Understanding Egyptian capitalism through the Muslim Brotherhood’s eyes: the quest for an ‘Islamic economy’ in the 1940s and its ideological and social impact

The following article addresses the intricate issue of contemporary Islamist thought’s relation to the modern capitalist economy, with special reference to the Egyptian case. Islamist thinkers have been vigorously proclaiming for the past decades that the economic prosperity of some Muslim nations stems from the proper adoption of an ‘Islamic economy’, whereas the absence of such a model has been mainly responsible for the crises that other nations faced. At the same time, we witness that the Muslim nations are fully integrated into the global market system. Although their rulers boast about achieving social justice, by economically interpreting Islam, nonetheless poverty and horrific injustices are officially retained and morally accepted, thus, enabling the upper classes to keep performing their pious duties in the name of God. In this regard, it seems that capitalism and piety are intertwined: the first justifies the necessity of the second, while the second humanizes the brutal impact of the first. By referring to the historical example of the Muslim Brothers in pre-socialist Egypt, the article tends to show under which circumstances was capitalism’s relation to religious piety conceptualized in Islamist thought and literature, in addition to the main social, organizational and ideological outcomes of this conceptualization.     

Secularizing Islamism and Islamizing Democracy: The Political and Ideational Evolution of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers 1984–2012

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged in Egypt in the early twentieth century to resist secularism and political pluralism in favour of religious revival and a unitary Islamic state. After three decades of political participation culminating in its formation of a government in Egypt, the MB has prioritized electoral paths to power, while claiming to defend individual rights, popular majorities and a civil state. Nevertheless, the MB's discourse continues to straddle religious and secular terrain: in recent election campaigns, MB leaders promised to build an ‘Islamic state’ and a ‘caliphate’, all the while insisting that the people, not God are the source of all power. What explains these contradictions, and what do they tell us about the Brotherhood's apparent adoption of political and ideational pluralism and democratic values? The article contends that the MB's ambivalence about democracy is not a sign of dissimulation or lack of ideological evolution. Instead, it has its roots in a 30-year process of partially adapting to democratic and ‘secular’ political ideas by reframing them in religious terms which, however, resulted in creating what the article discusses as a hybrid ‘secularized’ Islamism. This hybridization has both enabled and constrained the Brothers' adaptation to democracy in the post-Mubarak period.     

Sharia and control over territory: conflicts between 'settlers' and 'indigenes' in Nigeria

Introducing Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims overterritory in which the will of Muslims reigns supreme. Thishas led to violent conflicts, especially in parts of the MiddleBelt of Nigeria, where Muslim ‘settlers’ from thenorth, most of them Hausa and Fulani, have clashed with indigenousethnic groups which are largely Christian and ‘traditionalist’.The call for Sharia is popular among the migrants, as it providesthem with a divine mission: they have to assume supremacy overthe local non-Muslim population in order to shape public institutionsaccording to what they see as the will of God. The ‘indigenes’,however, have little interest in a religious confrontation.As ‘sons of the soil’, they want to defend theirancestral land against ‘foreign tribes’; they thereforeemphasize ethnic, not religious, antagonisms.     

Responding to Western Critiques of the Muslim World: Deconstructing the Cliché of Islamophobia and the Genealogies of Islamic Extremism

This paper is premised on the questions of whether Islam as a religion, spiritual domain, cultural practice and philosophy should be held responsible for whatever activities the Muslims choose to do in their personal capacity. Does the ascribed status of individuals being Muslims and their choice of declaring themselves as terrorists in the name of Islam entail that they are true followers of the religion and have been theologically and spiritually inspired by it? These questions have sprung up because Islam as a religion has constituted the fundamental component of western interpretation of the reasons for the rise of violent extremism involving Muslim radicals. In this context, the objective of this paper is to examine how the contemporary western interpretations, linking the actions of Muslim extremist groups with those of the ontology and epistemology of Islam, are predicated on a faulty cognition of the nature and the guiding principles of that religion itself. To accomplish this, the paper critiques Samuel Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and Bernard Lewis's version of the roots of Muslim extremism.     

Jerusalem in the Qur'a¯n

The focus of this article is Jerusalem and its status in Islam through the verses of the Qur'a¯ n (the holiest text in Islam), hadi¯th literature, and early Islamic history. The importance of this study is two-fold. First, it deals with all the Qur'a¯ nic verses which include either unambiguous references to Jerusalem and al-Masjid al-Aqsa¯ (the Furthest Mosque), or those that imply ambiguous but likely references to the same, or else those that imply ambiguous but unlikely references. Second, it shows why Jerusalem is so intrinsically important to Muslim beliefs and mentality. Therefore, it tries to help readers at large to understand the Muslim attitude in relation to this city. This article is divided into an introduction, four major sections and a conclusion. In the Introduction, the article tries to explain the status of Jerusalem in Islam and why it is regarded as holy by the one billion Muslims now living on earth. The first section illustrates the merits of Jerusalem in Islam through the Qur'a¯ n, hadi¯th literature, and early Islamic history. It also discusses the construction and the purposes behind building the Dome of the Rock. The second section illustrates and discusses the Qur'a¯ nic verses which imply unambiguous reference to Jerusalem. The third section deals with the verses which imply ambiguous, but likely, references to the same. The fourth section deals with the verses that imply ambiguous, but unlikely, references. It was found that there are about 70 places in the Qur'a¯ n which fall into these two last categories. These places are scattered through 21 s u¯ ras . In order to discover and explain the verses related to Jerusalem, I have relied on various sources of exegeses, hadi¯th , history and geography. Further, contrary opinions about the interpretation of any verse have been addressed and a sort of balance between them has been provided. Finally, in the conclusion, the writer of this article expresses a desire for justice without which a comprehensive peace cannot be established in this holy city, so that all the followers of the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, will have their rights equally.     

‘God Wanted Diversity’: Alawite Pluralist Ideals and their Integration into Syrian Society 1832–1973

The Alawites are often linked to the interests and fate of the al-Asad regime in Syria, yet a much broader context needs to be analysed to gain any meaningful impression of this community's politics. This article suggests that pluralism and diversity lie at the core of Alawite political preferences and what's more, according to Alawite perspectives, this is what God intended. Between 1832 and 1973 Alawites made gradual progress towards genuine integration into Syrian society, however, the confluence of two factors marked a turning point in this process: the mobilisation of Alawite ‘asabiyya by the al-Asad regime and a renewed perception of Sunni Muslim intolerance. Thereafter a different trajectory was set towards the current crisis in Syria. The final analysis suggests that the longstanding political aspirations of Alawites are not dissimilar to those demanded in anti- regime protests that began in Syria in early 2011.     

Defending the Egyptian nation: national unity and Muslim attitudes toward the Coptic minority

This article discusses the Muslim discourse concerning the Coptic Christian minority since the 2000s in Egypt. Emphasizing the effects of the January 2011 uprising, the paper analyzes the role of nationalism and the national unity discourse in suppressing the debate regarding discrimination against the Copts. Despite the fissures that were created in the discourse, which rejects any reference to discrimination against the Copts, the Coptic issue remains trapped among the contested interpretations of national unity. All narratives of national unity and Egyptian essence, whether the official one pursued by the regime or the one promoted by pro-democracy activists, require the Copts to suppress their demand for rights for the sake of national unity. Adherence to the national unity discourse by all forces precludes the possibility of developing a form of nationalism or a national culture which embodies pluralism of identities and cultures and reinforces the role of nationalism as a tool for stifling pluralism and democracy for all Egyptians, whether Muslim majority or minorities.     

Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?

ABSTRACT

This article asks whether campus preaching organizations such as the Indonesian Muslim Students Islamic Union (KAMMI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) serve as potential breeding grounds for radicalism or, alternatively, do they serve as institutions that promote political moderation and prevent radical action among young university-age Muslims. Utilizing insights from inclusion-moderation thesis, it concludes the answer to these questions depends on whether these groups are willing to accept Indonesia’s democratic political system. These determine the tactics the groups chose to promote their agenda to potential recruits. While KAMMI is willing to moderate its strategies, HTI is unwilling to do so and continues to promote its agenda through secretive means, although it formally rejects radicalism and extremism.     

也论回教与市民社会的不相容--以马来西亚回教青年运动为例

关于伊斯兰市民社会的研究,西方学术界有一种观点值得注意:市民社会与回教在本质上是不相容的,因为市民社会倡导个性与差异,或者说多元主义,而回教正好缺乏多元主义。果真如此吗?通过对回教经典《古兰经》有关多元主义论述的梳理和马来西亚穆斯林市民社会组织——马来西亚回教青年运动的实践研究,笔者发现:回教从理论上并不反对多元主义民主,在实践中,回教与市民社会也完全可以兼容。     

Forgotten brigade of the forgotten war: Turkey's participation in the Korean War

This study is an attempt to shed light on the issue of Cretan Muslim emigration from Crete to the Ottoman Empire in order to analyse the multiple connections among the Ottoman state, immigrants and different localities in the Eastern Mediterranean in the late nineteenth century. Following the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897, the establishment of autonomous government on the island of Crete and the withdrawal of Ottoman armies from the island, Cretan Muslims began to emigrate from Crete to various places in the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, this article aims to deal with the migration of Cretan Muslims and to focus mainly on the year 1899, during which large numbers of Muslims were forced to leave their homes. The article suggests that Cretan Muslim emigration provides a good case for understanding the attitudes and policies of the Ottoman state towards migration, and the relationship between the state and immigrants, as well as for analysing the broader connections between Crete and the other localities of the Eastern Mediterranean. The working hypothesis is that in order to understand certain socio-political and demographic changes and transformations experienced within the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, it is important to study the issue of Cretan Muslim immigration to Ottoman Anatolia. This presents an opportunity to investigate certain questions with regard to the dynamics of migration and also to discuss certain facts associated with migration within the late imperial context.     

泰南四府民族分裂主义的由来、演变与出路

在当今世界上,民族与宗教问题往往是引发地区骚乱或局部战争的导火线,而且往往与政治、经济问题交织在一起.泰南四府马来族穆斯林民族分裂主义的性质也基本如此.近百年来它始终困扰着泰国政府,尤其是二战以后,泰南穆斯林地区由于宗教、民族矛盾的发展,政治上的不平等和经济上落后等因素,导致要求独立自决的运动一直延绵不断,并由政治斗争发展到武装斗争.特别是在2001年"9·11"事件发生后,泰南四府原来积存的矛盾被重新激活,民族分裂主义分子公开采取了暴力恐怖手段与政治对抗,企图谋求独立,且愈演愈烈,引起了世人的广泛关注. 综观泰国历届政府的政策,笔者认为,为了打击南部民族分裂主义势力,仅靠法律手段和政治措施是远远不够的,武装镇压或同化政策也是难以奏效的.为了实现民族团结,社会和谐,国家稳定,首先要承认民族文化、宗教信仰等社会发展的多元性,尊重和保护宗教信仰自由,用政治对话代替武力对抗,用改革政策取代同化政策,加快经济发展,缩小贫富差距,增加人民收入,提高生活水平,做到社会公平、分配公正.青年是国家的未来,要重视和加强对青少年的教育和培养.政府要通过诚意来逐步取得绝大多数穆斯林的理解与支持,不给少数顽固的穆斯林分裂主义者以可乘之机.只有这样,才能逐步铲除南部的民族分裂主义势力,真正实现民族和睦、社会和谐和国家的稳定.     

Sudhir Kakar and the Socio‐Psychological Explanation of Hindu‐Muslim Communal Riots in India

Concentrated principally in four of twenty‐eight Indian states, there have been more than 33,000 Hindu‐Muslim riots since 1947. Scholars have differently explained communal violence. Some have argued that there are innate qualities in Indian society which encourage what Donald Horowitz calls “deadly ethnic riot”. Psychoanalysts have wondered if proneness to violence is ingrained in India's religion‐based culture. After assessing several existing explanatory paradigms, I examine the legitimacy of psychoanalysis and some selected aspects of other explanations, arguing that both the rational and psychological theories help explain Hindu‐Muslim conflict. I submit that Sudhir Kakar, who worked with Erik Erikson at Harvard and trained at the Sigmund Freud Institute in Frankfurt, unduly follows the elitist French social psychologist, Gustave Le Bon (1895), to present violent communities as undifferentiated masses. Specifically, Kakar's contention that Hindu males are psychologically socialized by confrontational religious values deserves close scrutiny. Methodologically, drawing on the postmodern thesis of the de‐centered subject and minimizing the significance of the master narrative, I conclude that primordial ancient hatred is not programmed in India, arguing that Kakar's insights do not speak to religion's truth, but do help us understand its manifestation and political psychology.     

"Real Solemn History" and its Discontents: Australian Political History and the Challenge of Social History

The relationship between Australian political and social history has received little historiographical attention. Political history has been lauded or, more often, dismissed as traditional historical practice, while from the 1960s social history took its place as a catch-all phrase for various "new" histories concerned with everyday life. This article examines the place of political and social history in the nascent Australian academic historical profession of the 1950s to the early 1970s, and then explores the impact of the new social history on academic political history. It will suggest that while there was only limited exchange before the late 1980s, in the last twenty years social history has contributed modestly to a reconstituted understanding of political history as part of lived experience.
"[…] I can read poetry and plays, and things of that sort, and do not dislike travels. But history, real solemn history, I cannot be interested in. Can you?"
"Yes, I am fond of history."
"I wish I were too. I read it a little as a duty, but it tells me nothing that does not either vex or weary me. The quarrels of popes and kings, with wars or pestilences, in every page; the men all so good for nothing, and hardly any women at all — it is very tiresome: and yet I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be invention […]". ¹     

Contesting and negotiating religion and ethnic identity in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan

Post-Soviet Central Asia has inherited a set of circumstances conducive to the revitalization of religion. The renewal of Muslim awareness and identity in Central Asia may not be surprising, but the growth of Christianity is, especially in its Protestant form within indigenous Muslim communities. This article, based on qualitative field research, reviews one example of this development: the process of conversion to Protestant Christianity among Muslim Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan. A prominent aspect of this social movement has been the ways in which Kyrgyz Christians have entered into a dynamic process of engaging with issues of identity and what it means to be Kyrgyz – a process that has sought to locate their new Christian religious identity within, rather than on the margins of, familial and ethnic identity, and one that challenges the normative understanding of Kyrgyz identity: that to be Kyrgyz is to be Muslim. While providing the context for Kyrgyz conversion, this discussion primarily focuses on the way Kyrgyz Christians utilize a number of different discursive strategies to contest normative Kyrgyz identity constructs and to legitimize a Kyrgyz Christian identity.     

A Dangerous Axis: The ‘Bulgarian Müftü’, the Turkish Opposition and the Ankara Government, 1928–36

In June 1967, when the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel following the outbreak of the Six Day War, it came as a surprise to many that Romania refused to do the same. This paper investigates previously unpublished documents in order to retrace the decision-making process in Bucharest and offer a rational answer to the question: why did Romania choose to ignore Moscow's decision? Was it a demonstration of support for Israel as it appeared at the time and, if so, what were the reasons behind it? Archival insight demonstrates that Romania's decision to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel can best be understood in the general framework of its relations with Moscow. Striving to gain autonomy in the Communist bloc and fight off Soviet domination, Romanian decision-makers preferred to engage in their own analysis of the events in the Middle East before assuming one decision or another. Their conclusions led them to believe that Moscow's policy had been adventurous and to break relations with Israel would have implied confirmation and reinforcement of Moscow's role in the Middle East.     

泰国的禁毒运动

制毒、贩毒和吸毒是当今世界最大的公害之一。它跟艾滋病、恐怖主义一样,是人类的大敌。目前全世界毒品的种植、生产和消费仍呈蔓延和发展的趋势,毒品问题已成为全球性的问题,几乎没有一个国家能幸免于难。地处世界著名毒源“金三角”的泰国,更是在劫难逃,长期受到毒品的危害和困扰,可以说,毒品已成为泰国国家安全与稳定的主要威胁之一。他信政府自2001年2月上台执政以来,把禁毒作为与脱贫、治贪并列的三大施政目标之一。他信认为,毒品是泰国当前的大敌,防毒反毒是政府的当务之急,提出了向“毒品宣战”的口号。近三年,由于措施得力,行动果断,所以扫毒工作战果累累。泰国政府禁毒的成功将不仅造福于全体泰国人民,也将为整个亚洲乃至全世界的禁毒斗争做出历史性贡献。     

The lessons of the ‘Nookat events’: central government,local officials and religious protests in Kyrgyzstan

As Muslim communities reassert themselves in public life across the world, including Central Asia, their actions are causing tension in relations with ‘secular’ governments. Various global theories have been offered to explain these dynamics. According to one theory, tension between religious communities and secular states is caused by the exclusion or marginalization of Muslims, a process exacerbated by the perceived anti-Muslim bias in the foreign- and domestic-security policies of Central Asian states. A second view is that tension results from the work of global extremist groups espousing the restoration of an Islamic Caliphate. The third approach presents the rising tension as part of a broader trend: a putative clash of Western and Muslim civilizations. This article challenges these theories by using a case study of a Muslim grassroots protest in Kyrgyzstan to highlight the importance of local politics, namely informal arrangements among local officials, power brokers and community members. In so doing, it seeks to make a contribution to theorizing Muslim–state relations in Central Asia.     

Presidential Approval and Public Security in Mexico's War on Crime

To fight criminal organizations effectively, governments require support from significant segments of society. Citizen support provides important leverage for executives, allowing them to continue their policies. Yet winning citizens' hearts and minds is not easy. Public security is a deeply complex issue. Responsibility is shared among different levels of government; information is highly mediated by mass media and individual acquaintances; and security has a strong effect on peoples' emotions, since it threatens to affect their most valuable assets—life and property. How do citizens translate their assessments of public security into presidential approval? To answer this question, this study develops explicit theoretical insights into the conditions under which different dimensions of public security affect presidential approval. The arguments are tested using Mexico as a case study.     

The indonesian general elections 2004

The year 2004 is crucial for Indonesia's democracy. It has held a series of elections, ending on September 20 with the final round of the presidential elections.

The first election on April 5 was to elect members of Parliament (DPR), the Council of Regional Representatives (DPD) and the provincial as well as county level legislatures. Around 600 million ballots were cast that day by about 120 million voters.

The election was seen by the public and the international community as democratic, fair and peaceful. This was also the case with the first and second rounds of the presidential elections on July 5 and September 20.

They have helped to move Indonesia's democracy several notches higher and the Indonesian people should be congratulated for the process and the implementation. It showed a kind of maturity that augurs well for the future.

Encouragingly, it has been a democratic process, where Indonesians are exerting their political right to make their choice without being influenced or feeling pressured by their social and political groupings.

The voters showed their displeasure with PDI-P whose votes declined from 34% in 1999 to 19% in 2004. Recent experience also showed that personal popularity is an important factor in the election of the president. In addition, despite being the biggest Muslim country, the Muslim parties that are proponents of the Sharia got only 23% of the votes. Two out of the five presidential candidates representing Muslim organizations were eliminated after the first round.

The final round on September 20 was a competition between SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), who was the most popular candidate, and Megawati, the incumbent. She has slightly improved her image and was able to build a coalition among the three biggest parties in parliament. The competition was thought to be a close one, but in the end it showed that popularity was the more decisive factor.     

Korean Unification

If you change your past and work together in the spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs…is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make…. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other place, belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state…. I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state.