Britain, the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957

This paper seeks to analyze the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and its impact on the Anglo-American reconciliation after the dispute over Suez in the previous year. The Middle East remained at the forefront of British and American continued regional instability and led to close allied cooperation over the perceived Soviet threat in Syria. This ensured that by the time of the Washington Conference in October 1957 both Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the Middle East required a joint Anglo-American policy to safeguard vital regional interests.     

Britain,the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957

This paper seeks to analyze the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and its impact on the Anglo‐American reconciliation after the dispute over Suez in the previous year. The Middle East remained at the forefront of British and American continued regional instability and led to close allied cooperation over the perceived Soviet threat in Syria. This ensured that by the time of the Washington Conference in October 1957 both Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the Middle East required a joint Anglo‐American policy to safeguard vital regional interests.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour - especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism - the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

States of emergency and ethnic conflict in liberal democracies: Great Britain and Israel

In constitutional theory, the declared purpose of a state of emergency is to restore the established constitutional order. Several liberal democracies have been employing emergency measures for many years to deal with internal ethnic conflict. Two notable cases are Israel and the United Kingdom that have maintained a state of emergency for over five decades. This raises an important question: Does the state of emergency that is designed to restore constitutional order actually yield an undesirable legal order?

Our findings suggest that emergency measures in both countries have permanently changed the nature of the democratic constitutional order. This new order grants the executive branch of government special powers at the expense of the legislature and judiciary. This finding should be remembered before declaring a national state of emergency rather than allowing ‘temporary’ emergency provisions to become entrenched permanently in the legal system.     

Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States

This article argues for the value of a theory of ‘intelligence culture’ in understanding not only how national intelligence systems work but also how intelligence failures occur in those systems. A model of national intelligence cultures in the governments of the United Kingdom and United States of America is developed combining existing work on organisational culture in the two countries with the author's comparative analysis of different conceptions of intelligence culture in the two systems. This model is used to develop a failure mode analysis of the two systems, which is then tentatively assessed against representative examples from the two countries, culminating in application of the model to the failure of both intelligence systems to correctly estimate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capabilities prior to March 2003.     

Eisenhower, arms control and disarmament: United States diplomatic documents, 1958-60

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60: Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998.     

The Rise of Policy Institutes in the United States, 1943-1971

In the period after World War II, an eclectic assortment of scholars, policymakers, and managers presided over the creation of academic centers for the study of war. This article examines the intellectual and administrative assumptions of many of these actors. Made up of academic scholars from the fields of political science, sociology, and economics, they advanced a vision based on what might be called “instrumentalist-positivist social science,” but in appeals to donors they employed basic scientific language.¹     

Master of the Game: The Relationship between the United States and Iran Revisited, 1969-1972

ABSTRACT

How and why did the Richard Nixon Administration end up with an Iran policy more in line with the preferences of the Shah of Iran than of the United States? At its onset, the Administration did not have a clearly defined or formalised Persian Gulf policy. Attempts to create over-arching guidelines regarding American conduct toward Iran were of little consequence, as the pro-Iranian inclinations of leading decision-makers led to day-to-day decisions that strongly favoured the Shah. This limited room for manoeuvre amounted to little more than acceptance of what was already established procedure. The Shah’s strenuous lobbying of American decision-makers, using their common Cold War considerations to his advantage and the effective sidelining of critical voices within the Nixon Administration, explain this outcome.     

The Road to Brussels: Austria's Integration Policy, 1955-72

If one analyzes Austrian integration policy, a range of repeating elements becomes visible. Starting with the 1950s, continued efforts to intensify economic and trade relations with the Common Market can be witnessed. This occurred in the form of step by step cooperation with European institutions. Since 1955 Austria's integration policy had been accompanied by the maintenance of and focus on 'permanent neutrality'. Among the EFTA states, Austria was the country the EEC sympathized with most, for it was important with regard to foreign and trade policy in the context of the East-West conflict. Austria was of central geostrategic significance. With regard to Russia's attitude, Austria succeeded in underlining its 'special case'. Austria's policy of going it alone failed in 1967 for several reasons, not only because of Italy's veto. There were also French reservations and Russian objections. Bridging the gap to Brussels revealed wishful thinking that was only to become true in 1972. An arrangement of bilateral tariff and trade treaties with different EFTA states and the EEC and ECSC came into force.