国际海盗问题与中国海上通道安全

作为世界贸易大国和能源进口大国,中国的发展越来越依赖于海外,海上通道安全对保障中国国家安全的重要性日益凸显。海盗作为一种国际犯罪行为,严重影响国际海上航运安全,也对中国海上战略通道安全构成现实威胁。海盗治理成为关系到中国海上通道安全的重大问题,必须采取积极有效措施加以解决。为此,我们必须进一步完善国内反海盗立法和反海盗机制;充分发挥联合国的作用,建立打击海盗、维护海上通道安全的长效机制;积极推动反海盗的国际和地区合作;增强防御海盗的力量和意识,重视远洋海军建设;坚持标本兼治,积极推进海盗所属国或地区的和平、发展和稳定。     

东南亚的海盗问题与亚太地区安全

近年来,东南亚海域的海盗活动日益猖獗,引起了亚太国家的关注.本文分析了东南亚海盗的特征、成因,比较了东盟、日本、印度和美国在反海盗上的立场,认为日本和印度海上军事力量介入东南亚海域这一动向,势必打破原有东南亚海域海上军事力量的平衡,对中国的海洋安全利益构成巨大的威胁.     

东南亚海盗问题及其治理

亚洲金融危机爆发以后,东南亚海域再次成为全球海盗活动频发的高危地带,特别是九一一事件以来,该地区的海盗活动呈现出与海上恐怖主义合流的新动向。目前的国际法体系对东南亚的反海盗行动具有相当大的局限性,同时,社会经济问题、政治动荡以及领海争议也成为该地区海盗行为兴起的重要原因。目前东南亚各国与区域外大国已经开展了行之有效的反海盗合作。本文旨在分析东南亚地区海盗行为的成因、类型及发展新动向,并在探讨该地区现有反海盗合作议程的基础上,提出加强内部合作、争取大国援助及利用国际组织整合资源的新治理模式。     

中国北极航线的安全问题

北极航线开通后,中国将成为受益方。中国到达欧洲、北美等世界经济重心地区的航路将增加新的选择,而且距离更加接近。另外,与原有世界海洋交通干线相比,"北极航道"不存在诸如索马里海盗之类的安全威胁。尽管如此,对于中国而言,北极航线依然面临诸多安全威胁。这需要我们未雨绸缪,从现在起就筹划如何有效维护中国北极航线的安全问题。     

印太语境下的日本—印尼海洋安全合作:进展、动因与限度

近年来,随着印太地区权力转移进程的加速,地区安全秩序开始变革,主要国家间的关系也处于重构中.作为印太地区两个具有代表性的重要国家,日本与印尼以海洋安全合作为重点,进一步加强和密切两国关系.日本—印尼合作既受到亚太乃至印太地区局势快速变化、美国对外政策调整等外部环境的较大影响,也是两国基于各自国家利益和战略取向的主动作为.然而,其合作受到若干负面因素的掣肘.双方不仅对未来海洋安全合作具体设想有所差异,在印太安全秩序构建主导权上也存在"美日印澳"或"东盟中心"的认知分歧,而且印尼等距离外交传统与国内民族主义思潮也会抑制两国合作的深入发展.因此,日本与印尼的海洋安全合作仍存在较多不确定性.     

日越海洋安全合作的演进:战略考量与挑战

2007年日越首脑联合声明发布后,两国海洋安全合作步入正轨。除了在东盟地区论坛等多边框架下开展一系列合作外,日越在双边框架内不断完善首脑与高官互访、对话机制,在实务部门的交流与海洋安全能力建设等方面的合作也取得了重要进展。日越海洋安全合作既是日本与越南推进彼此海洋安全战略、固化本国既得非法海洋权益的需要,也是在亚太"轮辐体系"变革背景下,日本呼应美国战略、协助美国维持亚太安全秩序的客观要求。然而,由于越南在经济上对中日的"双重依赖"、日越意识形态与社会制度的差异、两国合作外部动因减弱等因素,未来两国海洋安全合作的势头将受到一定的影响。     

日本与多边海上安全机制的构建

近年来,日本积极致力于在亚太地区构建以日本为主导的多边海上安全合作机制,其核心内容是联合亚太地区的海洋国家和岛国开展海上共同执法活动,其主要目的是帮助美国填补因政治等因素而无法直接军事介入南海以及马六甲海峡而导致的安全保障上的空白。对此,中国除应继续倡导共同安全、综合安全等新安全理念外,还应主动参与这一机制,以把握本地区海上秩序的走向,防止亚太地区的海上安全机制朝着准军事同盟的方向发展。     

日本对北冰洋的战略关注及行动

近年来,日本对北冰洋的战略关注不断升温,并积极行动参与北冰洋地区事务。日本对北冰洋的关注和参与,既有各国日益关注北冰洋问题的国际背景,也受到日本自身国策及海洋战略的驱动。日本对北冰洋战略价值的认识是多方面的,包括地缘政治与安全、资源与能源、航路与贸易、气候与环境、国际影响力等。日本主动提升北冰洋在国家战略中的地位,强化政策制定和执行机制,积极参与国际科研合作,介入油气开发和航路开拓,策动"北冰洋外交"以增强国际影响力,从而融入北冰洋开发的利益分享和规则建构过程,维护和争取国家利益。     

增长的极限:亚信会议发展的结构性困境与改革路径探析

作为源起于欧亚空间、且最终成为唯一活跃的泛亚洲层次的多边安全机制,亚信会议正面临着机制建设与转型发展的严峻考验。由于低估了亚洲与欧洲的安全环境差异,亚信会议最初的设计模板同亚洲安全现实存在严重的错位,从而使机制建设经历了漫长的准备期。直到"9·11"事件之后,亚信会议抓住亚洲安全议程出现积极变化的有利时机,在非传统安全合作方面打开突破口,建立了亚信机制的基本框架。然而,这种创建方式回避了亚洲空间内的关键安全分歧,使得亚信机制的发展空间受到了严重制约。在逐渐固化的运行模式影响下,亚信会议也陷入了结构性的发展困境。2014年亚信上海峰会之后,亚信会议进入了选择恰当改革路径、推进机制转型发展的关键阶段。在现有的地区安全环境下,只有通过稳健的改革路径,适当调整亚信会议发展的目标体系,赋予亚信会议更加合理的战略定位,才能够扬长避短,以退为进,顺利推进机制转型进程,保证亚信会议的持久稳定发展。     

安全利益的矛盾与取舍:日本实践国际海洋法的策略难题CSSCI

第二次世界大战后,国际海洋法在传统海洋强国与第三世界国家间长期博弈的背景下继续发展,日本亦开始重视基于国际海洋法规则维护其海洋权益。战后日本面临的客观条件,使其在维持经济安全方面得益于传统海洋强国所主张的“海洋自由”,也使其在国土安全层面对这种“海洋自由”存在顾虑。长期以来,日本对其安全利益进行权衡,在选择追随美国等传统海洋强国关于“海洋自由”主张的同时,对于涉及国土安全利益的国际海洋法规则,则刻意采取了模糊处理的策略,以最大化其国家利益。随着国际局势的变化,日本采取的这种模糊策略开始面临现实压力。日本虽然于2014年提出了“海洋法治”概念,但其实践国际海洋法的策略难题依旧存在,对于关键规则的解释与实践仍显模糊与保守。     

Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influenced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India, Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades.     

China and Northeast Asian regional security cooperation

Northeast Asia is a particularly complex area in the world, especially in terms of security. China advocates a new concept of security based on equality, mutual benefits, consultation and cooperation. China is making great efforts to reduce regional hot issues and lower regional tensions under the conditions that a regional security framework has not been completely established. In recent years, China has actively participated in regional security cooperation and promoted the construction of a security institution. The Six-Party Talks are of great significance not only for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, but also for forming a relatively formal framework of security organization. Among the various East Asian security cooperative relationships, that of China–Japan–Korea is critical with regard to East Asian stability. At the same time, however, China should face and deal with some problems concerning the promotion of Northeast Asian security cooperation such as how to regard the presence of US–Japan and US–Korean military alliance, let Korea play the dominating role in Northeast Asian security cooperation and eliminate the Cold War mentality.     

Asian Security without the United States? Examining China’s Security Strategy in Maritime and Continental Asia

Chinese President Xi Jinping has touted an Asian security architecture in which “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.” But does China really want to exclude the United States from the regional order? This article argues that previous answers are often insufficient because they do not account for sub-regional variation in China’s strategy. In maritime Asia, China seeks a significantly reduced role for the US and its alliances though major constraints limit the prospects for success. In continental Asia, however, the situation is more nuanced, with Beijing alternately ignoring, supporting, or hedging against US presence. The policy implication is that Washington should not overstate Beijing’s role as either a regional adversary or a regional partner. Rather, the United States needs to approach China on its own terms across sub-regions.     

The Japan‐US alliance and the Asia‐Pacific region

For the past fifty years the Japan‐US alliance has provided the framework for Asia‐Pacific security, says Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Centre for Strategic International Studies in Indonesia and former research fellow at IIPS. The region's political and economic dynamics are changing, Wanandi says, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports an increased Japanese security role, with regional organizations acting as a conduit. But before Japan will win the confidence of some Asian neighbors, he says, Japan must open its economy, reform its domestic politics, and come to terms with its militaristic past.     

Singapore: Recent developments in terrorism and Japan's role

The threat of terrorism to Singapore remains serious, given the spread of radical ideology in Southeast Asia. Aware that it is a prime terrorist target, Singapore's response has been the most vigorous of all the states in the region. It has instituted a comprehensive homeland security structure, stepped up security cooperation with the USA and has been at the forefront of many US-led counter-terrorism initiatives in the region. Japan's regional role is important as Japan cannot opt out of the global war on terrorism given its huge stake in the security of the Straits of Malacca and the stability of the littoral states. Japan's contribution lies in capacity building, in helping states build up their indigenous counter-terrorism capabilities. Japan also needs to take a much more proactive, strategic role in the Malay archipelago in regional “hearts and minds” strategies to counter radical ideology, as well as develop functional security linkages.     

US security strategy in Asia and the prospects for an Asian regional security regime

The US–Japan alliance serves as the cornerstone of US security strategy in East Asia. The Bush administration remains supportive of efforts by Japan to become a more “normal” nation and is expected, during its second term, to continue to encourage Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security (while refraining from open pressure or from meddling in the debate over constitutional revision). The Pentagon's ongoing Global Force Review will likely result in some modest adjustments in the US military footprint in Japan, but with no lessening of Washington's overall commitment or ability to respond to regional crises. Meanwhile, Washington will continue to support institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (including sub-regional efforts that do not include the US) as useful means to promote regional security and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, while relying on ad hoc coalitions (or unilateral actions if necessary) to address specific threats to its own security or to the security of its allies.     

The Philippines Discovers its Maritime Domain: The Aquino Administration’s Shift in Strategic Focus from Internal to Maritime Security

With China’s naval expansion in the South China Sea, the Philippine government has eased up its counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism campaign and has vigorously pursued instead the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) particularly in developing the deterrence capability of the Philippine Navy (PN). However, slow-paced and hampered by scant resources, the naval build-up will hardly deter China’s encroachment on the Philippine maritime territory. Faced with this predicament, the Philippines has resorted to forging new security partnerships with the United States and Japan, two major naval powers in East Asia. The paper concludes that maritime security will remain the Philippines’ priority concern way into the third decade of the 21st century.     

Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ has emerged as the newest addition to the lexicon of Asian regionalism. Conceived of as the conjunction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it reflects the belief that maritime linkages require extending Asian regionalism westwards to include countries on the Indian Ocean rim. It also competes with the longstanding ‘Asia-Pacific’ conceptualisation of the region, and four governments—Australia, India, Japan and the USA—have adopted it into their foreign policies. Much of the debate on the Indo-Pacific focusses on how it institutionally ‘rescales’ Asian regionalism through the incorporation of Indian Ocean states. This article considers the functional rescaling that attends this process: namely, what kind of regionalism is implied by the Indo-Pacific concept? It argues that the Indo-Pacific is a security-focussed regional project, reflecting the desire of its proponents to form a quadrilateral bloc to resist China’s growing maritime assertiveness. This security region is radically different from the Asia-Pacific concept, where regionalism was primarily driven by economic integration and cooperation. The Indo-Pacific thus marks a more contested period in Asia’s international politics, where the functional purpose of regional cooperation is being reoriented from economic- to security-focussed agendas.     

How China Seeks to Foster an Asia‐Pacific Security Community: Peace through Consultation,Cooperation and Co‐development

Faced by increasing challenges to its national security and development, China has taken active measures to improve its security position in the Asia‐Pacific and to foster a lasting and commonly‐beneficial regional security order based on its “New Asian Security Concept”, highlighting common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable peace. Though the Chinese government tends to follow a bilateral rather than collective approach to consolidate its regional security stance for the time being, one can expect China to push forward an all‐inclusive and comprehensive platform for enhanced collective security. Yet China will not pursue a completely new security order to replace the old one. Instead, it is taking a pragmatic and incremental approach to shape the necessary environment for the evolution of the US‐led hegemonic order into a more pluralistic, inclusive, and comprehensive one, where peace and security are guaranteed through closer political consultation and more integrated economic and social development among regional countries. If Sino‐US relations can be well managed and China keeps projecting its growing power in a restrained and contributive way to provide more public goods for regional peace and development, then one can hope for an Asia‐Pacific security community to take shape in the coming decades.     

Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia

Maritime security in East Asia is essential to the peace and prosperity of the world. Today, serious problems in this domain have arisen in the region. Resolving these problems is a pressing issue that impacts not just the region, but also the preservation of the peace and prosperity of the entire globe. Despite this urgent need, cooperative frameworks for preventing problems from arising in the first place—as opposed to mere security regimes for deterring conflicts—have yet to be organized. To preserve a maritime security order in East Asia that is based on laws and rules, mechanisms based on mutual trust must be arranged for deterring and preventing conflict.

Based on the foregoing, the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) has been engaged in research on problems of maritime security in East Asia. In December 2015, IIPS held the High-Level Conference on Maritime Security in East Asia and unveiled the “Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia” (the “Nakasone Proposal”). This paper will discuss the “Nakasone Proposal” and the background to its formulation, as well as the institute's future endeavors.