Facing the Consequences

Many philosophers endorse deterrence justifications of legal punishment. According to these justifications, punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can’t deter or that it can’t deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. I begin by isolating, in a simplified form, important claims common to deterrence justifications. I then endorse an uncontroversial claim about punishment and explore its implications for enforcement. These implications undermine the simple versions of the deterrence claims. I then evaluate several modifications of the claims to see whether they can be improved upon. I argue that they can’t easily be improved upon. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for deterrence justifications. I conclude by considering objections.     

Does Fault Matter?

In this article, I try to go beyond the traditional objections to strict liability public welfare offenses and confront other possible justifications for punishing non-culpable conduct. Specifically, I consider the following arguments:

• Penalties for public welfare offenses are punishment by name only, thus traditional justifications for punishment are not needed;
• Even if those penalties are punishment, punishing those who produce or threaten significant harm to others is not necessarily unjust; and
• Even if such punishment is not entirely just, it is consistent with other widely accepted criminal law doctrines.

     

Considering Capital Punishment as a Human Interaction

This paper contributes to the normative debate over capital punishment by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. The answer to the latter question turns on the kind of justification the agent can give for what she does in carrying out the role. So our inquiry concerns whether the justifications available to an executioner could provide him with the kind of justification necessary for him to take pride in what he does. If they cannot, I argue, this sheds some light on their adequacy as justifications. The main argument of the paper is that social control arguments for the death penalty fail to provide an adequate justification. I also give some consideration to retributive justifications. The argument is developed through close attention to the depiction of Albert Pierrepoint in the film, Pierrepoint: The Last Hangman.     

Two Misunderstandings About Public Justification and Religious Reasons

Two important objections have been raised against exclusivist public reason (EPR). First, it has been argued that EPR entails an unjust burden for citizens who want to appeal to non-public reasons, especially religious reasons. Second, it has been argued that EPR is based on a problematic conception of religious reasons and that it ignores the fact that religious reasons can be public as well. I defend EPR against both objections. I show that the first objection conflates two ideas of public justification (public justification as a conception of political legitimacy and public justification as an ideal of civility) and that the second objection conflates two ways to understand and identify religious reasons. Ultimately, it turns out that those who defend such objections actually share the concerns that justified EPR in the first place. In other words, if we are clear about the idea of public justification and the kind of religious reasons that EPR is really about, it appears that justificatory liberals are in fact all exclusivists.     

Do We Need Unicorns When We Have Law?

Abstract.  Theoretical justifications of human rights have been troubled by many criticisms and objections. It has been objected that the source of human rights is unclear as is the meaning attached to human rights. Yet today many human rights have been adopted in positive law. Law students today need to learn about this positive law of human rights and may consider that those debates in human rights theory are pointless. This article examines the extent to which the positive law of human rights answers these questions satisfactorily. It concludes that positive law offers several important answers to these criticisms, but suggests they cannot replace the need for a normative justification. The article concludes that approaches which integrate theory and positive law are fruitful avenues of inquiry.     

Human Genetics Studies: The Case for Group Rights

In this essay, the author focuses on an underlying theoretical issue which she believes seriously affects our collective response to the idea of group rights in the genetic-control context. That issue is to what extent are our responses to claims of group rights hampered by our bringing to the table (consciously or unconsciously) a model which is structured to acknowledge only individual concerns? Put another way, to what extent are our objections to group rights in this context a product of our inability (or refusal) to imagine the idea of group rights, rather than the product of truly substantive concerns?     

Surrogacy: is there a case for legal prohibition?

Surrogacy arrangements are a complex and challenging issue for legal regulation. On the one hand, if we wish to promote personal autonomy and enable the infertile to experience parenthood, there is a case for allowing these arrangements to proceed. However, objections to legal sanctioning of surrogacy include concerns for the surrogate and the child born through the surrogacy arrangement. Legally sanctioning surrogacy may also adversely affect social conceptions of women's roles or may be considered a form of commodifying women's reproductive capacities. This article examines these challenges to allowing surrogacy, but concludes that surrogacy should not be legally prohibited.     

Ordinary Folk and Cottaging: Law, Morality, and Public Sex

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced a new statutory offence of 'sexual activity in a public lavatory' into English law. Although written as a gender-neutral offence, the statute was formulated and enacted on the basis of concerns about male homosexual sexual activity in public lavatories ('cottaging'). This paper examines the justifications for, and implications of, the legislation. It considers the main arguments made in support of the offence and situates these within established moral, legal, and social debates about homosexuality. The paper considers the relationship between conceptions of public and private morality in relation to the legal regulation of homosexual sex. It goes on to explore the complex nature of regulating public sex in relation to sexual practices which often maintain high degrees of privacy. The final part of the paper argues that the legislation is largely in contradiction with the realities of police work and contemporary law enforcement.     

Reply to Five Critics of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why Tolerate Religion?</Emphasis>

This is my contribution to a symposium on my book Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, 2013), in which I respond to essays by François Boucher (Montreal) and Cécile Laborde (University College London), Frederick Schauer (Virginia), Corey Brettschneider (Brown), and Peter Jones (Newcastle). I clarify and revise my view of the sense in which some religious beliefs are “insulated from reasons and evidence” in response to the criticisms of Boucher and Laborde (2015), but take issue with other aspects of their critique. I defend most of my original argument against utilitarian and egalitarian objections from, respectively, Schauer and Brettschneider. I also discuss and defend the “No Exemptions” approach to conscientious objection to neutral laws of general applicability against a variety of objections, arguing, in particular, that my view is probably not very different from that of Jones.     

Probation Philosophies and Workload Considerations

Researchers have devoted a great deal of attention to understanding the punishment attitudes of different groups. Much of this research has focused on punishment attitudes of members of the public, while a few studies have considered how criminal justice officials perceive different sanctions. This study explores the justifications of probation rated by a sample of probation and parole officers. Attention is given to whether justifications are tied to the way officers rated the importance of different tasks as well as how much time officers reported their agencies devoting to different types of probation and parole activities. The results show some inconsistencies between justifications and work preferences/work activities. Implications are provided.     

“The roughest form of social work:” How court officials justify bail decisions

Growing research has analyzed quantitative patterns of bail decisions and outcomes, but we know far less about how court officials justify their bail decisions. To enhance understanding of how bail decisions—and their resulting pretrial outcomes—are generated, we interviewed 104 judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in a northeastern state. Court officials in our study reported three primary justifications at bail: ensuring defendants return to court, preventing crime, and lessening harm. The first two justifications have been suggested in the literature, but the latter is novel and encompasses two secondary justifications: lessening criminal legal system harm and lessening societal harm. We show how these justifications and the decisions they enable blend risk management with rehabilitation and emerge from court officials’ shared assumption of defendants’ social marginality but varied beliefs about what to do about such marginality pretrial. Each justification allows for distinct, but at times overlapping, bail decisions. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of court official decision-making, research on racial and socioeconomic inequality, and bail reform policy.     

Involuntary outpatient treatment as "desintitutionalized coercion": the net-widening concerns

In American jurisprudence, two justifications have traditionally been put forth to support the government's social control of persons with mental illness: police power and parens patriae. As public mental hospitals became less available as loci in which to exercise these functions, governments sought alternative means to achieve the same ends. One prominent but quite controversial means is involuntary outpatient treatment (IOT). While the concerns about IOT have been myriad, one often alluded to but never documented is that of "net-widening." That is, once IOT became available, it would be applied to an ever greater number of individuals, progressively expanding the margins of the designated population to whom it is applied, despite the formal standard for its application remaining constant. We tested the net-widening belief in a naturalistic experiment in Massachusetts. We found that net-widening did not occur, despite an environment strongly conducive to that expansion. At this time, whatever the arguments against IOT might be, net-widening should not be one of them.     

The Bologna Process: From a European Law Perspective

The Bologna Process, an intergovernmental process of voluntary policy convergence towards a common higher education structure, poses several concerns from a European law perspective. The Bologna Process takes place outside the institutional framework of the EU, while there would have been legal competence to enact the content of the Bologna Declaration as a Community measure. Hence it could be argued that Member States have straddled the borders of loyal cooperation by avoiding the institutional framework of the EC with its built‐in checks and balances. They have obstructed the Community in the attainment of its tasks, which stands in tense relation to Article 10 EC. Moreover, there exist several other objections against the Bologna Process, particularly in terms of democracy, transparency and efficiency. The Bologna Process resembles a deal done in a smoke‐filled room, and its voluntary character combined with a lack of coordination prevents its effective implementation.     

A Normative Approach to the Quistclose Trust

This is the first article to undertake a sustained analysis of normative justifications for the Quistclose trust. Whilst much of the existing writing on this topic has focused on the better classification of such trusts – for instance, whether they are express, resulting, constructive or sui generis – this article asks why the law should recognise a trust in addition to any underlying legal relationship. Four key justifications are addressed, based on respecting party intention, unconscionability, fairness, and the incentivisation of desirable transactions. It will be argued that: (i) there are difficulties with each of these justifications, although an intention‐focused explanation is probably the most convincing; and (ii) the existing law and commentary lacks coherence and consistency, as seen in the mismatch between normative and doctrinal analysis, and the failure to properly address the ramifications of the Quistclose trust during insolvency.     

Assessment of rape-supportive attitudes and beliefs in college men: development, reliability, and validity of the rape attitudes and beliefs scale

Discussed is the development and psychometric analysis of a measure of rape-supportive attitudes and beliefs called the Rape Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (RABS), intended for the use with college men. Items were developed from a literature review of "rape myths" that were correlated to some measure of sexual aggression. An exploratory factor analysis using only male participants revealed five factors: a) justifications for sexual aggression based on women's behavior, b) belief that women should hold more responsibility for sexual assault, peer c) pressure/need for sexual status and misreading women's sexual intent, d) acceptance of the use of alcohol and coercive tactics to acquire sexual compliance, and e) dislike for the feminine and acceptance of traditional gender roles. Initial reliability and validity studies were favorable for the RABS, including evidence that these factors were positively related to measures of sexual aggression. Each factor demonstrated differential power to predict sexual aggression, with justifications being the most powerful. Implications for counseling and education are discussed.     

Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice

The article examines the current criminal law and possible justifications for it with respect to three areas that are located between prosecutorial discretion and defences. These areas are officially-induced mistakes of law, entrapment, and conduct motivated by a desire to bring someone else to justice or to restore property. Common themes in the justifications for the avoidance of punishment in these examples suggest an underlying principle of fidelity to legal values, which should guide procedural and substantive law.     

People We Hire as Executioners: Who Are They? Who Are We?

Christopher Bennett has introduced a new inquiry into the capital punishment debate by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. He argues that this will depend on the kind of justifications that an executioner can offer in defense of his role and takes as an example the English executioner Albert Pierrepoint as portrayed in the film Pierrepoint: The Last Hangman. Bennett claims that none of the justifications available to Pierrepoint are adequate, that his pride in his role was unjustified, and that this gives us reason to doubt those justifications for capital punishment. I am unpersuaded by Bennett’s arguments and give reasons for thinking that the role of executioner can under certain circumstances be an honorable vocation in which one may legitimately take pride.     

Involuntary outpatient treatment as “desintitutionalized coercion”: The net-widening concerns

In American jurisprudence, two justifications have traditionally been put forth to support the government's social control of persons with mental illness: police power and parens patriae. As public mental hospitals became less available as loci in which to exercise these functions, governments sought alternative means to achieve the same ends. One prominent but quite controversial means is involuntary outpatient treatment (IOT). While the concerns about IOT have been myriad, one often alluded to but never documented is that of “net-widening.” That is, once IOT became available, it would be applied to an ever greater number of individuals, progressively expanding the margins of the designated population to whom it is applied, despite the formal standard for its application remaining constant. We tested the net-widening belief in a naturalistic experiment in Massachusetts. We found that net-widening did not occur, despite an environment strongly conducive to that expansion. At this time, whatever the arguments against IOT might be, net-widening should not be one of them.     

Medical treatment of dementia patients at the end of life: can the law accommodate the personal identity and welfare problems?

This article considers whether two significant philosophical objections to autonomy-based legal approaches to decision-making for incompetent individuals could be accommodated by the law. These philosophical objections are known as the personal identity and welfare problems. The article first sets out the autonomy-based approaches and their objections. Next, the present legal position is briefly canvassed in a comparative vein. Finally, the article suggests how the personal identity and welfare problems might be accommodated were legislators minded to do so, by proposing specific statutory amendments to the recent English legislation on advance decisions and evaluating their viability, particularly in light of the European Convention on Human Rights.     

A Forensic Entomological Analysis Can Yield an Estimate of Postmortem Interval,and Not Just a Minimum Postmortem Interval: An Explanation and Illustration Using a Case

Several authors claimed that a forensic entomological analysis can never be interpreted as the postmortem interval (PMI), but that it can be interpreted as a minimum postmortem interval (PMI_min), or dead for not less than X amount of time. Because in most instances, a PMI estimate should be a range, that is, the set of values from maximum postmortem interval (PMI_max) to PMI_min, objections to PMI estimation are objections to PMI_max estimation. The arguments for this position did not address the substantial body of literature describing estimation of both PMI_max and PMI_min using insect succession analysis. This report reviews the scientific issues and presents a recent homicide investigation in which several forensic entomology experts used the absence of carrion insects on the corpse, a kind of succession analysis, to estimate PMI or PMI_max.