Political instability and political terror: Global evidence on persistence

We test the hypotheses that fundamental characteristics in regional proximity, landlockedness, religious‐domination, legal origin, and income levels affect cross‐country differences in the persistence in political terror and political instability in 163 countries for the period 2010–2015. The empirical evidence is based on generalised method of moments. The hypotheses are that the following are associated with comparatively higher levels of persistence in political terror and political instability: regions with predominantly low income countries (Hypothesis 1); landlockedness (Hypothesis 2); Christian‐orientation (Hypothesis 3); French civil law (Hypothesis 4); and Low income (Hypothesis 5). The tested hypotheses are largely invalid. Only Hypotheses 5 and 2 are robustly investigated in the light of concerns about instrument proliferation. Hypothesis 2 is valid for political terror but not for political instability while Hypothesis 5 is neither valid for political instability nor for political terror.     

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Unilateral presidential actions, such as executive orders, are widely cited as a key strategic tool for presidential power. However, is unilateral action evidence of unilateralism or might it represent executive acquiescence? We answer this by (1) specifying three competing models, each with a different presidential discretion assumption and generating alternative hypotheses; (2) extending the canonical item‐response model to best measure executive‐order significance; and (3) comparing competing theoretical models to data for 1947–2002. Theoretically, we show that legislative preferences may impact unilateral actions differently than previously thought and indicate how parties may be influential. Empirically, a model where the president is responsive to the chamber's majority‐party median fits the data better than models assuming responsiveness to the chamber median or no presidential acquiescence. Unilateral action appears not tantamount to presidential power, as evidence implies that legislative parties, or the judicial actors enforcing their will, are key conditioning factors.     

Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the executive with fuzzy-sets

Abstract. What are the main variations in the constitutional control of the executive in 45 parliamentary democracies and how can these differences be accounted for? Four competing hypotheses, based on dichotomies, explain the degree of this control by means of contrasting institutional settings: consensus democracy versus majoritarian democracy, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, thick versus thin constitutionalism and established versus new democracies. These hypotheses are tested with the help of fuzzy-sets that allow for varying degrees of membership that go beyond the presence/absence suggested by these dichotomies. The necessary and sufficient conditions for constitutional control are specified with the help of this new methodology. The fuzzy-set analysis shows that the degree of constitutional control can be explained solely by a specific combination of institutional conditions stemming from the four dichotomies, and not by one single dimension. This constellation remains hidden for the traditional correlational techniques like regression. Hence, the fuzzy-set logic presents a promising new tool for comparativists that can be used to reveal causalities.     

Political judgments,perceptions of facts,and partisan effects

We test two competing hypotheses about the impact of partisanship and information on people's political judgments and perceptions of facts using Canadians' reactions to a major scandal. Our findings with respect to subjective political judgments confirm the argument that partisan predispositions are crucial. But there is no evidence to support the argument that the polarizing effect of partisanship is most evident among the most informed. When it comes to perceptions of “objective” facts, the results are consistent with Zaller's reception axiom: the more informed people are, the more likely they are to correctly perceive objective facts. Partisanship does not appear to affect these perceptions.     

Failing Political Representation or a Change in Kind? Models of Representation and Empirical Trends in Europe

This article reviews Peter Mair’s argument on the failure of political parties and the subsequent failure of representative democracy in Europe. It develops a conceptual framework to test the validity of Mair’s argument against competing interpretations of the development of representative democracy. It identifies three ideal typical models of representative democracy that seem to have succeeded each other over time: cleavage-based democracy, competitive democracy, and audience democracy. The article proposes specific empirical hypotheses for political parties and voters in each of these periods and provides empirical evidence to test the validity of these hypotheses. It concludes with a discussion of the results, evaluating whether the changes that occurred indicate failure of representative democracy or rather the emergence of a different form of representative democracy.     

Choosing between the government and the regions: An empirical analysis of the Italian constitutional court decisions

In this article the extent to which political variables can explain the behaviour of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions is explored. Two competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis argues that one should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. The other hypothesis suggests that there should be no systematic alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government. Unlike previous literature, the empirical results presented in this article seem to confirm that when the Rapporteur and the court's majority are allegedly affiliated with the Prime Minister's coalition, the odds of success of the Prime Minister go up.     

An examination of how voters form impressions of candidates' issue positions during the nomination campaign

There is increasing evidence that issues influence voter preferences during the nomination campaign (Bartels, 1985; Bartels, 1988); however, only Bartels (1988) and Conover and Feldman (1986, 1989) have examined how partisans forge perceptions of candidates' positions on issues prior to the general election campaign. The goal of this paper, then, is to examine how individuals develop perceptions of candidates' issue positions during the crucial months leading to the nominating conventions. Relying on theories developed in social-psychology, I tested five competing hypotheses known to influence individuals' perceptions of candidates' issue positions. An examination of the findings revealed that there is strong support for one of the hypotheses and modest support for three additional hypotheses. In summary, it appears that voters are quite ingenious in forming impressions of where candidates stand on the issues. They rely on stored information about politics, they actually adjust candidates' true positions to relieve cognitive inconsistencies, they evoke their own issue positions to assume candidates they like agree with them and candidates they dislike disagree with them, and finally they evoke their own issue positions to assume candidates agree with them even when they hold no sentiment toward the candidate.     

Ethnic Diversity and Social Capital in Europe: Tests of Putnam's Thesis in European Countries

This article focuses on the core theory recently proposed by Putnam on the relationship between ethnic diversity and dimensions of social capital. Hypotheses are derived from this theory, but also from other theories that propose competing hypotheses on relationships between national characteristics and dimensions of social capital. Essentially, the authors propose more rigorous empirical tests of Putnam's hypotheses by including these competing hypotheses: tests of these hypotheses provide possibilities to evaluate Putnam's and these other theories in terms of general (i.e. cross‐national) tenability for the European continent. The general question is: To what extent do national‐level characteristics like ethnic diversity, next to other national characteristics, actually affect dimensions of social capital of individual citizens in European countries? The authors set out to answer this question by testing hypotheses on cross‐national data from 28 European countries. These data contain valid measurements of a number of dimensions of social capital. The individual‐level data are enriched with contextual‐ (i.e. national‐) level characteristics to be included in more advanced multilevel analyses. The main finding is that Putnam's hypothesis on ethnic diversity must be refuted in European societies. Instead, it is found that economic inequality and the national history of continuous democracy in European societies turn out to be more important for explaining cross‐national differences in social capital in Europe.     

Tax and Spending Effects of Municipal Enterprises: The Case of Florida Electric Utilities

This study tests the appropriateness of two competing hypotheses drawn from the public finance literature about the impact of municipal utility profits on local tax and spending patterns. By comparing data from cities that own their electric utilities to nonelectric cities, this research finds that neither city expenditures nor property tax rates are significantly affected by the transfer of profits. The evidence suggests that the profits are used by cities with relatively weak tax bases to obtain revenues from tax-exempt institutions, homeowners, and nonresidents.     

Chaotic shop-talk or efficient parliament? The Reichstag, the parties, and the problem of governmental instability in the Weimar Republic

The German parliament in the Weimar Republic was very instable and governments did not last long. Historical research has tried to determine what caused this instability. Those historical hypotheses are re-examined by studying a completely new dataset covering 489 roll-call-bills in the parliament during the 14 years in question. According to the findings of this study it is very unlikely that it was only the system, its conditions and its actors that caused instability and that the reasons rather have to be found outside parliament.     

The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain

This paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition, measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election (i.e. the difference between the vote share and 50%). Two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper. On the one hand, the Leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is, the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector, irrespective of the ideology of the party in power. On the other hand, the Partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low (i.e., parties on the left/right will increase/decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low). These hypotheses are tested with information on spending, own revenues and deficit for more than 500 Spanish local governments over 8 years (1992–1999), and information on the results of two local electoral contests (1991 and 1995). The evidence favors the Partisan hypothesis over the Leviathan one. We found that, for left-wing governments, spending, taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases; whereas, for right-wing governments, a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables.     

Domestic political determinants of inflation

Abstract. Political economists have advanced a variety of diverse and competing hypotheses to explain the domestic political dimension of inflation. With few exceptions, however, these hypotheses have been tested individually without regard to competing explanations. This study uses pooled time-series data on fifteen industrial democracies to examine five prominent political hypotheses that purport to explain either political pressures that cause inflation or institutional arrangements that insulate governments from these pressures. The results indicate that: (1) Central Bank independence provides an effective counterweight to inflation by insulating monetary policy making from inflationary (particularly, partisan) impulses; (2) Government spending increases caused by distributive and redistributive politics intensify inflationary pressures even in countries with independent Central Banks and neocorporatist arrangements; (3) Inflation is determined partially by the ideology of the party controlling government. Leftist governments in pursuit of income redistribution produce higher inflation than conservative governments; (4) Elections do not have significant effects on inflation under any structural circumstances; and (5) Neocorporatism does not consistently reduce inflation or contain the inflationary effects of partisan manipulation and fiscal expansion. However, neocorporatism may stop inflation if wage moderation by labour is accompanied by the government's commitment to pursue restrictive monetary policy.     

Christian Religiosity and Voting for West European Radical Right Parties

This article examines the relationship between Christian religiosity and the support for radical right parties in Western Europe. Drawing on theories of electoral choice and on socio-psychological literature largely ignored by scholars of electoral behaviour, it suggests and tests a number of competing hypotheses. The findings demonstrate that while religiosity has few direct effects, and while religious people are neither more nor less hostile towards ethnic minorities and thereby neither more nor less prone to vote for a radical right party, they are not ‘available’ to these parties because they are still firmly attached to Christian Democratic or conservative parties. However, given increasing de-alignment, this ‘vaccine effect’ is likely to become weaker with time.     

The Relationship between Media and Political Agendas: Variations across Decision-Making Phases

This article examines the patterns of party patronage in post-communist Europe and provides an explanation for the varying practices observed by stressing the institutional legacies of the past. Drawing on the distinction between different types of communist regimes, it formulates three hypotheses concerning the extent, underlying motivations and intra-party control of patronage which guide the empirical analysis. It then clarifies the key concepts and discusses the methodology and data used in the article. Further, the three hypotheses are probed with data collected in a large expert survey in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In accordance with the hypotheses, these three countries are found to differ in the pervasiveness of patronage within the state institutions, in the reasons why party politicians engage in patronage practices and, to a lesser degree, in the intra-party mechanisms of controlling and distributing patronage. It is argued that this variation can be, at least partially, attributed to the nature of the communist regimes in the countries under study.     

Does political connection influence corporate financial decisions in unstable political environment?

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of political connection on the cost of debt, the cost of equity and the investment level in an unstable political environment. We use a sample of 55 Tunisian listed firms during the post-revolution period (2011–2018) and we apply a generalized least square (GLS) approach to test our hypotheses. Findings highlight that political connections increase the corporate financial costs and reduce the investment level. Furthermore, in an additional analysis, we show on the one hand that political instability negatively affects the investment and affects positively the cost of debt and the cost of equity. On the other hand, we make evidence that the political instability level negatively affects the relation between the political connection and the cost of debt. The contribution is, to the best of our knowledge, the absence of studies conducted in Tunisia countries examining the impact of political connection on the financial cost and investment level in an unstable political environment such as Tunisia.     

Economic evaluations vs. ideology: Diagnosing the sources of electoral change in Turkey, 2002–2011

Turkish elections reflect two competing influences. One concerns a long-term increasingly conservative ideological orientation; the other, more short-term pragmatic evaluations primarily on the economic policy front. This article uses three nationwide representative surveys from 2002, 2007 and 2011 to assess the relative merits of these competing hypotheses. The findings indicate that the critical election of 2002 is not shaped by economic performance evaluations but rather by indicators of ideology at large and left–right ideology in particular. The influence of ideology appears to rise from 2002 to 2007 and 2011. Economic performance evaluations increase in salience from 2002 to 2007 but seem to have somewhat lost their power for 2011. Implications of these findings for the Turkish party system and further research questions are discussed in the concluding section.     

Competing bureaus and politicians: A compliance approach to the diversion of public funds

This article analyzes the effects of the compliance relationship between the governing party and two competing bureaus producing differentiated goods. We assume that the three players simultaneously and independently take their decision in terms of production and rents with perfect knowledge of each others strategies. Unlike Niskanen's competitive results, which are invariant with respect to the monopoly solution and only depend on the characteristics of the review process, here the budgetary equilibrium changes depending on the nature of the goods supplied by the competing bureaus and is affected both by their demand and cost conditions and by the resources available to the governing party.     

The behavior of congressional tenure over time: 1953–1991

This paper studies the behavior of average length of tenure for cohorts of U.S. representatives who entered office from 1953–1989. Using a new methodology, it addresses the following questions. How much longer do representatives stay in office now compared to, say, twenty years ago? If an increase in tenure has occurred, when did it begin? Are reelection outcomes or voluntary departures the primary determinants of changes in congressional tenure over time? The results of this study are then applied to a number of hypotheses concerning possible causes of longer congressional stays.     

Functional Hypotheses of Party Decline: The Case of the Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties*

Functional hypotheses of party decline define parties as fulfilling specific functions in the political system and relate party decay to the inability or diminished capacity of parties to perform these functions. This article examines two major hypotheses of this sort by assessing their relevance in the case of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Social Democratic parties. First, it deals with the thesis of the declining functionality of the mass membership party. Second, it discusses the rival structure hypothesis which argues that rival forms of political organization pose a threat to parties by encroaching upon their functions. These arguments are confronted with available empirical data. In several instances, the empirical evidence points to inadequacies in the hypotheses, or directly confutes them. These weaknesses of the hypotheses are discussed, and alternative interpretations are offered.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.