制对象有:垄断价格、固定价格、价格歧视和低价倾销。     

Regulation and Social Solidarity

Justifications for regulation are commonly based on the identification of market failures. This is however inadequate to account for much regulation, and sees regulation as inherently second best to market allocations. This article argues that, although some regulation will be based on market failure, other justifications can be found in the protection of rights and in the maintenance of social solidarity. Theoretical support for this last rationale can be found in the work of Durkheim and Duguit and the concept of public service. To accept this rationale for regulation has important implications both for regulatory policies and regulatory instruments.     

浅论社会性规制的理论依据—兼论我国政府对食品与药品质量规制制度

长期以来,我们比较重视对经济性规制的研究,而忽视了对社会性规制的研究。作为社会性规制中的政府对产品质量规制应被重视。本文在对社会性规制的理论依据分析的基础上,就我政府对食品与药品质量规制制度进行分析,以期理论界对此问题有更准确的把握。     

水工程与水权

水工程涉及多种民事权利类型 ,水权只是其中一类。水工程的所有权或者用益权自身不包含、不产生水权 ,水工程用益权与水权各为独立的权利 ,所谓水利工程供水水权概念易生误会 ,应弃之不用。水工程所有权原则上归投资者享有 ,于是有必要承认地方所有权、部门所有权、法人所有权。南水北调涉及水资源所有权、水权、水工程所有权、水工程用益权 ,不可一律归结为水权。     

Regulation in Sport as a Borderline Case between State and Law Regulation and Self-Regulation

The study deals with the basic questions of a new field of law: the sports law. Sport is traditionally the world of self-regulation, since the sport-associations do create and apply law as well. The state has interfered in this monopolistic world in the last fifty years, so did, on the basis that intrusion, the law. Where are the limits of the regulation by law, and under which conditions can the state and its courts supervise the norms of sports, these questions are dealt by the study.     

Legal Regulation and Communicative Couplings

From 1989 to 1991 we studied the relationship between legal regulation and decisions about acceptable risk at off‐shore installations in the North Sea. The study focused on the interaction between authorities and private actors, when they develop subsidiary rules, discuss projects, and execute audits. This article discusses the case of regulation within the framework of communicative systems theory; the problem is how to couple differentiated, closed functional systems (e.g., law and economy). Applying empirical data we attempt to create a more complex understanding of the communicative processes, on the basis of which we can elaborate upon the coupling between systems, and the potential effects of law. The point of the article is that the coupling itself may develop into a new independent system (the discursive system). If this is correct and fairly generalizable, legal regulation contributes to the differentiation of society into closed systems. At the practical level the differentiation will have consequences for both regulation and democracy.     

自然垄断与政府规制

自然垄断具有竞争无益性与无利性的双重特点 ,在传统经济体制的影响下 ,中国的自然垄断兼具行政垄断与市场垄断的双重特性 ,政府可对自然垄断领域中的市场主体秩序、交易秩序及服务质量标准进行规制 ,但同时又存在弊端。政府应当时常检讨其规制措施 ,以有效实现规制作用     

市场监管信息不对称的法律规制

信息社会深刻地影响着当今政府的治理活动。这种影响具有双面性,一方面信息技术的发展与普及,给政府治理带来了便利,另一方面也为其治理活动带来挑战。市场监管作为一种传统政府治理活动,也同样面临着挑战——这种挑战表现为各市场监管法律主体间信息的不对称。为了消除信息不均衡,有必要构建信息交流法律机制,促进各监管主体间的信息交流,形成以信息交流为基础的政府、企业、社会多元协同共治的监管体系。     

Risk Regulation and Deliberation in EU Administrative Governance—GMO Regulation and Its Reform

The article analyses the problems of EU risk regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) through the lens of deliberative theories of EU law and governance, such as deliberative supranationalism and experimentalist governance. Previous research had suggested that the GMO issue is not conductive to deliberation within EU institutions because of its high politicisation. This article argues that another equally salient factor is the scientification of the GMO authorisation process. Scientification stands for the Commission's overreliance on epistemic legitimacy as the basis for risk management. Given the deadlock of comitology in this field, scientification is exacerbated by a reversion to top‐down regulation by the Commission. As a result, political responsibility for GMO authorisations gets lost. This article argues that both scientification and politicisation are mutually accelerative processes ultimately leading to a break down of dialogue at the EU level. This contradicts the assumption that deliberation is fostered by technocratic ‘behind closed door’ decision‐making. In the GMO case, the top‐down imposition of epistemic authority has only increased politicisation contributing to the de‐legitimation of all EU institutions involved in GMO regulation. The recent EU reform on national opt‐outs is not sufficient to address this problem. A successful reform should mitigate the negative effects of both politicisation and scientification.     

宏观调控的法律规制

宏观调控问题已引起法学界热情的关注 ,但现有研究成果尚不足以形成立法资源 ,且学者间对宏观调控主体、领域、手段的法律规制等问题也存在着认识上的差异。立法上确定宏观调控主体 ,应以宏观调控的价值目标为根据 ;对宏观调控领域的法律规制 ,应把握宏观经济的层面界定 ;从逻辑学角度对现有宏观调控主体的研究成果进行检视 ,有利于确立宏观调控主体法治化的观念