Why is there no securitisation theory in the Korean nuclear crisis?

Despite the fact that the Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most protracted security issues in the world, the research analysing the crisis from the perspective of securitisation theory is curiously absent. This article attempts to pin down some distinguishing features of South Korea’s securitisation of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, thereby investigating why one rarely sees the implications of securitisation theory in the way that the Copenhagen School theorists would suggest. Borrowing the key components of securitisation theory—existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures—this article suggests three elusive characteristics of the South Korean actors’ speech acts as sources highlighting the dilemma. To make the article’s arguments clearer, I hold Floyd’s classification of securitisation theory, which separated the securitisation process into two different stages: securitising move and security practice. While acknowledging the importance of the differences between illocution and perlocution in a securitisation process, this article takes this logic one step further by suggesting the limits of the perlocutionary effect in making the securitisation process complete.     

International marriage and the state in South Korea: focusing on governmental policy

With globalization, the number of individuals traveling, working or studying abroad is rising globally, and so is the number of international marriages. However, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of ‘mail-order brides’ through matchmaking since the 1970s in the Western world and since the 1990s in several Asian countries. The so-called ‘mail-order bride’ phenomenon has become an important route for international migration, especially for gendered migration. Since official relations with China began in August 1992, the number of Korean Chinese women who came into Korea for marriage with native Korean men is about 100,000 between 1990 and 2005. The number of Japanese women who married Korean men is approximately 17,000, while the numbers of Filipino women who married Korean men is about 6000. Recently, the nationalities of these foreign wives of Korean men have expanded to include women from Vietnam, Russia, and Uzbekistan. In 2005, among a total of 250,000 foreign spouses in Korea, 160,000 of them were women. The Korean state had contributed to initiate these international marriages by importing Korean Chinese women for their unmarried rural citizens. As international marriages have become a social issue, the state tries to cope with these new issues through changing the laws and policies. Utilizing several government statistics, a nationwide questionnaire survey of nearly 1000 foreign brides with various nationalities, which was conducted in May and June 2005, and some interviewed data of foreign wives and government personnel, this paper analyzes (1) patterns and trends of marriage migration to Korea; (2) the issues and problems of foreign brides, such as their status and citizenship, economic situation, access to social security and ‘fake marriages’ issues; and (3) recent changes in governmental policies towards them. Special focus will be on what factors influenced the recent governmental action and how the ideology that ‘A married daughter is no longer a daughter ()’ is still reflected in recent policies even in today's more progressive society.     

Japanese policy and the North Korean ‘soft landing’

Abstract

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.     

Revitalizing the United States‐Japanese alliance

Abstract

While the notion that subjective economic perceptions as well as objective economic conditions affect electoral outcomes has long been explored in advanced democracies and new democracies, evidence of the link between the economy and elections has been rarely found in East Asian countries. As economic issues have become salient since the 1997 financial crisis, political leaders’ capacity to manage the economy has become one of the most important criteria in electoral choice in East Asia. This paper examines how economic issues influenced the results of the 2007 presidential election in South Korea. By making use of the 2007 Presidential Election Panel Study, this study examines the continuity of and changes in the Korean voters’ electoral behavior. This study describes the political situation in the post-1997 financial crisis period under two liberal governments in Korea and introduces the processes and characteristics of electoral campaigns in the 2007 presidential election. This paper then explores the link between the economy and vote choice, focusing on whether economic issues were salient among the electorate, whether retrospective or prospective economic voting was prevalent among Koreans, and how the voters supported Lee Myung Bak across age groups, regions, and parties in the 2007 presidential election.     

Policy networks in South Korea and Taiwan during the democratic era

This article examines policy networks in South Korea and Taiwan during the democratic era. Policy networks are the core mechanisms of developmentalism in the two countries. However, democratization affects policy coordination differently in the two countries. By focusing on policy networks as their core mechanisms of developmentalism, this article shows that the fate of developmental states in the democratic period is not fixed. The Korean state fails to maintain policy networks, thus becoming less developmental. Its economic policies become inconsistent, short-term-oriented, over-politicized and poorly monitored. Meanwhile, Taiwan further develops policy networks, so becoming more developmental. These two contrasting experiences of network management and policy choice help account for the differential impacts of the financial crisis on South Korea and Taiwan.     

The limits of economic globalization in East Asian developmental states

Abstract

In an attempt to adjust to economic globalization or internationalization, East Asian developmental states have liberalized their domestic economic systems, accelerating the introduction of the free‐market ideology. Despite their plan to establish the internationally compatible open‐market economy, however, the extent to which they can advance economic liberalization is limited. Political and economic burdens that the developmental state's extensive intervention in the market has incurred in the course of state‐led mercantile economic development, make it impossible for those states to execute full‐scale economic liberalization. The South Korean case clearly shows this. The Korean developmental state retains two major economic burdens: the exclusive ownership and the poor financial structure of the chaebôl. Insofar as Korean big business preserves those weak spots, the government cannot surrender the power of regulation despite its spontaneous implementation of the economic liberalization policy. In addition, the common ‘egoistic’ interests which government bureaucrats and the political class share also limit the degree to which economic liberalization policy can be implemented. The degree of state intervention in the market in Korea has been deeper than that in Japan which pioneered Asian developmental statism, and, thus, the political and economic burdens it has incurred for itself are heavier. Consequently, the East Asian developmental state cannot entirely withdraw its intervention in the market. The ‘support’ of industries is likely to diminish, but ‘regulation’ for the formation of the autonomous market will increase. For the Korean developmental state, globalization and economic liberalization are political economic slogans to re‐launch economic growth and to elevate the international economic competitiveness of industries under the initiative of the state, and motivated by nationalistic reasons. Hence, the role of the state in the market is still far from becoming redundant even in the tide of globalization and economic liberalization in the case of South Korea, where the legacy of strong developmental statism remains considerable.     

The South Korean–Japanese security relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute

Abstract

The metaphor of Asia is frequently used nowadays as a concept for regional identity, but it is very problematical because geographic Asia contains such a large piece of humanity in all cultural, political and economic forms. Historically Asia also has negative connotations, and at times other regional concepts have been preferred over it. Pan‐Asianism, Greater East Asia, Asian‐African cooperation, Asian Socialism, Southeast Asia, Western Pacific, Asia Pacific, and East Asia are some of the regionalist permutations of the metaphor of Asia during this century, but thus far no strong institutional structures have emerged to fill the concepts with lasting and effective political power.     

Proceeding in hardship: the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional evolution of China–Japan–South Korea trilateralism

In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions among China, Japan and South Korea has begun to take shape. This study analyzes its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the nexus between trilateralism and bilateralism. A well-functioning trilateral grouping needs to overcome two structural limitations – dilution effects and bilateral constraints – both of which are triggered by embedded bilateral approaches. The critical juncture approach is effective in terms of elevating the payoffs of cooperative trilateralism during times of exigency. However, once common crises have dissipated, trilateralism has revealed starkly different performances with respect to functional and political-diplomatic cooperation. This article adopts a dichotomous approach between the two. Functional trilateralism has been steadily growing, and has proven to be less subject to fluctuations in the nations’ political relationships. Its outcomes are positive and worthy of praise. However, the outcomes of trilateralism have been less convincing in fields of middle and high politics. Trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations when its embedded bilateral relations change, and cooperative outcomes within a trilateral grouping are prone to being diluted by bilateral approaches. China–Japan–Korea trilateralism at diplomatic levels remains more an extension of bilateral relations than a mature form of minilateral arrangement.     

Is South Korea as Leftist as It Gets? Labour Market Policy Reforms under the Moon Presidency

Considering its conservative past, South Korea is undergoing an unprecedented turn to the left. Since priority was given to economic growth from the 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s, a close alliance between big business and government has characterised the country's labour market. Since the 1997 financial crisis, however, two decades of liberal and conservative governments have pushed a neoliberal agenda of labour market flexibilisation, which has resulted in growing inequality in a dualised labour market and left the trade unions in a marginal role. Following a rapid turn of events that led to the impeachment of conservative president Park Geun‐hye, left‐leaning President Moon Jae‐in seems determined to roll back this legacy of labour oppression with the strong support of trade unions and young voters. His administration is pushing for policy change with a series of expansionary active labour market policies aimed at promoting stability and full‐time employment. This article highlights the social‐democratic character of these reforms and the constraints in implementing them.     

The political economy of education and skills in South Korea: democratisation,liberalisation and education reform in comparative perspective

The success story of Korean economic development is intimately linked with the so-called developmental state; and education policy, as part of centrally orchestrated industrial policy, played a critical role in the country's rapid industrialisation, which allowed for high employment rates, relatively modest social inequality and remarkable social mobility. However, the Korean success story has started to show ‘cracks’ – with labour market dualisation, rising inequality and ‘over-education’. While acknowledging the importance of the East Asian financial crisis as external shock for the Korean political economy, we suggest more fundamental problems in the socio-economic and socio-political underpinnings of the developmental state and its education and skills formation system for understanding how Korea's economic and education miracle turned into ‘education inflation’, skills mismatch and social polarisation.