Multicandidate Equilibrium in American Elections

The United States presidential election of 1992 is anexample of a multicandidate contest involving bothDemocratic and Republican candidates. Using a spatialmodelling approach, I analyze candidate policystrategy for such elections, under the assumption thatvoters choose according to the multivariate votingmodel of behavioral research. This model representsvoters' decisions as probabilistic functions of theirpolicy preferences and political partisanship. Isuggest reasons why partisan voting motivatescandidates to locate near their party's partisans inthe policy space, and illustrate this argument withrespect to the 1992 presidential election. The resultsof computer simulations suggest that these motivationslead to multicandidate spatial equilibria, which arerobust to changes in the model's parameters.Partisanship appears to be an important source ofstability in multicandidate electoral competition.     

Class voting, social changes and political changes in the Netherlands 1971–2006

To what extent can the decline of class voting in the Netherlands be explained by sociological factors (compositional changes, the evolution of the class structure and economic progressivism) and political factors (a party-merger and changing party positions)? Multinomial logit (MNP) and conditional logit (CL) are employed using the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (1971–2006) and data of the Comparative Manifesto Project. We find that the rise of the class of social-cultural specialists is important for understanding changes in the class–vote relationship. Surprisingly, the impact of economic progressivism became more important for left-wing voting. Finally, although there seems to be a clear relation between party positions and the strength of class-based voting, the party positions hardly explain the assumed linear decline in class-based voting.     

The empirical application of the spatial theory of voting in multiparty systems with random utility models

Spatial models of voting predominate in the formalization of political decisions and continue to be a growth industry in political science. But strict empirical applications of this theory have been rare. Only recently, conditional discrete choice models have been proposed to fill the gap between formal and empirical models and to predict the individual voting decision in multi-candidate/multiparty contests on the basis of the spatial model. This article highlights several flexible features of these models that are well known in transportation economics and applied marketing science but not yet discussed in the electoral studies community. Empirical illustrations are provided on the basis of (nested) multinomial logit.     

Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters’ Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election

This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition.     

Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands

This paper is an empirical study to the effects of economic outcomes on party choice for the Netherlands. In the first part of the paper we employ a multinomial logit model to examine the links between voters' characteristics and party choice. The results suggest that there are long-run movements in party choice which are unlikely be the result of changing economic outcomes. In the second part, we use time series analysis to determine the effects of economic conditions on short-run and medium-run movements in votes shares. The estimations results provide support for the responsibility hypothesis and for the predictions of the partisan voter model that left-wing (right-wing) parties benefit (suffer) from favourable economic growth prospects.     

Voter Choice in the 1995 French Presidential Election

This study estimates a model of voter choice for the first and second ballots of the 1995 French Presidential election. Its objective is to characterize the relative importance of traditional bases of French voter choice such as social class relative to campaign issues and voter evaluations of the economy. The study also seeks to identify candidate-specific bases of voter choice. Multinomial logit analysis of voter choice among the four leading candidates reveals a stronger role for campaign issues than previous studies suggest. Voter-candidate ideological proximity is the strongest predictor of first and second ballot choice, followed by voter perceptions of candidate ability to address unemployment and political corruption. Demographic variables have limited explanatory power in both the first and second ballot models. The parameter estimates demonstrate considerable differences in the bases of voter choice across candidates, with the bases of voter choice for National Front leader Jean-Marie le Pen most distinct from those of the remaining candidates.     

Economic performance and U.S. Senate elections: A comment

This paper investigates the issue of economic performance and U.S. Senate elections analyzed by Bennett and Wiseman (1991) in a work published in this journal. Our study analyzes the electoral margins and election outcomes of U.S. Senate elections using state-level data involving only incumbents up for reelection in the 1976–1990 period (212 elections). The ordinary least squares and logit estimation results suggest that the effects of economic performance variables on incumbent senatorial elections are in general overshadowed by other factors known to be important in determining electoral margins and outcomes. In addition, the empirical results of the entire model are in general consistent with prior findings noted in the public choice and political science literature concerning the analysis of U.S. Senate elections. Therefore, we suggest that the findings raised in our study provide enough theoretical and empirical evidence to raise sufficient doubt regarding the robustness of the results suggested by Bennett and Wiseman (1991), and thus call upon other researchers to study further the relationship between economic performance and voting behavior in U.S. Senate elections.     

Approval voting in practice

Several leading professional associations have recently decided to use approval voting (AV). The largest of them, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), with more than 300,000 members, adopted AV in response to practical political problems with conventional plurality elections of precisely the sort that AV was designed to solve. This paper analyzes results of the first three multicandidate elections conducted by the IEEE using the new system. Issues examined include participation rates, use of multiple votes, patterns of shared support, majority rule, AV-dominance, effects on outcomes, and encouragement of candidate entry. In general, AV appears to have had a successful test.     

Economic performance and political popularity in the Republic of Ireland

This paper develops a model of discrete choice to analyse the choice of voters among a number of political parties. It then applies the model to an empirical analysis of the relationship between a government's economic performance and its political popularity for the Republic of Ireland over the period 1974–1987.Within this general statement the paper makes three contributions. First, it sheds light on a hitherto unknown phenomenon — namely the nature of the relation between economic performance and political popularity in Ireland. Second, it does this within the context of analysing the reactions of different types of voters viz. voters of all social classes and then of social classes ABC1 and C2DE. Third, the empirical work is grounded firmly in a choice theoretic model involving optimal choices between discrete alternatives.     

Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

Existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence, yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies. What accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation? I introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence: 1) a model which incorporates candidate-specific variables, so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy-related electoral advantages (or disadvantages); 2) a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters' candidate utilities, thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds. I report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model, which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model. I then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results.

     

Policy-Specific Alienation and Indifference in the Calculus of Voting: A Simultaneous Model of Party Choice and Abstention

This article aims to combine the spatial models of candidate/party choice and abstention/participation choice in a single decision model and to provide empirical reaction functions. The starting point of this study is the hypothesis of a sequential ordering of candidate choice and participation choice (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). The proposed model simultaneously considers the choice among n≥ 2 parties and the abstention option. It differentiates between policy-specific effects of alienation and indifference. The models are estimated with nested multiattributive discrete choice models which are theoretically founded on random utility theory.     

Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Abstract.  Theories of coalition formation represent a diverse set of arguments about why some government coalitions form while others do not. In this article, the authors present a systematic empirical test of the relative importance of the various arguments. The test is designed to avoid a circularity problem present in many coalition studies – namely that the theories are tested on data of national government coalitions in postwar Europe: the very data that gave rise to the theories in the first place. Instead, the authors focus on government coalitions at the municipal level. They base their analysis on an expert survey of almost 3,000 local councillors from all municipalities in Denmark. They use conditional logit analysis to model government formation as a discrete choice between all potential governments. The analysis confirms some, but far from all, traditional explanations such as those based on office and policy motives. At the same time, the analysis raises the question of whether actors really seek minimal coalitions.     

当代在校大学生恋爱认同及行为选择的实证研究

本研究利用2007-2009年大学生学习与生活状况追踪抽样调查原始数据,运用定量模型及定性资料分析了在校大学生的恋爱行为及恋爱认同的影响因素,结果发现,大学生的恋爱选择及恋爱认同受大学生个体特征、社会交往及家庭因素的综合影响,其恋爱行为与认同感的差异是一种社会理性选择的结果。     

Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty?

Abstract.  The formal stochastic model of voting should be the theoretical benchmark against which empirical models can be gauged. A standard result in the formal model is the 'mean voter theorem' stating that parties converge to the electoral center. Empirical analysis based on the vote-maximizing premise, however, invalidates this convergence result. We consider both empirical and formal models that incorporate exogeneous valence terms for the parties. Valence can be regarded as an electorally perceived attribute of each party leader that is independent of the policy position of the party. We show that the mean voter theorem is valid for empirical multinomial logit and probit models of a number of elections in the Netherlands and Britain. To account for the non-centrist policy positions of parties, we consider a more general formal model where valence is also affected by the behavior of party activists. The results suggest that non-convergent policy choice by party leaders can be understood as rational, vote-maximizing calculation by leaders in response to electoral and activist motivations.     

An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections

Two important assumptions underlying the Riker-McKelvey-Ordeshook, expected-utility-based, multicandidate calculus of voting are that citizens decide whether or not and for whom to vote in a single-member district (SMD), plurality-winner electoral system and that they ignore aggregate outcomes, that is, how citizens in other districts may vote. Aranson modifies this calculus by investigating citizens' decisions in proportional-representation (PR) systems and/or situations in which aggregate outcomes require parties to form parliamentary coalitions to govern. This study operationalizes and applies the probability and utility components of this modified calculus to data on the 1972 and 1976 West German federal elections, which combine features of SMD and PR systems and of which coalition politics is an integral part. Expected-utility calculations used to predict reported voting decisions achieve reasonably good levels of aggregate accuracy. Further analysis reveals that gradations in respondents' expected utilities, as well as in their utilities and surrogate measures of the subjective probabilities of electoral outcomes, relate significantly to reported voting decisions. Also, variables that model coalition considerations are commonly the most significant.     

The barely revealed preference behind road investment priorities

An attempt is made to reveal the preference of decision makers within the regional Norwegian public roads administration. The order of priority assigned to the respective, competing public road investment opportunities within the various counties (provinces) is studied by means of a rank order multinomial logit model. Explanatory variables used include cost, benefit, and a variety of attributes characterizing the individual investment projects. Although statistically significant, cost and benefit appear to be of only marginal importance for the priorities set. More weight is attached to cost than to benefit. Smaller projects are preferred to larger, given the benefit-cost ratio. In general, the models estimated are able to explain only a relatively small share of the priority setting made.     

A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions

This essay evaluates six single-winner, multicandidate electoral systems with respect to their tendency to choose Condorcet candidates. To this end I calibrate a logistic multiple regression model from Monte Carlo simulations, based on a multivariate normal spatial model, in which I vary the number of candidates, number of dimensions, correlation structure, and relative dispersion of candidates and voters. I investigate additional spatial-model variations by comparing further simulation results with predictions of the basic statistical model. The results suggest that for many electoral systems, Condorcet efficiency would increase with perceptual uncertainty of candidates' positions and would be low in a polarized society. Of the voting systems studied, approval voting and the Coombs systems appear least sensitive to variations in assumptions.     

Efficacy,power and equity under approval voting

Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates can affect the outcome. It also considers generic powers of voters and the extent to which approval voting treats voters equitably. If there are three candidates, votes for one or two candidates are equally efficacious in large electorates. For four or more candidates, votes for about half the candidates are most efficacious. Although inequities among voters can arise under approval voting, the common plurality voting system is considerably less equitable than approval voting.     

Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

This paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate. The model assumes no abstentions, sincere voting, and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate. We derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty. We show that, under concavity, convergent equilibrium exists at a “minimum-sum point” at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized. We then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance. In our examples, computer analysis indicates that non-convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases.