US Defense Innovation and Artificial Intelligence

The United States seeks conventional military overmatch in the strategic competition with China and Russia through efforts to develop advanced technology for military application and new concept of operations as well as pursue organizational adaptation and human talent pool development. The current article will trace the development of US defense innovation efforts from the Obama administration to the Trump administration and focus on the technological dimension of defense innovation by illustrating ways through which the U.S. Department of Defense is attempting to apply “narrow” artificial intelligence for military purposes such as situational awareness, cyber, military logistics, command and control, and swarm technology and tactics for autonomous unmanned systems. The article will conclude by making two caveats regarding the actual introduction of artificial intelligence into the US battle network, and very briefly point to implications for US allies.     

国家间网络安全竞争的特点

网络空间的内涵和外延不断扩大,网络安全问题逐渐从技术层面向政治、经济、社会、军事等各个层面扩展。在数字时代,国家间网络安全竞争的焦点是科技竞争、数字经济规则的制定,以及网络安全能力的建设。从华为事件到委内瑞拉电网遭受网络攻击,再到脸书公司推出举世瞩目的Libra加密货币,既可以看到网络空间已经成为大国博弈的重要领域和工具,也可以感受到非国家行为体权力不断扩大对国家带来的冲击和挑战。展望未来,网络空间国际治理进程会与现实空间的权力博弈产生复杂的双向互动,其进程的走向将取决于技术与权力两种逻辑的互动结果。     

国际秩序与中美战略竞争

当今国际格局的最显著变化,就是新兴市场国家和发展中国家的群体性崛起以及中国与世界主要国家间力量对比的变化。就中美当前的实力地位和国际影响力而言,中美战略竞争中短期内还难以决定性地改变当前的国际秩序。中国即便对美国的贸易霸凌主义和在亚太地区的霸权主义军事及安全行动采取斗争的回应方式,也并不意味着两国无法合作、或中美关系已进入国际秩序变革的主导权之争。中美战略竞争的同时,经贸往来和必要的合作仍会发展。中美战略竞争会影响权力、观念和行为方式的调整变化,其走势将在相当程度上影响国际秩序的稳定和变革。但未来国际秩序的变革并非只取决于中美,世界主要国家间的互动关系和战略选择,将决定性地影响中美战略竞争的走势和未来国际秩序的演变进程。     

Chinese Perceptions of and Responses to US Conventional Military Power

Chinese analysts view the US military not only as a model for emulation but also as a serious threat given its strengths in high tech weapons and equipment, power projection, and unparalleled ability to conduct information-intensive joint combat operations. Yet they also see many of the capabilities the US military relies upon to execute these operations – most notably forward bases, space capabilities, and computer networks and information technology systems – as potentially vulnerable to disruption. Accordingly, China has developed capabilities designed to deter or counter US military intervention in areas close to China. This poses two interrelated challenges for the United States: maintaining its military advantage in an era of rapid technological change and preserving deterrence against growing Chinese ambitions in Asia.     

Power Politics Behind the Transforming Geopolitics in East Asia

Current geopolitical dynamics in East Asia is generated by the US rebalancing and China’s counterbalancing. The US rebalancing has so far ended in an encircling of China, whereas China counteracts to extend into the seas and the lands as typified by the Belt and Road Initiative and assertive activities in the South China Sea. China under Xi Jinping’s leadership has set up a new guideline of ‘great power foreign policy’ (大国外交) to realize Xi Jinping’s ambitious vision of ‘China dream’. As delivered in the ‘New Model of Great Power Relations’, China under Xi Jinping’s leadership seeks clearly for ‘regional dominance’, while for ‘global balance’ with the USA. With rebalancing, however, the USA seeks to restore power balance in East Asia by adding up to military and economic resources already deployed there. By doing so, the USA aims to achieve its strategic goal of ‘regional balance’, while maintaining ‘global dominance’. These two distinct strategic goals, regional dominance and global balance for China and regional balance and global dominance for the USA, interact to result in currently transforming geopolitics in East Asia.     

On new rules for destroying old countries

The attacks on 11 September 2001 were not a major security threat to the United States, but they did create the political conditions for the implementation of an aggressive agenda by the Bush administration to assert U.S. dominance over the global control of oil and to establish an arc of military bases to contain China. Responding to Gowan, this article suggests that bid is unlikely to succeed because the concentration of military strength in the United States is paralleled by a concentration of financial strength in East and Southeast Asia. Though its Asian allies have been more supportive of the U.S. invasion of Iraq than their European counterparts, growing economic integration along Asia's Pacific coasts is likely to lead to a reduction in capital inflows to the United States and thereby aggravate the consequences of its high current accounts deficits and its low rates of domestic savings. The Bush administration's conservative social policies and anti-foreigner zeitgeist is also sapping the competitive edge of the U.S. economy in new technologies.     

The Origins of Security Cooperation in the Southern Cone

Argentine-Brazilian relations have undergone a remarkable transformation over the last two decades, from enduring rivalry to cooperation. Dating back to the late 1970s, security cooperation has been a byproduct of two different sets of factors, strategic and military organizational, that propelled the two countries independently but simultaneously toward peaceful settlement. The 1979–80 settlement of disputes over hydroelectric power and nuclear technology not only ended centuries of militarized competition but established the first institutional structures of what is today one of the world's most durable security regimes.     

制度距离、文化差异与中美贸易摩擦中的权力因素——基于1980~2018年美国对外贸易争端数据的定量研究

中美贸易摩擦是体系压力和美国国内因素共同作用的结果。基于1980~2018年美国对外贸易争端数据的定量研究,文章采用面板负二项模型对中美两国间的制度距离、文化差异和相对实力差距的缩小等结构性变量,以及美国国内政治等单元层次的中介变量、贸易和投资等渠道变量,对中美贸易摩擦的影响进行了实证考察。研究认为,中美间军事、经济和科技实力差距的缩小即相对实力分布的变化会显著强化美国作为守成大国对中国作为崛起大国发起贸易摩擦的可能性;中美两国间的政治、经济制度距离和文化差异或价值观的不同也会显著影响中美两国间发生贸易摩擦的可能性,同时,与美国政治关系良好、在制度和文化上与其接近的国家并不必然意味着与美国贸易摩擦的减少;美国国内不同政治行为体、社会行为体的利益诉求、政策偏好,与贸易的交互效应一起,会进一步增加中美两国因实力差距的缩小、制度和文化(观念)差异等体系因素或结构性变量所引发的贸易摩擦发生的概率;经济因素依然是决定中美贸易摩擦的基础性因素,中美贸易失衡、中国对美直接投资的迅速增加以及中国对美国市场渗透率的提升、美国国内经济绩效的波动、美国国内收入不平等程度的加剧,与贸易的收入分配效应一起,也会显著提升两国间发生贸易摩擦的可能性。     

拜登政府的美日印澳四方安全合作构想述评

2017年美日印澳四方安全对话重启以来,马拉巴尔2020军演是美日印澳四国首次举行的联合军演。马拉巴尔2020军演折射出美日印澳四国针对中国的意愿及合作新进展。美日印澳四方安全合作是美国印太战略的基础和牵制中国崛起的重要机制,在近几年持续获得进展。美日印澳四国在安全领域加强合作,对四国与中国双边关系产生深远影响。马拉巴尔2020军演后,原本紧张的中印及中澳关系继续恶化。美国进一步推动与中国的竞争。美日印澳四国不但在安全领域针对中国,还营造不利于中国的国际舆论。拜登上台后,美日印澳四方安全合作继续强化。拜登比特朗普更重视与盟友合作,借由与日印澳三国磋商推动美日印澳四方安全合作机制化和常态化并走向准军事联盟。美日印澳四国明确表示不会在政治与安全领域停止针对中国,但是在经贸领域基于自身利益考量将改善对华关系。美日印澳四方安全合作升级对中国安全环境及国家利益构成严重威胁。拜登政府正在强化针对中国的印太地区多边安全架构。美国试图在外交层面让中国陷入孤立态势,在安全层面对中国形成战略包围。拜登政府的美日印澳四方安全合作构想将让中国面临更加复杂的外交局面,更加险恶的安全态势。     

The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China's Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting

Abstract

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the conventional missile component of the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery Force (SAF) has emerged as a centerpiece of China's accelerating military modernization program. The conventional missile force has grown in size and sophistication, and China has developed a doctrine for its employment. Chinese military publications emphasize that it plays an increasingly important role in deterrence and warfighting. In particular, Chinese sources underscore its role in achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third-party intervention. China's development of advanced conventional missile capabilities highlights the growing vulnerability of fixed bases and surface ships. Moreover, organizational tendencies, could fuel dangerous escalation. In response to these challenges, the United States must adapt its traditional approach to military operations and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.     

The Vulnerability of Rising Powers: The Logic Behind China's Low Military Transparency

Scholars and officials persistently criticize China for low transparency in its military affairs. Why does Beijing exacerbate the asymmetric information problem, even though this theoretically increases the likelihood of conflict? I offer an explanation, the vulnerability hypothesis, for why rising powers are likely to reject military transparency and the conditions under which this may change. By evaluating over 100 authoritative Chinese sources, I identify four threads of Chinese strategic thinking consistent with the vulnerability hypothesis: the United States is inherently dangerous as a declining hegemon, transparency heightens the risk of war during power transitions, transparency grants operational advantages to the opponent, and only the strong can leverage transparency to enhance deterrence. These findings have implications for power transition theory and US–China military relations.     

Changing Global Landscape and Enhanced US Engagement with Asia—Challenges and Emerging Trends

United States President Barack Obama's announcement of significant shifts in US polices towards the Middle East and East Asia in 2009 has affected the global strategic landscape. President Obama's announcement of enhanced US engagement with Asia has posed certain challenges to the prevailing regional architecture of ASEAN centric institutions and ASEAN centrality which has fostered peace and stability, and prosperity in the region. The rise of China and its growing political and economic influence in the region and its military modernisation have aroused US concern that a rising China could in the future challenge its primacy in the Asia region. President Obama's announcement of a web of military alliances of treaty allies and strategic partners with the stationing of US marines in Darwin in November 2011 was perceived by China as an attempt by the US to contain China or constrain its rise. ASEAN is uneasy about any emergence of big power rivalry in the region.     

Bargain and Barter: China's Oil Trade with Iran

The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its ratcheting up of sanctions aimed to cut Iran's oil revenues virtually to zero by reducing trade between Tehran and its top foreign customers, especially China. This article examines the dynamics of the Sino-Iranian oil business and finds that the Chinese have never terminated their imports; instead, when Beijing cannot deal with Tehran directly, it continues the flow through subterranean methods. This practice holds some benefits for both sides, but the Iranian economy has become highly dependent on bartering with the East Asian power: exporting crude and receiving part of the revenues in Chinese goods and services. The two countries have vowed to keep up the oil trade, as sanctions have led Iran toward a growing economic and technological orientation toward the East.     

大国博弈、双层均势的亚洲时刻--俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦的认知与政策立场

俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦有着独特的认知和期待,并与克里姆林宫的官方立场互为表里。总体上,俄方智库的观点是,在经贸摩擦的背后,是中美两国对军事、政治、科技、地区和全球领导权的竞争;两国的国内议程和对外政策,将因此受到深远影响并产生溢出效应--在亚洲区域内形成两极结构。即使两国会因国内和国际政治因素,在经贸问题上达成妥协,但中方不会放弃获得世界科技领导者的雄心,美方也不会打消遏制中国发展动能的战略意图。俄罗斯应与中国继续保持经济与军事合作,避免与美国和西方关系的继续恶化,并在亚太地区推动"大欧亚伙伴关系"倡议。俄罗斯政策分析界基于自身利益的演绎,将中美经贸摩擦定性为大国博弈,相应的政策建议反映出俄罗斯以在全球和亚洲分别制衡美中为目标的双层均势策略。俄罗斯将在有亚洲其他国家参与的情景下扮演战略平衡手角色,借中美全面对抗之势,在中美俄三边关系之外扭转不利的外部发展环境。俄罗斯对亚太国际局势的盘活作用,将催生双边和三边竞合新模式的建立。     

Reading the Trump Administration’s China Policy

The policy toward China under the Trump Administration is a rare combination of the toughest part of that of the Democratic Party, which is trade, and of the Republican Party, which is national security. The National Security Strategy by the Trump Administration defined China and Russia as competitors. It is the first time for the US Government to be harsh against both China and Russia (the Soviet Union included) since the late 1960s. Though trade is by far the most salient aspect of President Trump’s confrontational China policy, it is in fact a whole-of-the-government approach or pushback that the US government is taking with China, which means that not just the White House but various Departments and the Congress are tough with China, dealing with many issues from trade to human rights to national security. The President might actually be the softest link, almost exclusively focusing on trade. This might be a historic turnaround in US policy toward China.     

Turkish racial theories

Mainstream media have reported on ‘China in Uncle Sam's Backyard’ - Latin America - with considerable alarm in recent years. But is such alarm justified? This article aspires to lift the fog on China's engagement with Latin America. The article finds that mutual concerns over economic development, not military advantage, are the driving force behind closer Sino-Latin American relations. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that China's presence in the Southern Hemisphere impacts the region's geopolitical dynamics, with possible consequences for the US security position. That said, China's arrival in Latin America also harbours a positive strategic opportunity for Washington to re-engage, on a more equal footing, with a continent whose relations with the US have been historically troubled, and more recently, have suffered from a certain neglect.     

Crisis Effects on the Electronics Industry in Southeast Asia

The financial crises of 1997–98 and 2008–09 each had a debilitating effect on Southeast Asian market economies because of the dominance of exports and foreign ownership. However, the 1997–98 financial crisis positively impacted electronics exports, production and employment, due to a booming US economy. The contraction in demand in the US during the 2008–09 crisis reduced electronics exports from Southeast Asia with the exceptions of Indonesia and the Philippines, which were shielded by regional linkages with Singapore, Malaysia and China. Foreign labour repatriation and fiscal stimulus packages helped Malaysia and Thailand rebound quickly from the 2008–09 crisis. In the Philippines, the 2008–09 crisis expanded further the casualisation of labour as retrenched workers from Malaysia and Singapore returned home. State grants encouraged upgrading in Singapore and to some extent in Malaysia, but the liberal approach of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand limited them to low-value-added activities. However, Singapore’s and Malaysia’s transnational-based strategy failed to reproduce the technological leapfrogging experience of South Korea and Taiwan. Also, Malaysia’s ethno-patronage policies discouraged upgrading in national firms.     

特朗普政府的极限“台湾牌”:表现、意图与影响

特朗普政府上台以来,打破中美多年来的外交惯例,频频出台公然背离一个中国政策的法案,有悖一个中国政策的动作不断,将"台湾牌"打至极限。特朗普政府"以台遏华"的战略企图十分明显,借此争取在与中国的博弈中占据主导地位,为中国稳步推进国家发展制造麻烦。此举会形成强大的反噬力,不仅无法干扰中国实现国家统一和民族复兴的既定目标,相反只会加剧台海紧张局势,并可能导致两岸冲突,使台湾面临巨大的经济损失和两岸局势失控的双重风险。美国也将陷入进退两难的尴尬处境,既有悖于其国家利益和全球战略,不符合打"台湾牌"初衷,也可能助力其他次级大国趁机崛起,对美国的霸主地位形成挑战,使美国谋求自身利益最大化意图更加难以实现。     

ASIAN WAR MACHINES

ABSTRACT

The South Asian security landscape is increasingly dominated by a complex four-way dynamic between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The stresses and strains of the relationships between these states directly affect the prospects for peace and prosperity for almost half of humanity. This article describes some of the military contours of this landscape, with a focus on strategic postures, weapon acquisitions, and the role of nuclear weapons. It maps the India–Pakistan arms race over the past decade, the economic constraints on the two states, the role of China and the United States as weapons suppliers, and the risk and consequences for nuclear war. The authors then look at India's relationship with China, which is marked by both cooperation and competition, and the rise of China as a close military, political, and economic ally of Pakistan. While the United States has had long-standing cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan, these relationships have been undergoing major shifts over the last two decades. U.S. concerns about China's increasing military and economic power have also intensified over this period as well. Of particular significance has been the effort to create a U.S.–India strategic partnership to balance and contain a rising China, which may become a central feature of the emerging global order. This article also offers a brief overview of what is publicly known about the nuclear arsenals of the four countries, ongoing production of weapons-usable fissile materials in Pakistan and India, as well as the race to build longer-range missiles.     

A New Era in Taiwan Politics and its Implications

Taiwan faces an uncertain future after the electoral victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the January 2016 elections. The election results, which reflected growing pro-independence sentiments amongst a younger generation of Taiwanese, have set Taiwan on a collision course with China, which is increasingly impatient for reunification to occur. The new US president, Donald Trump, has also added to the tensions by openly questioning the “One China” policy. Another Taiwan Strait crisis today would be fraught with immense risks due to China's dramatic economic and military rise which has altered the regional power balance. Given the increasingly tense China-US strategic rivalry, the US is also not likely to sit idly by should China attack Taiwan. However, the key player in resolving the Taiwan problem is China. For various reasons, it is in fact in China's interest to be patient with the current situation, and maintain the status quo for the immediate and medium-term future, while it constructs a new strategy that could win over the people of Taiwan, since true reunification can only occur if the people on Taiwan willingly accept it.