Who opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions

Competing accounts of the effect of globalization on labor politics agree that firms influence regulations, but make contrasting predictions for which firms are most likely to oppose regulations. Using survey data from employers in 19,000 manufacturing firms in 82 developing countries, we examine the determinants of employers’ opinions toward labor regulation. In contrast to the predictions of optimistic theories of globalization, we find that (i) firms that export are more likely to have negative opinions toward labor regulation than those that sell domestically, and (ii) firms that receive foreign direct investment have similar views as firms that rely only on domestic capital. Further, we show that systematic differences in employers’ opinions depend on the intensity of the competitive pressures they face and their use of skilled workers. In doing so, we provide an empirically grounded account of the heterogeneous opinions of key actors in economic policymaking in developing countries.     

How does government funding affect nonprofits' program spending? Evidence from international development organizations

Under the new governance models, the scope of government funding of nonprofit activities in service delivery and policy implementation is extensive. There is a long‐standing concern that government funding may compromise nonprofit operations and lead to unintended consequences. This research examines the concern by exploring the effect of government funding on nonprofits' spending on programs and services. Existing theories and empirical evidence propose competing arguments concerning the relationship between government funding and nonprofits' program spending. Using a 20‐year panel dataset of international development nonprofits registered with the United States Agency for International Development, we find that nonprofits receiving more government funding spend significantly higher proportions of their organizational resources on development programs. Government funding seems to increase nonprofits' program spending and to make them more focused on their mission‐related activities.     

How responsible is 'responsive' government?

The work of John Rohr focuses primarily upon the constitutional dimension of the work of public servants, most particularly, but not exclusively, career civil servants employed in central government. In stressing public service ethics as a form of constitutional practice Rohr's aim is to help reinforce the legitimate role of career public servants in government and to remind practising public bureaucrats (and academics and politicians) of the nobility of the 'administrative vocation' of state service, a somewhat daunting task in today's political climate. In this article I examine Rohr's work to see what ethical light it might throw upon recent and ongoing political attempts to make the British public administration more 'responsive'. I do so, first, by outlining the main themes of Rohr's work and their location within the US constitutional tradition. I then proceed to discuss the extent to which they translate into other constitutional contexts. Finally, I attempt to put Rohr's work to use in discussing aspects of civil service reform in Britain under recent Conservative administrations and that of the present New Labour government.     

Is a corrupt government totally unacceptable?

Corrupt governments are not always punished by voters. Under certain circumstances citizens consider voting for the incumbent party even if the party is perceived as corrupt. Using survey data for Spain, this article analyses what makes citizens reject (or not) the idea of voting for a corrupt party. Previous research has shown that party identification, ideology and political information play a role in voters’ reactions to corruption. The article argues that voters judge corruption in relative terms; what matters is not how corrupt the incumbent party is perceived to be but whether it is deemed to be more corrupt than the other parties.     

When does open government shut? Predicting government responses to citizen information requests

Methods for the analysis of “big data” on citizen-government interactions are necessary for theoretical assessments of bureaucratic responsiveness. Such big data methods also stand to benefit practitioners' abilities to monitor and improve these emerging transparency mechanisms. We consider supervised latent Dirichlet allocation (sLDA) as a potential method for these purposes. To this end, we use sLDA to examine the Mexican government's (non)responsiveness to all public information requests filed with the federal Mexican government during the 2003–2015 period, and to identify the request topics most associated with (non)responsiveness. Substantively, our comparisons of the topics that are most highly predictive of responsiveness and nonresponsivess indicate that political sensitivity plays a large and important role in shaping official behavior in this arena. We thus conclude that sLDA provides unique advantages for, and insights into, the analysis of (i) textual records of citizen–government interactions and (ii) bureaucratic (non)responsiveness to these interactions.     

Does democracy produce quality of government?

This article analyses the effects of political regimes over state capacity or the quality of government (QoG): Do democratic states perform better than authoritarian ones? Previous studies point to a nonlinear relationship between democracy and government quality. It is argued here that QoG is a function of both forces of supply (leaders who have the power to make reforms) and demand (citizens' desire for mid‐ to long‐term investments over short‐term needs), the latter of which is a function of economic development. In democratic states, leaders have stronger incentives to improve QoG after a certain degree of wealth is reached, while in poorer countries they have little incentive for long‐term bureaucratic investments. Thus it is predicted that the relationship between democracy and QoG is conditional, based on economic development. With over 125 countries in the sample, this hypothesis is tested using time‐series panel data and spatial models, and strong empirical support is found.     

Why does government produce national defense?

Economists argue that government produces national defense because it is a public good, and markets fail to produce public goods optimally. This argument has two shortcomings. First, it relies on different assumptions of individual behavior in the private and public sectors. Second, it assumes that government has a comparative advantage in the production of public goods, despite evidence to the contrary. Employing the standard assumption of self-interested behavior for both private sector and public sector individuals, government has an incentive to produce national defense because by doing so it is protecting its source of income: its tax base. Incidentally, citizens benefit from the exchange of protection for tribute because their assets are protected.     

Who Pays the Piper?

Abstract

This paper, using research from the UK and comparable US studies, looks at the growth in party fundraising, ethics of the process, impact on electoral systems, candidates, parties, campaigning and methods of obtaining funds (one donor in the UK has recently agreed to give £5 million to the Conservative Party because they are anti EU whilst Labour gained £1 million from the smoking lobby in 1997). It then links this to a growth in strategic public affairs and outlines the direct causal link between political lobbying and party fundraising.     

Who Benefits from KIPP?

The nation's largest charter management organization is the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP). KIPP schools are emblematic of the No Excuses approach to public education, a highly standardized and widely replicated charter model that features a long school day, an extended school year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms, and emphasizes traditional reading and math skills. No Excuses charter schools are sometimes said to target relatively motivated high achievers at the expense of students who are more difficult to teach, including limited English proficiency (LEP) and special education (SPED) students, as well as students with low baseline achievement levels. We use applicant lotteries to evaluate the impact of KIPP Academy Lynn, a KIPP school in Lynn, Massachusetts that typifies the KIPP approach. Our analysis focuses on special needs students that may be underserved. The results show average achievement gains of 0.36 standard deviations in math and 0.12 standard deviations in reading for each year spent at KIPP Lynn, with the largest gains coming from the LEP, SPED, and low‐achievement groups. Average reading gains are driven almost entirely by SPED and LEP students, whose reading scores rise by roughly 0.35 standard deviations for each year spent at KIPP Lynn.     

Making votes count in parliament or government?

Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation (PR) systems. The argument is that the existence of coalition governments forces voters to consider potential alliances and to vote in order to maximize their chances of influencing the outcome. In this paper, we argue that this vision is incomplete as PR, just as single-member district plurality, also creates incentives for voters to desert parties that have little chances of obtaining a seat in their district. We validate this theoretical claim using two different surveys conducted during the 2014 Belgian federal and regional elections. Our results show that both government and district viability have a substantial and distinct effect on vote choice.     

Voters' wrath? Policy change and government popularity

Recent research suggests that voters are bad at responding in a meaningful way to policy events when deciding for whom to vote. Voters rely on so‐called “blind retrospection”, punishing governments for events outside politicians' control. However, another core aspect of the blind retrospection perspective has not been put to the test: are voters unable to respond to policy decisions that clearly are under the politicians' control? We construct a unique large‐N dataset on legislative changes in German old age pensions and unemployment protection to see if cutbacks and expansions lead to lower/higher support for the government. Our data are exceptionally fine‐grained and allow us to track the policy‐vote link for 416 months from 1977 to 2013 with a total of 329,167 respondents. We find substantial support for the notion that voters react in a meaningful way to policy changes, but also that they can be distracted by high‐profile, extreme events.     

Who Participates in Exit Polls?

Concerns about growing and differential nonresponse in exit polls, and the challenges introduced by mounting levels of early and mail-in voting, suggest it is important to consider the demographic and attitudinal factors associated with exit poll nonresponse. In this study, we compare the demographic and attitudinal antecedents of exit poll nonresponse between exit polls conducted at voting precincts and those conducted via telephone. We find both similarities and differences in the factors that help to explain willingness to participate in exit polls of each type.     

Who will deregulate the deregulators?

A well-intentioned and fully informed regulator may determine that the optimal policy is to deregulate the market, yet the regulator may be constrained from doing so. In this condition, deregulatory policies originate in exogenous shocks to the regulator’s choice environment. Entrepreneurship in political and economic markets is a primary source of institutional change that promotes deregulation.