Reluctant disarmer: Italy's ambiguous attitude toward NATO's nuclear weapons policy

Of the five North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European countries of US nuclear forward deployment, Italy is the least-known and studied case, even though the country hosts the largest number of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and still has two bases of deployment. The paper aims at filling this gap by analyzing Italy's current view on the presence, value, and future of NSNWs hosted on its territory. The analysis begins with the examination of the process of profound devaluation that has minimized, starting from the end of the cold war, Italy's original interest in this category of weapons. It then examines the reasons why Rome continues to pursue conservative nuclear weapon policies and distances itself significantly from the progressive camp of NATO members, particularly Germany, that explicitly call for the withdrawal of US NSNWs from Europe. Through the study of the Italian domestic politics and security culture, the article explains Italy's opposition to any radical change in the NATO nuclear status quo, and its reluctance to pursue policies that are consistent with the process of nuclear devaluation that the country has experienced over the past two decades.     

Italy's Mediterranean role

ABSTRACT

Three main drivers underlie states’ intent to expand gas supply: energy security, geopolitics and climate goals. Such considerations also drive Greece’s expansive gas policy, but come with significant caveats. First, pipeline politics entails geopolitical costs and inflated anticipated gains. Second, while gas supply has yielded energy security for Greece, its cost-effectiveness is contentious. Third, the gas option obscures the transition to smart, clean energy sources and systems. A rational actor model within a rationalist-weak cognitivist framework can account for Greece’s gas policy. Yet, its limited success points to the need for a clean energy policy promising higher climate, energy and geopolitical gains.     

Italy's changing defence policy

After the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) decided to act as a stabilising force, to abandon the street and to lend democratic legitimacy to the political process designed by the army. The outcome of this strategy was that the MB was first ‘burned’ politically and then harshly repressed after having exhausted its stabilising role. The main mistakes the Brothers made were, first, to turn their back on several opportunities to spearhead the revolt by leading popular forces and, second, to keep their strategy for change gradualist and conservative, seeking compromises with parts of the former regime even though the turmoil and expectations in the country required a much bolder strategy.     

NATO's Southern flank and Italy's role in it

The end of the Cold War brought about a change in US basing policy in Italy. Some bases were dismantled, while others, like the one in Vicenza, were strengthened raising considerable local protest for environmental reasons. The article examines whether agreements establishing the US bases have a solid foundation in the Italian Constitution and whether the weapons detained there are in conformity with the disarmament treaties binding Italy. Since the bases are now employed for NATO “out-of-area” operations and have become a part of the US strategy of “war on terror”, they inevitably influence Italy's foreign policy and its option to stay out of ongoing conflicts. The article also considers the continuing need for US bases from the point of view of Atlantic solidarity.     

Organizing international armaments cooperation: institutional design and path dependencies in Europe

Abstract

Few issues are more important to scholars of Europe's emergence as a foreign policy actor than whether the European Union (EU) can forge a common defense-industrial policy out of 27 states' procurement policies and defense industries. Overlooked in most scholarly analyses of European defense-industrial cooperation, the story of Europe's international armaments organizations stretches back more than six decades. In this article, we examine the impact of past institutional outcomes on the defense-industrial field by applying the concepts and analytic tools of historic institutionalism to European armaments organizations. Because past institutional dynamics have channeled the subsequent development of armaments cooperation, what has emerged is a polycentric governance architecture wherein organizations with transatlantic, pan-European and restrictive-European memberships dominate distinct components of the cooperative process. We demonstrate that this maturing institutional pattern will likely limit the opportunities for the EU – and especially its Commission – to shape the future contours of European defense-industrial cooperation.     

Italy's Growing Burden of Choice in Security Policy

NATO, the EU, and the UN have been the cornerstones of Italy's foreign policy since WWII: although they continue to provide a point of reference, these institutions are undergoing major changes that reflect – and partly create – a very unpredictable international environment. The evolving security agenda, choices made by key allies (especially the United States), and domestic political forces are putting Italian decision-makers under pressure. There is a serious problem of resource constraints while the country is still unwilling to make clear-cut choices based on unavoidable tradeoffs. The past few years have witnessed a mix of continuity and change due to the political orientations of successive governments under these challenging circumstances.     

Taking production relations seriously: the role of defence firms in armaments cooperation

ABSTRACT

Coordinating defence-industrial relations towards harmonising and facilitating procurement policies, production processes and the joint operability of their member-states’ national defence sectors, International Armaments Organisations (IAOs) play an important role in armaments cooperation. How can we explain their institutional development? Existing literature tackles this question using International Relations theories to mid-range theories of institutions and integration. However, they adopt overly state-centric viewpoints, assume actor interests as given, and disregard the changes in the global economic landscape that constitute the backdrop of armaments cooperation. In response, we shift the focus onto a key group of actors: the defence firms. Using a Neo-Gramscian Historical Materialist approach, we investigate how the globalisation of the defence market has created a transnational defence-industrial class in Europe, and demonstrate how its economic interests have fundamentally shaped the institutional frameworks of European IAOs. We focus on the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to illustrate our argument. Our conclusions have implications for the study of armaments cooperation, particularly highlighting how the economic nature of this policy domain necessitates a closer look at the global and regional production relations, and the agency of the defence firms.     

New alliances,governance of the international system and Italy's Foreign policy choices

The EU and the US, mainly through NATO, have been successful in securing peace and prosperity in Europe during the Cold War and in promoting peace beyond Europe after 1990. With the emergence of new powers and the rise of multipolarity, however, it is no longer apparent that transatlantic relations are indispensable and ways must be found to make sure that the relationship remains relevant. The EU and the US currently relate poorly to each other and as a result do not obtain the best possible outcome from their combined resources. Two elements are key to improving transatlantic relations: an inclusive policy towards Turkey (in the strategic interests of both the EU and the US); and more permanent and workable structures suited to the realities of the 21st century.