“梅普组合”及普京治国方略的连续性

俄罗斯新当选总统梅德韦杰夫于2008年5月7日宣誓就职。他与前任总统普京关系密切，是普京把他扶上了总统宝座。梅德韦杰夫提名普京为总理并获得通过，“梅普组合”正式成立。梅德韦杰夫的治国理念与普京具有一致性。中俄两国关系是高度信赖的关系，是保障世界稳定的重要因素。中俄两国关系的发展不需要过渡期，可以保持持续稳定的发展。     

Job Swap versus Russian Politics

On September 24th, the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, proposed at a congress of the ruling United Russia Party that Prime MinisterVladimir Putin be selected as the sole presidential candidate for e...     

The future of the United States as a European power: The case of NATO enlargement

Abstract

European Union enlargement has left Russia on the margins of European political processes and led to widespread suspicion in the Moscow foreign policy establishment of European motives. This has resulted in, first, increasing resistance to the imposition of European norms and, second, a more assertive policy, particularly in the EU's and Russia's ‘overlapping neighbourhoods’. Although Moscow is likely to continue the strategy of engagement initiated under Putin, Brussels must radically rethink the nature and extent of Russia's ‘Europeanisation’. Russia's drive for modernisation will coexist with the strengthening of sovereignty and the power of the state, seen by the Putin administration as key to external and internal security. The EU will have to limit its ambition and work within this ‘window’—wider or narrower depending on state of play—of policy possibilities.     

Medvedev's Russia and the Social Dimension

In recent years Russia has, thanks to the action of President Putin, witnessed a significant strengthening politically and economically. After years of crisis, this has finally ensured a condition of stability functional to the compromise that has arisen between the regime and society. The election of a new president, Medvedev, in March 2008, marks the beginning of a development phase that will be no less fraught with unknowns than the previous period and destined to create new challenges for the authorities, especially as concerns the social question, long kept on the margins of official policy. The operational plan for the social dimension envisaging a series of interventions aimed at solving the relative problems represents a commitment that could turn out to be crucial for the country's future.     

Reluctant Appeaser: Douglas Hailsham and the German Problem 1932–1938

This article considers the ministerial career of Douglas Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham, during the 1930s and, in particular, his attitude towards the appeasement of Germany. Although Hailsham was a leading Conservative in the inter-war period and held key posts during the 1930s, his role in Britain's policy of appeasement has been overlooked. He was consistently wary of the Nazi menace and as Secretary of State for War from 1931–1935 he urged a firm line towards Hitler's Germany. As the decade progressed, however, the inescapable realities of Britain's international predicament drove Hailsham to support the government's appeasement policy, at least until September 1938. Although he forecast the near inevitability of the Second World War, he could not devise a viable alternative to the appeasement of Germany. Hailsham's experience thus offers a significant addition to the historiography of appeasement and to understanding the distinctions between “appeasers” and “anti-appeasers.”     

俄罗斯总统大选及今后4年的内外政策走向

在刚刚结束的俄罗斯大选中,现任第一副总理梅德韦杰夫获胜,普京的支持是梅德韦杰夫获胜的重要原因。新一届政府继续推行普京路线,但是在政治体制上将会出现事实上的调整。在对外关系中将继续以维护国家利益为中心,开展多极化的务实外交;在经济上,新一届政府面临的主要任务是确保经济增长、调整经济结构。     

梅德韦杰夫外交:特点、原因及前景分析

梅德韦杰夫执政以来,其外交特点是:重视独联体,调整政策但区别对待;重视东方,中印平衡;对西方继续强硬但不破裂,进而改善,对美欧有所区别;利用俄优势,重视能源外交、体育外交、军事外交和大国外交;对国际事务提出很多新观点、新建议,使政府在实施俄罗斯外交政策的分量加重。其原因既有俄罗斯国力上升,也有国内的梅普组合因素,还有国际上的美国因素和中国因素。今后梅德韦杰夫外交将更加重视经济安全、能源外交和军事发展。对华将继续友好,战略借重加大,但发展空间有限,必须寻求新的增长点。在对西方关系上,在继承普京时期强硬外交的基础上进一步调整、改善、缓和与西方的关系。     

The Alliance Politics of Concerted Accommodation: Entente Bargaining and Italian and Ottoman Interventions in the First World War

This article examines the challenges allies face in coordinating diplomatic efforts to accommodate and peel off their main enemy's potential allies. It elucidates the key dimensions, and the underlying coordination dynamics, of this problem of “concerted accommodation,” and it develops propositions about the conditions that shape the efficacy of such efforts. The argument links allies’ strength to their divergent or convergent assessments of the target state's ability to tip the war toward victory or defeat. Divergent assessments foster weak allied efforts that are likely to fail, but when allies agree that the target is a potential “war-tipper,” they will support their concerted accommodation policy with more robust cooperation that is more likely to work. The causal arguments and mechanisms are examined in a paired comparison analysis of two First World War cases: the Entente's efforts to induce (1) Ottoman neutrality and (2) Italian intervention.     

Cause,effect, and consistency: A response to Kenneth Waltz

In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, we argued that the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is due largely to the influence of a domestic interest group—comprised of Jews as well as non-Jews—and that this unusual situation is harmful to both the United States and Israel. Jerome Slater's thoughtful review endorses many of our central arguments, but it also highlights several points of disagreement. He argues that we overlooked important alternative sources, defined the lobby too broadly, and exaggerated its influence on Congress and especially the Executive Branch. Although Slater is even more critical of U.S. Middle East policy than we are, he argues that the special relationship is due to strong cultural and religious affinities and broad public support in American society, and not to the influence of the lobby. In fact, the alternative sources cited by Slater do not undermine our basic claims; a broad conception of the lobby makes more sense than his narrower definition; and there is little disagreement between us about the lobby's influence on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Most importantly, public opinion in the United States does not explain why the United States gives Israel such extensive and nearly unconditional backing. Although most Americans have a favorable image of Israel, surveys show that they also favor a more even-handed Middle East policy and a more normal relationship with Israel. Thus, the special relationship is due primarily to the lobby's influence, and not to the American people's enduring identification with the Jewish state.     

How the West Was One: France,America, and the “Huntingtonian Reversal”

Samuel Huntington was such a prolific scholar that it is sometimes difficult for researchers to keep up with his many policy analyses and recommendations. This article deals with one important Huntingtonian thesis, of the late 1990s. The thesis appertains to Huntington's worry about the US becoming a “lonely superpower” due to a French-led campaign to drive a wedge between America and its transatlantic allies. The authors detail the current irony inherent in what they call a “Huntingtonian reversal.” Today, unlike in 1999 when Huntington propounded his “lonely superpower” thesis, it can appear as if it is America that seeks to drive a wedge between itself and the European allies. Moreover, should the West become “one” again, it will in part be due to French efforts to revive transatlantic solidarity.     

基于俄罗斯能源经济下的“能源陷阱”分析

依靠能源出口拉动经济增长作为俄罗斯的一项基本国策,虽历经叶利钦、普京、梅德韦杰夫三代政府更迭,但无论何人主政这项政策均得到了有效延续。在以能源经济为主要发展方式的政策引领下,俄罗斯大国复苏之路清晰而坚定。但是,随着能源经济在俄经济发展中所占比例日益加重,"能源陷阱"也逐步凸显。因此,在这种能源经济的引领下,俄罗斯是实现真正的国家复兴,还是削弱自身经济自主性、跌入"能源陷阱",进而彻底沦为资源型经济国家,仍是一个值得深入探讨的问题。     

For the Present and the Future: The Well-Conceived,Successful, and Farsighted Statecraft of President Theodore Roosevelt

“It is difficult to escape the conclusion,” this historian has claimed in previous writings, “that in the foreign policy arena [Theodore] Roosevelt was probably the greatest of all US presidents.” Such a laudatory interpretation is built on an assessment of both the record achieved by Rooseveltian diplomacy during the years of Roosevelt's presidency and the long-term significance of TR's statecraft. In its own time Roosevelt's foreign policy success grew out of a sophisticated understanding of a complex international environment, a well-conceived perspective on America's interests within that environment, and a multitude of attributes in the realm of execution that usually enabled Roosevelt, even in the most challenging cases, to attain the results he was seeking. As to its long-range importance, Rooseveltian statecraft was anchored to three precepts that might be labeled the “precept of broadly defined US interests,” the “precept of US power,” and the “precept of Anglo-American leadership.” By conducting a foreign policy grounded on these precepts, Roosevelt – certainly well ahead of the great majority of his contemporaries – anticipated the type of foreign policy approach that would become and has remained the foundation for the practice of statecraft by many Republican and Democratic presidents and their most influential advisers from 1939 to the present day.     

新世纪俄蒙关系与东北亚区域合作

俄罗斯和蒙古国双边关系的真正改善是在普京当选俄罗斯总统之后。普京总统意识到蒙古国战略地位是俄罗斯远东战略不可或缺的重要因素后开始加强与蒙古国的关系。梅德韦杰夫进一步升级两国关系。俄罗斯和蒙古国良好关系的现状和优势有助于东北亚在各领域的合作。     

梅普共治 开启中俄关系新时代

目前中俄两国关系发展顺利,梅德韦杰夫的访问,是对普京执政期间中俄关系基本思路和做法的重申。我们对"梅普共治"抱有极大的信心。同时,梅德韦杰夫的访问显示,中俄合作正向着更加实质化和对等的方向发展。尤其是梅德韦杰夫表示,俄中协作成为保障世界安全的关键因素,应被视为两国未来关系的新基础。与此同时,中俄之间合作领域的深度和广度在不断拓宽,这才是双方合作的更深层次表现,也是双方互信加深的集中体现。为未来几十年双赢的双边关系及持久发展打下了牢固基础,开启了两国合作的新时代。     

Russia's Artificial Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that whichever country becomes the leader in artificial intelligence (AI) “will become the ruler of the world.” Yet Russia lags competitors like China and the United States substantially in AI capabilities. What is Russia's strategy for boosting development of AI technologies, and what role do groups within the Russian elite play in shaping this strategy? Russia's AI development strategy is unique in that it is led not by the government, nor by the private sector, but by state-owned firms. The government's distrust of Russia's largest tech firm, Yandex, has sidelined the company from national AI planning. Meanwhile, Russia's defense conglomerate Rostec publicly appears to focus less on artificial intelligence than on other high-tech priorities. As a result, Russia's AI development has been left to a state-owned bank, Sberbank, which has taken the lead in devising plans for government-backed investment in AI.     

Dialoog en Manipulasie in kommunikasie

SUMMARY

In this article the author deals with the misunderstanding of nonverbal behaviour. He presents relevant qualitative and quantitative data on misunderstanding based on tests administrated to both Ethiopian newcomers and veteran residents of modern Israel. He also discusses gestures in both cultures which are homomorphs but antonyms as well as what he calls “congruent” and “diverging” decoding, and the interpersonal and intrapersonal processes of misunderstanding. He offers a model of “Communication Quality” and introduces the concept of the “certainty factor.” For testing the level of nonverbal misunderstanding, the author developed the Schneller Israeli Emblem Test, which he administered to Israelis from eight countries. In the light of his relevant theoretical and conceptual approaches, Schneller's work yields important conclusions, so that this may be applied to other multicultural nations as well. Included in this contribution are also appendices with a total of 35 Ethopian and Israeli emblematic gestures.     

Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993–2000

How was the ouster of Saddam Hussein defined as the solution to America's Iraq problem? Current scholarship on the U.S. invasion of Iraq tends to focus on the post-9/11 road to war, promoting models of policy capture, intelligence manipulation, threat-inflation, or rhetorical coercion of Bush administration opponents. In this essay, I trace the “Ideapolitik” of regime change in the 1990s and show that Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric was firmly embedded in a preexisting foreign policy consensus defining Saddam Hussein as the “problem” and his overthrow as its “solution.” Drawing upon recent research in international relations and public policy, I show how the idea of regime change prevailed in redefining American strategy for Iraq. While the September 11, 2001 attacks had important effects on the Bush administration's willingness to use force, the basic idea that ousting Saddam Hussein would solve the Iraq problem was already embedded in elite discourse. Saddam Hussein's ouster was not simply the result of idiosyncratic or nefarious decision-making processes within the Bush administration, but was instead the realization of a social choice made by U.S. foreign policy elites well before George W. Bush came to power.     

On the Prospects of a Return to Keynes: Taking Keynes’s Political Philosophy Seriously

This article addresses the prospects of a “return to Keynes” in terms of Keynes's own philosophy. It shows that Keynes's moral and political philosophy provide little guide to how Keynesian economics might now be achieved. Keynes's gradualist reformism, derived from both Burke and Moore, leaves a gulf between his economic agenda and the means of its implementation, which is widened in attempts to transpose his proposals onto the global political economy of the 21st century. Keynes's faith in elite intuition and enlightened rule are never securely established and are undermined by his own insights into uncertainty. However, the priority of the short-run and Keynes's depictions of organic unity suggest potential if underdeveloped avenues for alternative social choices and policy re-direction.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

俄罗斯现代化主导力:“普京主义”还是“梅德韦杰夫主义”?

俄罗斯即将迎来大选年,无论普京是否能成功当选新一届总统,其治国思想都会对俄罗斯的政治生活产生长期的影响,而梅德韦杰夫之后的俄罗斯政坛也必将发生深刻变化。由于权力合法性基础和理念目标的不同,"普京主义"和"梅德韦杰夫主义"在不同的历史阶段对俄罗斯的现代化建设都产生了积极影响,但同时也遗留了一些问题。在新的历史时期,俄罗斯必须找到一种兼顾民族国家传统政治文化特点和现代化转型及全球化挑战需要的治国方略,在历史和现实的张力中找到一个平衡点,"新普京主义"是本文对此提出的大胆预测。