中国引入辩诉交易制度的三重障碍

辩诉交易制度的基本机能在于规避诉讼风险,同时也有助于提高诉讼效率。但是,从背景来看,辩诉交易制度本质上是一项内生于英美对抗式诉讼模式的制度设计,其运行依赖于对抗式诉讼制度以及契约文化和实用主义的哲学观念,在我国引入辩诉交易制度应当要慎重。     

域外辩诉交易的发展及其启示

辩诉交易源于美国。其后,辩诉交易在德国的传播实践叫"刑事协商";在意大利刑事诉讼法典中被规定为"依当事人要求适用刑罚程序";在俄罗斯刑事诉讼法典中被称为"在刑事被告人同意对他提出的指控时做出法院判决的特别程序",通称为认罪程序;日本学者建议在对其简略程序改造时增加该程序叫做"司法交易";而在英国、加拿大等国家中仍然习惯称之为"辩诉交易"。辩诉交易从在美国之发端,到在加拿大等国家之广为传播,其之所以在一片抨击与责难声中,仍能保持如此旺盛的生命力,根源于该制度所独具的、其它诸多刑事司法制度所无法媲美的价值蕴涵。     

The Time Penalty: Examining the Relationship Between Time to Conviction and Trial vs. Plea Disparities in Sentencing

Although studies of sentencing routinely find that defendants who plead guilty receive relatively lenient sentences compared with similarly situated defendants convicted by trial, we have yet to fully understand the role of “mode of conviction” in the sentencing process. In particular, we know little about how the size of the disparity between guilty pleas and trial convictions may depend upon time in case processing, or the timing of pleas; that is, when during the process defendants plead guilty. This is a considerable issue, as “time” often is central to explanations given for plea-trial disparities. The current study examines this central, yet seldom empirically captured, dimension of the sentencing process. Using information gathered in an ancillary data collection effort operated under the supervision of the American Terrorism Study, we differentiate between the mode of conviction and time to conviction and explore the role of “time” in sentence severity, especially with regard to the plea-trial disparity. While consisting of defendants identified in connection with terrorism investigations, and sentenced in federal courts, our study takes advantages of a unique opportunity to isolate the effects of time from the mode of disposition and to explore time correlates of sentencing outcomes. In doing so, we raise important questions about the multiple ways in which time and mode of conviction may affect sentencing more generally and contribute to the larger theoretical discussions of how punishment decisions are made.     

Gauging the Strength of Evidence Prior to Plea Bargaining: The Interpretive Procedures of Court-Appointed Defense Attorneys

An important debate among court observers is whether plea bargaining undermines the ideals of justice. This article presents findings that may rec-oncile some inconsistent research conclusions. It describes how, prior to plea bargaining, one group of court-appointed defense attorneys gauges the strength of evidence through a tacit, taken-for-granted process that emulates trial proceedings: based on their understanding of evidence in the legal com-munity, defenders imagine a courtroom dialogue wherein the prosecution and defense take turns presenting their cases in front of a judge and jury. At issue throughout the dialogue is whether or to what extent information is suffi-dent, legal, and persuasive enough to convict the defendant. Because the process is part of the defenders' ongoing and unspoken daily routines, it may elude unsuspecting investigators. Ironically, this means not only that some analysts may inappropriately conclude that legal ideals play no role in plea bargaining but also that others may ingenuously assume that such behavior is more ethical than it actually is.     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.

反垄断效率抗辩适用模式及不确定性克服

反垄断法上的效率抗辩,是指经营者通过证明集中的效率效果足以抵消或超过反竞争效果而取得反垄断法豁免。在效率抗辩的适用上,世界范围内存在抵消分析、一体分析和混合分析三种模式。基于我国国情和《反垄断法》的相关规定,我国更宜采用混合分析模式。在此基础上,还需要借助相应措施克服效率抗辩本身的不确定性,提高制度运用的可能性。     

我国控辩协商程序的规范进路:以认罪认罚案件为视角

认罪认罚从宽制度确立了具有中国特色的量刑协商模式。协商性司法模式的确立,使刑事诉讼的重心由审判阶段向审查起诉阶段前移,与对抗模式下的庭审实质化相对应,控辩协商实质化亦成为协商性司法模式的基本要求。然而,控辩平等协商作为协商性司法的核心和量刑合意形成的关键环节,却未受到立法、实务层面的应有重视,相应配套之程序性规则体系与保障措施的缺失,使得控辩协商的实施效果不尽如人意,控辩双方诉讼实力不平衡导致控辩协商实质性缺位成为司法实践中的突出问题。程序正义是刑事诉讼的灵魂。为增强控辩合意过程和协商结果的公正性,应探索控辩协商之规范模型,从控辩双方的主体地位、决策能力两个层面考量,探讨建立规范、具体、系统的控辩协商程序之基本方向和完善法律规范层面对控辩协商规制不足的路径。