刑法目的观转变简史——以德国、日本刑法的祛伦理化为视角

刑法的目的是刑事立法与司法的界限,是刑法学最为基本的问题.自启蒙以来,德日刑法目的观的不断流变表明,刑法目的由其所处的时代精神决定.在蔑视人权、专制统治时代,强调刑法目的是维护国家道义、社会伦理;在提倡保护人权、重视宪法、实行法治的时代,强调刑法目的是保护宪法性法益.当前,德日两国刑法学界一般认为,刑法的目的是保护(宪法性)法益,在刑事立法和司法中,应将单纯违背社会伦理而没有任何外部侵害性的行为排除在犯罪之外.     

Legal Order,Legal Pluralism,Fundamental Principles. Europe and Its Law in Three Concepts

The essay analyses the way in which the concepts of legal order, legal pluralism and fundamental rights have been used to describe (and decide) what European integration is (and what it ought to be) from the perspective of the law. The essay does not provide a legal theory but limits itself to investigating how certain concepts have been employed to justify legal decisions and to construct legal theories. The juridical discourse on Europe is examined to identify some trends in contemporary legal culture: the decline of a tradition of legal thought, ‘legal dogmatics,’ the vanishing of the distinction between internal and external law (between domestic law and international law, and between positive law and morality), the growing importance of fundamental rights discourse, the centrality of balancing test, the widespread criticism of legal science's claim to neutrality and the consequent normative turn affecting legal scholarship.     

论社会保障基本权

社会保障基本权是指公民所享有的依照宪法请求国家等公共主体提供援助以保障其基本生活或提高生活水平的基础性权利,它可被区分为缴纳性权利和非缴纳性权利、给付性权利和非给付性权利.由于社会保障基本权以维护人道主义价值为目标,并倚重于国家等公共机构,所以,它是一种社会基本权.不同社会保障基本权的实现对普通法的依赖程度有差别,但是,它们都具有对国家机关、社会组织及公民的直接效力.如果社会保障基本权未能被立法权、行政权具体化,或者具体化地不充分,或者具体化行为违宪,一旦该权利受到侵害,那么,就可通过宪法诉讼予以救济.     

Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct

It is evident that both law and morality serve to channel ourbehavior. Law accomplishes this primarily through the threatof sanctions if we disobey legal rules. Morality too involvesincentives: bad acts may result in guilt and disapprobation,and good acts may result in virtuous feelings and praise. Thesetwo very different avenues of effect on our actions are examinedin this article from an instrumental perspective. The analysisfocuses on various social costs associated with law and morality,and on their effectiveness, as determined by the magnitude andlikelihood of sanctions and by certain informational factors.After the relative character of law and of morality as meansof control of conduct is assessed, consideration is given totheir theoretically optimal domains—to where moralityalone would appear to be best to control behavior, to wheremorality and the law would likely be advantageous to employjointly, and to where solely the law would seem desirable toutilize. The observed pattern of use of morality and of lawis discussed, and it is tentatively suggested that the observedand the optimal patterns are in rough alignment with one another.     

中国民法的现代化与中西法律文化的整合

中国民法的现代化进程,特别是数次编纂民法典的曲折而艰辛经历,印证了中国学习和借鉴西方近现代民法的理性依据,以及中西法律文化整合的历史必然性。从性善与性恶、整体与个体、契约与身份、人情与法律、社会转型与弘扬传统美德等相互排斥又相互关联的法律文化理念和价值体系维度看,民法是保护善意人之法、聚个体间合作之法,民法不能忽视对身份关系的调整,具有辩证的情法观,道德精神是民法内在价值的根基。实现民法和传统文化、民法和现代文明的良性整合,需寻求他们之间的共通处和结合点,建立既尊重人性、彰显权利,又崇尚社会公益、弘扬社会公德的民法新格局。     

The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl‐Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory.     

失地农民社会权保障的宪法分析

社会权作为失地农民的一项基本权利,由于制度性根源、法律根源和公共政策根源造成了失地农民社会权的贫困,并且未得到宪法等法律的有效保护。从构建和谐社会角度看,加强失地农民社会权的宪法保障,以人为本是失地农民社会权宪法保障的哲学伦理学基础,阶层平等是失地农民社会权宪法保障的法理基础,人格尊严与个人自治是失地农民社会权宪法保障的人权法价值。失地农民社会权的宪法保障离不开宪法本身的完善和宪政制度构建的支持,实现失地农民社会权宪法保障是国家应尽的义务。     

差异和平等——兼论法律上的平等

＂平等＂是现代文明中一个重要的价值观念,但对它的理解却颇有争议,包括法律上的平等。人与人的差异显示了平等观念的核心——人权,人权的基本要求是人格的独立和与此适应的最基本的生存条件。因此不能把平等理解为无差异或把所有的差异理解为不平等。因为人与人的差异并不一定是不合理的,人与人的差异的产生有自然的原因,有社会的原因,只有后者才可能是不合理的,才是平等观念所反对的,其中的要义就是使所有人享有＂人权＂,即与现代文明相适应的＂人＂的尊严和与之适应的物质待遇。平等的要求仅限于此,超出此义,必陷入荒谬。现代法律应以平等为原则,从制度上限制因社会原因所造成的人与人的不平等,并平等地适用法律,坚持法律面前人人平等的法治原则。法律可以从立法和司法多种途径追求平等和保护人权,但其只能从制度层面为平等的实现创造条件,法律不可能消除一切不平等,法律更不会消灭一切差别。相反,法律在对平等的追求中还要保护合理的差别,故此,法律的公平原则中包含着差别原则。     

Juridification and the Construction of Social Citizenship

The article elaborates on the legal construction of citizenship within the welfare state. The concept of citizenship is constructed from the perspective of rights and is closely related to the legal development of various fields of law. Juridification processes in the welfare state directly concern the construction of social citizenship and indirectly affect both political and civil citizenship. Concentrating on juridification within the framework of the welfare state implies that the development of welfare law is the focal point of the article. To understand the implications of juridification processes in the welfare state, we concentrate on the relationship between social citizenship, on one hand, and political and civil citizenship, on the other, and consider the implications of the legal and institutional construction of social citizenship. Social rights may confine the scope of political and civil citizenship and at the same time enhance individual freedom and the extent of political action.     

法学意义上的社会弱势群体概念

对社会弱势群体概念的理解和认识不应当局限于社会学领域。因为那只是对社会弱势群体的多元化解释中的一种。既然法律是调控人类社会生活的主要规则 ,社会弱势群体就必然需要法律的调整、帮助和保护。那么 ,从法学的角度对社会弱势群体进行解释就并非毫无意义。在法学中 ,社会弱势群体是指由于社会条件和个人能力等方面存在障碍而无法实现其基本权利 ,需要国家帮助和社会支持以实现其基本权利的群体。因此 ,社会弱势群体概念的外延决定于现时社会中被人们认可的基本权利。同时社会弱势群体并不是严格意义上的比较性概念 ,而是身分性概念。     

The Sinews of Peace: Rights to Solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Abstract. This article examines the provisions on social and economic rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. After a conceptual clarification of the terms “fundamental rights” and “rights to solidarity,” three main claims are made. First, not all rights to solidarity are granted the status of fundamental rights in the Charter, in contrast with the treatment of the right to private property. Second, positive law does not justify such an approach. An analysis of the sources of the Charter clearly indicates that the right to private property is not a proper fundamental right as Community law stands. Third, rights to solidarity could be construed as a repository of arguments that Member States and regions could invoke when claiming an exception to the four fundamental freedoms.     

土地承包经营权性质探讨

由于农村土地承包经营制并不是单纯按民法理念设计的制度,因此,仅以民法理念来诠释这一制度是不可能对它形成正确认识的。我国农村土地从来就具有社会保障的功能,承包土地权利也从来不是一种单纯的财产权利。我国农村承包土地上存在的是由一系列权利构成的权利束:土地的社会功能(保障属性)派生出成员权,而成员权又派生出土地承包权;土地承包权行使的结果产生承包土地使用权,再由承包土地使用权派生出农户的土地承包经营权。现代农业的发展需要赋予承包土地使用权以物权属性,但应以解决一系列基础性问题为前提。     

行政相对方权利的语义分析

行政相对方与行政相对方权利是行政法的基石范畴。这两个基石范畴界定上的模糊,会导致行政法理论体系的混乱。对行政相对方及行政相对方权利进行语义分析,是进行行政法基础理论研究的切入点和逻辑起点。本文从行政相对方的界定、行政相对方权利的内涵、行政相对方权利与民事权利的辨析,以及行政方权利的划分着手,试图对行政相对方权利的内涵与外延进行法理学分析。     

论社会危害性理论与实质刑法观的关联关系与风险防范

社会危害性理论与法益理论确实可以成为实质刑法观的理论基础,但是社会危害性理论与实质刑法观的关联性比较复杂,并非如部分学者所提示的那样一一对应。就持有传统社会危害性理论立场的学者而言,他们其实并非可以简单地归入实质刑法观立场;而主张改革完善传统社会危害性理论的部分学者,反而坚持实质刑法观立场。在中国语境下,实质刑法观面临的风险与批评,主要根源就在于作为实质刑法观理论基础的社会危害性理论具有太过强大的解释功能,且实质解释论的功能表现包括了保障人权的正面功能与严重侵犯人权的负面功能的两面,呈现出矛盾属性。为了防范风险,不但需要发展实质刑法观,而且需要完善社会危害性理论。单面的实质刑法观或者保守的实质刑法观,主张通过实质罪刑法定原则的限制、实质犯罪论的限制与实质司法解释权的限制,以有效防范开放的实质刑法观可能存在的侵蚀人权保障机能的风险,因而应当成为当下中国最理想的选择。     

德国《基本法》中的社会国家原则

从语义解释的角度看,社会国家原则在《联邦德国基本法》(以下简称《基本法》)文本中不具有显著地位,且内容不够明确;但从体系解释而言,该原则享有不得修改的宪法基本原则的突出地位。社会国家原则产生的历史则表明,该原则具有弥补《基本法》中社会基本权利缺失的功能。但社会国家的目的以及社会国家原则保障的基本权利都必须通过立法者制定的法律来加以具体化。联邦宪法法院在发挥社会国家原则的宪法规范功能以及确定社会国家的最低宪法标准方面起到了重要作用。社会国家原则在联邦宪法法院的判决中一般与基本权利条款、基本权利限制条款以及社会国家的目标一起发挥作用,被用来为立法者设定社会权利保护义务或论证限制基本权利的法律规范的正当性。     

基本权利具体化之辨伪

基本权利的具体化是一个如何实施基本权利规范的问题,涉及法律的品质、宪法与法律、宪法与公权力的关系。立基于防御品质的早期基本权利具体化是一个法律保留问题,在很大程度上与基本权利限制同义,意在通过立法划定外部界限明确其内容,其后发展了国家保护义务与重大性理论,行政权与司法权亦负有具体化基本权利的义务。具体化的实质一则在于确定以立法者为优先的所有国家机关之于基本权利的义务;二则在于在形成基本权利内容的同时划定不受公权力支配的核心领域;三则在于使基本权利于具体生活关系中获得内容。广义上的基本权利具体化包括三方面的内容,即基本权利的形成、限制与保护,狭义的基本权利具体化要求普通法律在具体的生活领域与生活关系中形成基本权利的内容。     

道德性:法律的人性之维——兼论法与道德的关系

法是人类社会特有的一种社会现象,所以对法的研究最终不可能不追寻到人的本性.但能作为法律基础的人的本性只是道德性,道德的最高境界是正义,它是一种理想的人际关系和社会制度,在其中人人受到尊重和关爱,人人各尽其能,各得其所.人的行为它必须借助于法律这样的公共权力使一个社会人们的行为保持道德性的一种制度安排.因此,道德性是法律的人性基础,是制定和实施法律的出发点和归宿点.     

Political Unhappiness

The starting point of this paper is the idea of individual autonomy: Autonomy from the social body and from its influences, i.e., broadly speaking, autonomy from the "whole" of which the individual is a part. In particular, I shall address some of the problems arising out of the relations between the whole and its parts, basically problems of law and morality. We are accustomed to thinking that the relation between a particular individual and the universal whole to which the individual belongs should be a happy relationship. Such "happiness," however, will prove to be—from the liberal perspective here assumed—a problematic notion. From such premises as these, an argument will be developed, on behalf of social recognition and legal protection for out-of-the mainstream forms of behaviour or lifestyles, i.e., for individuals or groups that claim the "otherness" of their position together with a right of freedom from discrimination.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

论逮捕与人权保障

由逮捕的特殊性和人权的重要性决定,二者之间是一种辩证的关系：逮捕存在的根本目的是为保障人权,然而却是以限制或剥夺具体人的基本人权为条件的;从对被害人人权和社会制度角度讲,需要而且离不开逮捕,从被告人人权保障角度讲,要控制和慎用逮捕。二者统一于社会的共同道德和法律基础。尊重人权是人道的,正确地适用逮捕同样是人道的。尤其应当注意对被逮捕者权利的保障。