新时期印度海权战略的确立及其思想根源

新时期印度海权战略的确立不是一蹴而就的。经过长期的酝酿与积淀,21世纪初新时期印度海权战略最终确立。它集印度洋“区域控制”和向周边大洋“远洋延伸”为一体,以建立世界级“海权国”为终极目标。新时期印度海权战略有两大思想根源：其一是源于印度地理和历史的强烈海权意识,其二是马汉海权论影响下的潘尼迦海权思想。     

美国对海权的再认识及其政策影响

受全球化、科技革命、中国海上力量快速发展等因素影响,近年来美国国内对海权进行新的反思,海权终结论让位于海权不可或缺论,马汉与科贝特的海权理论受到新的审视,技术创新对海权的影响被格外关注。与新认知相伴的是美国海军战略及相关政策的调整,从"由海向陆"转向"重返海洋控制",扩大海军舰队规模,加强在印太地区的军事部署,确定"全域进入"新职能,将中国作为西太平洋海权的主要竞争对手。美国对海权的再认识及政策调整,是其维持海洋霸权的自然逻辑发展,将加剧大国间的地缘战略竞争。     

论海权对东亚国家的历史与现实影响

本文全面追溯海权对东亚国家的历史影响,并分为四个历史时期进行评述。在历史叙述中,既梳理了西方国家以海权改变东亚国家以及东亚格局的过程,也重点对比了历史上中国和日本两个主要东亚国家对海权的认识差距以及由此决定的不同命运,并初步分析了当今东亚海权势力消长及其对亚太战略格局可能产生的影响。     

韩国海权观:力的谋求与逻辑转换

韩国对海权概念的表述和对海权概念内涵的认识历程独具特色。韩国将海权译为"海洋力",也存在着将海权概念内涵要素从传统的"海军力""海运力"扩展至"海军力""海运力""水产力""海洋开发力""海洋环境保护力""海洋治理力"等等的趋势,表明韩国海权观从传统海权观向综合海权观的过渡。韩国海权观凸显了对"力"的谋求。随着韩国海洋实力由弱转强,韩国海权观经历了从海洋弱小国家的海权观到谋求建设海洋强国的海权观的逻辑转换。目前,韩国海权观仍存在诸多局限性。     

海权争霸与俄苏的兴衰及其历史反思

从海权的角度分析俄苏的兴衰是一个尚未有人进行充分探讨的问题。在数百年的争夺中 ,海权的扩张固然构成了俄苏崛起的一个因素 ,但从长远的角度看 ,对海权的过度追求又构成了俄苏走向衰落的根源之一。具体说来 ,从俄苏海权扩张西进、南下和东进 3条线路中 ,西进战略较为成功 ,并促进了俄苏的崛起 ;南下和东进战略虽有所收获 ,但都遭遇挫折 ,尤其是南下的世界扩张战略直接导致了苏联的衰落。从本质上来说 ,地缘政治条件的制约、俄苏海权过渡扩张所导致的一系列矛盾构成了俄苏海权战略失败并导致国力衰微的根源之一。     

论后冷战时代世界海洋战略格局中的中美海权合作

海洋是人类的第二生存空间,其战略地位不断提高。作为传统的海洋强国,美国充分认识到其霸权是建立在对海洋控制的基础上的。进入后冷战时代,美国强化了对海洋的控制。作为一个新兴大国,中国认识到海权的重要性,并开始大力发展海权。作为连接中美两国的唯一地理媒介,海洋事务成为双边关系的重要议程。两国在海权领域不仅有矛盾,也有合作。由于太平洋成为世界海洋体系的轴心地带,中美两国成为世界海洋战略格局中的主要国家,这种合作具有非常重要的战略意义。中美海权合作主要包涵科技、经济、安全等领域,并且由于主客观因素,中美海权合作有深化的趋势,未来有可能成为推进双边关系稳步发展的动力。     

论中印海权矛盾中的南海问题CSSCI

中国是东亚地缘政治板块的主体国家,而印度是南亚次大陆的主体国家。两国在陆地接壤,但并不是海上邻国。然而近年来随着海洋战略地位不断提高、印度"东向"政策实施的加速以及中国在印度洋地区利益的增加,中印之间开始产生海权矛盾。南海这个世界海洋热点地区在中印海权矛盾中占据重要地位,并有影响双边关系的趋势。     

海权问题与中美关系述论

从近代到冷战时期,海权问题一直是重大战略问题。长期以来,我国在反对美国海洋霸权、维护我国海洋安全进行了不懈的斗争。冷战后,美国的太平洋海权战略安排具有遏制中国作为潜在对手挑战美国太平洋霸权的图谋,并集中体现在美日军事同盟、台湾问题、南海问题等具体领域对中国的海洋主权和海洋权益形成沉重的压力与挑战,对此中国应该引起高度重视。     

去霸权化:海洋命运共同体叙事下新型海权的时代趋势

海洋命运共同体是中国倡导的一种海洋叙事。海洋叙事是塑造海洋秩序与海权及捍卫海洋权益的话语体系。中国的海洋叙事一直较为式微,特别是中国海权在世界海洋叙事体系内常常处于被西方海权"代表"的状态。这严重影响着中国对历史性海洋权益的维护。海洋命运共同体作为人类命运共同体的有机组成部分及其在海洋领域的发展,叙述着一种去霸权化的新型海权与新型海洋秩序,是海权从垄断走向共享、从传统走向新型的分水岭。在海洋命运共同体叙事下,中国海权的发展趋向是有别于传统海权的新型海权,是一种去霸权化的治海权,而非零和式海洋霸权。由于传统海权的惯性以及美国海洋霸权的主导,新型海权及其观念若要形成普适性共识,尚面临诸多挑战,但去霸权化的新型海权必将成为未来海权的时代趋势。     

太平洋海权角逐的传统与现实

太平洋海域一直是反映世界海权强国的窗口。谁是世界海军老大,谁就在太平洋上耀武扬威,不论最初的西班牙、荷兰还是后来的英国、日本和美国。美国在太平洋地区拼凑对付中国的政治军事联盟的同时,为了避免卷入不必要的麻烦,也在一定程度上约束其盟友不要挑衅中国。美国目前在亚太部署的性质是:为万一将来开战,占据有利的前沿阵地,并用这种有利的战略前沿部署来制止中国使用武力。它既是战略态势层面的遏制,又是心理层面的威慑,也是未来可能的作战层面的前沿部署。中美要避免"修昔底德陷阱"而引发灾难性悲剧,双方都应消除在敏感地方的模棱两可,变模糊为清晰,以防陷入"萨干坦盲点"。     

Theory of Land-Ocean Peaceful Cooperation: a Geopolitical Study of the Sustainable Security of One Belt One Road

The joint establishment of One Belt One Road is a practice of international cooperation initiated by China and actively participated by other countries. One of the important issues is how to ensure sustainable common security, and what kind of geopolitical theory should be employed for guidance. Traditional geopolitical theories, such as sea power theory, land power theory and Rimland theory, mainly serve for the fi ght for geopolitical hegemony or military strategy. They are in sharp contrast with the goal of One Belt One Road, which is of mutual interest and a win-win situation. However, One Belt One Road is still regarded by some countries from the traditional geopolitical perspective. To equip One Belt One Road with new geopolitical concepts, the author hereby proposes the theory of land-ocean peaceful cooperation, which is a non-alliance network community of common interests, security and destiny. This community would be established for mutual benefi ts, between ocean countries and land countries, among ocean countries and among land countries. It could help policy communication among participant countries of One Belt One Road, and the establishment of an open net-like system of peaceful operation and common development. The theory of land-ocean peaceful cooperation of sustainable security, together with the practice of international cooperation of One Belt One Road, will undoubtedly break through the vicious cycle of the Eurasian geographical fi ght and confrontation between sea powers and land powers illustrated by the traditional geopolitics.     

论戈尔什科夫的国家海上威力论及其现实意义——以海权理论为视角

苏联戈尔什科夫的国家海上威力论是海权理论在冷战期间发展的一个高峰。国家海上威力论认为大洋对人类生活具有非常重要的意义,国家有必要发展自己的海上威力。国家海上威力由海军、运输船队、捕鱼船队、科学考察船队等组成。海军的主要任务是对海作战和对陆打击等等。苏联红海军在国家海上威力论的指导下成为足以与美国海军相抗衡的强大海上武装力量。然而,国家海上威力论存在的缺陷与不足也给苏联的海权发展和海军建设带来了严重的后果,值得海权领域的学者深思。     

The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War

Balance of power theories have come roaring back into prominence in recent years as international relations theory grapples with new developments, including offshore balancing and soft balancing. Recent works demonstrate the importance of more than just the distribution of power, and have addressed the role that domestic politics plays in balancing. One overlooked aspect of this debate, with implications for offensive realism and the current discussion on the United States and soft balancing, is the role that nonintervention conventions play in decision making. British nonintervention during the American Civil War presents a case at odds with offensive realist theory, as Britain should have intervened to protect its national interests—cotton, trade, and shipping—while also restraining a regional hegemonic power. Domestic cleavages, democratic peace norms, and public opinion pressures do not sufficiently explain this behavior. Instead, this paper posits that nonintervention was a result of British adherence to precedents and conventions.     

美国对海权的再认识及其政策影响（英文）

A new debate over sea power and a new understanding of it has emerged in the US, highlighting the increasing domestic anxiety about a rising East and a declining West. The return to sea control as the focus of US naval strategy may complicate the regional security situation and create more risks.     

The Struggle for Sea Power: Lessons from the Great War

The history of the contest for naval mastery during the Great War has particular resonance for today because the United States now faces a serious threat from China's increasing capabilities to wage war at sea. China's naval challenge calls into question America's continued command of the maritime commons. The stakes at risk for the United States in today's contest are just as high as they were a hundred years ago for Britain. Defeat at sea would wreck American global leadership in the twenty-first century just as surely as it would have meant the collapse of British power in the twentieth. What, then, can we learn from past struggles for sea power and America's entry into the First World War that offers guidance for understanding our current strategic predicament?     

欧美列强的东亚地缘及海军战略(19~20世纪中叶)

19~20世纪中叶,欧美列强在东亚推行由基地、经关键点、再进行展开以及建立缓冲区、防波堤的地缘战略;基于地缘之上,欧美列强推行夺取储煤站、建立海军基地、控制重要航道、以小规模舰队威胁或集中海上力量击溃对手的海军制胜战略。欧美列强的东亚地缘及海军战略对东亚尤其是中、日、俄三国关系产生了巨大的影响。     

The long‐term stability of deterrence

In this article, we construct a model of deterrence that specifically integrates both systemic and decision‐making variables. After contrasting its underlying structure with more standard views of the deterrence relationship, we demonstrate the logical consistency of the power transition model with the expected utility framework. The model we develop combines and extends the insights of each of these two approaches, thereby permitting us to develop a theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions of major power war and conflict initiation. In other words, for the first time, we are able to specify, precisely, the theoretical consequences of variations in power dynamics, evaluations of the status quo, salience, and attitudes toward risk. As theories of the necessary conditions for international conflict, neither the power transition theory nor the expected utility model provide this information. Thus, by combining and then extending these two frameworks, we merely refine propositions implicit in each of them, making them more exact. The resulting structure provides several additional insights into the dynamics of nuclear conflict.     

Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain

The oceans present a variety of perils to both states and private actors, ranging from smuggling to direct attacks on vessels. Yet, a disconnect exists between states’ maritime power and sovereign fleets due to the emergence of open shipping registries in the 20th century. How have great powers like the United States responded to threats generated by transit of the oceans for legitimate and illicit purposes? The nature of peacetime security threats that states confront at sea has shaped divergent responses. The main maritime powers draw a distinction between threats aimed at states and threats to commerce. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers have sought to revise understandings of the protections sovereignty provides—specifically, by seeking expanded interdiction rights—to further their own security goals. When maritime powers perceive that international commerce is under threat, they delegate the sovereign protection function both upward to internationally sanctioned maritime coalitions and outward to private security firms. These policies are responses to the security challenges that result from the decoupling of sovereign power and the merchant fleet that followed the emergence of open shipping registries.