The construction of Orthodox churches in post-communist Romania

Against the background of church – state relations in contemporary Romania, this article explores the question of the construction of places of worship by the Romanian Orthodox Church after 1989. Besides providing and analysing general figures, it focuses on the proliferation of Orthodox churches in state-owned and state-operated institutions, and on the issue of funding. It also offers an examination of relevant legislation and its implications on church construction.     

War of textbooks: History education in Russia and Ukraine

Many scholars stress that teaching about the shared past plays a major role in the formation of national, ethnic, religious, and regional identities, in addition to influencing intergroup perceptions and relations. Through the analysis of historic narratives in history textbooks this paper shows how the governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine uses state-controlled history education to define their national identity and to present themselves in relations to each other. For example, history education in Ukraine portrays Russia as oppressive and aggressive enemy and emphasizes the idea of own victimhood as a core of national identity. History education in the Russian Federation condemns Ukrainian nationalism and proclaims commonality and unity of history and culture with Russian dominance over “younger brother, Ukraine”. An exploration of the mechanisms that state-controlled history education employs to define social identities in secondary school textbooks can provide an early warning of potential problems being created between the two states.     

Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited

Ukraine has long been considered as a bone of contention between the EU and Russia which could eventually lead to a geographical split of the country. This interpretation, however, fails to explain the dynamic of the Ukrainian revolution and Russian–Ukrainian war. To address the deadlock in understanding the mixed dynamics of the situation in Ukraine, the article argues that the relations in the EU–Ukraine–Russia triangle are affected by the combination of choices that the Ukrainian political class, business elites and broader society make in four major dimensions: internal political practices; economic dimension; a dimension of international politics; and an ideological dimension.     

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania,Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to women's status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.     

Party identity change in post-communist politics: the cases of the successor parties in Hungary, Poland and Russia

In recent years much has been written on the communist successor parties. Although much of the existent work focuses on the electoral performance of these parties or has described, in great detail, the development of single parties, this paper evaluates the utility of theories of party identity change in application to the successor parties. As an initial exploration we investigate the successor parties' programs before and after the initial competitive parliamentary elections in Hungary (in 1990), Poland (in 1991) and Russia (in 1993) to determine the extent to which poor electoral performance in initial competitive elections compelled the successor parties to alter their political identities.     

When civil engagement is part of the problem: Flawed anti-corruptionism in Russia and Ukraine

In developing countries, the fight against corruption entails purges of political and business elites and the restructuring of electoral, financial, and social provision systems, all of which are costly for the incumbents and, therefore, unlikely without sustained pressure from civil society. In the absence of empirical analyses, scholars and practitioners have, therefore, assumes that civil society plays an unequivocally positive role in anti-corruptionism. In this article, we challenge this dominant assumption. Instead, we show that, under certain conditions, an engaged non-governmental community may, in fact, undermine the fight against corruption. Using the data from forty interviews with anti-corruption practitioners in Ukraine and Russia, as well as primary documentary sources, we present two models of anti-corruptionism whereby active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes. One is faux collaboration, defined as a façade of cooperation between the state and civil society, which hides the reality of one-sided reforms. The other model is that of non-collaborative co-presence, whereby the governance role is shared by the government and non-governmental activists without compromise-based solutions. In both cases, civil engagement helps perpetuate abuses of power and subvert such long-term goals of anti-corruption reforms as democratization and effective governance.     

Overcoming the past: De-communization and reconstruction of post-communist societies

In several of the central and eastern European nations, the fall of Communism has initiated a new round of political intolerance that threatens to destroy the foundations of their fragile democratic regimes. Campaigns of lustration (political “cleansing”) have imposed ideological tests for employment and political participation in the Balkan countries and in parts of the former Soviet Union. The small, poor nation of Albania has been especially seriously impacted by this atmosphere of vengeacean against ex-Communists and their families. Justified by the principles of destructive entitlement—reminiscent of ancient cultural rituals of blood retribution—journalists have been arrested, members of the opposition have been imprisoned, and University programs have been suspended. In response to Albania’s plight, and to a similar pattern of civil rights abuses in neighboring countries, social scientists have begun to analyze the powerful role played by the “past-in-the-present” in current reconstruction efforts. As Jurgen Habermas, Adam Michnik, Seymour Martins Lipset, and others have noted, a new “culture of forgiveness” may well be a necessary condition for the development of stable and authentic democratic societies in the region. Fatos Tarifa is currently at the Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Tirana in 1985. He is director of the New Sociological Research Center (NSRC) in Tirana, Albania, and is the author of several books and journal articles, including a 1991 bookIn Search of the Sociological Fact (published in Albanian). Jay Weinstein is a professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University. He has travelled widely in the Third World and in Central and Eastern Europe. Author of numerous books, journal articles, and chapters, he is currently working on a volume entitledSocial and Cultural Change: Social Science for a Dynamic World (forthcoming in 1997 by Allyn & Bacon Publishers).     

Extricating the state: The move to competitive capture in post-communist Bulgaria

This article uses the Bulgarian case to analyse movement from a situation of what appeared to be a ‘Partial-Reform Equilibrium’ to an ‘Equilibrium of Competitive Capture’. In such a process, elections are important forces for change, but not because they bring reformist parties to power or lead to completed economic liberalisation. Instead, especially in the first several electoral cycles in a new democracy, they can bring to power new leaders who are not beholden to existing captors, but rather to other clients that would like to capture the state for their own interests. Over time, the country experiences a parade of captors, eventually leading to a system where no single group owns the state, but where it is still not insulated. Instead, several competing groups fight with each other to raid it for their own benefits.     

The misuses of manipulation: The failure of transitional justice in post-communist Hungary

Hungary, like most countries in the former Soviet bloc, made numerous attempts to carry out various types of transitional justice, but the process was ultimately unsuccessful. This article argues that transitional justice in Hungary has been used primarily for political manipulation and introduces the main types of such manipulation. A discussion of the two main components of Hungarian transitional justice, retroactive criminal legislation and screening based on secret police files, illustrates the failure of this process. The article concludes by offering some tentative explanations for this failure, finding it in the sharp ideological division within the political elite and in the population's indifference towards issues of transitional justice.