Canadian Federalism Revisited

The crisis in Canadian federalism is examined in its historicalcontext, with particular emphasis on regionalism, provincialand national assertions of power, the institutional framework,and intergovernmental consultation. Current problems are consideredin relation to the new Constitution.     

Canadian Federalism, The Charter of Rights, and the 1984 Election

The federal election of 1984 may prove to be a critical eventin the evolution of Canadian federalism. The election createda political climate favorable to a restructuring of the Canadianpolitical agenda away from the "territorial politics" that hasdominated it for several decades, toward a politics of national,non territorial issues. Such a transformation of the politicalagenda had been sought by the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau,which saw the new Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms as amechanism for promoting a more national politics. The climateof intergovernmental confrontation that characterized the Trudeauera, however, may very well have undermined the Charter's nationalunity potential. Ironically, that potential is more likely tobe realized under the Mulroney Conservatives than it would havebeen under a continuation of the Trudeau regime.     

The Macdonald Commission Report and Canadian Federalism

The Macdonald Commission report is the latest in a series ofreports on Canadian federalism. Its proposal for free tradewith the United States has attracted the most public attentionand has already raised the issue of the appropriate role ofthe provinces in the negotiations. This proposal, together withproposed domestic economic and social policies directed at greaterreliance on market forces, would have a significant impact onthe relative roles of the federal and provincial governments.The institutional reforms advocated are intended to make thecentral institutions more representative and responsive, toensure federal leadership within the economic union, to clarifythe distribution of responsibilities between governments, andto facilitate intergovernmental relations. The proposals arebased on an underlying conception that while interdependencebetween governments in a federation is unavoidable, federalismis essentially competitive rather than cooperative in character.     

Natural Resources and Canadian Federalism: Decentralization, Recurring Conflict, and Resolution

Canada has an unusual degree of decentralized authority overnatural resources. A recurring challenge of resource policyhas been to balance interrelated powers—of managementand taxation provincial governments and of trade and taxationby the federal government—when there is divergence inthe goals of the two governments. Constitutional amendment in1982 and federal-provincial negotiations in the 1970s and 1980sconfirmed the need for accommodation. The result was to strengthenthe decentralization of management, yet to recognize the legitimacyof the interests of both orders government. Especially withthe emergence of new types of interests in the resource sector,occasional frictions may be anticipated because of the interrelatednessof powers.     

Federalism and Party Interaction in West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria

The federalism established in the constitutions of the FederalRepublic of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, in addition tothe common language of these countries, distinguishes them fromthe other West European countries, which lean toward centrallyorganized states. After examining the historical foundationand development of the federal systems in the three countries,the article analyzes the segmentation, federal-state interaction,and intraparty effects of political parties in them. While federalismis strengthened by the heterogeneity and regional solidarityof the political parties in Switzerland, federalism has becomea pure "party federalism" in the Federal Republic of Germanyand Austria.     

Federalism and Party Democracy in West Germany

According to Gerhard Lehmbruch, there is a growing inconsistencyin West Germany between the principles of a federal polity andparty democracy, primarily because the former relies on bargaining,and the latter relies on majority rule as a mechanism of conflictregulation. However, comparative analyses have shown that federalismand party competition are not incompatible. Generally, federalstructures are neither detrimental nor conducive to the recruitmentfunction of parties. Competence and experience as a parliamentaryleader or as a specialist is the most essential preconditionfor advancement to national executive positions. The integrativecapacities of political parties may even be strengthened bythe federal division of power. Only in the area of the formulationand implementation of public policy may an inconsistency betweenthe federal system and party democracy arise because the strainon consensus-building inherent in German cooperative federalismmay, under specific conditions, prevent the national majorityparty from converting its programs into public policy.     

The Fusion of Powers and the Crisis of Canadian Federalism

The crisis in Canadian federalism has not emerged suddenly,but has been building for many years. It is our contention thatCanada's political and constitutional problems can only be alleviatedby reform of the parliamentary system. The fusion of executiveand legislative powers inherent in the parliamentary systemrequires strict party discipline to sustain a government, arequirement intensifying the difficulties posed by Canada'sparticular combination of enormous geographic size and ethnicand regional differentiation. The fusion of powers is not onlya major obstacle to the formation of a national consensus andconciliatory parties. It contributes also to the absence oftrust and the lack of a common national desire to form adequatebargaining mechanisms to resolve differences. The particularCanadian intergovernmental relationships and several of theconditions responsible for them are shown to be idiosyncratic,only partly related to the federal structure, and of great importanceto an understanding of the country's current situation.     

Public Sector Politics, Modernization, and Federalism: The Canadian and American Experiences

The focus of this analysis is an attempt to compare Canadianand American federalism in terms of Samuel Beer's modernizationtheory. In Canada, it is argued that modernization had led tothe enhancement of provincial power rather than the centralizationof the federal system. The Westminster model of parliamentarygovernment contributed to these developments, although the wayin which power is organized in government has been even moreimportant in determining the directions taken by Canadian federalism.     

The Effect of the Charter of Rights on Canadian Federalism

Canadian experience under the 1982 Charter of Rights contradictsthe orthodox understanding of judicial review as a decentralizinginstitution that performs a checking or blocking function. Charterpolitics in Canada suggest that in a federal system, judicialreview can also enhance values and policies favored by the nationalgovernment at the expense of the constituent units. Rather thanweakening the policy capabilities of the federal government,the Canadian Charter has enhanced its influence. The Charterhas undermined the policy autonomy of the provinces by givinga policy veto to the Supreme Court, an institution that is morereceptive to the policy preferences of national elites, especiallyin the area of language policy. This has aggravated French-Englishrelations, because of the high incidence of judicial nullificationsof Quebec's restrictive language policies. Elite attempts tocompensate Quebec by way of new constitutional amendments (e.g.,the Meech Lake Accord) have been thwarted by the emergence ofan influential coalition of postmaterialist social interests,which use Charter litigation to promote their nonterritorialpolicy objectives. These "Charter Canadians"have opposed constitutionalamendments that would "weaken" the Charter or the Court. Thiscoalition has broken Canadian governments' historical monopolyon the constitutional amending process. By stimulating the democratizationof constitutional politics, the Charter has weakened the institutionsof consociational democracy and elite accommodation. This hasdiminished the influence of all the provinces, but especiallyQuebec, thereby contributing to the recent rise in secessionisttendencies within Quebec.     

Federalism and the Controversy Over the New Media in West Germany

The possibilities of expanding the television network by meansof cable and satellite service have paved the way for the Länderto determine relevant organizational structures. The newly completedState Media Treaty seems to represent a definite breakthroughin regulatory policy. The legal regulation of the new media—cableand satellite television—faces further complications,however, insofar as nine Land media laws impose different legalrequirements on the new broadcasters. Even so, differences amongthe Länder in the area of cable TV are no longer as greatas they were in the past, and a satellite agreement reachedby the Länder provides for more uniform regulation. Also,the Federal Constitutional Court's 1986 decision emphasizingthe importance of a uniform system of broadcasting and requiringdual private and public broadcasting may have settled the fundamentalpolitical dispute among the Länder over the new media.     

Fission and Federalism: The Disaggregation of Canadian Party Activists

This article focuses on the Progressive Conservative (PC) partyof Canada and contrasts the orientations of four different setsof PC party workers: those who are active in the provincialarena in Nova Scotia and in Alberta, as well as those who areactive in the national arena from the same two provinces. Thedata reveal that federalism has had a disaggregative effecton Canadian political party ideology. Not only is the cleavagebetween activists in different orders of government consistentlylarge; it also generally exceeds that which exists between activistsin different provinces.     

The Impact of Federalism on the Organization of Canadian Foreign Policy

The international activities of Canadian provinces—mainlyAlbert, British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec—challengeconventional concepts of sovereignty and the federal view ofa national monopoly in foreign policy. These provincial activitieshave become more important since the early 1970s and have yieldedoutcomes in the field of foreign policy that would not haveoccurred otherwise. Provinces engage in international activitiesfor a number of reasons. They have the capacity, jurisdictionalobligation, and political desire to do so. Economic necessity,especially the international economic environment, is importantmotivation. Both conflict and cooperation with Ottawa also encourageprovincial involvements in international activities. Occasionally,foreign governments invite such activity as well. Present trendscoupled with the constitutional division of responsibilitiesin Canada suggest that territorial transgovernmentalism willhave greater consequences for Canadian foreign policy, therebygiving to Canada's international presence a character similarto the complexities and contradictions of the country's domesticmosaic.     

Canadian Federalism in the 1990s: Once More in Question

Failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 has produceda constitutional crisis in Canada and sharpened the polarizationbetween Quebec and the rest of Canada. The future of Canadianfederalism and of Canada as a nation is now in question. Proceduralfactors contributing to the failure of Meech Lake included flawsin the constitutional amendment process, inadequate public involvement,distrust of executive federalism, inept political leadership,and ratification of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Morefundamental factors, however, involve significant social andpolitical changes within Quebec and the rest of Canada. Thecrisis is expected to reach a peak by the fall of 1992 whenQuebec may hold a referendum on sovereignty.     

Canadian Federalism: The Entanglement of Meech Lake and the Free Trade Agreement

In retrospect, 1988 may turn out to be a pivotal year in theevolution of Canadian federalism. The November general electionwas dominated by an intense national debate over the proposedFree Trade Agreement with the United States. Although the FreeTrade Agreement was seen to have important ramifications forCanadian federalism, coherent discussion of those ramificationsbecame blurred in the face of a much broader and emotionallypartisan debate. Concerns about the nature of Canadian federalismwere instead absorbed by, and in part displaced by, an emergingnational debate on the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord. TheAccord had been reached by the eleven first ministers in 1987,but by the end of 1988 it had yet to receive legislative ratificationin Manitoba and New Brunswick. In the aftermath of the 1988election, debates over free trade and the Accord have becomeprogressively entangled. While this entanglement did not alterthe outcome of the free trade debate, it has had important consequencesfor the Meech Lake Accord, and thus for the future of Canadianfederalism.     

Federalism and the Strong-State/Weak-State Conundrum: Canadian Economic Policymaking in Comparative Perspective

The areal dispersion of power and constitutional division ofresponsibilities in federal arrangements are generally feltto limit the ability of federal systems to improve economicperformance. Examining Canada within a comparative framework,we assess "the federations as weak states" hypothesis as wellas the utility of the "strong-state/weak-state" model itself.Although some aspects of the Canadian federal system—namelythe combination of federal with parliamentary traditions andthe resulting adverse policy styles—inhibit the adoptionof effective economic adjustment policies, these features arenot necessarily found in other federal arrangements. Comparisonswith Switzerland, Austria, and West Germany suggest that, undercertain circumstances, federal power sharing may be conduciveto bringing about broad agreement on both goals and policiesamong national, regional, and local governments and major economicactors.     

Federalism, Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance

The Northwest Ordinance, enacted by the Congress of the Confederationon 13 July 1787, addressed in its own way the two crises facingthe Framers in Philadelphia: the crisis of the Union and thecrisis of republican government. It gave government to the NorthwestTerritory, which had been created for the sake of the Unionand with an eye to the security of republicanism. That territorywas destined to be a matrix of new states, equal members ofthe Union and republican in form. The working out of those principles,commanded by the Declaration and foreshadowing the Constitution,is traced from Jefferson's plan of 1784 to the Ordinance of1787. The uncultivated and intractable character of the frontiersman,making his attachment to the Union and his capacity for self-governmentdubious, presented a special problem. It is seen how the NorthwestOrdinance, establishing government, procuring certain socialand economic conditions, and inducing proper habits and opinions,sought to make the expansion of the Union an extension of republicanism.     

State Health Policies, Federalism, and the Elderly

This article examines recent state health policy efforts forthe elderly and their implications for future federal and stateroles. States have been particularly active in creating programsto address the needs of the chronically ill and in seeking tomodify regulatory policies and promote private sector efforts.Those efforts have involved relatively autonomous state programsas well as programs developed within the intergovernmental system.To meet the health policy needs of an increasing elderly population,future federal policies must recognize potentials for significantstate contributions and seek to minimize actions that reducepolicy innovation, while continuing to address the problem oflimited responses in low-performance states.     

FEMA, Federalism, Hugo, and 'Frisco

This article examines intergovernmental performance during naturaldisasters. The United States has an ongoing response systemwhich requires the cooperation of national, state, and localgovernments. This system was severely tested during the fallof 1989 by four major crises: Hurricane Hugo in the Caribbean,South Carolina, and North Carolina, and the Loma Prieta earthquakein San Francisco. The intergovernmental response functionedvery differently in the four situations. Three patterns emergeto describe the intergovernmental dynamics of disaster relief.The article discusses the causes and consequences of these differentpatterns.     

Public Opinion and Federalism, 1986

At a time when Americans are assessing their Constitution, thequestion of how the public views the federal system is important.This article examines questions relating to federalism and intergovernmentalrelations from public opinion polls in an effort to understandpublic attitudes. Different polling organizations asked differentquestions at different times, producing conflicting and oftenincomplete data. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that Americansrecognize the intergovernmental nature of their system and believethat all their governments should share in the provision andfinancing of public programs and policies. Moreover, they wereselective in their choice of which government should bear theprincipal responsibility for certain functions. Although theywanted a more vigorous federal government and believed thatit gave them more for the dollar, Americans expressed strongsupport for the states. Their attitudes evidence support forthe federal arrangement, a preference for shared authority,and a climate conducive to cooperation.