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Dayanath Jayasuriya 《圆桌》2017,106(3):339-340
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苏联的"罗名制",从产生到最终被取消,其间经历了将近70年。它的产生与发展是与苏联政治生活中的权力逐渐集中相一致的,其形成和确立又是与斯大林模式的形成和确立同步的。实际上,苏联的"罗名制"就是斯大林模式的一部分。苏联"罗名制"的特点既有斯大林模式的共性内容,也有其独特的方面。"罗名制"的形成与确立并被固定化,给苏联社会的发展产生了严重的消极影响,可以说,虽然苏共解散、苏联解体的原因是多方面的,但"罗名制"所带来的社会消极后果无疑也是导致苏联解体的重要原因之一。 相似文献
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Rebecca Bill Chvez 《拉美政治与社会》2007,49(2):33-58
This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control—defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party—permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. 相似文献