Fragmentation of presidential elections and governability crises in Latin America: a curvilinear relationship?

Part of the literature views high numbers of presidential candidates as a threat to political stability in presidential democracies. A contradictory model proposes that an overconcentration of the presidential party system is problematic. Both models are hard to reconcile. We approach this puzzle by arguing that the relationship between the level of presidential election fragmentation and governability crises is curvilinear: both very low and very high effective numbers of presidential candidates increase the risk of governability crisis. We test this theoretical claim with ordered logit models drawing on a sample of 108 presidencies in Latin America between 1978 and 2013 and using an ordinal index of the intensity of crisis as the dependent variable. We explore the operation of the theorized causal mechanisms through case studies and argue that they are different at both extremes, high and low levels of fragmentation. Finally, we formulate implications for the design of presidential electoral rules drawing on the debate contrasting runoff and plurality rules.     

The European Union and Latin America: ‘Transformative power Europe’ versus the realities of economic interests

Relations between the European Union (EU) and regional subgroups in Latin America (Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America) are clear examples of ‘pure interregionalism’ and provide evidence of the EU's active promotion of regional integration. Within the context of these cases, this article explores what type of international power the EU wields, how interregionalism is embedded in that power, and how it is deployed. Combining strands of literature on EU–Latin American relations, interregionalism, EU external policy and power provides a framework within which interregionalism can be understood as an important normative and practical tool for the EU's external power projection. Drawing on official documentation and interviews with key individuals, the paper highlights the EU's articulation of power in interregional relations and reflects upon its mixed success. It concludes that, while imperial qualities and aspirations can be observed in the EU's penchant for interregionalism, the transformative power of the EU remains limited.     

Latin America in Transition and Its International Status

There are presently 33 independent countries and 12 regions that have not yet acquired independence in Latin America. They include Mexico, Central America, Caribbean region, and South America. With abundant natural resources, the land covers an area of 20. 7 mil- lion square kilometers, 13. 8% of the world's total land and has a popu- lation of 540 million, over 8. 7% of the world's total. Since the late 18th century and the early 19th century around when the Latin Ameri- can states succes…     

Opportunities and Challenges in the Social Development of Latin America

Entering the threshold of the 21st century, Latin American countries, in active response tothe callsof the UN Millennium Summit, have been striving to     

Friendly and Cooperative Relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean Countries & China''''s Foreign Policy towards Latin America

Ⅰ.RelationsbetweenChinaandLatinAmericanandCaribbeanCountriesChinaandLatinAmericasharesuchalonghistoryofrelationsthatthemigrationofChinesetoLatinAmericacanbeevendatedbackto16thor17thcentury.In18thcenturyandearly19thcentury,hun-dredsofthousandsofChineselaborersweretraf-fickedbyWesterncoloniststoLatinAmericatoserveascontractedlaborers(Kuli)andengageinhardphysicallabor,thuscontributingtolocaleco-nomicdevelopment.From1949whenthePeople'sRepublicofChinawasfoundedto1950sand1960s,thecontactsbet…     

Crisis leadership and non‐communication: Marcos of the philippines

For all of their centralized power and undisputed authority, even crisis leaders are susceptible to breakdowns in political communication. This is particularly significant when martial rule or a state of emergency—most effective when of short duration— becomes open‐ended; the sense of urgency no longer prevails.

In the initial stage of proclaiming a constitutional emergency it is perhaps easiest to create an atmosphere of crisis and to promote a collective sense of danger. A climate of national fear and insecurity, in turn, enables the constitutional dictator to mobilize broad support even for draconian measures imposed at the expense of individual freedoms. With the prolongation of the emergency, however, and the institutionalization of crisis government, certain immunities to authoritarianism do begin to surface. As suggested by periods of prolonged emergency rule in India and South Korea, the leader becomes remote and isolated; he or she no longer feels quite so compelled to communicate; domestic opposition increases.

The experience of President Marcos and the Philippines since 1972 illustrates some of the political dynamics of the modern, permanent “emergency state.” What has happened to the New Society program of reforms should help in understanding the critical link of communication between leaders and their followers under conditions of either real or manipulative domestic political stress.     

Non-Alignment and Beyond: India’s Interest in Latin America, 1961–1972

ABSTRACT

Between 1961 and 1972, Latin America came to capture India’s diplomatic imagination. Officials within India’s Ministry of External Affairs identified strengthened ties with the region as a way to augment, restrain, and transcend the Non-Aligned Movement, further India’s international prestige and political influence, spread Indian culture, and bolster India’s economy. India’s interest in Latin America climaxed after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi prioritised the region and Pakistan strengthened diplomatic relations with Panama in autmn 1967. Yet uncertainty over the internal realities of Latin America hindered any Indian pivot. In the end, India’s aspirations for Latin America failed to materialise.     

Civilian power and ‘history‐making’ decisions: German agenda‐setting on Europe

This article examines ‘history‐making’ decisions on Europe by the German government, drawing on the concept of civilian power, which has been refined by international relations theorists, subjecting it to a political science critique. Three case studies ‐ of economic and monetary union (EMU), dual enlargement and European defence and security policy ‐ are discussed and compared with the aim of assessing the value of civilian power for the analysis and explanation of key German decisions. The focus is on agenda‐setting in relation to key ‘history‐making’ decisions. It is argued that German European policy behaviour is better explained by civilian power than realism or neo‐liberal institutionalism. However, civilian power does not adequately capture the complex attitudes and values at work in Germany, the interests brought to bear in a fragmented, sectoralised policy process, the resource limitations on pursuing this approach, and the external conditions for sustaining such a role.     

Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016

ABSTRACT

Does the executive's institutional hegemony represent a risk to the survival of democracy? By hegemony, we refer to the president's ability to control other institutions, particularly the legislature and judiciary. To answer this question, we develop two indices of presidential hegemony and analyze the duration of democratic regimes in 18 Latin American countries between 1925 and 2016. The results show that executive hegemony is a major driver of democratic instability. This finding is robust to non-linear effects and to potential endogeneity in the relationship between presidential power and democratic backsliding. Our findings challenge traditional concerns about executive-legislative deadlock, and have significant implications for the nascent literature on democratic backsliding, which highlights executive aggrandizement as a risk factor.     

Strategic Interest Orientation of China and Latin America,and Advantages and Disadvantages to Realize It

For China and Latin America, the 21th century is a century inwhich great progress could be achieved. As the economic globalization sweeps its way across the world, interdependency between countries will be enhanced, and relations between China and Latin America tend to be even closer. What's more important, both sides consider its rela- tions with the other one on a strategic level. This serves as a new impe- tus to promote the bilateral relations in the new century. Judging by the present …     

Richard Nixon and Economic Nationalism in Latin America: The Problem of Expropriations, 1969–1974

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Nixon administration confronted the problem of how best to protect US economic interests in Latin America during a period of rising economic nationalism. After extensive debate, the president approved a policy designed to deter expropriations and rein in nationalist economic sentiment by threatening to terminate US and international financial assistance to countries that expropriated American holdings without prompt and adequate compensation. As it turned out, however, this policy was little short of a disaster. Nixon's stance heightened American unpopularity during a period when US credibility in Latin America was already on the wane, and failed to have any restraining effect on either the number of expropriations by Latin American countries or the strength of economic nationalism in the area. Informed by domestic and bureaucratic pressures and the same ideological proclivities that have long characterized American relations with the underdeveloped world, Nixon's policy on the expropriations issue ultimately proved ineffective and even pernicious to US interests in Latin America.     

Moral panics and anti‐cult terrorism in Western Europe

Religious minorities in Western Europe today are often perceived as threatening. After Solar Temple suicides and homicides, parliamentary and other official commissions investigated the dangers of ‘cults’ or ‘sects’. The article reviews reports published between 1996–1999 and argues that they may be classified into two categories. ‘Type I’ reports (more prevalent throughout French‐speaking Europe) rely on anti‐cult models and stereotypes, and may perpetuate moral panics by seeing all unfamiliar religious minorities as uniformly dangerous. ‘Type II’ reports, while still maintaining elements of the anti‐cult models, appear to be more balanced and concentrate more attention on academic findings. ‘Type I’ reports, and anti‐cult models in general, generated ‘anti‐cult terrorism’ (an expression first used in one of the Swiss ‘Type II’ reports) in the form of both verbal and actual violence, with extremist groups acting as self‐appointed anti‐cult vigilantes. While there are actually and potentially dangerous religious minorities, anti‐cult rhetoric in official documents may incite and provoke violence both against the assaulted movements and by the movements threatened. Law enforcement, the article concludes, should focus on the minority of violent religious and millenialist movements and the small extreme anti‐cult fringes.     

Radical right parties in Europe and anti‐foreign violence: A comparative essay

This is a comparative survey of contemporary patterns of anti‐foreign violence in Europe and some historical antecedents, such as pogroms and individual and small group attacks on visible foreigners. It considers the perpetrators and the long list of different categories of victims, many of them not foreigners at all. Against the background of general youth violence in schools and neighborhoods and waves of asylum‐seekers, the motives of anti‐foreign violence are examined and attributed to the under‐educated, ‘no‐future’ youth or underclass ‘losers’ of the ‘communications revolution’ of the 1980s. The skinhead and soccer hooligan anti‐foreign violence is, on the whole, not remotely as political as the fascist blackshirts and Nazi stormtroopers of the inter‐war period were. A look at the evidence from different European countries reveals on the one hand recruitment attempts by extreme right‐wing organizations among the skinhead and hooligan groups ‐ but rather limited success. On the other hand, most of the violent actions appear to be uncoordinated and responsive to community panic and media hype regarding the ‘floods’ of asylum‐seekers and illegal immigrants in the offing. By making themselves the executors of the community panic, the otherwise despised skinheads are grasping at personal acceptance and legitimacy.     

A General Review of the Situation in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008

In 2008, Latin America and the Caribbean area maintained the momentum of economic growth. However, the pace of growth slowed down due to various factors. The stagnant impact of global financial crisis lashed on its economy was beginning to show its effect. The overall political situation in Latin America remained stable. But some countries experienced political turmoil, which had some impact on their political landscape countries, the ruling parties faced . In some with new challenges. In foreign relations, pragmatism and pluralism continued to be the main features. The role of regional diplomacy in promoting regional stability was conspicuous. Latin American countries have demonstrated strong will for regional integration. The relations between Latin America and other major regions in the world were enhanced at different levels. China-Latin America relations of partnership also witnessed further boost in various fields.