The Politics of the Past in Dagestan: National Unity and Symbolic Revolt

Abstract

Dagestan is inhabited by numerous ethnic communities with their own languages, cultures and histories. However, despite its ethnic and cultural diversity, the republic’s authorities have consistently sought to promote a unified concept of Dagestani identity. This policy has been challenged by local ethnic nationalists concerned about the future of their ethnic communities, which they saw as being endangered by assimilation and marginalisation. This struggle to secure political and social benefits began in the Soviet period and reached its height in the early 1990s. Resentment was particularly widespread among the Kumyks and Lezgins. Their dissatisfaction with the status quo resulted in a competition between inclusive (national) and exclusive (ethnic) approaches, which in turn manifested themselves in debates over historiography. This essay analyses the development and outcomes of this struggle from the 1950s through to the early 2000s, with an emphasis on the early 1990s.     

Support for Separatism in Ethnic Republics of the Russian Federation

This study examines popular support for separatism among Russians and non-Russian titular nationalities (titulars) in 10 ethnic republics of the Russian Federation: Karelia, Komi, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Adygea, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha-Yakutia and Tuva. A survey was carried out in the urban regions of these republics in 1999 and 2000 in which 5,233 Russians and 4,703 titulars participated. We found that perceived negative inter-group relations significantly contribute to support for separatism among titulars, but reduce support for separatism by Russians. In contrast, indicators of prosperity of the republic and prior separatist elite-activism predict support for separatism among both titulars and Russians.     

Ethnic Identification in the Former Soviet Union: Hypotheses and Analyses

The article seeks to ‘measure’ the concept of ‘identification as titular’ in regard to the members of five ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union (Bashkirs, Karels, Komis, Tatars and Yakuts) and the factors which strengthen, or conversely weaken, such identification. In order to do this it uses multigroup confirmatory factor analysis and multigroup structural equation modelling. Identification is mainly associated with a sense of national superiority and duration of residence in the home republic. The pattern among Yakuts, however, differs from that of the other ethnic groups and would require further detailed analysis.     

National Identity: Civic,Ethnic, Hybrid,and Atomised Individuals

We challenge the civic–ethnic dichotomy drawn by previous authors and propose a four-category typology of identities based on out-group tolerance and in-group attachment. Drawing from work on national identity formation and nation-building, we test hypotheses about the processes that cause individuals to adopt one identity over others using survey data based on representative samples of five ethnic groups in Ukraine. We find that the effects of socialisation processes vary greatly depending upon ethnic group. Our results challenge some long-held assumptions about the potential destabilising effects of ‘ethnic’ identities and the degree to which ‘civic’ identities correspond to values and behaviours supportive of democracy.     

Contextualized violence: politics and terror in Dagestan

Despite the escalating terrorist actions, there is no polarized constellation in the Islamic politics of Dagestan. Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) officers regard the corrupt Dagestan authorities to be significantly responsible for the massive conversion of youths to terrorism, and began to contact with moderate Salafis to isolate the “forest brothers” (armed Salafis) in 2010. Exploiting the FSB's soft strategy, secular intellectuals requested to reform the Muslim Spiritual Board of Dagestan by electing a legitimate mufti. Having seen the incompetence of intra-Sufi opposition (non-Avar sheikhs) in the War on Terror, the Spiritual Board jumped on the bandwagon of dialog strategy in 2012. The secular authorities of Dagestan, indifferent to intra-Muslim politics, limit their activities to the call for dialog between the secular authorities and the forest brothers. In this way, political actors hijack the master narrative of the “War on Terror” and these narratives are imported to local politics.     

On researching ‘Ethnic Conflict’: epistemology,politics, and a Central Asian boundary dispute

Providing a critique of alarmist discussions of the danger of ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, and the positivist epistemological assumptions and research practices that underpin them, this article develops an approach to researching ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic conflict’ through the use of focus groups. Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan expressed similar views about the closures of international boundaries, framed in terms of ethnicity. However, this was not an essentialist notion, but rather a concept of authentic ‘Uzbekness’ or ‘Kyrgyzness’ predicated primarily on the performance of endogenous kinship practices and Muslim/Soviet notions of class morality, nuanced by geography. These overlaps and discrepancies provide resources for those wishing to articulate visions of future social formations wider than the range of options currently propagated by ethnic entrepreneurs.     

Security Through Sociology: The North Caucasus and the Global Counterinsurgency Paradigm

The global counterinsurgency strategy to combat terrorism emphasizes responding to the social and economic needs of communities where terrorists may find support. Public opinion data can help in that strategy, as shown by a 2006 survey of 1,200 young males from three provinces in Russia's North Caucasus. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, the survey shows few signs of burgeoning radical Islam or ethnic animosity. Instead, economic conditions and poor governance are primary concerns. The region provides both an opportunity and threat: policymakers can and should address the region's needs; if not, radical Islamist groups can turn it into a flashpoint for terrorism.     

Ethnic minority development in Vietnam

This study examines the disparities in living standards between and among the different ethnic groups in Vietnam. Using data from the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys and 1999 Census, we show that ‘majority’ Kinh and Hoa households have substantially higher living standards than ‘minority’ households from Vietnam's 52 other ethnic groups. While the Kinh, Hoa, Khmer and Northern Highland Minorities benefited from economic growth in the 1990s, the position of the Central Highland Minorities stagnated. Decompositions show that even if minority households had the same endowments as Kinh households, this would close no more than a third of the gap in their per capita expenditures. While some ethnic minorities seem to be doing well out of a strategy of assimilating with the Kinh-Hoa majority, others groups are attempting to integrate economically while retaining distinct cultural identities, and a third group is largely being left behind by the growth process.     

FROM COUNTY MAGISTRATE TO COUNTY HEAD: THE ROLE AND SELECTION OF SENIOR COUNTY OFFICIALS IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE IN THE TRANSITION FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

Abstract

When China became a republic in 1912, the country’s core territorial units of province and county were retained intact. Continuity in the territorial architecture of state from empire to republic invites the question of whether provinces and counties were institutionally identical before and after the revolution. This paper explores adjustments made to the county level of government aimed at meeting republican ideals of good government and popular sovereignty. It probes changes in the roles assigned to county heads and the patterns of their appointment in Guangdong relating to educational qualifications, native places, and tenure over the transitional period. Employing magistrate tenure as a proxy for the stability of local government, the paper correlates variations in the length of tenure with other variables at the provincial and sub-provincial levels of government, including competition between different echelon levels, disputes between military and civil authorities, in-fighting among regime factions, and methods of appointment varying over time from appointment by administrative fiat to county-head elections. By relating these variables to longitudinal data on magistrates’ length of tenure, it identifies some of the challenges facing provincial and county authorities in trying to manage the revolutionary transition from empire to republic at the local level while keeping the inherited territorial system largely intact.     

National Identities and Virtual Foreign Policies among the Eastern Slavs

The three eastern Slavic states-Russia, Ukraine and Belarus-have virtual foreign policies towards each other that are a product of weakly defined national identities inherited from the former USSR. In addition, this virtuality has been compounded by the presence of centrist, former high-ranking nomenklatura elites who have led all three countries at different times since 1992. Former “sovereign communist” centrist oligarchs are ideologically amorphous, in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas. Of the three eastern Slavic states, Ukraine had the strongest ethnic national identity by 1917–1918 when the Tsarist and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed. A Russian ethnic identity had not been promoted in the Tsarist era, in contrast to an imperialstatist one. Belarus was heavily Russified and all of its territory was to be found within the Tsarist empire. Of the three ethnic groups therefore, only Ukrainians made a major attempt, unsuccessfully, to create an independent state in 1917-1921. In the USSR the situation did not radically improve, with the exception again of Ukraine. Russian and Soviet identities were deliberately intertwined, especially after 1934. Belarus emerged from the former USSR with a stronger Soviet Belarusian than Belarusian ethnocultural identity. For Ukraine the record is mixed with nation building accompanied by nation destroying. The Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (SFSR) was the only Soviet republic to never declare independence from the USSR, Ukraine held a highly successful referendum on independence while Belarus failed to hold a referendum after declaring independence a day after Ukraine.     

Lives on the border: language and culture in the lives of ethnic Russian women in Baltinava,Latvia

This study draws on ethnographic research conducted in a small village, Baltinava in Latvia, 2.5 kilometres from the border with Russia. The research examines how ethnic Russian women create a specific Latvian Russian identity by contrasting themselves from ethnic Latvians and Russians who live in Russia and identifying with both groups at the same time. To narrate their lives and to make them meaningful, real and/or perceived “attributes” are combined to draw boundaries between “us” and “them.” Thus, the same thing such as language can be used not only both to distinguish themselves from Russians in Russia or Latvians but also to form coherent identities and to emphasize similarities. This study suggests that ethnicities cannot be reduced to a list of set ethnic groups that are very often used in official government statistics. Ethnic identities have to be viewed as fluid and situational. Moreover, this study shows the dialectic nature of ethnicity. On the one hand, external political, historical and social processes create and recreate ethnic categories and definitions. Yet, on the other hand, the women in this study are active agents creating meaningful and symbolic ethnic boundaries.     

Challenges in conflict management in multi-ethnic states – the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro

This article examines the break-ups of post-communist Czechoslovakia and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro under consociationalism. According to Arend Lijphart, social divisions may be neutralized at the elite level with power-sharing mechanisms. Lijphart's theory has been abundantly criticized, particularly because, while its intention is to induce cooperation, consociationalism does not give leaders actual incentives to cooperate. Czechoslovakia and the Union qualified as consociations; however most favorable factors were absent. The states failed to overcome their divisions and broke apart. Both states were going through a democratization period, experienced differently in each republic. The article argues that the application of consociationalism at this time magnified the divisions. Stirring up the ethnic sensitivity of the population was the most reliable strategy for politicians to secure popular support. In this context, and with the EU enlargement prospect, the consociational structure, instead of bringing elites together, weakened the federal power and provided elites the opportunity to defend republican interests at the expense of the federations. Hence, while a consociation requires certain conditions and favorable factors, the context in which consociationalism is implemented, and particularly democratization periods, may have a decisive influence on the leaders’ ability to cooperate, on their decisions, and thereby on the state.     

Repression and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Kurdistan

Why do ethnic conflicts spread to neighboring states? This article examines the effect of transborder ethnic groups on the spread of ethnic conflict. It argues that when a transborder ethnic group is in conflict in one state, neighboring states perceive a threat from members of that ethnic group residing in their own territory, leading the state to take preemptive repressive action. This repression in turn changes the ethnic group's security situation within the state and can result in violence and thus ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict spread is not determined by the actions of either the ethnic group or the state alone, but is a product of threat perception and interaction between the two groups. This argument is tested in a set of cases in a region where an ethnic conflict seems to have spread—the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey from 1961–2003.     

A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation

This article assesses the successes and setbacks of Moscow’s policy of counterinsurgency and beyond. It challenges the general consensus in scholarship positing that military successes associated with Chechenisation have been obtained against the backdrop of Chechnya’s increasingly autonomous status within Russia, considered by some as a case of ‘systemic separatism’. The article tracks how four key mechanisms (Chechnya’s institutional design, internal opposition to the Kadyrov clan, the tradition of blood feud among kadyrovtsy—initially Chechen paramilitary forces named after both Kadyrovs, gradually transformed into seemingly regular Ministry of Interior (MVD) units—and Chechnya’s economic dependency on Moscow) have enabled Moscow to maintain control over Chechnya while simultaneously allowing its elites to consolidate power within the republic.     

Multicultural Vanguard? Sarajevo’s Interethnic Young Adults between Ethnic Categorisation and International Spaces

This article analyses how Sarajevo’s young adults from a middle class, interethnic background deal with the rigid ethnic categorisation enforced by state institutions and society. Their strategies (exit, reframing, and partial separation) appear to be unsatisfactory to the actors themselves, and wield generally no influence on the institutions they wish to change. Three factors have been setting into motion this dynamic: first, the difficulty of escaping ethnic group thinking when attempting to reframe ethnic categories; second, the rationality of avoiding open defiance to ethnic categorisation; and third, the young adults’ tendency to centre their life on interethnic and international spaces. As a ‘project elite’, Sarajevo’s young adults are rather separated from society, both discursively and socio-economically.     

Corruption complaints,inequality and ethnic grievances in post-Biafra Nigeria

Based on anthropological field work in southeastern Nigeria, this paper explores the public concerns and everyday experience of corruption in a society still living with the legacies of the Biafran secession attempt. The paper shows how the revival of Igbo nationalism and resentment over perceived marginalisation is fuelled by perceptions that the corrupt machinery of the federal government runs against the interests of the Igbo people, and funnels resources away from the southeast as punishment for the failed separatist struggle more than 40 years ago. Hence, complaints about corruption are used to critique the Nigerian state and other regional or ethnic groups, but they also figure in an internally focused critique by Igbos of their own complicity in Nigeria’s endemic corruption.     

Mass Violence and the Recognition of Kosovo: Suffering and Recognition

In instances of international negotiations over state recognition, the way the violence sustained by a given group is categorised becomes a critical factor in the international community's decision to support independence or not. This essay argues that the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 was made possible by the use of justifications based on Kosovo Albanians' collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The essay bridges the gap between two bodies of literature that have not been used in conjunction up to now, namely normative theories of ‘remedial’ secession and works on the logic of mass violence against ethnically defined groups. It finds that the international community has used the ‘remedial argument’ for Kosovo's recognition because it allowed it to minimise the risk of further unilateral declarations of independence in a volatile region.     

Contemporary Russian nationalisms: the state,nationalist movements,and the shared space in between

For several years, various nationalist groups and the Russian state have been competing over nationalism as a political concept and for popular support to nationalist claims. This paper analyzes the relationship between the state and anti-government, ethnocentric nationalistic groups that gather annually in an event called “the Russian March.” Emphasis is on the change in that relationship that happened in 2014, when the state added efforts to channel and mobilize the nationalists to its previous repressive and controlling measures. The article conceptualizes the competition over the nationalist argument in contemporary Russia as a case of dissentful and consentful contention in hybrid regimes, and shows how the dissentful nationalists have been forced to make way for the more consentful ones. Until recently, the room for maneuver for the radical nationalists was relatively wide. The events in Ukraine, however, divided the nationalists, and since 2014 radical nationalists have faced increased state repression. At the same time, pro-government nationalist actors have strengthened, and new players have appeared in the field. These developments tell us not only about the Kremlin’s diminished tolerance for dissentful contention, but also about the importance of the nationalist argument in Russian politics today.     

Systems of Partial Control: Ethnic Dynamics in Post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia

This article offers a theory to capture ethnic dynamics in post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia. It also explores a research question of great interest to political scientists, historians, sociologists, and economists: what accounts for stability in deeply divided societies? Drawing on Ian Lustick’s formulation of control, the author suggests that stability in deeply divided societies is a result of conscious efforts made by elites to construct what she calls “systems of partial control.” In such systems, the majority ethnic group controls the political sector, but shares control of the economic sector with minority ethnic groups. Economic prosperity derived from dispersed economic control accounts for stability in Estonia and Latvia. The article identifies two conditions that must be satisfied for elites to tolerate partial control. First, elites must reach a threshold of political hegemony at which point they dominate the political sector and second, the respective state must have a flourishing private sector. The article concludes with an assessment of whether or not systems of partial control are likely to be stable, and a reflection on implications of these systems beyond the post-Soviet region.