N. A. Graebner,R. D. Burns,and J. M. Siracusa,Reagan, Bush,Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War

Faced with creating a grand strategy for American foreign policy in the post–Cold War world, the Clinton Administration launched the strategy of ‘Democratic Enlargement.’ This analysis makes two contributions to the existing literature on the topic. First, it investigates the role of Wilsonianism and the ‘Democratic Peace Thesis’ in the discourse of the strategy of ‘Democratic Enlargement’ based on public speeches with a focus on the relationship between democracy and security. Second, it utilises securitisation theory to analyse how Clinton’s Administration used the linkage of democracy and security to legitimise humanitarian interventions in Haiti and Kosovo. By addressing ‘Democratic Enlargement’ in security terms, the Administration securitised democracy promotion and, thereby, created a discourse that helped legitimise a gradual move towards a more militaristic foreign policy during Clinton’s presidency. This discourse offered arguments later utilised by the George W. Bush Administration.     

A. Adamishin and R. Schifter,Human Rights,Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War

The international community's March 2011 military intervention in Libya contrasts sharply to its reluctance during the preceding forty years to halt the Qadhafi regime's sponsorship of transnational terrorism and pursuit of WMD. American diplomacy, eventually supported by international sanctions, was a four decade effort to end Qadhafi's violent foreign policy. This commentary discusses how diplomacy and the American judicial process combined to achieve this successful outcome. Diplomatic and legislative efforts to compel Libya's payment to terrorism victims helped create judicial remedies enforceable in US Courts and ultimately, a bilateral claims settlement agreement that, while disappointing to the terrorism litigants, normalized relations between the Libya and the United States.     

Domestic Costs, the U.S. Public, and the Isolationist Calculus

This article examines and tests two models of the circumstances shaping the extent of the American public&;apos;s isolationist sentiment. The first, termed the "elastic band" model, assumes a constant popular disinclination toward foreign involvements, one that may, at most, temporarily be stretched to accommodate responses to major external threats. A second model assumes the operation of a "cognitive shortcut" based on low-information rationality. It proposes that acceptable levels of domestic involvement depend on the gravity of the domestic opportunity costs of foreign involvement, and it is termed the "domestic costs" model. While the former model implies a constant public resistance to international activism, a resistance that is relaxed only in proportion to the gravity of external threats, the latter model suggests that the U.S. public displays a relatively constant internationalist attitude, and that variations around that threat are largely explained by fluctuations in the perceived domestic opportunity costs of international involvement.
Both models are subjected to statistical testing, a testing that vindicates the domestic costs model. Further insights are obtained by examining attitudes toward internationalism as they are affected by levels of education. Although internationalism increases with education, and although levels of education predict differential impacts of the variables encompassed by the model, each segment of the public seems to operate within the general parameters of the "domestic costs" model.     

Tragedy,Realism, and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber,E.H. Carr,Hans J. Morgenthau,and Henry Kissinger

Many realist international relations theorists characterize realism as a perspective grounded in a firm grasp of the tragic constancy of human nature and the autonomous role that power plays in human politics. Realism is thus cast in opposition to the hopeful, but often naïve, optimism of liberals who seek to steer international relations theory and ethics away from these historical realities. This paper examines the philosophical roots of theories developed by four realist thinkers, Max Weber, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, in postmodern epistemology and ethics, perspectives not often associated with constancy or notions of objective historical truths. I argue that the origin of their respective theories in Nietzschean epistemology plays a profound role in undermining their ability to develop a credible view of international ethics. Though each of them is, in his way, committed to democratic principles, their works assert an existential, private morality that is incompatible with the ethical requirements of a modern, democratic society.     

Ⅲ. Greater Periphery and China, the U.S. and Neighbors

Lu: The world situation tends to be relaxed generally. Big powers often interact, especially in Asia, because China is developing and Asia is developing as well. When we review peripheral and regional situations, we can see it. In China's concept of diplomacy, periphery is put at the foremost position and China's periphery is in a sense the U. S. 'strategic front. Therefore, building a greater peripheral environment,coping well with China's relations with the U.S. and China's Neighbors has a bearing on China's geo-strategic environment. As the issue covers a broad range, let us begin from the greater periphery.     

利益差异、战略分歧和美韩同盟关系的再调整

结盟是相关行为体为了维护自己的安全利益根据自己的安全战略而进行的安全合作安排,盟友之间因安全环境的变化而产生的战略分歧和利益差异也将会导致同盟关系的调整。美韩同盟是冷战时期形成的,具有防御性且主要着眼于半岛安全之同盟的性质,但进入后冷战时期,尤其是"9.11"事件之后,基于安全环境和战略利益的变化,美韩两国对同盟关系进行了较大幅度的调整,调整之后的美韩同盟虽然在联合指挥协调机制问题上还存在着一定的不确定性,但从整体上看美韩同盟在本世纪初的调整则是一个走向强化的过程。     

Greater Periphery and China, the U. S. and Neighbors

Lu: The world situation tends to be relaxed generally. Big powers often interact, especially in Asia, because China is developing and Asia is developing as well. When we review peripheral and regional situa- tions, we can see it. In China's concept of diplomacy, periphery is put at the foremost position and China's periphery is in a sense the U. S. ' strategic front. Therefore, building a greater peripheral environment, coping well with China's relations with the U. S. and China's Neigh-…     

体系压力、威胁认知与韩国在中美之间的战略选择

随着中国综合国力的增长以及中美在亚太主导权竞争的加剧,作为地区重要的中等强国,韩国如何在中美之间进行战略选择日益成为学界关注的重要问题。本文以韩国加入亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)、韩国部署萨德反导系统、韩国在南海问题上的行动为例,分析了韩国在中美之间战略选择的特点及决策影响因素。研究发现,第一,"安全上靠美国,经济上靠中国"的战略定义不足以全面说明韩国在中美之间的战略选择特点,韩国的战略选择具有多样性。第二,体系压力、自身的安全认知是影响韩国在中美之间战略选择的重要因素。其中,对于韩国来说,抵御来自朝鲜的安全威胁优先于防范中美博弈给韩国带来的安全风险。具体来说,如果某一议题涉及朝鲜威胁,韩国通常采取跟随美国的战略;如果不涉及朝鲜威胁,韩国则会选择迎合一方但不损害另一方的"对冲"战略。     

Managing Military Transformations: Agency,Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution

The marketplace of ideas within a mature democracy such as the United States is supposed to fairly reliably vet foreign policies through open, wide-ranging debate. It is widely recognized that the U.S. marketplace of ideas failed during the 2002-03 debate over going to war in Iraq. Examinations of this market failure have emphasized executive powers and public fear after 9/11 as the main reasons threat inflation succeeded; I show neither explains this case. The majority opposition was silenced throughout early 2002 and ultimately defeated in a struggle over the Iraq War Resolution by pressures to be patriotic. I contend that this silencing patriotism should not be considered ordinary patriotism for a democracy as it is anti-democratic. I discuss how two critical norms of behavior which silence debate of national security policies and cause deference to the executive branch on war powers became established as part of the militarized political culture that took root in the United States during the Cold War. Thus these norms, enforced by what I term to be militarized patriotism left over from the Cold War, silenced debate over Iraq and led to the failure of the marketplace of ideas.     

Constructing NAFTA: Myth, Representation, and the Discursive Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy

The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in November 1993 signified the acceptance of Mexico as an equal trading partner with the United States and Canada. However, accepting Mexico as an equal partner challenged a deeply ingrained U.S. image of Mexico as inferior, childlike, dependent, and suspicious. How was it possible for the U.S. public and its congressional representatives to accept equal economic integration with a country that embodied such a negative image? Addressing this dilemma through a constructivist approach, this article argues that the existing image of Mexico remained intact. The passage of NAFTA instead resulted from a discursive construction of NAFTA that emphasized a positive U.S. self-image through American myths thereby allowing the simultaneous acceptance of Mexico as inferior and as an equal trading partner. American myths and other representational elements constructed NAFTA for the American public and created a policy success for President Clinton. This article relies on an empirical investigation of newspaper advertisements to demonstrate how myths contributed to the discursive construction of NAFTA.     

日、美、英等发达国家公务员制度的变革及借鉴

近年来,在“企业型政府”理念下工业化国家对公务员制度进行了较大的变革。各国公务员改革的一个共同的核心理念是建立“企业型政府”。通过转变行政观念、加强绩效评估、简化规章制度和下放管理权力等,推动整个行政管理范式的转变,使公务员制度显现出一系列新的发展趋势,这对我国的公务员制度改革具有重要的借鉴意义。     

The prince of darkness and the evil empire: Richard Perle,the Soviet Union,and U.S. arms control policy

This paper consists of three parts. First, it investigates the rationality assumption behind much deterrence theorizing and arrives at the conclusion that the rationality assumption is not fully compatible with credible retaliation. Moreover, the requirements of central deterrence and of extended deterrence tend to be incompatible with each other. Since theoretical deliberations call the persisting reliability of deterrence into question, alternatives to deterrence have to be considered. The second part of the paper therefore investigates strategic defense as an improvement over deterrence and a possibly stabilizing element in deterrence. The final part refers to conceivable conflicts of interests between the USA and Western Europe concerning SDI. It is argued that such conflicts of interest either arise from parochial concerns or from overlooking the comparative advantages of free and totalitarian systems in the production of military power.     

Saving the league: V.K. Wellington Koo, the league of nations and Sino-Japanese conflict, 1931-39

In 1919, VK. Wellington Koo, the most famous Chinese diplomat of the early twentieth century, participated in the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Little over a decade later, as Japanese forces expanded into Manchuria and North China, Koo struggled to save the League he had helped found. He argued that inability or refusal to brand Japan as an aggressor would sound the League's death knell. In vain, Koo tried to convince European statesmen that the Far Eastern Crisis was a litmus test of the League's viability as a collective security organization. From 1936 on, League inaction in the face of Japanese, German and Italian expansion left Koo thoroughly disillusioned. The lessons of the League were not forgotten during World War II, when Koo argued that a more effective collective security organization, in the form of the United Nations, be created on a basis similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept.