Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited

Ukraine has long been considered as a bone of contention between the EU and Russia which could eventually lead to a geographical split of the country. This interpretation, however, fails to explain the dynamic of the Ukrainian revolution and Russian–Ukrainian war. To address the deadlock in understanding the mixed dynamics of the situation in Ukraine, the article argues that the relations in the EU–Ukraine–Russia triangle are affected by the combination of choices that the Ukrainian political class, business elites and broader society make in four major dimensions: internal political practices; economic dimension; a dimension of international politics; and an ideological dimension.     

History education and historical remembrance in contemporary Russia: Sources of political attitudes of pro-Kremlin youth

Why during the last decade have many young Russians become politically active well beyond simply voting? Particularly striking among youth activists is their enthusiastic support for Putinism and a resounding rejection of the policies, symbols and political figures of the era of President Boris Yeltsin (1992–2000). The vast majority of youth activists are of college age (18–24), which means they were far too young to be aware of what was happening in the country in the 1990s, the period that while democratic and pro-Western, also represents a failure of the Russian state in their imagery. To what degree do the opinions and world views of politically active pro-Kremlin youth reflect the recently emerged, nearly ubiquitous interpretation of recent history as presented in the high school curriculum? To that end, we undertake a content analysis of 47 high school textbooks in Russian history, followed by open-ended interviews with 37 activists from the three most visible youth organizations, all of whom are pro-Kremlin in their orientation. Although demonstrating a causal relationship is methodologically unfeasible, we find a marked correlation between the views of both the Yeltsin and Putin eras presented in those textbooks and in the political beliefs of the youth groups.     

When civil engagement is part of the problem: Flawed anti-corruptionism in Russia and Ukraine

In developing countries, the fight against corruption entails purges of political and business elites and the restructuring of electoral, financial, and social provision systems, all of which are costly for the incumbents and, therefore, unlikely without sustained pressure from civil society. In the absence of empirical analyses, scholars and practitioners have, therefore, assumes that civil society plays an unequivocally positive role in anti-corruptionism. In this article, we challenge this dominant assumption. Instead, we show that, under certain conditions, an engaged non-governmental community may, in fact, undermine the fight against corruption. Using the data from forty interviews with anti-corruption practitioners in Ukraine and Russia, as well as primary documentary sources, we present two models of anti-corruptionism whereby active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes. One is faux collaboration, defined as a façade of cooperation between the state and civil society, which hides the reality of one-sided reforms. The other model is that of non-collaborative co-presence, whereby the governance role is shared by the government and non-governmental activists without compromise-based solutions. In both cases, civil engagement helps perpetuate abuses of power and subvert such long-term goals of anti-corruption reforms as democratization and effective governance.     

Causes and Consequences of the War in Eastern Ukraine: An Economic Geography Perspective

Abstract

This essay provides an economic geography perspective on the causes and consequences of the war in eastern Ukraine. It focuses on the controversial proposition that the armed conflict in 2014 was triggered by domestic, economically determined factors. The essay argues that economic and material circumstances in the region had generated neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a locally rooted, internally driven armed conflict. The role of the Kremlin’s military intervention was paramount for the commencement of hostilities. As the human and economic costs of the war continue to mount, Ukraine’s war-ravaged eastern regions face further depopulation, economic decline and erosion of development.     

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania,Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to women's status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.     

From Balcony to Barricade: Nationalism and Popular Mobilisation in Georgia,Ukraine, and Russia

This article examines the dynamics of popular mobilisation in autocratic post-communist regimes, focusing on how opposition groups manoeuvre around cultural and structural constraints to inspire ordinary citizens to join street protests, despite the real dangers associated with political action. Using evidence from original interviews with activists in Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia, the article analyses the comparative challenges facing Russian activists in constructing new collective identities for the people they hope will become their followers, through the use of an inclusive, civic nationalism and a narrative that links action in the present to an ongoing, shared historical process.