Guilty but mentally ill: the South Carolina experience

Thirty of the first 45 individuals to receive guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdicts in South Carolina were interviewed using a structured interview schedule for diagnosis. The relationship of diagnosis to pretrial evaluation and posttrial conviction treatment are discussed. No person received GBMI in a jury trial. Suggestions to improve the operation of the GBMI verdict are made, as well as a brief review of these data with data from other states.     

Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense

Public opinion data show that the most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts. This article examines the extent to which the public's perceptions of the insanity defense are consistent with newly collected empirical data. Specifically, it compares perceptions of the use, success, and outcomes associated with the insanity defense to data derived from a large-scale study of insanity pleas in eight states. The analysis reveals that the public overestimates the use and success of an insanity defense and underestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are confined upon acquittal. The role of selective media reporting in the formation of public perceptions is discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Special thanks go to John Monahan and Joel Dvoskin for reviewing an earlier draft and to Sharon Steadman for providing editorial comments.     

Myths of the insanity defense: Inherent and procedural obstacles

Often societies perceptions can be shaped by the media not only by what it reports but by how it is reported. This article discusses the impact that the American media has had on the social perception that the insanity defense is too often successfully used to avoid legal and criminal culpability. Many of the procedural obstacles associated with the assertion of an insanity defense are poorly understood or ignored. The article further address some of the less attractive characteristics associated with the assertion of the insanity defense that are not procedurally founded but nonetheless serve as an impediment the wide spread use of the defense. In conclusion the insanity defense is submitted as an unavoidable necessary evil in a civilized society that incarcerates its criminals.     

Schizotypal personality disorder and the insanity defense

What constitutes a "mental disorder" for purposes of the insanity defense? Does mental disorder denote any diagnosable condition listed in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders? Is a mental disorder a disturbance wherein the functional criteria of the appropriate insanity law appear to be met? Or does insanity law define mental disorder apart from functional criteria of insanity? The answer to the last question is that some insanity laws attempt to define or qualify mental disorder, but many do not. Unclarities in the law leave room for unnecessary disagreements between expert witnesses even before the functional criteria for insanity are to be addressed. The potential for confusion is compounded when the defendant's disturbance is ambiguous, amphibious, or both. Schizotypal personality disorder is offered as an example of such a disturbance, and inferences are discussed.     

The insanity defense: asking and answering the ultimate question

The authors address the main questions in the insanity defense debate: Should it be abolished? Should psychiatrists participate as expert witnesses? Is the profession damaged by such testimony? Is there a logical leap between providing psychiatric findings and providing an opinion to the ultimate question? Because the free will/determinism model underlying the current insanity defense positions can be used to argue either side of the debate, it does not supply any rational answers. The authors reframe the discussion, using a systems approach, and suggest answers to these questions that are in line with the clinical realities and on a firmer philosophic ground.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

The insanity defense in Shelby County,Tennessee

The purpose of this investigation was threefold: to document the number of cases in Shelby County, Tennessee where an insanity defense was possible: to follow cases through to disposition to determine what percentage of defendants use the defense successfully; and to examine the type of charges for insanity cases. Of the 25.000 individuals processed through the Criminal Courts. 685 (2.7%) were referred for insanity evaluations and 45 defendants (6.6%) were returned to the court with a recommendation from the Midtown Mental Health Center's Forensic Team that an insanity defense was possible. Of the 45 insanity defendants identified, 49% (n=22) pleaded guilty, 31% (n=14) went to trial, and 20% (n=9) were dismissed. Overall, 22% (n=10) of the insanity defendants were adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, of all defendants processed (25,000), 04% (n=11) were adjucated not guilty by reason of insanity. While no one type of offense predominated, two general categories were observed: murder and related offenses (33%) and property crimes (27%). The findings are discussed with reference to procedures for handling insanity cases in Tennessee and the position that extreme caution should be exercised before investing substantial resources to effect sweeping changes in laws that effect so few criminal defendants.     

Community standards of criminal liability and the insanity defense

Two experiments (N=71) compare lay standards of insanity to standards incorporated in American legal codes. In Experiment 1, case vignettes provided only legally relevant information about defendants' degrees of impairment in cognition or in behavioral control. Respondents' judgments of criminal liability ornot guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) reflected an exculpatory standard of substantial impairment in both cognition and control. In Experiment 2, case vignettes provided realistic information about defendants' psychiatric diagnoses; respondents had to infer levels of cognitive and control impairment. Results showed that respondents made highly idiosyncratic inferences based on diagnostic categories, but once made, these inferences predicted NGRI judgments. Implications of the concordance between laypeople's rules for assigning NGRI verdicts and the rules used in American legal codes are discussed.Daniel Bailis gratefully acknowledges the support of Public Health Service grant No. 5T32 MH18021-07 for Research Training in Social Psychology during the time in which the present research was conducted. John Darley wished to acknowledge the generous support of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and Princeton University. Study 2 presents work done for the Princeton University undergraduate thesis of Tracy Waxman. The authors are grateful to Norman J. Finkel, Valerie Hans, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft on this article.Northwestern University.     

Ideology as determinant of views on the insanity defense

This research explores the hypothesis that an individual's position on the insanity defense is a function of his/her underlying ideology. Fifty-seven clinical psychologists and fifty-five psychiatrists in the United States responded to a questionnaire that measured their beliefs about personal vs. social responsibility for crime, the frequency of their own experience as expert witnesses in insanity cases, and their attitudes toward the insanity defense. As predicted, locus of responsibility for crime was found to have a highly significant curvilinear relationship to attitude toward the insanity defense, with very liberal and very conservative subjects being most anti-insanity defense. Psychiatrists, and those with more expert witness experience, were also significantly more favorable toward the insanity defense.     

精神分裂症患者病理性“正当防卫”行为的研究

目的探讨病理性防卫对精神分裂症患者凶杀行为的影响及相关犯罪学的特征。方法以61例具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为研究组,以73例无病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为对照组,采用犯罪学调查表进行调查分析。结果具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案中幻觉（χ2=5.69,P〈0.05）及被害妄想（χ2=28.87,P〈0.01）多见;作案动机以病理动机突出（χ2=50.22,P〈0.01）,很少出现现实动机（χ2=15.57,P〈0.01）,案发时行为的紧迫性十分明显（χ2=63.17,P〈0.01）;刑事责任能力评定为无责任能力者明显多于对照组（χ2=16.12,P〈0.01）;疾病诊治情况,研究组未经诊治情况较多见（χ2=5.09,P〈0.05）。结论病理性防卫与正当防卫理论存在某些相同点,在具有病理性防卫行为的凶杀案中,借鉴正当防卫理论,对评定刑事责任能力具有一定的参考价值。