The construction of spatial regional identities: the case of the Baltic in a global context

Comparative interregionalism is often limited to the policy or panoramic dimension, reducing local differences and specificities, the “minute particulars” (Blake, William Blake’s Writings, 614, 620, 1978) of the lifeworld to their more abstract forms. This is particularly the case when the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are compared: generalities remain abstractions, whereas the sharper the focus the more diffferentiated the mindscape becomes and the more the basis for the comparison is undermined. Yet, in a global knowledge networked economy (to get all the buzzwords in one phrase), comparisons are necessary if often invidious. While commentators are often reluctant to see the EU as a model for ASEAN, it is often seen as a complex of experiences to be shared. Yet what—in this domain—gets exported, transplanted and implanted elsewhere, how does this transference take place in such an internetted society, and to what end? Seen in an interregional, even global context, and including an examination of teaching Günter Grass’ Crabwalk (Im Krebsgang, 2002) in English translation to undergraduates of a contemporary European literature class at the National University of Singapore, the paper hopes to indicate some temporal and spatial contexts of transplantation and the means by which this is achieved.     

Europe's others and the return of geopolitics

In the context of European Union enlargement and the discussions about a European constitution, the question of Europe's identity has once again entered the limelight of political debates. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are constructed through practices of othering, articulating a difference. In this article, I follow Ole Wæver to argue that for most of the time after the Second World War the most important other in the construction of a European identity has been Europe's own past. This temporal form of othering offered the possibility to form an identity through less antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international society. However, since the 1990s geographic and cultural otherings are on the increase, marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation‐states.1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the workshop ‘Other Europes’, organised by the Poststructuralism working group of the British International Studies Association, Keele University, England, 16 May 2003. I would like to thank the workshop participants, Alessandra Buonfino, Bahar Rumelili and the three referees of this journal for their critical and constructive comments. View all notes     

Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: Security,Ethics and Global Health

*This article is part of a project on infectious diseases, security and ethics sponsored by the Australian Research Council. For their valuable feedback on earlier versions, the author thanks Simon Rushton, Stefan Elbe and the Global Society reviewers. View all notesThe worldwide spread of drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis (TB) bacteria is out of control and incidents of harder-to-cure TB illness are rising. This article explores the present and potential impact of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB)—a deadly, contagious and virtually incurable disease—on human health and state capacity. Detected cases of XDR-TB can occasion the implementation of extraordinary control measures, because some governments are sufficiently fearful of the disease as to frame it as an issue of national security. Such framing has the potential to precipitate more financial resources and stronger legal powers to bolster public health, but it might also increase the risk that emergency response measures will be counterproductive and/or unjust. Framing XDR-TB as a security issue is empirically plausible, and doing so is a good thing provided that increased response efforts promote rather than hinder the provision of universal access to adequate TB treatment over the long term. Two disease control measures that are motivated particularly by security concerns are border control and patient isolation. This article offers an assessment of each measure by reference to public health ethics in order to differentiate good and bad securitisation.     

The politics of performance evaluation: Independent evaluation at the International Monetary Fund

How has the Fund institutionalized independent evaluation as a means of assessing its performance? This paper process-traces the contentious creation of the Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). I use primary interviews conducted at the Fund headquarters in 2008–2010 and Fund archive documents dating back to the beginning of the debate over independent evaluation in 1992 to analyze the interaction of internal and external actors and interests that led finally to the creation of the IEO in 2001. I then comment on the ‘performance of the performance evaluator.’ I draw from a recent external evaluation of the IEO (Lissakers et al. 2006), as well as interviews and secondary sources, to identify enduring contestation over the IEO’s function and scope of authority and to discern how this has affected the ability of the IEO to inform and shape the Fund’s process and outcome performance. To this end, I discuss four issues currently facing the IEO: the need to establish both actual and perceived independence, the problems of ambiguous or non-existent metrics for assessing Fund performance, difficulties in balancing candor of evaluation reports with credibility in the eyes of multiple constituencies, and the challenges of fostering a culture of learning in the Fund.     

Explaining the European Parliament’s gains in the EU Constitution

The Constitutional Treaty, like each set of reforms since the Single European Act, would constitute another incremental increase in the European Parliament’s powers. But the Parliament did not get everything it wanted. What we do in this paper is investigate why the European Parliament tends to ‘win’ in some areas but not in others. We consider five possible explanations and test these theories by looking at the issues the Parliament promoted in the constitutional negotiations and the factors that determined whether the Parliament was successful or not in a particular area. We find that the Parliament gains power in areas where the governments delegate new powers to the EU and are uncertain about the consequences of this delegation. We also find that public support for the Parliament played a role in the extension of the Parliament’s powers in the Constitution.

Evaluating Spain's Reparation Law

The Reparation Law1 This article follows Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla in referring to the Law of Historical Memory as the Reparation Law. Although Aguilar et al. do not specify why they choose this terminology, the term is used here as it better denotes the law's content. Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla, ‘Determinants of Attitudes Towards Transitional Justice’, 3. View all notes approved on 26 December 2007 is the latest link in a chain of reparatory measures from the earliest days of Spain's transition to democracy to deal with the legacy of the Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship. Numerous articles have analysed the historical memory movement2 See Encarnación, ‘Reconciliation After Democratization’; and Gálvez Biesca, ‘El proceso’. View all notes and the reasons behind the timing and scope of Spain's reckoning with the past.3 See Encarnación, ‘Reconciliation After Democratization’; Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics and Memory’, Barahona de Brito, Gonzaléz-Enríquez, and Aguilar, The Politics of Memory; and Blakeley, ‘Digging Up Spain's Past’. View all notes This literature presents the case of Spain as a counterpoint to the received wisdom of the transitional justice literature that successful democratization requires reconciliation. This article contributes to the specific literature on Spain, and the wider transitional justice literature, by focusing on an area which has not yet been analysed: the ‘co-construction’ and content of the Law. Through a comparison of the draft bill and the final Law, this article fills this gap.     

Multipolarity and instability in the Middle East

Tensions have long been a feature of the international relations of the Middle East. After the 2011 Arab uprisings, regional instability is being driven by a confluence of three interrelated developments. First, the weakening role of the United States as a power balancer in the Middle East, combined with the larger global context, has provided assumptions about threats and new opportunities for local and other actors to pursue strategic and foreign policy objectives that have deepened tensions and regional competition. Second, there has been a juxtaposing of power multipolarity with ideological multipolarity, itself a source of increased instability, with two of the regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, fanning opposing sectarian flames to further their respective strategic objectives. Third, this strategic competition is being played out in several newly weakened or collapsing states such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Similarly, the regional powers’ competition in previously weakened states, such as Lebanon and Iraq, has intensified due to the acquisition of new, sectarian dimensions. These developments are likely to perpetuate instability and tensions in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

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Book Reviews

Mac and Supermac

Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 1894–1956 : Volume I of the Official Biography. (London: Macmillan, 1988. £16.95. ISBN 0 333 27691)

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000 (London and Sydney, 1988)

Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard University Press, 1987)

Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Vision of Anglo‐America: The US‐UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943–1946 (Cambridge University Press, 1987)     

Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations

ABSTRACT

The chapter begins with a discussion of the draft definition of terrorism in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, a definition which covers both terrorist blackmail and intimidation of target audiences but does not address the terrorist goal of impressing potential and actual constituencies with their “propaganda by the deed”. It distinguishes then between a military response to terrorism, based on maximum force within the framework of the laws of war, and a law enforcement response, based on minimal use of force, within the framework of the rule of law. Subsequently twelve principles of the rule of law are outlined and their relationship to human rights is clarified. Next a discussion of specific human rights and how they relate to terrorism and countering terrorism follows. The activities of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime are discussed in the framework of the three-pronged UN Strategy against international terrorism. The chapter ends by stressed that upholding human rights and effective anti-terrorist measures are not exclusive. On the contrary: human rights and the rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism.

By its very nature, terrorism is an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes upon which the United Nations is established.

K. Annan, 4 October 2002

The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’

To remember Hiroshima is to commit oneself to peace. Pope John Paul II, 1 ?1. Pope John Paul II, 25 February 1981. View all notes 1981

Pax Invictis2 ?2. ‘Peace to the undefeated’ or the victor's peace. Inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Solider in St Mary's Cathedral, Sydney, Australia. View all notes

Virtue runs amok. Attributed to G.K. Chesterton     

Militancy and violence in West Africa: reflecting on radicalisation,comparing contexts and evaluating effectiveness of preventive policies

By 2000, ‘radicalisation’ had become a major global issue. Although ‘9/11’ was still a year away, the American Embassies in East Africa had been bombed in 1998 and violent conflicts simmered in many parts of the world. At just about the same time, bitter civil wars, resource-centred conflicts and intra-ethnic strife raged in West Africa. Against the background of research being undertaken at King's College London,1 1. For example, Dr Olonisakin was researching into the civil wars in the region and was completing her book on the politics of United Nations involvement in the Sierra Leone war, while Dr Alao Alao, Abiodun. 2007. Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment, Rochester: University of Rochester Press.  [Google Scholar] was looking at the politics of natural resource conflicts in the region and was also completing a book on the subject. The Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG), King's College London, was awarded a grant from the UK Department for International Development (DfID) to undertake a research project on youth vulnerability and exclusion in West Africa, with Dr Olonisakin Olonisakin, 'Funmi. 2008. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL, Boulder: Lynne Reinner.  [Google Scholar] as principal investigator. the mutually reinforcing links between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ (potentially sensitive terms, discussed below) in West Africa became clearly obvious and a successful application to investigate this was submitted to the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).2 2. ‘Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Reflecting on Radicalisation, Comparing Contexts, and Evaluating Effectiveness of Preventive Policies’. Dr F. Olonisakin and Prof A.J.W. Gow. ESRC Award No. RES-181-25-0024. This Special Issue contains articles emerging from that work, with a set of country studies complemented by overarching synthetic analysis.     

Challenging international law: a dilemma of private security companies

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a marked increase in the sale of military services by private security companies (PSCs).1 ?1. The term private security company is used throughout the article instead of private military companies or private military firms. View all notes These companies sell anything from combat support for government military operations to military training and assistance, logistical support and more conventional security protection services. They have undertaken operations in countries as diverse as Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Columbia and now Iraq and Afghanistan. The presence of these companies on the international stage raises fundamental questions about the way war is now being fought. Unfortunately, the legal issues raised by their presence in conflicts have not yet been properly addressed. This article sets out to examine the suitability of international law in defining and controlling the activities of PSCs on the battlefield. It then goes on to discuss the problems associated with national regulation. Here the focus is on the attempts by the United States (US), South Africa, and United Kingdom (UK) governments to introduce effective legislation to control the industry.     

Malaysia – towards a topology of an electoral one-party state

For the first time in 51 years of independence, Malaysia's ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) under the weak leadership of Abdullah Badawi was denied its customary parliamentary two-third majority in the 2008 elections. The three major opposition parties, which formed the Pakatan Rakyat (The People's Alliance, PR) after the elections, increased the number of opposition-held state governments from one to five. The opposition had never held more than two state governments at any one time.1 Chin and Wong, ‘Malaysia's Electoral Upheaval’. Parts of this paper were used in a research project organized by the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. View all notes For many practitioners and students of Malaysian politics, the 2008 poll means the birth of a long overdue ‘two-party system’, where two multi-ethnic coalitions contest for power and alternate in running the country. After all, two similar attempts to build a Malay-dominated second coalition to rival the ruling coalition dominated by the ethno-nationalist United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) were made in the 1990 and 1999 elections by former UMNO leaders who lost in their party in-fighting. Sadly, the coalitions built did not survive even the next elections. We argue that such optimism may be misplaced due to a failure to appreciate the ‘electoral one-party state’ nature of Malaysia.2 Wong and Norani, ‘Malaysia at 50’. View all notes Despite having held 13 national elections without failure, and having almost no incidence of in- or post-election violence, neither a military coup nor ‘people's power’, Malaysia has never been anywhere close to being a ‘consolidated democracy’, 52 years after joining what Huntington called the second wave of democratization.3 Huntington, The Third Wave. View all notes For Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy requires not only a government with de facto authority to generate policy and exclusive de jure power, but also that ‘this government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote’. In other words, democracy has to become ‘the only game in town’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 5. View all notes     

Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from the DR Congo

Border towns bring out the worst in a country… 1 ?1. Charlton Heston ‘Vargas’ in Touch of Evil, 1958. View all notes     

Capital and the state system: a class act

This paper is set up as a critique of Alex Callinicos's Callinicos, Alex. 2007. Does capitalism need the state system?. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20(4): 533–549. [Taylor & Francis Online] [Google Scholar] contribution, ‘Does capitalism need the state system?’ It challenges his understanding of the relationship between capitalism and the state system and the theory of imperialism, before presenting an alternative view that conceives the connection between capitalism and the state system as embodied in the formation of a transnational capitalist class holding power in an English-speaking, liberal Atlantic core or ‘heartland’, facing a series of ‘contender states’, which developed under state auspices. This constellation has to be analysed in its own right by applying the method of historical materialism to it, rather than confining that method to the analysis of capital and then bringing in state-centric International Relations. Today, the rise of China as the new contender illustrates how the combined process has evolved. The response to China comes from the larger constellation of the West and not just from the United States: the capitalist class acts to ensure the sovereignty of capital in the process.     

New Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse

Scholars of political communication have long examined newsworthiness by focusing on the news choices of media organizations (Lewin, 1947 Lewin, K. 1947. Frontiers and group dynamics. Human Relations, 1: 143–153. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; White, 1950 White, D. M. 1950. The “gate keeper”: A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Quarterly, 27: 383–390. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Sigal, 1973 Sigal, L. V. 1973. Reporters and officials, Lexington, MA: Heath.  [Google Scholar]; Gans, 1979 Gans, H. J. 1979. Deciding what's news, New York: Vintage Books.  [Google Scholar]). However, in recent years these traditional arbiters of the news have increasingly been joined or even supplanted in affecting the public agenda by “new media” competitors, including cable news, talk radio, and even amateur bloggers. The standards by which this new class of decision makers evaluates news are at best only partially explained by prior studies focused on professional journalists and organizations. In this study, we seek to correct this oversight by content analyzing five online news sources—including wire services, cable news, and political blog sites—in order to compare their news judgments in the months prior to, and immediately following, the 2006 midterm election. We collected all stories from Reuters' and AP's “top political news” sections. We then investigated whether a given story was also chosen to appear on each wire's top news page (indicating greater perceived newsworthiness than those that were not chosen) and compared the wires' editorial choices to those of more partisan blogs (from the left: DailyKos.com; from the right: FreeRepublic.com) and cable outlets (FoxNews.com). We find evidence of greater partisan filtering for the latter three Web sources, and relatively greater reliance on traditional newsworthiness criteria for the news wires.     

Military Mobilization and Commitment Problems

Because of its costliness, military mobilization is generally seen as a mechanism by which high-resolve leaders can credibly signal their high resolve in international crises, thereby possibly overcoming informational asymmetries that can lead to costly and inefficient war. I examine how power-shifts caused by mobilization within a crisis can lead to commitment-problem wars. In a simple ultimatum-offer crisis bargaining model of complete information, war occurs if and only if the power-shift caused by mobilization exceeds the bargaining surplus, which is Powell's (2004 Powell, Robert. 2004. The Inefficient Use of Power. American Political Science Review, 98 May: 231–241. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2006 Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60(1): 169–203. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) general inefficiency condition for commitment-problem wars. When private information is added, and hence mobilization potentially has a stabilizing signaling role, under certain conditions the commitment problem overwhelms the signaling role and mobilization leads to certain war. Finally, I analyze an infinite-horizon model that captures the reality that mobilizing takes time, and find that commitment-problem wars occur under broader conditions than the general inefficiency condition implies.     

Capital Mobility and Current Account Imbalance: Nonlinear Threshold Vector Autoregression Approach

In this study, we utilize the growth rate of gross domestic product as the threshold variable to construct two nonlinear threshold vector autoregression models to re-examine the findings in Yan (2007 Yan, Ho-Don. 2007. Does Capital Mobility Finance or Cause a Current Account Imbalance?. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(1): 1–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]:23) that “current account imbalance causes capital mobility in developed countries; capital mobility causes current account imbalance in emerging countries.” The nonlinear causality test shows that the findings of Yan (2007 Yan, Ho-Don. 2007. Does Capital Mobility Finance or Cause a Current Account Imbalance?. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(1): 1–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) can exist only in certain regimes and the primary factor that affects the causality between current account and financial account (and its components of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment) is the asymmetry caused by the business cycle.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy. ¹ 1. If no particular sources are mentioned, the facts of the case are based on reports of the printed editions of the International Herald Tribune, The New York Times and The Wall-Street Journal and the on-line editions of the Los Angeles Times The Washington Post The Korea Herald The Korea Times, The People’s Korea and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)