Spying on the rock: an assessment of Abwehr clandestine operations against Gibraltar during the Second World War

This article will offer an assessment on the effectiveness of clandestine operations conducted by the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr, against the British colony of Gibraltar during the Second World War. This assessment is based on declassified British archival records, and this paper will argue that while the Abwehr had complex networks which attempted operations against the British at Gibraltar the Germans actually achieved little meaningful success. This article will reason that the inability to achieve any significant results was due to ineffective leadership and direction from Abwehr officers who also oversaw inadequate agent recruitment and training which impaired Abwehr clandestine operations.     

Does the median voter model explain the size of government?: Evidence from the states

Despite an attempt by its own authors, it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) has had convincing empirical backing. In this paper, we adapt that model to a model of state government size. The main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows, government size (as measured by the percentage of income devoted to government redistribution) grows. We test the model using panel data from the US states from 1979–1991. In contrast to the results found by Meltzer and Richard (1983), we find little evidence to support the model. The results are robust to several model specifications and estimation techniques.     

Dramatising intelligence history on the BBC: the Camp 020 affair

This article considers an episode of the television drama-documentary series Spy!, broadcast on the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1980. The programme proved controversial owing to its depiction of a physical assault during interrogation at an MI5 facility, Camp 020, during the Second World War. Numerous 020 veterans complained, pointing out that, with one exception, such physical violence had never taken place there. As their complaints were largely made in private correspondence with the BBC, which stood by its programme, the association of wartime British intelligence with physical abuse was allowed to go unchallenged in the minds of the viewing public.     

The impact of intelligence on decision-making: the EU and the Arab Spring

This article examines the 2007 EU all-source intelligence assessment ‘Worst Case Scenarios for the Narrower Middle East’ and the lack of policy response to the warning provided. SIT-6577/07 mostly predicted and provided forewarning on some of the events lately known as the Arab Spring, as well as a rise of anti-European terrorism, and an increase of refugees and migrants in the European Union. The article offers a post-mortem analysis of the key judgements and main findings of the most significant intelligence product declassified by the EU and discusses the main question: Why the warning was not effective?     

Research note: the Daniel report on UK atomic intelligence, 1954

Following an Open Goverment initiative request the 1954 Daniel Report on atomic intelligence was declassified. The Report was the culmination of a request by the Chiefs of Staff for a comprehensive evaluation of the British atomic intelligence organisation. This previously classified document details the Directorate of Atomic Energy (Intelligence), from its organisation to its performances – it therefore represents an insight into the hitherto closed environment of the British intelligence machinery's highest priority target in the postwar world.     

Foreign policy by commission: Reforming the intelligence community

Can presidential commissions serve as a source of significant policy innovation in the area of intelligence analysis? This study shows that intelligence commission recommendations present a decidedly mixed bag. We cannot speak of a linear movement toward improving the quality or management of intelligence analysis in which one problem is solved and attention then is turned to the next. Yet presidential commissions looking into intelligence analysis cannot be mere symbolic window dressing. Many of their recommendations have been listened to. It would be more accurate to see them as having in each instance narrowed the range of policy choices receiving serious consideration as means of improving the intelligence product.     

Rethinking the training of intelligence analysts

Abstract

Despite intense scrutiny and promised fixes resulting from intelligence ‘transformation’ efforts, erroneous analytic assessments persist and continue to dominate news coverage of the US intelligence community. Existing analytic training teaches analysts about common cognitive biases and then aims to correct them with structured analytic techniques. On its face, this approach is eminently reasonable; on close inspection, incomplete and imbalanced. Current training is anchored in a mid-twentieth century understanding of psychology that focuses on checking over-confidence and rigidity but ignores the problems of under-confidence and excessive volatility. Moreover it has never been validated against objective benchmarks of good judgment. We propose a new approach: (a) adopting scientifically validated content and regularly testing training to avoid institutionalizing new dogmas; (b) incentivizing analysts to view training guidelines as means to the end of improved accuracy, not an end in itself.