Critical theory and the capitalist state

This article is an overview of Michel Callon's contribution to the reformulation of economic sociology and anthropology. It contextualizes Callon's concepts within science and technology studies, and indicates the main lines of influence on his thinking about economic processes. Callon's work also opens up a number of debates and challenges to current perspectives within economic sociology. Finally, the article considers the way in which Callon's perspective reconfigures both the relation of politics and economics, and the nature of politics itself.     

Trotsky,Gerschenkron and the political economy of late capitalist development

Abstract

The study of late capitalist development is often characterized as a battle between protagonists of market-led versus state-led development. For the latter position, Alexander Gerschenkron looms large, as one of the most significant theorists of state-led development under conditions of relative backwardness. There are striking similarities between Gerschenkron's explication of the advantages of backwardness and Leon Trotsky's concept of uneven and combined development and the privilege of backwardness. (These similarities have been commented upon often but rarely subject to closer comparison.) Indeed, both men share a common problematic – the comprehension of how economically backward countries could skip stages of development in order to join the ranks of economically advanced countries. This article compares their conception of this problematic and illustrates how in a number of areas the two are complementary. These are: their rejection of unilinear patterns of capitalist development, their appreciation of the role of states and institutions in facilitating late development and their understanding of development as a disruptive social process. However, in crucial areas the two diverge. These are: their comprehension of international economic and political relations, the role and position of labour in late development and, ultimately, the potential for late capitalist development to unleash social upheavals and further, non-capitalist transformations. Overall, I suggest how Trotsky's and Gerschenkron's approaches can complement each other, but that ultimately they represent fundamentally opposed approaches to human development.     

Administration in a small capitalist state: The Hong Kong experience

This article is primarily concerned with the functions of bureaucracy in a minimal state and with how those functions might change in response to economic growth. It is predicated on the assumption that bureaucracy is necessary for economic growth even in those countries which seek to achieve such growth through the relatively free operation of the economy within the rubric of a capitalist state. Hong Kong is a case in point. Although it has often been taken as the epitome of the benefits which can be derived from keeping government out of the economy, the bureaucracy has in fact played a critical role in support of economic development. Aside from the functions which must be performed by any state, such as the maintenance of law and order, the administration of justice, and the provision of public works, three features of Hong Kong bureaucratic practice appear to have been important in the definition of the bureaucracy's tasks in the economic growth process. These are ‘value for money’ and the constant need to justify government expenditure; effective line implementation; and the ability to manage crises. If these constitute minimal essential requirements for such governments, they may provide useful criteria which small or micro-states, following capital growth models but not yet experiencing rapid economic development, can apply in assessing the capabilities of their own bureaucracies.     

The political affiliation effect on state credit risk

Past research largely has ignored the effects of political parties on states’ default risks. This paper addresses that question by analyzing the response of credit spreads to weekly polling data from 17 gubernatorial elections between 2009 and 2012, during the 6 months prior to Election Day. The findings are that political affiliation has a significant effect on states’ default risks. The estimated effect of electing a Republican governor is a 6% reduction in the credit spread of the state. The effect prevails regardless of the party in control of the state legislature, and it is larger when gubernatorial elections are contested closely. Set in the context of case law, the paper links higher tax levels to greater credit risk. Moreover, an analysis of the candidates’ campaign promises suggests that stronger positions against tax increases are associated with less default risks. The results of the paper are therefore consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting that Republicans prefer lower taxes.     

Planning theory as political practice

Howell S. Baum is associate professor, teaching planning theory, social planning, and organizational behavior at the University of Maryland Institute for Urban Studies and School of Social Work and Community Planning. He has done research on planning in bureaucratic organizations and is author of Planners and Public Expectationsand The Invisible Bureaucracy.He is completing a book on the experience of working in bureaucracy, Membership Without Intimacy.     

The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments

Empirical evidence offered in this study suggests that decisions by state government officials to effect debt-financed spending depend in part on the state's gubernatorial election cycle. More specifically, the results reveal relative increases in state debt issues in anticipation of elections, and furthermore, they reveal that such increases are more significant for states characterized by high interparty political competition. While theoretical limitations preclude a definitive explanation for these results, the evidence is consistent with a view of state political markets where incumbent parties manipulate public policy so as to enhance the probability of success in pending elections. This insight is significant in that it suggests a relationship between public policy decisions and election cycles in a context heretofore unexplored.     

Distribution of income in advanced capitalist states: political parties, labour unions, and the international economy

Abstract. Hypotheses about determinants of income inequality in advanced capitalist societies are tested with data from the World Bank for 1975–80 across virtually the complete population. The results support most of the propositions of a model that takes into account differences in partisan control of government, the organization strength of labour, and the openness of the economy to international market forces. Hypotheses derived from global models of income distribution are not supported. The major findings are (1) that labour organization has no direct effect on income inequality; (2) that strong socialist parties have a negative effect on the size of the gap between the rich and the poor but no effect on the gap between the rich and the middle class; (3) that the governmental strength of conservative parties is unrelated to the size of the gap between the rich and the poor but has a very strong positive effect on the gap between the rich and the middle class; and (4) that, regardless of partisan control of government, relatively small trade dependent economies are more egalitarian than relatively large economies which are less dependent on international trade.     

理性、实践、价值之于政治哲学

政治哲学作为政治理论和实践的道德辩护者,首先表现为理性批判者,它以健康的怀疑和批判精神,"沉思"政治生活中的一切,而决不是以君临世界的绝对权威,以改造现实的实践者和革命者姿态去"做"和"行动"。     

Policy analysis,policy practice and political science

Bridgman and Davis have responded to criticism of their widely‐used model of the policy process as a cycle, ‘a series of interlocking steps’ by describing it as ‘pragmatic’, a ‘toolkit’, ‘not a theory’. This article asks what makes for ‘practical knowledge’ of the policy process. It identifies the theoretical basis for the ‘policy cycle’ model, and asks how this model relates to research on policy and to policy practitioners' own knowledge. It argues that we need to recognise the way that underlying theory about policy forms part of policy practice, and to give more attention to the relationship between research, experiential knowledge, and formal maps like the ‘policy cycle’.     

Public opinion towards welfare state reform: The role of political trust and government satisfaction

The traditional welfare state, which emerged as a response to industrialization, is not well equipped to address the challenges of today's post-industrial knowledge economies. Experts and policymakers have therefore called for welfare state readjustment towards a ‘social investment’ model (focusing on human skills and capabilities). Under what conditions are citizens willing to accept such future-oriented reforms? We point at the crucial but hitherto neglected role of citizens’ trust in and satisfaction with government. Trust and satisfaction matter because future-oriented reforms generate uncertainties, risks and costs, which trust and government satisfaction can attenuate. We offer micro-level causal evidence using experiments in a representative survey covering eight European countries and confirm these findings with European Social Survey data for 22 countries. We find that trust and government satisfaction increase reform support and moderate the effects of self-interest and ideological standpoints. These findings have crucial implications not least because they help explain why some countries manage – but others fail – to enact important reforms.     

The political costs of tax increases and expenditure reductions: Evidence from state legislative turnover

This paper estimates the political costs of increasing taxes and cutting expenditures for members of a legislature. It is found that both costs are individually significant, but that they are not significantly different. This coincides with the first order condition for maximization of the probability of reelection. Republican legislatures have a higher political cost for taxes, thus the party's relative bias toward smaller government is founded in stronger constituent preferences against taxes, not for lower spending. Additionally, by being ideologically conservative, Republicans lower the political costs of taxes, while by being more liberal, Democrats lower the cost of cutting expenditures.     

The origins of redistributive policy preferences: political socialisation with and without a welfare state

Research on the impact of the macroeconomy on individual-level preferences for redistribution has produced varying results. This paper presents a new theory on the presence of an expansive welfare state during one’s formative years as a source of heterogeneity in the effect that macroeconomic conditions have on individuals’ preferences for redistributive policy. This theory is tested using cohort analysis via the British Social Attitudes surveys (1983–2010), with generations coming of age between the end of World War I and today. Findings confirm that cohorts that were socialised before and after the introduction of the welfare state react differently to economic crises: the former become less supportive of redistribution, while the latter become more supportive. The research sheds light on the long-term shifts of support for the welfare state due to generational replacement.     

Economic discourse and the capitalist order

This paper uses the concepts of business model and financial ecosystem to analyse the relation between the US capital market and corporate business. Under a capital market double standard, from 1995 to 2000, new companies with digital prospects could recover their costs from the capital market; but, after the tech stock crash in 2000, all companies were required to generate profits from the product market. This encourages a blurring of old and new firm identities, because sectoral power is increasingly necessary to secure cost recovery. But this does not imply any return to business as usual when the financial ecosystem for new technology survives the crash and large-scale venture capital investment continues. From this point of view,the new economy illustrated, concretely, the determining role of finance in the broader processes of financialization.     

Conditional contraction: Globalisation and capitalist systems

The effect of globalisation on social spending is one of the most intensely studied issues in the political economy literature. Until recently, conventional wisdom held that globalisation leads governments to expand social spending to compensate workers for increasing risk exposure. The latest research shows, however, that globalisation has become strongly associated with spending cutbacks since the late 1980s. This article adds to this research by arguing that the negative impact of globalisation is conditioned on the capitalist system in different countries. In coordinated market economies (CMEs), employers are dependent on the willingness of the workforce to invest in specific skills and therefore become supportive of extensive social spending. Not so in liberal market economies (LMEs), where employers are much less dependent on social spending because the workforce in general invests less in specific skills. Employers in LMEs are therefore likely to use increasing globalisation as a means to push through retrenchment, whereas employers in CMEs are not. This argument is tested in a time‐series cross‐section regression analysis, which clearly supports it.